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Introduction  
 
CONSIDERING THE ‘OTHERNESS’ AND ATTRACTION OF 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM  
 
 
What else can we do? You can wear a belt and take two people into death, 
if it doesn’t go wrong. (…) Eventually we are prepared to do anything, in 
a broad sense, anything. (…) Mohammad B. said it right: ‘the 2nd of 
November Allah sent his soldier’.1 - Nidal 
 
It is good, finally they feel it. (…) It is true that they are suppressing more 
Muslims now, but they know now that we offer resistance and that scares 
them. They can’t distinguish the terrorists from non-terrorists. (…) There 
is a hadith that says that if the end of the world is coming near, a war will 
take place between believers and unbelievers. The believers will win. - 
Yelda 
 
It is these kinds of statements and violent actions that have aroused fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands since 9/11. Nidal’s and Yelda’s words 
express a conviction of the ultimate truth and a dualist vision of the world. From 
this conviction they derive a sense of superiority and that violence is legitimate 
against their enemies. Viewpoints like theirs have, moreover, promoted the clash 
of civilization thesis that presents (fundamentalist) Muslims as diametrically 
opposed to Dutch non-Muslims. But how ‘other’ are fundamentalist Muslims in 
the Netherlands? What are their beliefs and practices? How do their beliefs and 
practices develop over time? And what attracts Dutch Muslims to 
fundamentalism? These questions form the principal focus of this book.  
The introduction will, on the one hand, clarify the context in which 
these questions have emerged and, on the other hand, elaborate on the approach 
to find answers to them. First it will consider how Dutch society has come to see 
the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Thereafter it reflects on the limitations of 
explanations that emphasize the ‘otherness’ of Dutch fundamentalist Muslims. 
The introduction continues to discuss the exact focus, the research questions, and 
the added value of this criminological study. Finally, it presents an overview of 
the structure of this book. 
 
 
The Perception of an Islamic Fundamentalist Threat 
Islamic fundamentalism has fostered a sense of threat in the Netherlands. The 
sense of threat stems in part from international events. On a worldwide scale, the 
                                                      
1 Nidal refers here to Mohammed Bouyeri, who killed Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the name 
of Islamic jihad on November 2, 2004. His motivation was to defend Islam against the insults of van 
Gogh. See the next section of this introduction for an elaboration on this matter.  
| Purification and Resistance 
 
14 
most notable events are those of 9/11 – that demonstrated violent jihad going 
global – and the transnational ‘War on Terror’. Within Europe violent plots of 
extremist Islamic groups in various countries, as most notoriously expressed in 
the Madrid and London bombings, have fuelled social fear.  
The perception of threat, however, has not been reserved to groups that 
promote violence.2 Instead, Islam in its entirety has received criticism for posing 
a danger to liberal democratic societies. In the Netherlands the main critics of 
Islam have been the politicians Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Geert Wilders, 
and filmmaker-columnist Theo van Gogh. Fortuyn’s anti-immigration and 
especially anti-Islamic statements found broad resonance in Dutch society after 
9/11. He chose a populist approach and indicted ‘the left-wing church’ for its 
politically correct views regarding multiculturalism. As opposed to their views, he 
was particularly critical of Muslims in the Netherlands because he viewed Islam 
as a ‘backward’ religion that failed to conform to Dutch liberal standards 
(Fortuyn, 2002). As a result of his popularity the 2002 opinion polls predicted 
that his party would become the big winner of the elections. It was only a few 
days before the elections in May 2002, that he was murdered by an 
environmental activist. Still, the Dutch voted massively for his party, thereby 
signalling to the old political establishment that they wanted change. 
Consequently, mainstream political parties also adopted Pim Fortuyn’s ‘new 
political correctness’. This correctness involved criticism of multiculturalism and 
an awareness of the alleged ‘dangers’ of Islam becoming more widespread. From 
2002 onwards, the loudest voices came from members of the Dutch Liberal 
Party: former Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the former Minister of Integration and 
Immigration Rita Verdonk, and Geert Wilders.  
These politicians criticized different aspects of Islam. Hirsi Ali directed 
her criticism mostly towards the position of women in Islam and claimed that 
Islam and democracy are irreconcilable.3 Wilders agreed with this latter clash of 
civilizations argument (Huntington, 1996) and developed a general anti-Islam 
rhetoric with his film ‘Fitna’ in 2008 being one of the intended highlights. 
Verdonk’s criticism was of a more general nature, in line with her post as a 
Minister. She stood for strict immigration and integration policies for ethnic 
minorities. Over time, Wilders became the principle representative of the 
                                                      
2 In fact, in the Netherlands the threat of terrorism has been put into perspective in recent years. In 
line with the absence of actual terrorist attacks, reports from intelligence services and policy 
documents demonstrate a return from the perception of radicalization and extremism as a mostly 
internal to a largely external, yet ‘limited’ threat (NCTb, 2011; Zaitch, van Swaaningen & Geelhoed, 
2007). In addition, policy documents acknowledge the need to distinguish between, on the one hand, 
orthodox and even radical Muslims – who do not have to pose an actual threat – and, on the other 
hand, violent extremists who are presented in these documents as the real danger. The government 
argues that “non-violent forms of extremism and orthodoxy are not necessarily troublesome from a 
safety perspective. To prevent violent extremism among individuals and groups it is required to 
intervene as quickly as possible” (NCTb, 2011: 9-10). Yet, as a consequence of this view and despite 
the nuances, the Dutch government continues its ‘broad’ policy approach and, hence, unavoidably 
continues to target a large group of Dutch Muslims.  
3 She eventually left the Netherlands to become part of the American Enterprise Institute, a think 
tank in the United States. 
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population’s discomfort. He started his own political party which takes a harsh 
stance against Islam, for example by calling for a stop to immigration from 
Muslim countries and by calling the Quran a fascist book.  
Besides these politicians other public figures expressed criticism of 
Islam. One of them was filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh, who called 
Muslims ‘goat fuckers’ among other things. With Ayaan Hirsi Ali he made the 
film ‘Submission’ about the alleged inferior position and abuse of women in 
Islam in which they showed projections of Quranic verses on the bodies of naked 
women. This film attracted the attention of Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-old 
man of Moroccan descent who was raised in the Netherlands. Motivated by 
indignation about the movie, he tracked down van Gogh on the 2nd of November 
2004 and killed him, shooting him five times and slicing his throat. The note he 
left on the body and the subsequent trial proved that he believed to have 
murdered van Gogh in the name of Islam. 
The assassination of van Gogh caused a shock in the Netherlands that 
led to an intensification of the criticism of Islam and a call for a fierce reaction by 
the criminal justice system. In response, policy makers and Intelligence Services 
implemented a ‘broad approach’ aimed at a large group of potential radicals 
through new legislation and policies that increase the possibilities for their 
detection, disruption and prosecution (de Graaff, 2008; Ministry of Security and 
Justice, 2011; Zaitch, van Swaaningen & Geelhoed, 2007). One of the main 
changes in criminal law concerns the newly introduced ‘terrorist objective’ as a 
reason for harsher punishments. The trial of the ‘Hofstad group’ – of the group 
around Mohammed Bouyeri – was the test case for the new law. The suspects in 
this trial were initially convicted of being members of a terrorist organization.4 In 
addition, a change in criminal procedural law allows for exceptional measures 
against alleged terrorists, for instance by keeping them in a special detention 
regime. By simultaneously attributing more powers to criminal justice agencies, 
the human rights of suspects and convicts are jeopardized. Besides these legal 
changes that have already taken effect, a discussion on the prohibition of certain 
religious expressions is taking place. Wilders’ party calls Islam “primarily a 
political ideology and thus it cannot in any way make an appeal to the privileges 
of a religion” (PVV, 2010: 15). As a result, the party promotes a ‘fight against 
Islam’ and requests anti-Islamic policy measures. Among the measures the party 
suggests are the closure of Islamic schools, a prohibition of the Quran and the 
face-covering burqa5, and the introduction of a tax on headscarves, the so-called 
‘head-rags tax’ (PVV, 2010). Several scholars have expressed their concerns about 
this kind of policy development as being irreconcilable with the Dutch 
constitutional state (e.g. de Graaff, 2008; Maussen, 2006: 232). These concerns 
are fuelled because Prime Minister Rutte’s cabinet depends on the support of 
Wilders’ Freedom Party, which became the third biggest party after the  
 
                                                      
4 In appeal the suspects were acquitted of the charge of being members of a terrorist organization, but 
in 2010 the Supreme Court decided that the Court of Appeal has to reconsider the acquittal.  
5 Since September 2011 women who wear a burqa can receive a fine of up to 380 euros. 
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Parliamentary elections of June 2010. As a result, the cabinet is obliged to 
acknowledge Wilders’ arguments.6 
 The massive number of votes for Wilders reflects the broad social 
support that the anti-Islam rhetoric has. The media are also claimed to have 
contributed to this supportive atmosphere. According to, for example, Shahid 
(2005) they have fostered a climate of polarization by focusing on sensational 
issues related to Islam and Islamic radicalism in particular (also see Bouabid, 
2010). Opinion polls have confirmed that Islamophobic sentiments among the 
population have risen. In their turn these feelings have inspired violence against 
Muslim targets. In response to the extremist violence of 9/11 and the murder of 
van Gogh there have been reports of vandalism against Islamic institutions, such 
as setting fire to Islamic schools. Furthermore, Muslims have more frequently 
become victims of physical abuse and discrimination (Bovenkerk, 2006).  
At the time of finishing this study, the call for democracy in the Arab 
world has become louder. This call has already led to the downfall of several 
undemocratic regimes while some other political leaders still face massive 
protests from their population. Depending on whether democracies or religiously 
inspired regimes will be installed in these countries, the clash of civilization 
thesis could be proven wrong or claimed to be right. In the first case, this could 
eventually lead to less polarized views, also in the Netherlands. For now, 
however, the social reality is still, in sum, that the relation between the Muslim 
and non-Muslim populations in the Netherlands is tense and polarized. But 
what underlies this polarization? This raises the question whether, or to what 
extent, Islamic fundamentalism results from cultural otherness.  
 
 
How ‘Other’ are Muslim Fundamentalists?  
When considering the otherness of Muslim fundamentalists one has to 
remember that the phenomena of fundamentalism and radicalism are, firstly, not 
limited to Islam and, secondly, have historically occurred within ‘civilizations’. 
The term fundamentalism, for example, was first applied to scripturalist 
Christian movements in the United States in the 19th century. In addition, 
Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism also have fundamentalist currents (Marty & 
Appleby, 1991-1995). Moreover, past and present societies have known radical 
groups in different shapes and forms, with both religious and ideological 
                                                      
6 In its 2011 Integration Policy the cabinet demonstrates how it is trying to achieve a balance between 
anti-Islamic sentiments and a more nuanced approach by arguing: “The cabinet is aware of the fact 
that Islam, which as the religion of many immigrants has quickly become one of the larger religions 
in the Netherlands, evokes concerns among parts of the population for its different traditions, 
attitudes and the association with violence and radicalization elsewhere in the world, but also in the 
Netherlands. In its view, the acquirements of a democratic constitutional state could end up under 
pressure. The cabinet acknowledges the existence of these concerns and sees it as its task to take them 
away wherever possible because they threaten societal cohesion; but neither through misrecognition 
of Islam’s freedom of religion nor by a principal distrust against this religion. The freedom of 
religion, however, should not offer protection to radicalization or behaviour that is anti-democratic or 
fundamentally opposed to the foundations of Dutch society” (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations, 2011: 5-6). 
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motivations. Examples range from radical Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland to 19th century anarchists in Russia and communist radicals and 
extremists from the late 1960s till the 1980s (e.g. Juergensmeyer, 2003; 
Duyvesteyn & de Graaf, 2007). Of the latter type, the most notorious groups are 
the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany and the Brigatte Rosse in Italy, who 
received support from – among others – ‘De Rode Jeugd’ in the Netherlands 
(Pekelder, 2007). It is important to note that while the members of these groups 
adopted a communist rhetoric, they generally had the same cultural background 
as their fellow nationals. The same applies to contemporary movements like 
those of right-wing extremists and animal rights activists, but even to Islamic 
fundamentalist movements in Muslim countries. Thus the radical or 
fundamentalist ideas of these groups do not seem to result from a clash of 
civilizations. Instead, it appears that the emergence of these groups can better be 
explained by other social processes and conflicts, such as has been done for 
radical groups in the past (Duyvesteyn & de Graaf, 2007; Pekelder, 2007). The 
logical question is thus why one would presuppose that this is different for 
fundamentalist Muslims in Western countries like the Netherlands. 
 One argument in favour of a different approach towards (radical) 
fundamentalist Muslims could be that they have a non-Western cultural 
background. A popular perception of fundamentalist Muslims in the 
Netherlands – and other Western European countries – is that they are 
immigrants, often second-generation, who have failed to integrate sufficiently 
and/or are living in between two cultures that they find hard to reconcile. As a 
result, the argument goes, they fall back on a fundamentalist interpretation of 
their religion. Previous research has put a large emphasis on this type of cultural 
explanation. This is the case for both publications on the basis of governmental 
and governmentally commissioned research (most notably Buijs, Demant & 
Hamdy, 2006; Meah & Mellis, 2009; Slootman & Tillie, 2006) and independent 
research by academics (see Benschop, 2004 and de Koning, 2008). These studies 
have focused on second-generation Moroccan youngsters and their interest in 
‘Salafism’ and principally its ‘radical’ interpretation. Considering this limited 
focus it is not surprising that the researchers present cultural factors – such as 
living a diasporic life and intergenerational conflicts of second-generation 
Muslim immigrants – as principal explanatory factors. Yet, this cultural 
argument falls short in three senses. First, it over-predicts the popularity of 
Islamic fundamentalism among Dutch Muslims. Second, it fails to explain why 
only some of those who adopt Salafi viewpoints choose a radical interpretation 
(e.g. Balogh, Siesling, Jacobs & Moors, 2009; Roex, Van Stiphout & Tillie, 
2010). Can the same cultural factors help to explain these differential responses? 
Third, the cultural argument fails to account for converts who turn to Islamic 
fundamentalism. Such a turn appears to have happened with Jason and Jermaine 
Walters in the Netherlands, but also with – for example – the British Germaine 
Lindsay (e.g. Benjamin, 2007; Mukhopadhyay, 2007; Pargeter, 2008; Spalek, 
2007). There were also a few native converted women involved in the 
background of the Hofstad group, such as Martine van den Oever.  
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In light of the shortcomings of previous explanations, my argument is that – 
instead of taking cultural differences as a starting point – it is necessary to adopt 
a more open attitude. This attitude implies a close review of the personal 
experiences and narratives of Dutch fundamentalist Muslims, including converts, 
in the light of the broader social context. It is through such an approach that one 
can discover what inspires their turn to various forms of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Further, to discover why some individuals opt for non-radical and others for 
radical interpretations of Islamic fundamentalism, it is necessary to look outside 
the box of existing radicalization studies. Unlike previous studies,7 I therefore 
treat Islamic radicalization as a specific form of conversion: ‘radical conversion’. 
Before moving on to the question of how to undertake such a project, 
the next section reflects briefly on the exact focus of and the reasons behind this 
study. 
 
 
Fundamentalism, not Terrorism 
Although one of the issues addressed in this book is indeed how certain Muslims 
come to legitimize religious violence, the foregoing indicates that violence is not 
the central focus of this book. The main question is how Dutch Muslims become 
convinced of the absolute, dualist truth of fundamentalisms. Even though there 
are studies that use the term fundamentalism to describe religious militant 
movements, I follow the example of other studies which consider the term also 
applicable to non-militant movements that take a scripturalist approach to return 
to what they see as the ultimate fundamentals of their religion.8 Why is it that 
certain Dutch Muslims feel that they need this type of ultimate answer? And 
how do some of them, like Nidal and Yelda, come to use this claim on truth to 
legitimize violence? 
These are questions that have fascinated me ever since adolescence. 
With a father from a very strict protestant family and a brother who entered a 
new age world of absolute truth, love and light, I have always been around people 
who claim to hold THE truth, as opposed to mass deception. In the eyes of these 
‘chosen ones’ everybody who does not recognize the universality of truth’s nature 
seems to be ignorant and captured in the seductive nature of the material world 
and their human egos. Because of my fascination with dualist belief systems, it 
was logical for me to become interested in Muslims who were labelled ‘radical 
Muslims’ after the murder of van Gogh. It was only a few months after his 
murder that I got the opportunity to write a research proposal. At that time, the 
discourse in the media and politics was changing from a focus on an external 
Islamic threat to the internal threat of the ‘home-grown’9 radical Muslim. In the 
                                                      
7 Scholars on radicalization have neglected the lessons of conversion studies, with Spalek (2007) as an 
exception. Yet, she too fails to explain the differences in conversion to non-radical and radical 
interpretations of Islamic fundamentalism. 
8 A more detailed description of fundamentalism and the different types of fundamentalism follows 
in Chapter 2. 
9 The term ‘home-grown’ is commonly used to refer to radical Muslims who grew up in the 
Netherlands.  
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following years ‘radical Muslims’ became associated with ‘Salafism’. I wanted to 
know who these people were, what they believed and how their Islamic views 
developed over time. The case of Bouyeri suggested that a young person, who 
seemed to be well-integrated into Dutch society, could suddenly become 
radicalized. He performed reasonably well at school, was involved in volunteer 
work in a youth centre. Some incidents in his personal life, such as his mother’s 
death and the failure of a youth project that he had developed, seemingly pushed 
him towards another view of society. How would this be for other young 
Muslims like him? Furthermore, I was curious about their experiences in Dutch 
society since 9/11 and the murder of van Gogh. I wondered if they experienced 
more criticism of Islam and if so, how they responded to it. The events since 
9/11 thus offer a suitable opportunity to address questions of fundamentalist 
truth, its appeal to people in certain social contexts and how it relates to 
polarization and violent and other behaviour.  
 
 
Research Questions  
In short, the objective of this study is to gain insight in the attraction of Islamic 
fundamentalist views in the Netherlands. This study, therefore, aims at 
deepening knowledge about 1) the differences between various Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, 2) the relation between beliefs and behaviour, 3) the 
religious development of Dutch Muslims over time, 4) the attraction of 
fundamentalist beliefs, and 5) the involvement of converts. These aims find 
expression in two central research questions: 
 
1. How does the development of Dutch Muslims who turn to Islamic 
 fundamentalism take place? 
2. What are the reasons for and motives of these Muslims to get involved in 
Islamic fundamentalism? 
 
Both central research questions focus especially on converts and include 
women.10 The first question is of a descriptive nature. It implies exploring how 
and when respondents construct their Muslim identity. At what moment in their 
lives do they become interested in practising Islam? How does the process of 
identity construction take place? What is the role of other people when they turn 
to Islam? How do they legitimize their fundamentalist truth? And how does it 
affect their attitudes and behaviour in daily life? In brief, the first question aims 
                                                      
10 While research on radical and extremist women exists (e.g. Blee, 1998, 2005; de Cataldo 
Neuburger & Valentini, 1996; McKay, 2005; Moser & Clark, 2001; Ness, 2005), and also in Islam 
(e.g. Cook, 2005; Nivat, 2005), recent studies on Islamic radicalization in the Netherlands focus 
largely on men. Neglecting women is unjustified since the Dutch terrorism convicts formed part of a 
group which included converted and born-again women, of which one – Soumaya S. – has been 
convicted for membership of a terrorist organization, among other things. Similarly, little is known 
about what attracts Dutch female converts to orthodox Islamic views that are often presented as 
limiting women’s rights. The question as to why Dutch women – Muslim or otherwise – opt for 
Islamic fundamentalism and what it brings them thus remains to be answered.  
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at clarifying the process by which individuals come to accept the ‘absolute truth’ 
of Islamic fundamentalism. 
 The answer to the second question contributes to understanding the 
attraction of the fundamentalist truths that the people in this study are convinced 
of. To arrive at this understanding, this study explores issues related to personal 
experiences, life events, and group dynamics from a criminological perspective. 
 
 
The Added Value of a Criminological Study 
To determine the added value of this particular study this section first considers 
its relevance. At present, there is a risk of increasing polarization which could 
prove to be a matter of socially toxic interaction. In social debate Islam is 
regularly equated with radicalism or even terrorism. Through this kind of 
equation Dutch Muslims are ‘othered’ and considered a threat to Western 
constitutional states. This generalization is problematic for two reasons. First, 
whether the fear of Islam is justified or not, the Thomas theorem proves itself 
right: if people define something as real, it is real in its consequences. In this case 
that means that polarization contributes to Muslims being viewed and treated as 
the other. According to survey results of the CBS 95% of the 850.000 Dutch 
Muslims are from non-Western origin. The majority is of Moroccan and 
Turkish descent. This makes them relatively easy to distinguish from the native 
Dutch population in both an ethnic and a religious sense (van Herten, 2007). It 
is therefore likely that in their everyday lives Muslims experience Islamophobic 
reactions, which can increase polarization (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). 
The second problematic aspect concerns the possible impact of polarization. 
Islam is the second largest religion in Europe. With an estimated 5.8% of the 
population the percentage of Muslims in the Netherlands is among the highest 
in Europe (Forum, 2008: 11). Consequently, generalizations and simplifications 
(on either side) could enlarge social problems instead of solving them. 
Unfounded generalizations and simplifications could be prevented with the 
answers to the research questions. 
 It might not seem evident why these in themselves relevant research 
questions should be the subject of a criminological study. What is the relevance 
and added value of a criminological perspective in the study of fundamentalist 
Muslims? Criminologists have studied a broad scope of subjects related to crime 
and social problems, varying from deviants to victims and social reactions, such 
as safety policies, media discourse, and social exclusion. The development and 
attraction of Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands fits this picture in 
several ways. To begin with, social discourse generally presents Islamic 
fundamentalism as a social problem. Islamic fundamentalist views have been 
linked to ‘radicalization’ which could lead to intolerance and violence. According 
to this discourse, Muslims who turn to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam 
potentially form a criminal or other threat to Dutch society. In addition, and as a 
result, these Muslims have become the object of safety policies through which 
they experience labelling and social exclusion. Radicalization and the impact of 
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social exclusion are thus both criminologically relevant issues (e.g. Hamm, 2004, 
2005b; Ruggiero, 2006, 2010). A criminological study of these phenomena 
should not be limited to radical Muslims, however, because one is likely to 
understand radicalization more fully when one compares radicals to non-radicals. 
 In terms of the added value of a criminological approach, one of the 
strengths of criminology is its interdisciplinary nature. This interdisciplinary 
approach recognizes that social problems are too complex to understand within 
the borders of a single discipline (e.g Ruggiero, 2010). Therefore, criminologists 
study their subjects from a broad range of disciplines. The disciplines that this 
study draws lessons from are sociology, social psychology, globalization studies, 
religion studies, political sciences, and anthropology. Some of these lessons relate 
to the methodological approach while others concern the theoretical framework. 
For the methodology, it is sociology, psychology and anthropology that form the 
main sources of inspiration. This inspiration has contributed to a mixture of 
qualitative research methods: in-depth interviews with participant observation 
and analysis of discussions on internet forums. These methods help to reveal the 
insider perspective of fundamentalist Muslims and consequently allow for a 
unique insight to be gained into the complexities of their world.  
The theoretical framework is equally interdisciplinary. It emerged over 
the course of this project through evaluating the data in the light of literature 
from the various research disciplines. As a result of this evaluation the main 
theoretical point rests in cultural criminology, sociology and social psychology. 
Key concepts in explaining the attraction of fundamentalist views are identity, 
belonging, strain, liquidity, othering and glocal subculture. From criminological 
theories I will make most use of subcultural theories and cultural criminology. 
From sociological theories I focus especially on ideas about the identity project 
and social interactions in a liquid, consumer society (Bauman, 2004; Giddens, 
1991). Thereby this study considers to what extent the respondents’ religious 
development and identities reflect ‘glocalization’ processes in which global 
phenomena – such as Islamic fundamentalism – merge with the local into glocal 
shapes (Robertson, 1995).  
The main themes indicate that the theoretical framework includes 
explanatory factors that range from social structure on a macro-level to 
psychological processes on a micro-level. By recognizing the relevance of 
individual psychology, this study responds to the call to re-introduce a critical, 
social psychology into criminology (Chancer & McLaughlin, 2003; Gadd & 
Jefferson, 2007; Jefferson, 2004). Gadd and Jefferson argue for a ‘psychosocial 
criminology’ that addresses: 
 
(…) the need to understand human subjects as, simultaneously, the 
products of their own unique psychic worlds and a shared social world. 
(…) The important point is to hang on to both the psychic and the social, 
but without collapsing the one into the other. Conceptualizing this 
psychosocial subject non-reductively implies that the complexities of both 
the inner and the outer world are taken seriously (Gadd & Jefferson, 2007: 
4). 
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Then how does such a psychosocial criminological approach help to fill in the 
blanks in current explanations of Islamic fundamentalism in Western countries 
such as the Netherlands? A psychosocial orientation requires researchers to probe 
deeply into the individual’s biography and conscious or unconscious narratives. 
While previous research in the Netherlands has paid insufficient attention to 
individual conversion or radicalization processes, this study demonstrates that 
these processes – in relation to the current social context – shed light on the 
motives and reasons to turn to Islamic fundamentalist views. As will become 
clear, such a close look offers indications for the differential attraction of non-
radical and radical fundamentalist beliefs. The resulting understanding 
contributes to insight into what motivates people to adopt a radical 
interpretation of Islam. This insight allows governments to evaluate existing 
discourses and policies and points to new directions to address these motives. As 
such it can lead to a decrease in violent expressions, such as the murder of van 
Gogh, and their support. In short, the understanding that this particular 
criminological approach brings forth would ideally be able to help diminish 
tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 
 
Structure of the Book 
Several building blocks bring answers to the research questions. The first step 
concerns the methodological foundation of this study. For that purpose, Chapter 
1 includes a description of the three qualitative research methods – semi-open 
interviews, observations, and analysis of internet discussions – and a reflection on 
the use of these methods.  
Chapter 2 elaborates on Islamic fundamentalist views in the 
Netherlands. It does so by presenting previous research findings and comparing 
these to the practice of the respondents. It sketches a broad picture of the 
respondents’ beliefs concerning those matters that public debate is most 
concerned about. It reveals the different approaches that the respondents have 
regarding the ‘truth’ of Islam and their attitudes and behaviour as citizens of a 
Western, democratic society such as the Netherlands. The chapter finally 
distinguishes between moderate, orthodox, radical and extremist views, a 
distinction that is used throughout the remainder of this book.   
  The following three chapters deal with the reasons and motives for the 
respondents to turn to the various fundamentalist views. To begin with, Chapter 
3 will show how the religious development of the respondents has taken place. 
The principal question that this chapter addresses is how the respondents 
developed a cognitive opening for fundamentalist views (Wiktorowicz, 2005). 
The chapter therefore considers experiences of identity crisis and strain as well as 
the role of significant others. Chapters 4 and 5 address the appeal of 
fundamentalist discourses of self-identification and resistance. These chapters 
thus deal with the question about what fundamentalist discourses have to offer to 
the respondents with their specific cognitive opening. 
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The reflection on attitudes is followed by a comparison between the respondents’ 
attitudes and their actual fundamentalist practice in Chapter 6. This chapter 
reflects on how the fundamentalist respondents internalize and express their 
Muslim identity. As such, this chapter provides further insights into the 
attraction of different fundamentalist viewpoints. 
Chapter 7 evaluates the lessons of the previous chapters and places the findings 
in the broader social context. In addition, this chapter finally presents the 
theoretical framework of this study. While it might seem odd to discuss theories 
at the end, the reason for doing it is that it is only once all the pieces of the 
puzzle have been laid out that they can be put together. So reflecting on what 
Islamic fundamentalism and the turn to it means to the respondents helps to 
bricolage a suitable theoretical framework.   
Finally, the conclusions present the overarching message of this study. 
As such the conclusions put together the answers of previous chapters 
concerning how and why the Dutch individuals in this study, from Muslim or 
non-Muslim families, men and women, have turned to orthodox, radical or 
extremist Islam. On the basis of these answers the conclusions shed light on the 
question of how ‘other’ the participation in these Islamic movements in the 
Netherlands is, which leads to policy implications and suggestions for further 
research.  
In the chapters which present the data I have included a number of text 
boxes. These boxes serve to give an impression of the data and stories of the 
respondents. In most cases they tell the stories of the interview respondents, 
whereas in a couple of other chapters they involve a fragment of an observation 
report or of an internet discussion. Obviously, these figures only contain a 
selection of the available data even though I have attempted to include all 
relevant information for the topic of the chapter at hand based on interview 
reports. As a result, some boxes are rather lengthy, while others are relatively 
short. In either case, the boxes could be read independently, but the main text 
clarifies the relation of the fragments to the chapter’s topic. 
  
 
  
 
1    
 
REMOVING THE VEIL 
 
 
“It is about time that the girl in black gets looked at differently!” says Layla, a 
student of a so-called Salafi teacher, when asked to participate in an interview. In 
her view she is well-integrated and she disagrees with the image that Salafi 
interpretations of Islam are radical. Layla’s views point to the methodological 
issues that this chapter deals with. On the one hand, her willingness to cooperate 
is indicative of some of the problems concerning validity. By trying to shed a 
favourable light on Salafism, for example, she could hold back information and 
give socially desirable responses. On the other hand, her disagreement with 
negative opinions about Salafism confirms the need to understand the insider 
perspective. Understanding is obviously not the same as ‘agreeing’ or ‘justifying’. 
It simply means gaining insight into the beliefs and experiences from the 
perspective of fundamentalist Muslims. Existing studies which search for reasons 
and motives of Western Muslims to turn to fundamentalist views generally fail to 
explore the insider perspective. Most common are studies based on secondary 
data or interviews with specialists (e.g. Bakker, 2006; de Poot & Sonnenschein, 
2009; Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009; Precht, 2007; Sageman, 2004, 
2008; van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009; Vidino, 2007), questionnaires (e.g. 
Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008; Mirza, Senthilkumaran & Jaf’ar, 2007; Slootman 
& Tillie, 2006; van den Bos, Loseman & Doosje, 200911), and internet research 
(e.g. Benschop, 2004; Bunt, 2003; de Koning, 2008; Rogan, 2005; Roy, 2004). 
There are some researchers who did conduct qualitative interviews with orthodox 
and/or radical Muslims (e.g. Balogh, et al., 2009; Buijs, et al., 2006; Hamid, 
2007b; Marranci, 2007; Pargeter, 2008; Stern, 2003), but the use of 
ethnographic methods, such as observations, is rare. In the Netherlands the study 
by de Koning (2008) is the main exception even though his study is about the 
meaning of various forms of Islam to youngsters of only Moroccan decent.12 
Nonetheless, it is particularly qualitative methods and ethnographic research 
which can shed light on the reasons and motives behind conversion and 
radicalization (see Horgan, 2004). 
 This chapter presents the three research methods that have been 
employed to explore the perspective of Islamic fundamentalists: semi-open 
interviews, observations, and analyses of online discussions. After an 
introduction to the qualitative approach this chapter continues with the 
researcher’s role in the field and the validity and reliability of this study. 
                                                      
11 The researchers of the latter two studies also conducted some interviews. 
12 The study by Roex, van Stiphout & Tillie (2010) and to a lesser extent that by Moors & Jacobs 
(2009) also employ ethnographic methods, but do not or hardly use the data to explain the turn to 
Salafism. More importantly, the focus on solely orthodox Muslims results in the common failure to 
address the differences between the groups. 
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1.1 Islamic Fundamentalism in the West: The Dutch Case and a British 
Impression 
Knowledge about ‘home-grown’ fundamentalist Muslims in Western countries is 
still limited. So what is their story? How did they turn to Islamic fundamentalist 
views and why did these interpretations attract them?  
To answer these questions this study focuses on the Dutch ‘case’. It is 
not a case study in the full sense of the word. Case studies are limited in scope, 
whereas this project includes a diverse group of Muslims and various locations 
(Leys, Zaitch & Decorte 2010: 176-177). Yet, it does share the objective to dig 
deeply into the social context and the diverse factors that contribute to Dutch 
Muslims embracing fundamentalist viewpoints. The aim is thus to come to 
understand this process, also from the insider perspective. Despite crossing the 
British border, this study does not involve a full international comparison, but it 
does include a modest glimpse into the British situation. This British outing is 
for two reasons. Firstly, the British situation is interesting for putting the Dutch 
data into perspective. Britain has a slightly longer history with Muslims and 
relatively large Salafi communities in cities such as London and Birmingham. 
Furthermore, Great Britain has experienced several terrorist attacks, but has 
responded to these issues in an allegedly more liberal way than the Netherlands. 
Secondly, some Dutch respondents have therefore argued that life for Muslims 
in Britain is better than in the Netherlands. One of the respondents even 
migrated to Great Britain. These two reasons made it a worthwhile endeavour to 
take a peak over the British fence.  
 
 
1.2 Getting Started: Three Research Methods 
Exploring the meaning of Islamic fundamentalism to Dutch Muslims requires a 
combination of methods. To arrive at an insider perspective qualitative research 
methods are most suitable, because they allow for in-depth insight into personal 
biographies, conversion stories, the meaning of fundamentalist viewpoints in 
everyday life, social interactions and identity construction. Yet, not every 
qualitative method lend themselves equally well to these diverse issues. Personal 
biographies, for example, are easier to reveal in the face-to-face communication 
of interviews, whereas observations are more suitable for exploring social 
interactions. Combining interviews, observation and the analysis of online 
discussions made it possible to gather sufficient data to answer the central 
research questions. The following sections briefly review the scope, selection 
procedure and general research set-up for each research method. The practical 
employment and problems associated with these methods are the topics of later 
sections. 
 
1.2.1 Conducting Interviews  
In total, the data includes the transcripts of 42 formal in-depth interviews and 
reports of a similar number of additional conversations with a total number of 40 
Muslim respondents. The interviews took place between May 2006 and January 
2010. Keeping in regular touch with six respondents allowed me to follow their 
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development and, in some cases, their change of mind. Because of these changes, 
the interviews with two respondents have been repeated in their entirety.  
 
‘Recruiting’ Respondents 
The first steps into the research field aimed at ‘recruiting’ respondents for the 
interviews. In order to encounter potential respondents I went to a variety of 
places and events. First, I attended the court procedures of the two principal 
Dutch terrorist cases. Other occasions were events held by diverse Islamic and 
other organizations, such as lectures held by Islamic student associations, debates 
in youth centres, Ramadan Festival events, and events organized by the 
multicultural organization ‘Forum’.  
 The selection of respondents is based on a theoretical, purposive 
sampling technique (Mortelmans, 2010). The objective was to assemble a diverse 
sample in terms of background and ideas, but to principally include 
fundamentalists with a Salafi orientation. The respondents also include so-called 
‘moderate’ Muslims.13 By including them it became possible to compare 
divergent views and experiences. Such a comparison can clarify the meaning and 
attraction of Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, the aim was to prevent a bias 
regarding gender, ethnicity, age, educational level, and the willingness to 
participate (which is possibly related to the type of story that they had to tell). In 
terms of personal characteristics the respondents are therefore converts and those 
raised as Muslims, both men and women. They have diverse ethnic roots and are 
of different ages. Regarding their religious environment the respondents had to 
come from diverse social networks, and a variety of cities and places. While 
trying to realize such variety I selected four respondents at the court, four at 
public events, three through introductions by colleagues, four through 
participation in another research project, five in the mosques, and three at 
various activities held by Islamic organizations. Another respondent was selected 
by following the lead in a newspaper article. The final 12 respondents resulted 
from snowballing through various other respondents. Although the snowballing 
led to some people who knew each other, there are only few who saw each other 
on a very regular basis. The snowballing within social networks even led to 
respondents with differing religious opinions, such as a moderate and two 
orthodox siblings within one family. Since the snowball method helps to recruit 
respondents through existing trust relations, this method probably contributed to 
acquiring respondents who might otherwise have been inaccessible or would have 
refused to participate. Among the respondents that I recruited through other 
means than snowballing there were also some who were immediately willing to 
participate, while others only agreed after a period of time. Furthermore, to 
prevent a biased sample I made sure to include not only people with ‘interesting’ 
stories.  
 
 
                                                      
13 An explanation of what this study views as a ‘moderate’ Muslim is discussed in Chapter 2.  
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In addition to these 36 respondents, four experts participated in this study. They 
are experts in the sense that they witnessed the turn to Islamic fundamentalism 
of young Muslims from close-by. One of them was introduced to me by a 
journalist, the other three I met at public events.  
 
Personal Background of the Respondents 
As a result of the selection method, the ages range from 19 to over 60 years old, 
although most respondents are between 19 and 30 years old. Regarding the 
ethnicity there are Moroccan respondents, as well as a Turkish, Pakistani, 
Somalian, Bengali and two Eritrean respondents who were raised as Muslims. 
Furthermore, there are youngsters from mixed ethnic backgrounds who 
converted to Islam, native Dutch, a Spanish and a British convert. Of the 40 
respondents, 25 have a Salafi orientation. Among them are 15 respondents who 
regularly attended services or lectures in the Salafi mosques mentioned by the 
Dutch Intelligence Service. Another six respondents of these 25 are close to 
those convicted for terrorism in the Netherlands. Of the 15 remaining 
respondents, one respondent is a member of the politically radical Hizb-ut-
Tahrir. The other 14 respondents are non-fundamentalist Muslims. The 
respondents’ level of education varies from secondary school to intermediate 
vocational level and university. Appendix I provides a more detailed overview of 
19 female and 17 male respondents.14 The four experts are not included in this 
table. They are all Muslim men with moderate views. Three of them have a 
background in social and youth work and one is a theologian. 
 Obviously, a diverse group requires more data to reach saturation 
(Mortelmans, 2010: 100-104). The data of the observations and internet 
analysis, however, compensates for the relatively limited number of interviews. 
Moreover, in accordance with the requirement for saturation, the final interviews 
did not lead to new information but confirmed earlier findings.  
   
Semi-Open Interviews and Topics 
The emphasis on the meaning of Islam in the respondents’ lives resulted in 
opting for semi-open interviews. A topic list served as an instrument to enable 
the respondents to talk freely, yet to cover all relevant issues (Beyens & Tournel, 
2010: 203-205; Noaks & Wincup, 2004: 79-80). During the course of this study 
the interviews became more open. The structure of the interviews thus depended 
to a large extent on what respondents brought to bear first. The respondents’ 
prioritization of subjects revealed the issues which the respondents consider 
important, which helped to demonstrate what Islam means to them. 
The topics concern the respondents’ religious development, their 
religious experience, the implications of their beliefs for life in Western societies, 
and their perception of social reactions to Islam since 9/11. These are quite a few 
topics and as a consequence, the interviews were extensive. The interview plus 
                                                      
14 Eventually, there were more moderate men than women in the sample. This results from the fact 
that some male visitors of Salafi mosques or respondents who appeared to have affinity with Islamic 
fundamentalism turned out to have moderate viewpoints. 
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the first additional conversation lasted 3.5 hours on average. As a result of this, 
more than half of the interviews and conversations took place on two or 
sometimes more occasions. Follow-up conversations over the years led to several 
further meetings mainly with six respondents.  
 
1.2.2 Getting in Place for Observation 
The observations took place over a period of 11 months in the Netherlands and 
3.5 months in Great Britain in a number of so-called ‘Salafi’ mosques and in 
mosques where youth preachers of Salafi mosques gave lectures. Occasional 
social activities outside the mosque enabled me to conduct additional 
observations.  
 
Finding a Suitable Setting 
In 2007, the Dutch Intelligence Service described four mosques as being Salafist 
and a threat to Dutch Society (AIVD, 2007). Because of the link the Intelligence 
Service assumed between Salafism and radicalism, I decided to ask two of these 
mosques permission to do fieldwork.15 Eventually, however, the fieldwork took 
place in a variety of mosques, because the ‘students of Islam’ attended lectures 
and conferences at different institutions. These were one mosque in Eindhoven, 
four in The Hague, three in Amsterdam and an Islamic school in Den Bosch. 
Through visitors of the mosque I also became acquainted with a local foundation 
for Muslim women where I joined the women several times. During the research 
period in London the Brixton mosque was the principal observation setting, and 
occasionally South Bank University where I attended, for example, an Islamic 
lecture. The Brixton mosque is also a ‘Salafi’ mosque and has a controversial 
reputation because one of the suspects in the British terrorism cases frequented 
this mosque. The mosque has since been under close government scrutiny. The 
board of this mosque also granted permission for my presence as a researcher.  
Although most events were for both women and men, the fact that I am 
a woman limited my access to the field. Men and women had separate spaces 
and so I was only able to learn about the attitudes and behaviour of women. 
Altogether the observations helped me to make contact with more than 100 
women in the Netherlands and 35 in London. The women had different 
backgrounds, again ranging from women raised as Muslims, converts with a 
mixed ethnic background and converts from the native population. I undertook 
various social activities with them. Besides taking classes together, I accompanied 
some women to mosque stores and bazaars. At other times we ate together in or 
around the mosque, or we went shopping for food.  
Some further observations followed from contacts with respondents 
from the interviews and from Arabic classes that I took in a local community 
centre. Several respondents invited me to social events, visits to other mosques, 
or we scheduled a private meeting. This allowed me to take part in an Islamic 
                                                      
15 The initial objective was to conduct observations amongst young Muslims in Amsterdam. In 2006, 
I volunteered at a foundation that in particular helped second-generation youngsters from the age of 
12 to 16 years with their homework. The context of a homework class where there was little room for 
interaction, proved to be unfruitful. 
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wedding party, some dinners at home, and a dance class. On another occasion a 
respondent took me for a walk in the street in a long khimar and niqab, a 
combination that is commonly referred to as a burqa, to experience the social 
reactions to this garment. 
 
Intensity and Length of Stay 
The observations in the Dutch mosques took place from September 2007 until 
July 2008. During this period I attended lectures and conferences organized by 
these mosques or given by their lecturers in other mosques. Some lectures lasted 
less than an hour, while the conferences lasted up to three days (of which I 
attended two days). In addition to these infrequent events I attended a weekly 
class at the As-Soennah mosque in The Hague from January 2008 to July 2008, 
which was sometimes followed by classes in two other local mosques. From April 
2008 to July 2008 I attended weekly lectures in the El Tawheed mosque. 
Observations in the Brixton mosque took place from March 2009 to mid-June 
2009 starting with (or right after) the Friday sermon until around 6.00 or 7.00 
pm. In between the sermon and the class there were a couple of hours to talk 
with the women.  
The principal aim was to observe and participate in the women’s 
routines and thereby gain insight into group dynamics, attitudes and behaviour. 
The topic list for the interviews functioned as a guideline for the conversations. I 
had substantial conversations with over 135 women, as mentioned earlier. I had 
extensive conversations with approximately 75 of them, also individually. The 
conversations with the remaining respondents were limited to fewer topics in a 
group setting. The conversations did not only vary in terms of time and privacy, 
but also in terms of frequency. I met some women only once or twice, whereas I 
met other women on multiple occasions, for example every week in class, as a 
result of which it was possible to build up a bond with them.  
  
1.2.3 Exploring Online Interactions 
For the analysis of internet discussions I selected relevant topics on two sub-
forums from the Morocco Virtual Community. The selection includes 14 
discussions in the summer of 2007 and another 24 discussions in the first months 
of 2008. To put the analysis in a broader context I read several dozen additional 
topics, emails through mailing lists and had MSN conversations with 
respondents derived from the fieldwork.  
 
Choosing a Suitable Forum 
The Internet provides many options to do research on Islamic fundamentalism 
(e.g. Bunt, 2003; Højsgaard, 2005).  Unlike in the case of interviews and 
observations, the problem lies not in gaining access, but in making a selection. 
The first task in the selection concerned an inventory of suitable online sources. 
This initial search led to online discussion forums, because these forums are 
popular among Muslim youngsters as a means to express their opinions. Internet 
discussions therefore provide vital information about online group processes, 
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differences in opinion, the creation of virtual identities and, in particular, radical 
opinions.  
The most actively used Dutch discussion site among Muslims is 
Morocco Virtual Community (MVC). This community has existed since 2004 
and was initially intended for Moroccans in the Netherlands and Belgium. MVC 
has grown from over 140.000 members in 2007 to over 212.000 in 2011, both 
from the Netherlands and Belgium (approximately 70% and 30% respectively) 
(“Marokko Media,” n.d.). MVC provides a variety of forums, ranging from news 
and business, to love and dating, sports and health, and Islam.  
In the main this discussion forum is a place where mostly non-
fundamentalist Muslims come together. Yet in January 2007 and 2008 the 
website became a topic of political discussion, because of the expression of radical 
views on the forum. As this site is both the most popular and has become known 
for attracting alleged radical Muslims, MVC was the logical option for 
conducting my research. 
 
Selection of Relevant Topics on Morocco Virtual Community 
The next step in the selection was to choose useful sub-forums within MVC. 
Because of the political-religious orientation of Islamic radicalism/extremism and 
the scripturalist attitude of orthodox Muslims the most relevant forums are those 
where participants talk about political and religious issues.16 This happens in 
respectively ‘Moroccan youngsters and news’ and ‘Islam and me’. As each of 
these forums consisted of approximately 35,000 discussions, I had to make a 
selection. The selection criteria concern the period when the discussions took 
place, their content and their length. 
 Regarding the period, I opted for two moments: the summer of 2007 
and the first months of 2008. The choice for the first period was due to the 
absence of any particularly dramatic events. On the contrary, the second period 
coincided with social upheaval concerning the movie ‘Fitna’ by Geert Wilders. 
The selection could therefore help to determine the response to criticism of 
Islam. 
The content of the discussions was also a criterion for selection. A 
detailed inventory of subjects and their popularity resulted in a varied sample. 
The two samples not only cover various popular topics, but also topics which 
lend themselves to fundamentalist expression. To give an example, one of the 
most popular topics is Islamic rules. Within this topic, a discussion concerning 
the rules for interaction with non-Muslims, however, is more suitable than a 
discussion about rules for the preparation of food. Another selection criterion 
was the topicality of the discussion, such as was the case for discussions about the 
film ‘Fitna’. I subsequently evaluated the quality of the discussion. In some cases 
the start of a discussion may appear relevant, but then the participants tended to 
go ‘off the topic’. These off the topic contributions sometimes provide relevant 
and interesting information, but if this was not the case, such a discussion was 
not considered.  
                                                      
16 A description of these groups and their orientation follows in the next chapter. 
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The final selection criterion was the length. In terms of reactions, most 
discussions are of an average length, namely between 30 and 100 reactions. 
Shorter discussions offer too little information and are apparently unpopular, 
whereas the longest discussions are too lengthy and tend to turn towards other 
topics.  
 
 
1.3 Ethical Issues when Entering the Field 
Obviously, selecting respondents and fieldwork settings are not the only 
decisions a researcher has to take before entering the field. In research methods 
that rely on human interactions, researchers have to take several ethical issues 
into consideration. Major ethical considerations pertain to the researcher’s role 
and information about it, the nature of the study, and issues of anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
 
1.3.1 Being an ‘Unveiled’ Non-Muslim Researcher 
For ethical reasons I took on the role of an overt, obtrusive researcher (Noaks & 
Wincup, 2004; Zaitch, Mortelmans & Decorte, 2010). Whenever entering a 
new research setting or having a meaningful conversation with respondents I 
informed them about my identity as a researcher and the nature of the study. I 
introduced myself as a researcher from Erasmus University Rotterdam who 
wanted to gain insight into the Muslim side of the story regarding ‘radical Islam’.  
 Since I did not wear a headscarf I was recognizable as a potential 
outsider in mosques where traditional garments were commonplace. As a result, 
women in the mosques often asked me if I was interested in Islam, which offered 
me an opportunity to introduce myself as a researcher. Only in the Brixton 
mosque this was different, because the Imam asked me to wear a headscarf. 
During the gatherings in this mosque I therefore had to take more initiative in 
introducing myself as a researcher. Obviously, I also revealed my researcher 
identity towards the representatives of the mosques when I asked them for 
permission to attend classes and conferences.  
 
1.3.2 Anonimity and Confidentiality 
Another essential ethical matter is to guarantee the anonymity and the 
confidentiality of the information shared by respondents (Creswell, 2007; 
Fontana & Frey, 2000; Noaks & Wincup, 2004; O’Gorman & vander Laenen, 
2010). When asking potential respondents to participate in interviews I told 
them they would remain anonymous and that the data would only serve 
academic purposes. During the observations these topics usually came up when I 
explained that, unlike journalists, academics keep their sources anonymous.  
 Although internet discussions are freely accessible online, this does not 
mean that data from these sources does not demand the same anonymous use 
(Gruber, 2008). However, since the participants in online discussions have 
virtual names and rarely disclose personal information, their anonymity is 
sufficiently guaranteed. 
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1.3.3 Assuming Informed Consent  
When informed respondents interacted with other Muslims during the 
observations, I did not always introduce myself as a researcher. An introduction 
at such moments would have interfered with the course of interactions and 
render observing these interactions impossible. On those occasions, I assumed 
that the respondents would inform the other persons about my identity if they 
considered this important. Sometimes they did. At other times, I introduced 
myself as a researcher as soon as the opportunity arose. 
 
1.3.4 Acceptance of Closed Inner Doors 
In some circumstances my formal request for permission to enter the field ended 
in refusal. When this occurred there was no informed consent and I had to leave. 
There were three principal moments when the Muslims involved denied me 
access to their activities. In all cases the refusal was based on recent negative 
experiences with researchers and the media. As mentioned before, however, 
these experiences were an exception as I mostly encountered cooperation. 
Consequently, all types of activities and groups were sufficiently accessible.  
 
 
1.4 In the Field: Countering Obstacles and Limitations to Validity 
Like all lessons, the lesson of this study came with some obstacles. Implicitly in 
the qualitative methods of this study are issues of trust, socially desirable 
information and the unrealistic presentation of self, secretiveness, and 
unwillingness to participate. Each of these matters can affect the validity of the 
data. So how did I deal with these issues? 
 
1.4.1 Problems in Gaining Trust 
As mentioned before, I told the respondents that I was interested in persons who 
were seen as ‘radical Muslims’. Introducing oneself in this way may be regarded 
as a case of academic suicide, because radicalism is a sensitive topic. As a 
researcher of this topic one has to associate with people who sometimes feel they 
are scapegoats and might become more distrustful in response to such an 
introduction (Abell & Myers, 2008: 157; Babbie, 2001: 291). Yet, stressing that 
the research focus was on the story of the people that Dutch society has come to 
perceive as ‘radical Muslims’ turned out to be a good solution. First of all, 
because the interviews started with people around the Hofstad group who were 
very aware of having acquired this label. Furthermore, by the time of the 
observations in the Salafi mosques, the Dutch Intelligence Service had just 
described these mosques as ‘dangerous’ and ‘radical’. Hence, in these mosques it 
sufficed to refer to what had been stated about them in politics and the media. In 
Great Britain, the Salafi community was also under some scrutiny, which helped 
to facilitate my introduction. 
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This introduction produced two – somewhat contradictory – immediate 
reactions. On the one hand, it resulted in some expressions of distrust. The 
distrust stemmed in part from unpleasant experiences in the past. These 
respondents felt that they had been misinterpreted and misrepresented by 
undercover journalists who had attended lectures or sermons in mosques. Being 
overtly and visibly present as a researcher, however, helped me to distinguish 
myself from negatively regarded journalists and allowed me a chance to ‘get in’ 
and also talk about other topics. Consequently, most people were open to 
informal conversations and they reacted positively when asked to participate in 
an interview.  
On the other hand, the introduction inspired most respondents to 
immediately express their opinion on the social reaction to Islam in recent years. 
The introduction even served as an invitation to talk about sensitive issues like 
jihad. Most respondents brought up these issues themselves to show that they 
had distanced themselves from terrorist activities. Yet, eventually the respondents 
who were supportive of violent jihad in the Netherlands also talked to me openly. 
The reason for their openness seemed to be that they wanted their message to be 
heard.  
In the British context there appeared to be more initial openness and 
more trust towards researchers. The Muslims I met in London talked about their 
religion with more pride and they were less defensive than the Dutch 
respondents. As an apparent result, they hardly needed time to open up. Overall, 
the fact that the Muslims I encountered were enthusiastic about their convictions 
and religion (or ideology) has probably contributed to a diverse sample of people. 
In other words, most respondents trusted me enough to participate. 
 
Being a Non-Muslim Woman in a Strict Islamic Environment 
Religious orientation and gender are issues that require extra attention in terms 
of gaining access and trust. Initially, one of the main concerns was that I would 
not acquire access because I was a non-Muslim. Over time this concern proved 
to be unsubstantiated. One of the reasons for the willingness to participate could 
be the fact that the Muslims I was interested in believed it to be a duty for every 
Muslim to do da’wa. That is, to invite other people to Islam. Some respondents 
hoped they would either convince me or the readers of this study of the truth of 
Islam. It also helped that this study focused on their favourite topics which they 
enjoyed talking about.  
 There also appear to have been advantages to me being a non-Muslim. 
Initially, the respondents did not have any expectations of me, as they considered 
me ignorant of ‘the truth’. Although I said that I was not interested in becoming 
a Muslim, they made every effort to inform me about their interpretation of 
Islam. They believed that they had to be patient, because it could take years for 
people to convert. They might have shown less patience and more expectations 
towards a Muslim researcher.   
  Another concern about access was in relation to me being a woman. 
The belief of fundamentalist Muslims that men and women should have limited 
contact could result in a lack of access to male environments. This disadvantage 
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was partly true; just as a male researcher would not have had access to the female 
part of the mosque, as a woman I could not enter the male part. In interviews, 
however, gender was hardly an obstacle. None of the men refused to talk to me 
on the basis of me being a woman, although two male respondents did want to 
have the interview together as they did not want to be alone with a woman.  
 Being a non-Muslim woman required a certain level of adaptation to 
the social environment (Zaitch et al., 2010). In the fieldwork period I opted for 
relatively wide outfits and hardly any make-up. Moreover, out of respect for the 
norms of conduct between women and men I avoided making as much eye-
contact as I would normally do and refrained from shaking hands when greeting 
men.  
 
Dealing with Distrust  
Of course, there was some distrust. Distrust expressed itself in various ways as 
there were diverse ways to deal with distrust. Regarding the observations there 
was more distrust when the women did not know me well. Particularly in 
contexts where women only saw me occasionally or just once, for example at 
conferences, I heard rumours about me working for the Intelligence Service. 
There were undoubtedly women who were therefore reluctant to talk to me. 
Although I tried to meet new women every time, not everyone was immediately 
open to having more than a superficial conversation.  
 For the interviews the issue of trust was even more essential, because it 
made the distinction between having a respondent or – in the absence of 
observation as an alternative – nothing at all. Of the selected people there were 
only few that did not want to give an interview. They used two types of 
arguments. One group consisted of people, particularly converts, who said that 
they were still ‘too ignorant’ of Islam and were afraid they would misrepresent 
their religion (cf. van den Bos et al., 2009: 69). Another argument was that 
either I or society would misinterpret their words. Nonetheless, some of the 
people who refused to give an interview were open to informal conversations.  
 There are several ways in which researchers can gain trust. The relevant 
methods in this project are 1) patience, 2) networking, 3) showing sincere 
interest and 4) by giving something in return (also see Noaks & Wincup, 2004: 
62-63). Patience mainly concerned the observations, but it was also a strategy for 
approaching respondents for the interviews. Patience expressed itself, for 
example, by waiting to ask them to become respondents until we became better 
acquainted. The situation in the mosques was similar. When I was new to a 
certain context, I usually did not start by asking difficult questions (also see 
Oberhuber & Krzyżanowski, 2008: 188; Zaitch et al., 2010). Once women got to 
know me, their responses to me indicated that I could ask more and more 
difficult questions, also about more sensitive issues. 
 The networking strategy helped to increase trust thanks to positive 
contact with other group members. For example, having permission to 
participate in classes allowed me to tell the women that the board or Imam had 
agreed to my presence. Also contact with some women in a group contributed to 
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the other women having an open attitude. In relation to the interviews contact 
with their friends helped to gain the trust of new respondents.  
Thirdly, showing honest interest and the intent to treat the data 
carefully also affected trust positively (also see Hamm, 2005a: 242-243). In the 
case of the interviews, I offered the respondents the option to read the transcript, 
which confirmed for them that I was not on a mission to confirm the negative 
stereotypes they so resented. During the observation period, my regular presence 
during classes and conferences showed that I was making an effort. 
Consequently, they became more sympathetic to the purpose of my presence, as 
was mentioned by some. In general, staying in touch with a number of 
respondents has contributed to building trust. Furthermore, some women said 
that they appreciated my openness and honesty about being a researcher and the 
purpose of the study.  
Finally, I tried to be open to them by answering some of their questions. 
These questions were mostly about whether or not I was considering becoming a 
Muslim and what I thought about Islam. I answered these questions as honestly 
as possible without saying anything that could promote social desirability. 
Answering honestly led to interesting information in return. For example, in the 
form of stories about what they thought before their conversion and more 
generally, by demonstrating how they invite people to embrace Islam. This 
brings up the topic of social desirability. 
 
1.4.2 Internal Validity: Social Desirability and Hidden Transcripts 
Trust and participation are no sufficient guarantee for high quality data. The 
data can be seriously flawed if respondents portray their social reality in a 
distorted way. For this study one can think of several reasons for respondents to 
either give socially desirable answers or to present an unrealistic picture to the 
researcher. As a non-Muslim woman the respondents were likely to consider me 
to be part of the dominant out-group that is critical of Islam. They could 
therefore opt not to disclose their actual views (see Scott, 1990).  
 Socially desirable answers could, firstly, spring from a prioritizing of 
da’wa over being open. For that reason respondents could be tempted to only say 
what they thought I wanted or needed to hear. Secondly, respondents might 
have felt that they were on a mission to improve the image of Islam. Thirdly, 
they might have kept secrets for opportunist motives, such as not disclosing 
extremist beliefs to keep out of sight of the criminal justice system (Horgan, 
2004: 52). Fourthly, the social context of the mosque and the Internet can lead 
them to consciously or unconsciously adjust to the group’s dominant discourse or 
taboos. Around fellow Muslims they are likely to talk and present themselves as 
Muslims with certain views to manage their impression towards peers (Goffman, 
1959). Similarly, particularly the converts could unconsciously or consciously 
reinterpret their experiences in a more dramatic way to contrast their new life 
with their old life (Denzin, 1989; McGuire, 2002: 76-77; Wohlrab-Sahr, 2006). 
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There are several ways in which researchers can deal with such obstacles to 
validity. For one, it is important not to take the respondents’ reports at face 
value. It is therefore important to remain critical of their stories, such as by 
comparing reports to objective facts and by comparing attitudes with actual 
behaviour. For example, the messages given out during lectures, conferences, in 
mosque magazines and the literature available in the mosques’ bookshops helped 
to shed more light on formal internal discourses within the Salafi mosques that I 
visited.17 Moreover, having long and multiple conversations helps to probe 
deeper and get to actual opinions. In the interviews, for example, respondents 
with radical views became more open the more often we met. With one of them 
conversations took place over five different meetings that took over nine hours in 
total. Over time, they did disclose sensitive information. In retrospect, some 
respondents were even surprised about their own openness. It appears that 
people let their guard down when they experience the sincere interest and neutral 
attitude demanded by academic research. “What I like about you is that you 
don’t judge” is how one of the women phrased it.   
The triangulation of the interviews, observation and internet analysis 
also helps to raise the validity (Maesschalk, 2010; Noaks & Wincup, 2004). 
While all three methods have limitations regarding social desirability and hidden 
transcripts, combining them diminishes this problem. Each method offers an 
advantage: in interviews there is no risk of group pressure, observations make 
contradictions visible between behaviour and words (particularly over a longer 
period of time) and online discussions are anonymous and thus a relatively safe 
platform to speak openly.  
 
1.4.3 Validity of Virtual Reality and Personalities 
When analyzing online discussions researchers have to address several matters 
concerning internal validity. As in other forms of discourse analysis, in online 
discussions the non-verbal context is lacking. Moreover, because I had not 
participated in the selected online discussions I had no way of asking participants 
to clarify their contributions. I therefore had to triangulate the data through 
placing them in the broader context of the discussion and take into account 
symbols such as emoticons, other lines of discussion and links, and the broader 
social context of discourses regarding Islam in the Netherlands (Wodak, 2008: 
12-13).  
In online research the question of validity also has distinctive 
characteristics. A frequently heard criticism concerns the difficulty of 
determining whether or not a virtual personality and its online attitudes and 
behaviour correspond with those of its ‘real life’ counterpart (Flick, 2010; Hine, 
2000: chapter 6). Are people who they say they are? Are they really women or 
men, young or old, native Dutch non-Muslims or Moroccan Muslims? In the 
contemporary world, however, online identities, attitudes and behaviour have 
                                                      
17 Obviously, one could argue that the messages of lecturers and speakers at conferences reflect social 
desirability as well, but this would imply that the Muslim visitors of these mosques are likely to adopt 
such socially desirable viewpoints and that it becomes their internal discourse. 
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become part of reality. One could even argue that the virtual world is almost as 
real as the ‘real,’ material world (Williams, 2006b: 99). Considering this study’s 
focus on online reality, authenticity is only relevant to the extent that the 
participants regard it as an issue. They try to expose unauthentic online identities 
and some express criticism when discovering inconsistencies in the messages 
posted by their fellow forum members.18 In sum, the data exclusively offer 
information about virtual identities and interactions. Such information also 
contributes to an answer to the research questions.  
 
1.4.4 External Validity 
Qualitative research does not allow for generalizations outside the research 
population. In this case the findings only allow for conclusions concerning 
fundamentalist Muslims in the Netherlands. This is not to say that the findings 
of this study are not transferable to other communities. The following chapters 
attempt to offer a so-called ‘thick description’ of the research material which 
facilitates comparison to similar cases in other places. Transferability of the 
findings can also follow from theoretical generalizations. This study attempts to 
recontextualize traditional criminological, sociological and social-psychological 
theories on the basis of its findings. As such it contributes to the development of 
theory that could have validity in other cases (Maesschalk, 2010: 130-131).  
 
 
1.5 Human Factors in Fieldwork  
The human factor plays an essential role in qualitative research. One’s personality 
and background influence the way one perceives the world and thus have an 
impact on how one interprets data, which affects the reliability of the data (Abell 
& Myers, 2008: 157; Oberhuber & Krzyżanowski, 2008: 197). For a researcher it 
is important to recognize and face one’s own subjective tendencies, including 
prejudices and emotions, as well as to be prepared to deal with the prejudices and 
emotions of the respondents. This section discusses two matters related to this 
human side to research. The first part concerns the need for a neutral position 
between the insider and outsider perspective. The second issue relates to dealing 
with personal relations and the expectations of respondents.   
 
1.5.1 Reliability: Opening up to the Insider Perspective 
Researchers need to be aware of their position toward the groups that they study. 
This position can be located between two ends of a spectrum: on one end that of 
the total outsider and on the other end that of the group member or insider. The 
risk facing outsiders is that they fail to understand the insider perspective, either 
                                                      
18 Thus it could be that the participants who resent ‘fake’ identities participate with their real-life 
identities. Another indication for the correspondence between ‘real’ and virtual identities is the 
information that participants disclose online. In some discussions participants talked about attending 
the same school or arranging to meet, for example to go to lectures together. A better image of the 
correspondence between ‘reality’ and ‘virtuality’ could have been obtained through contacting 
respondents and actually meeting them. For reasons of time and priorities I chose not to do this. 
Instead, I accepted the limitations. 
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because they hold a conscious or unconscious grudge against the reality of the 
insiders or because they lack a shared language and shared symbols, which 
renders them incapable of understanding. The position of insiders can also 
threaten the reliability of their findings. When researchers lose their distance 
from the groups that they study and become assimilated, they run the risk of 
‘going native’. As a result they can develop a blind spot for what they come to see 
as self-evident practices or beliefs. Alternatively, they may refrain from reporting 
certain findings, for example, out of fear of retaliation or because of conflicting 
interests (Zaitch et al., 2010). Since I am a non-religious person and not in 
search of any ‘truth’, the risk of going native was never an issue. The only risk 
that I had to be aware of was that of positioning myself as an obvious outsider.  
 There were several ways in which I tried to promote an objective, 
neutral balance between the insider and outsider perspective. To get to the 
insider perspective I reminded myself of the distinction between ‘understanding’ 
and ‘accepting’ the respondents’ truth. This reminder helped to diminish 
tendencies to distance myself from their opinions and facilitated an honest 
interest. In addition, I made an effort to learn about the language and symbols of 
the Islamic movements in this study, initially by reading academic literature and 
books from Islamic bookshops, by reading the Quran, and by starting to learn 
Arabic. Later on I tried to further explore the insider perspective through 
interacting with respondents in the field. In these interactions I regularly asked 
questions to ensure that I had understood people or lessons in the mosque 
correctly. In this way, I gradually became more aware of the nuances in their way 
of reasoning and their view of the world. The good relations that I developed 
with both male and female respondents, the previously mentioned comments 
about me not judging, and their confirmation of the reports I made of interviews 
all indicate that my efforts to open up to insider viewpoints were successful. 
Overall, it turned out to be not as troublesome as I had expected to become 
familiar with the insider language and symbols, because despite the religious 
symbols and elements in their speech, they did not speak a ‘different’ language. 
Thanks to the fact that the people in this study had grown up in the 
Netherlands, we shared a common background that facilitated understanding.  
 While trying to grasp the insider perspective I simultaneously made sure 
to keep an appropriate distance at all times. A principal way of doing this was by 
making extensive notes and detailed transcripts that left room for etic reflections 
on emic categories. At the start of the fieldwork, my supervisors read a number 
of my transcripts and made suggestions to strengthen this study’s internal 
reliability.  
 
1.5.2 Dealing with Expectations of Respondents 
Building up relationships with respondents can result in expectations or at least 
certain hopes regarding the researcher. Such expectations and hopes can lead to 
tense situations. In this project, the most common expectations and hopes 
regarded my possible conversion to Islam. This was particularly true when it 
came to my observations over a longer period of time where the women could 
monitor my ‘progress’. Overall this did not result in tensions. Usually the women 
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only asked whether I had decided to become a Muslim yet and some tried to give 
me more ‘proof’ of their truth to convince me. 
When I left the Brixton mosque in London, however, the expectations 
of some women turned our final meeting into an emotional event. At that time I 
had started to analyze the findings and decided to present the women with my 
viewpoints as a test case. Instead of discussing the contents of my findings, the 
women inquired as to whether it was time for me to convert, as I had apparently 
learnt so much. The resulting discussion took about an hour. The women started 
by reiterating the wonderful aspects of Islam and ended with a negative forecast 
for me on Judgement Day. One woman started crying, because she refused to 
believe that I was leaving without taking the shahada and because she was angry 
with me for ignoring the ‘signs’ of Allah. In this emotional situation I had to deal 
with the expectations of respondents in a neutral way by confirming my outsider 
position yet showing respect for their views. Finally, the women concluded that 
“Allah guides who he wishes” and that I might convert in a few years time.  
 
 
1.6 Registration of Observations and Interviews 
 
(…) about notetaking, obviously you find corners in the day when you can 
take notes. And every night you should type up your fieldnotes. [And] you 
have to do it every night because you have too much work to do and you’ll 
begin to forget. If you put your notebook on a large piece of paper, people 
won’t see your notebook. It’s masked. They won’t be disturbed by it – 
Goffman, 2001: 157-158. 
 
As Goffman emphasizes, accurate data registration is essential (also see Babbie, 
2001: 295; Oberhuber & Krzyżanowski, 2008: 189-190; Zaitch et al., 2010: 309-
311). In the course of my research I employed different strategies for notetaking 
during the interviews and observations. Obviously, I could hardly use a notebook 
or dictaphone because of the sensitivity of the topic and the alertness of the 
respondents to my activities.  
 
1.6.1 Observations: Overt Researcher, Covert Notetaking  
Islamic lectures might appear the perfect context for a notebook on a sheet of 
paper and writing down some notes. Yet, notes on these occasions were hardly 
private. In particular during the lectures the women took notes, but if they 
missed something, they would look at somebody else’s notes to fill in the blanks. 
Maybe it was because of my detailed notes of the class or because the women 
wanted to check if I was not writing down anything else, but they regularly 
glanced at my notes. At other times women asked if I was taking notes about 
them or about the lecture. It felt, therefore, inappropriate to take notes of 
conversations, personal backgrounds and life stories during the classes.  
Instead I limited the notetaking to the contents of the lecture, like 
everybody was supposed to do. Similarly, it was possible to make notes of the 
students’ questions, because they were part of the lessons. When something 
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special occurred I did put little signs in my notebook. For the gatherings that 
only lasted a couple of hours, postponing recording was unproblematic. Under 
those circumstances it was possible to remember events and conversations in 
detail. Long conference days, however, demanded alternative solutions. One of 
the methods that I used – following the example of a fellow criminologist (de 
Jong, 2007: 90-91) – was sending myself a text message with key words during 
prayer. This was less ‘suspicious’ as there were more women who used their 
mobile phones. Alternatively, I used to quickly write down key words in a 
separate notebook during prayer. Because conference days took up to 15 hours, 
these notes were a precondition for a detailed report.  
Besides such modest fieldnotes, the notes had to wait until after the 
event. Immediately after having left, usually on the way home in the train, I 
made notes. I would recall the events in a chronological order and write 
everything down that came to mind. Usually, this resulted in two to three pages 
of short words and incomplete sentences. In the initial phases of the observation, 
I made a detailed report of these notes within a day or two. At a later stage and 
for shorter meetings I followed the same protocol of detailed short notetaking, 
but finished the report with a few exceptions within a week.  
 
1.6.2 Interviews: No Recording Please! 
Despite the recommended practice to record interviews (Beyens & Tournel, 
2010), only 12 of the respondents plus the four experts agreed to a recording. 
The other respondents argued that the negative attention for Islam made them 
worry about who could get hold of (and misinterpret) the recordings. For the 
first respondents that I met at the trial of the Hofstad group I felt uncomfortable 
about digital voicedocuments as well. 
Without recordings conducting the interviews was a demanding 
business. I had to write everything down as quickly and extensively as possible, 
while simultaneously being alert to non-verbal communication and thinking up 
questions. Even though it was impossible to write down everything verbatim, I 
secured important quotes by writing rapidly. There is one exception to this 
recording practice. One male respondent was clearly uncomfortable and gave 
meaningless answers. After several attempts to encourage him, he eventually said 
that he did not want me to take notes. As soon as I put the notebook away he 
gave me a full record of his past radicalization process. By making notes 
immediately after our meeting also the report of this interview is substantial 
(with over 7,500 words). Clearly, quotes are missing in this case.  
Besides the disadvantages, not recording had the advantage of providing me with 
a reason for a second meeting. Because of the sensitivity and the need for 
accuracy the respondents of the non-recorded interviews were given the 
opportunity to read the transcription. Obviously, the purpose was not to get their 
approval. Instead, I checked for misunderstandings and used our second or third 
meeting (if the interview had taken more than one meeting) to gather new 
information or clarify matters. The attempts of some respondents to rephrase 
answers more favourably were thus in vain. Their comments did become part of 
the transcription as they point to social desirability and the lack of it in the 
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original transcript. The second time, the respondents tended to open up more, 
which led to more information about sensitive or personal topics. So not 
recording also had a positive effect on the data.  
The aim was to make the transcripts as soon as possible. Within a day 
after the interview I described the interview setting, impressions about social 
desirability and suchlike. I finished the transcription within a few days. In a 
couple of exceptional cases I added notes to prevent misunderstanding when 
transcribing the interview at a later time. 
 
 
1.7 Analysis of Data 
Another essential part of the methodological process is the data analysis. To 
analyze the data, I employed various strategies. This section presents some of the 
principal choices concerning the analytical instruments, software, and coding 
(Decorte, 2010a; 2010b).  
Two methods mainly facilitated a thorough analysis: an analytical 
instrument and the use of Atlas.ti. The instrument served to systematically 
analyze the internet discussions. It also contributed to the internal reliability by 
comparing my own analysis with that of a student assistant who helped to 
analyze the second series of discussions. As Appendix 2 demonstrates, the 
instrument includes a variety of topics to detect both radical thoughts and 
explanatory factors.  
Atlas.ti contributed to creating order in approximately 1,200 pages of 
interview transcripts and observation reports. By the end of the data collection I 
started to reread and organize the data with Atlas.ti. The analysis was partially 
deductive, because I had derived some ideas from common theories on 
radicalization and conversion studies. Yet, the analysis was also inductive as the 
data also formed the starting point for additional theorizing. The combination of 
inductive and deductive methods led to different types of codes. Some codes are 
linked to existing theories, such as ‘liquidity’ and ‘signs of subcultures’. Other 
codes are theoretically neutral, for example ‘Chapter 3’, ‘global’ or ‘local’.19  
In addition to its usefulness in organizing the data, Atlas.ti also helped 
to make sense of the underlying meaning, particularly through the use of memos. 
While coding the data I made memos of any interpretation that came to mind. 
Memos therefore contained comments on the overall impression of the answers, 
the relation to other respondents, internal inconsistencies and suchlike. 
Moreover, I made a summary of each interview with descriptions and deeper 
reflections on the respondents. After the coding and during the writing process I 
repeatedly scrolled through the data to check for new thoughts and relevant 
parts.    
 
 
 
                                                      
19 These latter two codes denote alternative factors on either a global or local level which appeared to 
explain the religious development of the Muslims in this study. 
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1.8 Summary 
At the basis of this study are three qualitative research methods designed to gain 
insight into the religious development of and the meaning of Islamic 
fundamentalism for Muslims in the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent in Great 
Britain). The methods are semi-open interviews, observations and analysis of 
online discussions. The data includes 42 interviews and an equal number of more 
informal conversations. The observations have resulted in reports of Islamic 
activities in the mosques that I visited over the course of a period of 11 months 
in the Netherlands and 3.5 months in London. These reports contain data about 
substantial conversations with over 135 women. Third, the internet data are 
derived principally from the analysis of 38 discussions on Morocco Virtual 
Community.  
 To gain access to the interview and observation settings, I had to choose 
an appropriate research role and deal with several ethical issues. I have opted for 
an obtrusive researcher role by openly presenting myself as a non-Muslim 
researcher. The presentation as a researcher largely resolved the ethical matter of 
informed consent in case of the observations. Regarding other ethical concerns 
the respondents received information about the academic nature of the research 
project, its purpose and planned use of the data. Finally, I guaranteed the 
respondents anonymity.    
In addition, to maximize the quality of the data I had to safeguard their 
validity and reliability. The major challenges were the respondents’ refusal to 
participate, lack of trust, and social desirability. The first way in which I tried to 
resolve these problems was by gaining their trust and asking further questions 
when I suspected socially desirable responses. Another way to confront these 
challenges and to increase the internal validity of this study has been the 
triangulation of theories, methods and data. Opting for a diverse group of 
respondents for the interviews with different religious views and backgrounds 
also contributed to the internal validity. A detailed description of data and the 
development of theory have helped to enlarge the external validity. The 
transparency offered to the supervisors of this study has contributed to its 
internal reliability. 
  
  
 
2  
 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AS A THREAT TO DUTCH 
SOCIETY?  
 
 
The methodology that we follow is the one of the Ahl-Sunnah wa’l 
Djama’a, so the people of the Sunnah and (…) the Salaf al-salih. (…) 
Those are the Prophet, the companions, and then the three generations of 
followers. (…) It is in fact the true methodology, according to me. (…) 
Our characteristic is that you follow the truth and you can only know the 
truth through knowledge. Knowledge in Islam is literally proof: proof 
from the Quran and proof from the Sunnah. - Layla  
  
Like the other fundamentalist respondents in this study, Layla is convinced that 
her interpretation of Islam represents the absolute truth. This study’s central 
focus is to understand how and why some Dutch Muslims embrace such 
fundamentalist, absolutist claims. Yet, before turning to explanations, it is 
necessary to determine what Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands is 
about. What do Islamic fundamentalist beliefs entail? To what extent do the 
respondents adopt fundamentalist viewpoints? And what indications are there of 
Islamic fundamentalism threatening the Dutch democratic order, as has often 
been assumed? To answer these questions this second chapter deals with the 
attitudes and practice of Dutch fundamentalist Muslims regarding those issues 
that have worried Dutch society most, namely their approach to non-Muslims, 
sharia, and jihad.  
 The first section considers the concept of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Then follows a brief review of the global ideological roots of local, Dutch 
manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism. The next section discusses the main 
findings of previous research on fundamentalism among Dutch Muslims. Since 
previous studies principally focus on attitudes and tend to neglect the behavioural 
factor, the chapter continues with the respondents’ attitudes in relation to their 
everyday practice (also see Roex et al., 2010). The final section discusses how one 
could best categorize the various fundamentalist attitudes of the respondents. 
This categorization will be used throughout the remainder of this study. 
 
 
2.1 Conceptualizing Islamic Fundamentalism 
Our first objective is to clarify the concept of Islamic fundamentalism. ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’ is perhaps the most commonly used term to describe the 
religious orientation that this study focuses on. Some other available terms are 
Islamism, political Islam and neofundamentalism (see Brown, 2000; Marty & 
Appleby, 1991-1995; Roy, 1994 and 2004; Tibi, 1998). A disadvantage of the 
term Islamic fundamentalism is that it has been used to describe a variety of 
| Purification and Resistance 
 
46 
Islamic interpretations (Geelhoed, 2010). Scholars differ in opinion whether 
fundamentalism reflects a political or a merely religious orientation. The scholars 
with the latter opinion argue that the term originates from Christian movements 
in the United States with a purely religious focus (Arjomand, 1995: 193; 
Esposito, 2003). Other authors, however, consider the term applicable to 
political movements, such as Marty & Appleby in their famous ‘Fundamentalism 
project’ (1991-1995). In line with a political interpretation, the term 
fundamentalism is often used as an equivalent of extremist movements. 
Although the confusion about the term could be an argument not to use it (also 
see Phalet & ter Wal, 2004a: 67), alternatives also suffer from disadvantages. In 
fact, when one accepts these different meanings Islamic fundamentalism serves 
as an overarching term, which is useful as long as one remembers to distinguish 
between various Islamic fundamentalist orientations. The final part of this 
section deals with these orientations. First, this section discusses the principal 
communal characteristics of Islamic fundamentalist thought, as put forward in 
literature. 
 The first characteristic concerns the claim to go back to the foundations 
of Islam. Fundamentalist Muslims stress the need to return to an ‘authentic’ 
Islam that can be found through a literal reading of the Quran and the hadith 
and that has universal force (Hunt, 2005: 116-117; Roy, 2004: ix). Second, 
despite this apparent traditionalist approach, studies on fundamentalism have 
pointed out that this fundamentalist nostalgia for an ‘authentic’ Islam is in fact a 
modern phenomenon. The most notable modern element is that 
fundamentalism is reactionary to aspects of modernity that it sees as morally 
threatening to Islam (Giddens, 1991: 207; Gray, 2003; Herriot, 2009: 2; Roy, 
2004).20  
Other characteristics of fundamentalism are its dualist and millenarianist 
views. Millenarianism concerns the belief that the current social order will come 
to an end with an Apocalypse to make way for a return of God’s rule on earth. 
This view legitimizes criticism of the social order in modern times and hope for 
improvement in the future (Herriot, 2009: 2; McGuire, 2002: 39, 44-48). The 
dualism concerns views of the world as divided between truth and deception, 
salvation and redemption, ‘us’ and ‘them’, et cetera, and the belief in Good versus 
Evil (McGuire, 2002: 39-44). Dualism also supposes certainty of the absolute 
truth as opposed to doubt. Towler (1984: 107) clarifies what such certainty 
entails: 
                                                      
20 Thereby it has proven the secularization thesis wrong that heralded the end of this kind of absolute 
religious claims only a few decades ago (Berger, 1967). Under the influence of globalization and 
individualism scholars of religion predicted religion to lose its grip on people’s lives. Individualism 
would weaken people’s ties to religious communities. Globalization would contribute to pluralism – 
whether in terms of ethnicity, religion or other social values – that challenges truth claims. As a result 
people were to become more open to alternative views. Although globalization has rendered the 
world at the beginning of the 21st century smaller than ever and individualization appears to be at an 
all-time peak, absolute truth claims have not disappeared. On the contrary, Islamic fundamentalism 
is thus an example of an opposite development under the influence of globalization: a 
countermovement to modern developments. 
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Certitude is the absence of doubt. The need for certitude is the attempt to 
escape from doubt. (…) Doubt (…) is an intrinsic part of faith, and since 
certitude is marked by the absence of doubt, or the attempt to escape from 
it, this places the two in sharp contrast. Certitude overshoots faith, craving 
for sureness. Instead of having a vision it makes a blueprint, and by fleeing 
from the last vestige of uncertainty it ceases to be conventionally religious. 
 
Islamic fundamentalism thus ceases to be conventionally Islamic, which is visible 
in its interpretations of the Islamic creed (aqeeda)21 and its sources. 
Fundamentalist views of what worshipping demands of Muslims in everyday 
practice are an example that is dealt with in the following part. 
 In short, this study is interested in Muslims who (in reaction to 
modernity) have a dualist and millenarianist vision and who claim an absolute 
certainty of the universal truth of Islamic beliefs.  
 
 
2.2 Global Sources, Local Manifestations of Islamic Fundamentalism 
Where does Islamic fundamentalism originate from? And how did 
fundamentalist movements spread to the Netherlands? These are questions that 
this section addresses on the basis of previous research on global roots and Dutch 
manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism.   
 
2.2.1 The Rise of Transnational Fundamentalism 
Scholars have documented the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist movements 
in Muslim countries particularly since these movements spread in the 1970s. The 
resulting research is largely historical and founded on literature and documents of 
political fundamentalist movements (e.g. Abu-Rabi, 1996; Bonney, 2004; 
Cooley, 2000; Davidson, 1998; Esposito, 2002; Gerges, 2005; Hafez, 2003; 
Hiro, 1989; Kepel, 2002, 2005; Lewis, 2003; Moaddel, 2005; Moussali, 
1992,1998; Oliveti, 2002; Sidahmed & Ehteshami, 1996; Wessels, 2001). This 
body of work concentrates on the content of the ideology, explanatory factors 
behind the rise of principally politically oriented movements in Muslim countries 
and, in some cases, on how these ideologies have spread around the globe. In 
terms of the ideology, it shows the history of this kind of absolutist thought in 
Islam and describe the ideas of the Islamic scholars that form the historical 
                                                      
21 The creed involves basically the six articles of faith (imaan) and the five pillars of Islam (e.g. al-
Barbahaaree, 1995; Esposito, 2003). The six articles of faith are belief in Allah, the angels, the books 
(most notably the Quran, but also the ‘original’, ‘unfalsified’ Bible and the Torah), the messengers, 
judgment day and fate (qadr). Accepting these articles of faith requires Muslims to live by the five 
pillars of Islam. The first pillar of Islam is the shahada, the witnessing of Islamic faith. The shahada 
requires Muslims to declare that ‘there is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God’ 
of which the first part is la illaha illallah in Arabic. By stating that there is only one God, they 
acknowledge tawhid, the unity of God. The other pillars are the obligations of prayer (salaat), the 
pilgrimage (hadj) to Mecca, fasting (sawm), and the paying of charity (zakaat). The approach of 
Islamic fundamentalists goes beyond the conventional by their strict interpretation of the obligations 
following from these articles and pillars. 
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sources of inspiration, such as Ibn Taymiyyah (approximately 1263-1328), Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab (approximately 1703-1792), Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) and 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966).22 These ideologues shared the fundamentalist belief 
that Muslims have to return to the sources of Islam through a scripturalist 
approach to the Quran and the Sunnah of the pious predecessors (the salafiya). In 
terms of political approach the ideologues differed. Ibn Taymiyyah’s had both a 
religious and a political interest. Besides his strict interpretation of the Quran 
and Sunnah, he promoted an Islamic state in accordance with Muhammad’s 
community in Medina and the rule of Islamic law. Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab engaged 
in politics more actively, however, by building an allegiance with Abdelaziz ibn 
Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism has consequently become the 
official national doctrine. At present Wahhabism has turned into a conservative 
current of which the representative scholars – such as recently the very influential 
Abdul-Aziz bin-Baz – consider only discrete advice to the Saudi government 
allowed. Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, took a 
more activist stance and favoured more open criticism of the Muslim 
governments. Even though he represented a non-violent approach, over time 
various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood developed, some of which were 
more radical and violently inclined. Finally, Egyptian Sayyid Qutb could be seen 
as “the godfather of Muslim extremist movements around the globe” according 
to Esposito (2002: 56). He had a dichotomous view of the division between the 
dar-al-Harb and the dar-al-Islam. In his view, the former part was reserved for 
the West, as the ultimate non-Muslim enemy, and its collaborators. He believed 
the latter territory to belong to ‘true’ Muslims who were obliged to expand and 
ensure the rule of Islam by means of jihad. He argued that if the Muslim masses 
would not start an Islamic revolution, then a violent revolution would be required 
to realize a true Islamic state (Abu-Rabi, 1996; Aslan, 2005; Esposito, 2002, 
2003; Kepel, 2002; Meijer, 2009; Roy, 2004). In line with the various political 
approaches of their ideologues, scholars stress the diversity of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements. In addition, they point to the movements’ modern 
nature that becomes clear, for example, from the belief that a perfect Islamic 
state can be reached through social ‘progress’ (Brown, 2000: 4, also see Ali, 2002; 
Gray, 2003; Watt, 1988). 
The explanatory factors for participation in such movements mentioned 
by previous research are largely of a structural, macro nature, while only some 
studies offer explanations on a psychological level (like Taylor and Horgan 
(2001) who take a behaviourist approach, and Burdman, 2003; Loza, 2007; Post, 
Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Stern, 2003). Concerning the structural level scholars 
present the rise of Islamic fundamentalist ideologies in Muslim countries as a 
consequence of Western colonialism, corrupt governments, the repression of 
alternative views and (relative) deprivation of the population. They show that it 
is generally the middle classes that take the intellectual lead in political 
fundamentalist movements. The lower, uneducated and poor classes, on the 
                                                      
22 Sayyid Qutb’s (2001) ‘Milestones’ is seen as his most influential work (also see Zimmerman, 2004 
for Qutb’s influence on Al Qaeda). 
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contrary, form their ‘foot soldiers’. In the last decade of the 20th century the end 
of the Afghan War and the first Gulf War represent a turning point. These wars 
and the international politics of Western countries, particularly the US, played a 
central role in these movements – most notably Al Qaeda – going global. In the 
eyes of movements such as Al Qaeda a transnational battle is going on between 
Islam and unbelievers. They see the presence of foreign troops in countries such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq, and the occupation in Palestine as a reason to wage a 
religious war against the Western states that they consider responsible for these 
military forces (e.g. Gerges, 2005; Kepel, 2002; Roy, 2004).  
Since the late 1990s researchers started to focus on the reception of 
these Islamic beliefs among Western Muslims. Part of this research points to the 
global character of political fundamentalist movements as a result of Muslims 
with fundamentalist ideologies who flee from their countries of origin – usually 
because the rulers do not accept their political opposition – and start to fight 
their battle from Western countries. Over the course of the past decade, the 
image of fundamentalists coming from abroad has made way for that of ‘home-
grown’ fundamentalists. Movements, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al Qaeda, 
have gained local support in the West. Some of these studies mainly stress the 
threat of these groups to Western countries and their link to terrorism (e.g. 
Jansen, 1997; Jordan & Boix, 2004; May, 2007; Rosenthal, Muller & 
Ruitenberg, 2005). Other studies are less focused on security issues and describe 
the nature of what is going on in a more neutral way (e.g. Pargeter, 2008; Roy, 
2004). Recent studies offer a description of how, particularly young second-
generation, Muslims in the West get involved in these movements (e.g. Abbas, 
2007; Cole & Cole, 2009; Buijs et al., 2006; Phillips, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 
2005).23 This raises the issue of the presence of Islamic fundamentalist views in 
the Netherlands. 
 
2.2.2 The Resonance of Islamic Fundamentalism among Dutch Muslims 
To what extent has Islamic fundamentalism found fertile ground in Dutch 
society? As mentioned, many different fundamentalist (and non-fundamentalist) 
interpretations of Islam exist, also in the Netherlands. Despite this variation of 
fundamentalist views, since 9/11 academic interest in particularly Salafism has 
grown. The reason for this interest is that groups such as Al Qaeda have adopted 
a specific interpretation of Salafism to legitimize their actions (Roy, 2004: 234; 
Wiktorowciz, 2006). 
 
                                                      
23 Obviously, 9/11 has also inspired a large number of publications on ‘radical Islam’ and 
radicalization of Muslims in popular reading material outside the academic realm. The perception of 
a threat of radical Islam has opened up a whole new market by forming a catalyst for the emergence 
of a genre of (semi)fiction (e.g. Erkel, 2007; Hamid, 2007a), personal reports of former ‘jihadis’ (e.g. 
Husain, 2007; Kaddouri, 2011), journalistic accounts (e.g. Chorus & Olgün, 2005; de Stoop, 2010; 
Emerson Vermaat, 2005; Groen & Kranenberg, 2006; O’Neill & McGrory, 2006) – sometimes of a 
sensationalist nature if reporters immersed themselves in alleged radical, extremist and orthodox 
groups (e.g. Groot Koerkamp & Veerman, 2006; Pouw, 2008). 
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Focus on Salafism 
In line with the international interest in Salafism, this Islamic movement is 
under close scrutiny in the Netherlands. Four ‘Salafi’ mosques – in Amsterdam, 
Eindhoven, The Hague and Tilburg – have attracted public attention due to a 
number of incidents. One main trigger concerns a couple of youngsters that 
visited these mosques and joined jihad abroad or became terrorist suspects and 
convicts. Another trigger has been imams of these mosques that expressed 
intolerance toward anti-Islamic politicians, opinion-makers and un-Islamic 
lifestyles, like those of homosexuals. Despite recent studies showing the nuances 
in their thoughts (and to a lesser extent behaviour),24 the dominant view in 
Dutch debate is that Salafis are radical and a threat to the Dutch social order 
(AIVD, 2006; AIVD, 2007).  
 Then what is Salafism about? Salafism strives for a pure Islam, based on 
the Quran and the Sunnah (the ways of the Prophet). The purity relates to 
getting rid of innovations, such as cultural elements and returning to the example 
of the pious ancestors, the salaf al-salih (Haykel, 2009: 33-34; Roy, 2004: 243-
244; Wiktorowicz, 2006: 210). Academics have identified different orientations 
within Salafism. Wiktorowicz (2006) distinguishes three types of Salafis: the 
purists, the politicos and the jihadis. Dutch researchers have adopted this 
categorization, thereby following Buijs et al. (2006). According to this 
differentiation, the various types of Salafis all agree on the central issues, 
principally the aqeeda. The difference between them, argues Wiktorowicz, 
concerns the implications of their convictions for participation in the modern 
world. The first category of the purists believes that Muslims should stay away 
from politics. Out of fear of getting corrupted through participation in politics, 
purists believe that Muslims should focus on spreading their message, keeping 
the religion free from innovation and gain more knowledge about Islam. The 
second group, the politicos, on the contrary, do promote political activities. They 
believe it to be an immediate responsibility of Muslims to strive for the rule of 
God’s law and thus try to realize political change. The jihadis, the last category, 
go a step beyond the politicos. They consider violence necessary to instigate a 
societal revolution that installs a truly Islamic government (Balogh, et al., 2009; 
Buijs et al., 2006; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2006). To what extent 
do Dutch Muslims adopt such fundamentalist interpretations? 
 
Islamic Fundamentalism among Muslims in the Netherlands? 
To come to a better understanding of the position of ‘Salafi fundamentalism’ in 
the Netherlands, it is necessary to put Salafism in the larger perspective of the 
position of Islam in general in Dutch society. Overall, one has to beware not to 
treat Islam in an essentialist way by considering it a static, homogenous religion 
(Mandaville, 2004: 55). Muslims in Western countries like the Netherlands 
represent a social reality that contradicts such essentialist views of Islam; most 
                                                      
24 Roex et al. (2010) and Balogh, et al. (2009) in particular demonstrate that the Salafi mosques and 
its visitors consider it possible to respect the laws of liberal democracies and live in accordance with 
Islam at the same time, as long as they are granted sufficient freedom of religion.  
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Western Muslims opt for more moderate interpretations than those of Islamic 
fundamentalism. In line with this argument Roy (2004) argues that one should 
let go of the image of Western Muslims holding on to the culture and religion of 
their country of origin. He argues, on the contrary, that contemporary 
interpretations of Islam among Western European Muslims all result from the 
intention to reconstruct an Islamic identity. Vertovec and Rogers (1998) confirm 
that particularly the younger second and even third generation Muslims in 
Western Europe are creatively constructing Islamic identities that are ‘hybrid’. 
This leads them to develop ways of living in accordance with Islam that match 
and respect the societies they live in (also see AlSayyad & Castells, 2002; 
Haddad, 2002; Nonneman, Niblock & Szjakowski, 1996). This is the case 
regardless of whether this identity is based on liberal, reformist or fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam. Although Islamic fundamentalist interpretations 
promote a return to the foundations of Islam, they should thus also be seen as 
result of global reality’s complexities and a modern phenomenon (Gray, 2003; 
Mandaville, 2004; Roy, 2004: chapter 3). 
 Another important element of the position of Islam in the Netherlands 
is that the general trend in religious participation is one of decline, despite the 
worries about the Netherlands being ‘Islamized’. The number of Muslims that 
visit the mosque is dropping and this is more so for young Muslims. This 
development seems to have continued after 9/11, despite the fact that Muslim 
youngsters believe that 9/11 has stimulated them to learn more about Islam and 
that many of them consider being Muslim a very important aspect of their 
identity (Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008; Korf, Yeşilgöz, Nabben & Wouters, 
2007; Korf, Wouters, Place & Koet, 2008; Nabben, Yeşilgöz and Korf, 2006; 
Phalet & ter Wal, 2004b: 8-15).25  
With regard to the way young Dutch Muslims practise Islam Nabben et 
al. (2006) mention different groups: conformists, neo-orthodox, flexibles, 
hedonists and escapists. These groups vary in terms of how important they 
consider Islam to be, the extent in which they are critical of the cultural 
interpretation of Islam of their parents, their opinion on the political 
implications of Islam, the importance of school and a career and finally, the level 
of participation in Dutch youth lifestyles of consumption, clubbing and mixing 
of the sexes. The authors of this study believe that the conformists and the 
escapists are most susceptible to radical beliefs. This is because conformists 
follow the rules of Islam in a rather uncritical way and are relatively intolerant to 
Dutch lifestyles. The escapists have a questionable lifestyle, characterized by 
deviance and other problematic behaviour, which they blame on external factors 
such as the negative image of Islam in the Netherlands. As they do consider their 
Muslim identity to be very important, the authors believe that they might have a 
cognitive opening to radical Islamic views (Nabben et al., 2006: chapter 5 and 
chapter 9). 
                                                      
25 These studies concern Muslim youngsters from Muslim families. They thus fail to account for 
Dutch converts to Islam. 
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Altogether, it follows from this research that most Muslim youngsters construct 
much more moderate Muslim identities than the ones that fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam offer. Nonetheless, there are young Muslims who do 
adopt or might be susceptible to fundamentalist interpretations (also see 
Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008; Phalet, van Lotringen & Entzinger, 2000; 
Slootman & Tillie, 2006). Roex et al. (2010) have estimated that approximately 
eight percent of Dutch Muslims are strictly orthodox and susceptible to Salafism. 
Among the Moroccan population of 15 years and older this percentage is the 
highest with 12 percent. An earlier quantitative study by Slootman and Tillie 
(2006) found that 1.4 percent of the respondents (only in Amsterdam) 
considered violence a legitimate response to the negative climate towards Islam 
in the Netherlands. They tried to estimate the number of Muslims who were 
susceptible to radicalization by measuring two preconditions: 1) an orthodox 
stance and 2) the sense that Islam was under political attack. These 
preconditions were present in the case of 35 percent of the respondents between 
16 and 34 years old. Nonetheless, the researchers argued that these numbers 
could not shed any light on the actual number of potential radicals (Slootman & 
Tillie, 2006, chapter 3). Altogether, there are thus only vague estimates of the 
number of fundamentalist Muslims in the Netherlands. An important question 
that remains after these studies concerns the relation between political 
orientation and orthodox interpretations in radicalization. What political and 
religious attitudes indicate radicalization? How could these attitudes help to 
distinguish different types of fundamentalist Muslims? The following section 
considers the attitudes and behaviour of the respondents to shed more light on 
this relation.  
 
 
2.3 Anti-Western Beliefs and Behaviour?  
So what are the attitudes of the Dutch respondents toward life in Western 
society? And how are these attitudes put into practice? One of the principal 
concerns in the Netherlands is that Islam is not ‘simply’ a religion, but a way of 
life, an image that all respondents confirm (also see Balogh a.o, 2009: 41; de 
Koning, 2008; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008: 38-40). Because of the all-pervasive 
role that Islam allegedly has in the lives of Muslims, its critics fear intolerance 
toward non-Muslims, the desire to implement sharia and the willingness to fight 
violent jihad.26 Over the years, issues that were on the forefront of public debate 
included the animosity and isolation politics of orthodox Muslims, the 
opposition of certain Muslims to democracy and Dutch laws, and the support for 
violent jihad in the Netherlands or elsewhere in the world (e.g. AIVD, 2007; 
Balogh, et al., 2009; Pouw, 2008). In December 2009 the Dutch Intelligence 
Service published a report on the state of the four Salafist mosques in the 
Netherlands, among which are the As-Soennah and the El-Tawheed mosques 
where this research took place. The report states: 
                                                      
26 Also see (Baumeister, 1991: 187) and Fromm (1941) who point to the possible intolerance that can 
stem from absolute truth claims. 
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Although Salafist preachers proclaim a moderate message in public 
sermons, they do not hesitate to fiercely object to the West in private and 
they urge their followers to adopt an isolationist attitude. Thus, the 
Salafist centres still proclaim an anti-integrative and intolerant isolationist 
message that is irreconcilable with democratic principles and that can 
disturb societal relations. For instance, certain preachers summon their 
supporters to not adapt to Dutch society and to prioritize Islamic laws to 
the Dutch law (AIVD, 2009: 7). 
 
From this perspective a strict religious doctrine thus goes hand in hand with 
socio-political activism. To be able to evaluate these concerns and the extent to 
which the respondents share an anti-Western attitude this section discusses their 
most relevant beliefs and practice. Questions to review are: What does the 
Islamic way of life imply for fundamentalist Muslims? How do they think their 
relation to non-Muslims should be and how is this relation in practice? What do 
they think of democracy and how do they deal with democracy in the 
Netherlands? What is their opinion on the situation in countries like 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and specifically Israel? And under which circumstances do 
they consider violent jihad allowed? Together this will give an answer to the 
question what being a Muslim in the West is about in the experience of the 
fundamentalist respondents.  
 
2.3.1 The Islamic Way of Life: Islam is Everywhere and Everything 
“It is not only religion. It is a way of life. You submit your entire life to Islam”. 
These words of Summeeyah correspond with the opinion of all respondents: 
from their point of view – and regardless of their Islamic orientation – they see 
Islam as the most important thing in their lives. They argue that Islam is more 
important to them than their parents, their partner, their children, their work, et 
cetera. At first glance this might seem threatening to non-Muslim societies. Yet, 
the participants in this study see Islam as a way of life that regulates their 
behaviour, including behaviour regarding significant others and work. By putting 
Islam first they feel that they have general guidelines (in the case of non-
fundamentalist Muslims) or a strict framework of rules (in the case of 
fundamentalist Muslims) to become better children, lovers, parents, and 
employees. They thus see Islam not as competition for other important matters 
in their lives, but as a system that confirms the importance of these other 
matters. 
 It seems hard, if not impossible, to entirely submit to an Islamic way of 
life in practice, particularly for the scripturalist, dualist approach of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalist views offer very specific regulations for 
practically everything: for the way to pray, to wash oneself, to eat, to go to the 
bathroom, to interact with other people, and the like. The rules are not limited 
to obvious religious activities. On the contrary, it can apply to the most banal 
aspects of their lives, as becomes clear, for example, from a book with rules for 
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women during their menstruation period. Consequently, every aspect of the life 
of a Muslim can be covered by Islam.  
 Then how do the fundamentalist respondents believe they prioritize 
Islam in practice? When describing their daily routines the fundamentalist 
respondents clarified this in two ways. First, besides acts that are likely to 
demand more effort such as trying to always be modest or kind to others, they 
build in routine worship activities that are simpler to realize. Examples of such 
routine acts are thanking God every morning for waking up, praying five times a 
day, saying ‘bismillah’ when entering a door, being aware of eating only with 
one’s right hand, and so on. Second, especially the fundamentalist respondents 
emphasize that everything they do and that does not conflict with Islam can be 
an act of worship if they do it with the intention to worship. They mentioned a 
large range of activities that they see as possible acts of worship, ranging from 
getting a University degree, to cooking for one’s husband, eating, and even 
sleeping. As Ava, a native Dutch convert to Islam, says: 
 
My life is intertwined with Islam. Everything I do is Islam.(…) Even 
sexuality is prayer. There are oral traditions in which they say ‘there is a 
time for prayer, there is a time for work’….for the men that is…, there is a 
time for prayer and there is a time for interaction with your family. So that 
means playing with your kids and satisfying your wife sexually. Period. 
That simply is an obligation. And that sexuality that is indeed…you could 
see it as prayer. (…) Well hello, isn’t that great.  
 
Similarly, Nidal – a ‘born-again’ Muslim who turned from a traditional 
interpretation of Islam to a Salafi interpretation – argues that he is “busy with 
Islam almost 24 hours a day”. Nidal describes how a game of football can turn 
into an act of worship among brothers “We don’t swear, whereas before I could 
bash someone after a game of football. Now we say, when somebody misses 
‘insh’Allah, next time better’ and if we score ‘mash’Allah, what a nice goal!’” 
  Thus, the fundamentalist respondents believe that normal everyday 
activities in Western society can become appropriate Islamic behaviour by 
changing the intention with which they undertake these activities. In itself, 
adopting a fundamentalist way of life, therefore, does not have to interfere with 
life in Western societies. This could be the case, though, for those aspects of 
Western life that fundamentalists consider un-Islamic, such as contact with non-
Muslims.  
 
2.3.2 Contact between Believers and Unbelievers 
An important concern in Dutch society is whether fundamentalist Muslims 
promote isolationism and hatred for non-Muslims. In 2008 a Dutch journalist, 
Patrick Pouw, published a book on the experiences he had when taking classes in 
one of the Salafist centres in the Netherlands. Social upheaval resulted from his 
report of a lecture about how Muslims should deal with ‘unbelievers’. The 
teacher told the students that, as Pouw repeats in his own words (2008: 101): 
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We learned that all unbelievers are enemies of Allah, that everybody who 
is not following Islam is an enemy of Allah. We heard that sincere love for 
Allah means that we have to hate His enemies, and should see them as 
our enemies. That was no less than an obligation.  
 
The fundamentalist Muslims in this study generally disagree with the harshness 
of the lesson that Pouw learned, as this section discusses. As Roex et al. (2010) 
found in their study, the respondents with a Salafi orientation argue that they 
should not hate unbelievers personally, but only their unbelief. Moreover, the 
hatred of unbelief does not make them consider all non-Muslims bad people. On 
the contrary, opinions about these issues vary, even among those with a Salafi 
orientation. In addition, even the respondents with the fiercest stance against 
unbelievers show more nuance in practice. Hence, the hatred for unbelief seems 
to be of a largely discursive nature, as the next part will demonstrate. 
 
Different Attitudes and Nuanced Behaviour  
Then what opinions do the fundamentalist respondents have about (contact 
with) non-Muslims? And to what extent do they put these opinions in practice? 
Overall, the contact with unbelievers is a topic that occupies the respondents, 
which also becomes clear from online discussions in which participants question 
the position they should take. This topic is of particular concern to 
fundamentalist converts who usually have non-Muslim families and had mostly 
non-Muslim friends.  
The main point of concern and disagreement is what the doctrine of al-
Wala wal-Bara – love and hate for the sake of God – means in the modern 
(Dutch) context. Figure 2.1 contains fragments of an internet discussion that 
reflects the heart of the difference of opinion. One matter that the respondents 
do agree about is that Muslims are allowed to have contact with non-Muslims 
and that they should be friendly (also see Balogh et al., 2009: 47-51). The main 
group of the fundamentalist respondents argues that if such contact was not 
allowed, they could not invite people to Islam either. In addition, they frequently 
refer to a hadith about how kind the Prophet Muhammad was to a Jewish 
neighbour who used to treat Muhammad badly. On the basis of the Prophet’s 
example, these respondents stress that patience is required. Although everybody 
agrees with the need to be friendly, they disagree about whether or not 
friendship is allowed. Among the fundamentalist respondents part believes 
friendship to be allowed to a certain extent. Bassam, a convert, is representative 
for this group. He still has some non-Muslim friends from prior to his turn to 
Salafism. In his view the issue is not whether such friendship is allowed as long 
as there is mutual respect, but whether there is sufficient common ground for a 
friendship. Bassam argues, therefore, “friends do easily become acquaintances. 
My present friends are mostly Muslim”. Other fundamentalist respondents 
consider friendship with non-Muslims allowed as long as they make sure that 
they also have Muslim friends. They argue that being around Muslims 
strengthens them to follow the right path, while being mostly around non-
Muslims might lead them astray. Convert Ava represents this opinion. Since she 
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has many Muslim friends she considers it unproblematic to have a non-Muslim 
lesbian as her best friend. She disagrees with her homosexuality but does not see 
it as an obstacle to their friendship. On the contrary, by staying friends she feels 
she does da’wa on her: “I kind of like, I also like it to do da’wa to my girlfriends. 
Simply to show that Islam is not weird, not strange, not scary or stupid”. Finally, 
there are some who believe that friendship is not allowed. Yet, even they admit 
that there exist ‘good’ unbelievers that they respect and that some of these 
unbelievers might turn to Islam at a later stage in their lives. 
In comparison to their opinions, the everyday practice of the 
fundamentalist respondents’ shows additional nuance. Even some of the 
respondents who argue that they cannot have friendships with unbelievers have 
relations with non-Muslims that resemble friendship. Maysa, for example, 
admits that in the past years her contact with non-Muslims has been better than 
that with Muslims. She resolves the tension between rule and practice by talking 
of ‘friendly contact’ and calling these people ‘acquaintances’ instead of friends. 
Layla too believes that having a non-Muslim as her best friend goes against the 
Islamic code of conduct, but cherishes this friendship: 
 
You have to interact with them in a good way, have respect for them, but 
you have to socialize with them for the sake of inviting them to Islam, to 
show them it is the truth. You do take distance to a certain extent. (…) 
That is not the way I interact with Elise. I’ve known her ever since 
secondary school and she tells me everything. That is actually not allowed 
either. The code of conduct is that you don’t tell intimate things, but that 
is what the friendship is about for me. (…) My family knows her, my 
father totally adores her. She is like a sister or a daughter and everybody 
knows her so well. Yesterday we were watching football27 and all my 
practising brothers were sitting next to her. (…) Life is not black and 
white.  
 
The situation of fundamentalist converts is more complicated. As converts they 
have at least non-Muslim families that they have to interact with. Despite the 
fact that many parents have problems with their turn to Islam the converts 
emphasize that the Islamic code of conduct demands that they respect their 
parents. Thus even though many of their former friendships with non-Muslims 
dilute when they choose Islam, they claim the relation with their non-Muslim 
family to be very important.  
In sum, when considering the interpretation that Pouw gave to his 
lessons about ‘hatred of unbelief’, the beliefs and practices of the fundamentalist 
Muslims in this study are much more nuanced. Concerning the public concern 
about isolationist behaviour the practice of fundamentalist respondents and their 
arguments show that they are more connected to Dutch society and culture and 
have more intensive contact with non-Muslims than one might suspect. 
 
                                                      
27 The interview took place at the time of the European Championship. 
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2.3.3 (Western Liberal) Democracy versus Sharia 
Another principal fear in Western societies is that fundamentalist Muslims 
either work against democracy or advocate its replacement by a system based on 
sharia. The vast majority of the respondents, however, have no problem with 
democracy in the Netherlands. While they criticize certain policies and 
politicians, they argue that the Netherlands is a Western, non-Muslim country. 
They believe that because they choose to reside in this country, they have to 
respect the laws and the accompanying governmental system (also see Balogh et 
al., 2009: 44-45, 51; Moors & Jacobs, 42-43; Roex et al., 2010: 94-95).  
 
FIGURE 2.1 | Topic: How are we supposed to deal with unbelievers? 
 
In this topic the participant Abyad posts Quranic verses that – in his view – prohibit 
friendship with unbelievers. He wonders how Muslims should treat unbelievers and 
whether this should be ‘harsh’. Several participants nuance his contribution by 
arguing that Muslims should be friendly and respectful towards non-Muslims. After 
a while, Umm Moesab al Qoraishiyyah posts a text that she translated and that 
reflects a politically activist Salafi stance about the doctrine of ‘Al-Wala wal-Bara’. 
Hence, this text presents one of the sternest views on rules about contact with 
unbelievers. 
 
Umm Moesab al Qoraishiyyah posts the following message: 
Al-Walaa wal-Baraa - The Character of the Believer, from at-Tawheed  
Publications, Translated by Umm Moesab al Qoraishiyyah 
Another fundamental aspect of our belief is the topic of Al Walaa wal 
Baraa’. This topic if understood correctly clearly distinguishes the kafir 
from the Mu’min (believer) and lays down clear principles with regards to 
the alliance, support and friendship towards the kufar. (….) Al-walaa wal 
baraa’ is divided into two aspects, al-Hubb (love) and al-Bughoud 
(hatred), both of which have to be practised purely for the sake of Allah 
(swt) [swt means ‘glorious is he and he is exalted’]. Al-Hubb means to 
love for the sake of Allah (swt) otherwise known as Muwalaat. Al-
Muwalaat means to accompany, to love, to support, to ally, to help, to 
elevate, to respect and to befriend, all of which must be done for the sake 
of Allah (swt) in the manner that He has commanded. Al-Bughoud, on 
the other hand, is to have hatred for the sake of Allah (swt) also known 
as al-Muadaat, which is the complete opposite of muwalaat. Hence the 
requirement upon the believers is to have muwalaat with the Muslims 
and muadaat against the kufar, to love Allah (swt), the Messenger and 
the Muslims that have hatred for the kufar, to love all that Allah (swt) 
commands us to love and show walaa towards them, to have no rejection 
or animosity towards a command of Allah (swt) and to hate all that Allah 
(swt) hates together with those who hate Allah (swt) and the believers. 
“O you who believe, do not take unbelievers as friends in preference to 
the Believers. Do you wish to give Allah a clear proof against you?” 
[Surat an-Nisa, 144] 
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Criticism of Western National Politics 
The respondents, converted or raised as Muslim alike,28 are critical of Western 
politics and politicians. In their view anti-Islamic policies and legislation lead to 
the unjust treatment of Muslims. On the national level the Dutch respondents 
criticize mainly politicians with anti-Islamic attitudes, namely Wilders, Hirsi Ali 
and Verdonk.29 The principal criticism concerns the current use of the freedom 
of speech. While the respondents value the right of freedom of speech, they 
argue that this right should also apply to Muslims and that it should not be 
interpreted as a right to offend. Marid, who was raised as a Muslim and turned 
to a fundamentalist interpretation, is one of the respondents who argues that the 
Dutch apply double standards to Muslims and non-Muslims: “When I give my 
opinion, I’ll be arrested tomorrow. But if there is a website that says ‘all Muslims 
                                                      
28 And both for respondents with a fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist orientation. 
29 The British respondents criticize the political viewpoints of the right-wing BNP (British National 
Party). 
Later on she adds in a milder tone:  
[It] does not mean that one should not invite the kufar in a friendly way 
to Islam, because the Messenger of Allah, salla Allahu ‘alayhi wa sallam, 
was open against the kufar in his declaration against their kufr and he 
was open in his hatred and his animosity against them and this did not 
obstruct him, salla Allahu ‘alahi wa sallam, to invite them to Islam in a 
soft, mild manner as a good example. (….) They have to know that you 
reject unbelief, like you said, that ungratefulness that unbelievers have. 
But this does coincide with a just treatment and a friendly invitation to 
Islam. Does this make it clearer? 
 
While the topic starter Abyad follows her opinion, there are several participants who 
disagree. Some are non-Muslims who state that Abyad and Umm Moesab confirm 
their fear of Islam. There are also Muslims, however, who contradict the texts of 
Umm Moesab. 
Participant ‘On fire’ argues, for example: “I also have a friend that wasn’t a believer 
and exactly because I was friends with her, I told her about Islam and now she is 
gaining knowledge about it and she wants to convert inshallah” 
 
Also Battle_4_Peace criticizes Umm Moesab’s interpretation:  
You should take "Wala" and "Bara" matters from the Ulama’, and not 
from little .doc or .pdf documents, written by juhaal and self-crowned 
‘shakes’. Imam Muslim cites Ibn Sirien who said that knowledge is 
religion, so he said: “Beware from who you take your religion”. 
Wasalaamu Alaykom Warahmatullaah, 
 
Abyad and Umm Moesab do not respond to these nuances. The discussion ends after 
one more contribution of a person who posts links to www.soennah.com, a site that 
argues Muslims have to treat non-Muslims well. This site also argues against 
terrorism. 
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should die’, then nothing happens”. Naqeeb, also a born-again fundamentalist, is 
one of many who deny that contemporary criticism of Islam and Muslims, like 
that of Wilders, should fall under freedom of speech: 
 
You see that Muslims are pushed into a corner and generalization takes 
place: ‘they are all terrorists’. That’s what you see in the Netherlands the 
past couple of years. Muslims are supposed to accept that the Prophet is 
mocked, that the Quran is ridiculed. (…) That is not freedom of speech, if 
you tell lies and create hate. (…) If, for example, the government fails to 
forbid the slander of religion, and if there are no scholars as a result of 
which youngsters start to react by themselves, then you have a problem.  
 
While Naqeeb – like the majority of the fundamentalist respondents – believes 
that Muslims should react calmly and peacefully he thus warns against a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Another sense in which Naqeeb represents the majority opinion is that 
he does not criticize all politicians. A minority of the fundamentalist respondents 
reject the entire Dutch government. One of them is Maysa who argues 
politicians lack capacity. She describes the government as consisting of incapable 
politicians: “the level is dropping. Everybody can get into it nowadays”.  
Online arguments from both positions are present. The general 
atmosphere among the online participants corresponds with that of the other 
Muslims in this study: an atmosphere of frustration. Muslimrose says, for 
example: “It seems at present that you only make the news if you have something 
to say about that ‘damned’ Islam. Like…boys, I’d like to give an impulse to my 
career!” 
 
Opinions about Democracy  
The fundamentalist respondents that are most critical of the government also 
express the strongest opposition to democracy. Whereas all fundamentalist 
respondents criticize democracy for its human laws, the way this critical minority 
speaks about democracy shows anger about the way in which democratic 
countries like the Netherlands and the United States treat Muslims. Marid, for 
example, complains about double standards of Western democracies regarding 
Muslims. He argues that “the Dutch are always talking about democracy, but if 
you oblige others to install democracy, what is that?” Nidal confirms the opinion 
of Marid and adds:  
 
The vote of the majority counts and the rest can get screwed. (…) 
Democracy, that’s the laws of the majority. And the majority is stupid. 
(…) Democracy is wrong, but laws can be good. For example, I can’t 
imagine any Muslim who would not agree with traffic regulations.  
 
Nidal does not distinguish between different forms of democracy by, for 
example, only criticizing Western liberal democracies. Instead he and the rest of 
this critical minority express opposition to all democracies. Online they find 
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considerable support in discussions about democracy and Islam that form 
popular topics. In one discussion Qardawi expresses the frustration and sense of 
humiliation that underlies the rejection of democracy: 
 
It is often said that the US is a democratic state, but actually it is a 
barbarian, imperialist, extremist, animalistic, capitalist (…) state… (…) 
Muslims are weak nowadays and don’t have technology. So let’s enjoy and 
start insulting and ridiculing….humanity does not exist in the mentality of 
the materialists!!! Just respect power, not fellow humans. 
  
The remaining respondents express less disapproval of the democratic system. 
Their ideal for the Netherlands is a truly multicultural society where people 
respect one another, regardless of their religion. The respondents with a 
fundamentalist orientation generally believe that life in a democratic society can 
go hand in hand with being a Muslim, as long as they can practise their religion. 
In converted Khadija’s words: “I follow the Dutch law as long as I can pray, do 
Ramadan and choose my own clothing”. If laws would change in such a way that 
they become an obstacle for the respondents’ religious practice, the respondents 
believe that they should leave the country. They do consider it better to live in a 
Muslim country and consequently the majority argues that they should 
eventually emigrate (do hijra). Whereas many respondents thus see a future in a 
Muslim country, they are not trying to realize these plans in the short run. 
Instead, for most it seems a surreal dream for a far away future.  
 
Participation within the Democratic System 
In their everyday practice, the fundamentalist respondents participate in Dutch 
society and sometimes even in the democratic system, such as by voting. There is 
difference of opinion about whether voting is allowed. Some see it as an act of 
shirk, the major sin in Islam, as voting would imply worshipping something else 
than Allah. Nonetheless, some Salafi scholars who advocate this opinion 
explicitly requested Muslims to vote in the 2010 elections because of the rise of 
Wilders. Apparently, the same act can cease to be shirk if it serves a higher 
religious goal, in this case securing the position of Dutch Muslims. There are 
also respondents with a Salafi orientation who consider voting allowed regardless 
of the political circumstances. Muhammad, for example, a loyal student of the 
controversial Ahmed Salam, does not see any problem in voting. He says “when 
I vote, I vote for the Christian Democrats, you can write that down”. 
Alternatively, some consider it allowed to hand in a blank vote to ensure that 
their vote will not be divided between the various political parties. 
Another way in which the fundamentalist respondents participate in the 
democratic system with its human laws is through their study or work. Some do 
a degree in political science or legal studies. Moreover, two Salafi oriented 
respondents work for municipal organizations. In short, the beliefs and practices 
of Muslims with fundamentalist views are not as univocal as they seem. The 
answer to a question that Abu Ismaiel, a popular lecturer of the As-Soennah 
mosque, gave during one of his classes summarizes the point of view of the 
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respondents. When asked for an opinion about working for the Dutch 
government he says “Why not? You’ve chosen to live here”. 
 
The Islamic State as Far Ideal 
Despite their adaptation to the Dutch system, the fundamentalist respondents 
see a true Islamic state based on sharia as ultimate ideal. With a few exceptions, 
none of them want such a state in the Netherlands. Anna, a fundamentalist 
convert, upholds this opinion “I myself as a Muslim am an advocate of an Islamic 
state, but as a Dutch person I’m not. I live together with many non-Muslims, 
Christians, Hindus and then this form of government, democracy, is best”. The 
fundamentalist respondents do see the Islamic state as a utopian ideal for 
Muslim countries. They argue that there hardly are, if any, true Islamic states in 
the world, because of the incorrect implementation of the sharia. They criticize 
Islamic governments for being corrupted and the leaders for being puppets of the 
United States. Only few of the respondents, however, consider this their personal 
concern. In general the answers reflect an abstract awareness of the religious 
requirement of an Islamic state. The limited ideas that they have about how, 
where and when such a state should be realized, indicate that the Islamic state is 
hardly an issue in their everyday life.  
A couple of respondents with a more political orientation form 
exceptions to this common position and see the sharia also as the ideal form of 
government for the Netherlands. During our first interview Nidal argues, for 
example, “as Muslims here we have the task to clarify our message to make 
people want sharia too”. Online this viewpoint receives some more support. 
Rechtuit says, for example, in an online discussion “sharia is the best solution for 
the problem of mankind”.30 Nonetheless, when Nidal and I get to talk about this 
topic three years later, he has changed his opinion. He has come to see it as 
unrealistic to install an Islamic state in a country where the majority is non-
Muslim and thus believes it better to realize such a state in a Muslim country. 
 
Realizing the Islamic State 
In practice the realization of an Islamic state seems to be of (even) less personal 
concern. Overall the fundamentalist respondents and several participants in 
online discussions only express the intention to migrate once a truly Islamic state 
is there. Even Hujjat, a convert and member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (a movement 
with the installation of an Islamic state as its principal reason for being) intends 
to only go and help when the Islamic state has already been proclaimed. Until 
then he sees it as his task to fight an intellectual battle by spreading the word of 
Islam and convincing others of the need of an Islamic state. In that respect even 
the most activist respondent when it comes to the Islamic state shows a kind of 
‘armchair activist’ practice.  
                                                      
30 Yet, online discussions also reflect the strongest opposition to the sharia by Muslim participants 
who consider sharia to be a system of the past. 
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2.3.4 International Issues and Jihad 
Since 9/11 the principal concern regarding the Muslim population in Western 
non-Muslims societies such as the Netherlands has been the interpretation of 
jihad. Studies on radicalization of Western Muslims limit their focus to the 
question whether respondents are in favour of (violent) jihad to change society or 
not (e.g. Abbas, 2007; Buijs et al., 2006; de Poot & Sonnenschein, 2009; Moors 
& Jacobs, 2009; Slootman & Tillie, 2006). As a result, these studies show a 
rather simplistic view concerning the issue of jihad, as if there is only one type of 
jihad and they largely neglect the difference of opinion about the conditions of 
jihad. The respondents in this study demonstrate that there are quite some 
nuances in support for jihad.  
All participants, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist alike, say that 
they feel the pain of their Muslim brothers and sisters who are suffering from 
wars and war crimes – most notably in Palestine – and corruption of Islamic 
governments. The politically aware respondents criticize both Muslim 
governments and the hypocrisy of Western countries, particularly the United 
States. In their view Western countries support dictatorial regimes for power and 
oil, but when these regimes fail to act in accordance with Western interests, the 
West wants to replace these governments in the name of democracy, if necessary 
through undemocratic means. From their viewpoint Muslims suffer as a 
consequence of such complex political games. Online a typical example of this 
argument takes place when an Islam critic called GalietBaconEter argues “Islam 
has never been peaceful so far it has been a large bloodshed with those Muslims. 
Islam is standing up to its ankles in blood”. To this criticism participant, 
Salaheddinne, responds: 
 
You’ve seen that very well baconeater…. And indeed in the blood of her own 
people of which so much has been spilt by Western imperialists and Zionists. 
Islam has unfortunately never been offered the chance to flourish peacefully, not 
by the West nor by radical groups such as the Taliban. 
 
Yet, opinions differ regarding which of the Muslim and Western parties involved 
are principally responsible for causing and solving these problems. More 
importantly for this study, opinions differ about the right response. Regarding 
the matter of violent jihad the respondents’ reports show three main categories of 
opinions. These opinions involve the promotion of 1) a reserved approach, 2) 
local defensive jihad or 3) global defensive and/or offensive jihad. Although in 
Islamic doctrine a distinction is made between defensive and offensive jihad, 
most respondents talk about both forms indistinctively.31 Because the differences 
of opinion help to categorize the respondents’ views, this section reviews their 
positions in considerable detail. 
 
                                                      
31 Among Islamic scholars there is quite some disagreement about the conditions for defensive and 
offensive jihad. A review of these conditions is a theological endeavour that goes beyond the scope of 
this study. See Bonney (2004) for an extensive overview of the doctrines of jihad. 
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Reserved Approach 
The first group of Muslims with a reserved attitude forms a minority of (in the 
interviews two male and two female) Muslims with a Salafi orientation.32 The 
global suffering of Muslims does not occupy a major place in their lives. These 
respondents argue that they feel bad for their brothers and sisters or pray for 
them whenever they find themselves confronted with their misery. They do not, 
however, actively search for images and stories about international injustices and 
some of them doubt if jihad in countries like Iraq and Palestine is legitimate. 
This lack of certitude about the justifications of jihad has various reasons. One 
reason is that they focus on doing non-violent jihad in the literal sense of 
‘striving on the way of God’. They do not consider violent jihad their personal 
concern. Another reason is that they believe that not all conditions for violent 
jihad are fulfilled, such as it being for Allah and under Islamic leadership. Her 
turn from a moderate interpretation to Salafism convinced Ava of this group’s 
argument: 
 
Look, they aren’t fighting for Allah! They don’t have…jihad is a battle for 
Allah. That is not about oil, about people, about power, about land. It’s 
not about that. And they really don’t fight for Allah. (…) Where is a holy 
war at this time? The war in Iraq was also for power. That’s about money, 
it’s about…I mean, people who slaughter each other, people with suicide 
missions that is no holy war. (…) Sometimes it is maybe justifiable if you 
are under attack and that you defend yourself, but even then there are 
rules regarding how [you defend yourself]. And how you…no, yes, for me 
it is simply something that really does not concern me. 
  
These fundamentalist respondents believe that Muslims’ misery is a test and a 
punishment for the deteriorated state of the ummah. In their view suffering will 
stop when Muslims rebuild the ummah by starting to improve and gaining 
Islamic knowledge as individual members. In their view it is wiser to try and 
reason with the rulers, because violence only worsens the situation. 
An online contribution of Lieveling indicates that this stand is not 
popular among the online participants. When she asks critically where in the 
world an actual violent jihad is taking place and how it can be that no Islamic 
leader has called for such jihad, other participants refuse to clearly answer her. 
The only response she gets is the comment ‘turn on your tv’ and a questioning of 
her Muslimhood.  
                                                      
32 It is very well possible that some of the women in the mosque also have this opinion. The 
conversations about jihad in the mosques, however, were usually limited to whether or not terrorism 
and violence are legitimate. The fine nuances between the first and second category did not become 
sufficiently clear during the observations.  
In the online discussions the reserved position also seems rare. This could in part be because those 
who are not concerned with violent jihad are likely not to participate in discussions about this topic. 
It could also be that this position is hard to distinguish from the next one without probing, which the 
analysis of online discussions does not allow for. For example, a participant may call for a peaceful 
response to Wilders, but then it remains unclear what the participant thinks about other situations, 
such as that of Palestine. 
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Local Defensive Jihad 
The second category consists of over two-thirds of the fundamentalist and the 
non-fundamentalist respondents, plus the women I spoke to in the Dutch 
mosques about this issue and many participants in online discussions. These 
respondents do express support for local, defensive jihad. Yet, the conditions 
under which and with which means they consider such jihad allowed are similar 
to the conditions and means Western states have laid down in international law 
for a ‘just war’. 
Regarding the conditions, they share the just-war argument that 
violence is only allowed as self-defence when under attack. The most common 
just-war arguments are the right to defend one’s family and Muslim community, 
and the restriction to only fight military forces and not innocent civilians (e.g. 
Elshtain, 2002). Non-fundamentalist Labeeb’s words are representative for this 
position: 
 
Islam is against killing innocent citizens. But if a country is under attack, 
it is self-defence. The Prophet has been expelled from Mecca, but he 
didn’t do anything, it wasn’t self-defence under those conditions. Thus 
jihad is when you are at war and when you’re under attack. Then you can 
defend yourself against the attackers, the soldiers. 
 
Similarly, in an online discussion about Israel and Palestine Jamie_3, a female 
participant, writes in response to some anti-Islamic Dutch participants about the 
violence by Palestinians: 
 
What do you want..? They are driven away from their homes, 
systematically murdered and finally, life is made impossible for 
them…They have the right to defend themselves…☺ Go cry, you buggers 
that you are, just heard what the bombardments on Palestine have brought 
about…  
 
Interestingly, especially in online discussions the participants hardly use the term 
jihad and simply talk of ‘war’ and ‘self-defence’, which gives the impression that 
the religious legitimization is not their main concern.  
Within this category there is difference of opinion, however, about 
where such jihad is allowed. Most mention Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan 
and Iraq as legitimate religious battlegrounds. Yet, a couple of respondents argue 
– similar to Ava – that a defensive jihad is not taking place in Palestine, because 
it concerns a fight for land instead of for God. Another few argue that they have 
insufficient knowledge to determine where a defensive jihad is legitimate and 
consider this matter of limited relevance to their own lives.  
In the case of defensive jihad, the respondents contend, this is a plight upon the 
Muslims in the countries where the fight takes place. For Muslims in the West 
they consider it sufficient to support the fight by praying, doing supplications, 
and according to some by sending money, clothes, and the like. Since they 
believe that only Muslims under direct attack have a right of self-defence, they 
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argue that there is no ground for a battle in Western countries. On the contrary, 
they fiercely condemn terrorism as un-Islamic. Moreover, although some claim 
to understand the despair of suffering Muslims, all respondents in this group 
view suicide missions as prohibited by Allah. Summeeyah, for example, explains 
that the attack on the WTC on 9/11 is not an act of jihad with reference to a 
book she read titled ‘O youngsters, with what kind of mind is bombing 
considered jihad’. “The book explains exactly what jihad is. (…) Suicide bombing 
is not allowed anyhow”. She emphasizes that killing women, children, the elderly 
and the handicapped is not allowed either, and then points at the general 
criticism among Muslims in this study to ‘the Western style of warfare’. “Islam is 
very positive towards women. In America it doesn’t interest them whether they 
kill a woman or a kid, as long as it’s dead”.  
 
Global Defensive and/or Offensive Jihad 
Finally, the few who advocated a transnational jihad at the time of the interview 
present a more black and white vision of wars involving Muslim countries.33 
These six respondents (three male and three female, of whom one male and one 
female convert) and several online discussants consider all such fights jihad in the 
sense of holy war. They believe that any Western country with military forces in 
Muslim countries is part of a war that the West under the lead of the United 
States waged against Islam. Because of the military involvement of Western 
countries and the resulting misery of Muslims they consider it legitimate or even 
obligatory to attack the responsible foreign powers on Western territory. When 
making their case they present common just-war arguments, but they adopt a 
broader interpretation of self-defence. In addition, most of them consider suicide 
attacks against civilians allowed. In line with their argumentation, these 
respondents admit that they are supportive of Al Qaeda and consider Bin Laden 
a hero. For example, despite the fierce criticism of the majority of the online 
discussants, a female participant, Roosje_70, states:34 
 
I think Osama bin Laden a real man. At least he does something. Where 
are the real Islamic men? They are simply watching how our brothers die 
in the Palestinians, in Iraq and the like. If only there were more men like 
him. 
 
In line with their support for Al Qaeda, they are predominantly positive about 
events like those of 9/11, the London bombings and the murder of Theo van 
Gogh. Maysa clearly vocalizes the arguments for violence that these 
fundamentalist Muslims use. She believes that there is no true Islamic state 
anywhere in this world. Until this state is founded, there is no leader who can 
declare jihad. In her view this inevitably leads to chaos, because Muslims have 
the obligation to fight any power that prevents the Islamic state from coming 
                                                      
33 Another two respondents shared the visions of this group of people in the past. 
34 There are quite some grammatical errors in the original quote. For the purpose of readability I have 
only added punctuation and left the sentences incomplete to not risk changing the meaning. 
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into being without such leadership. She claims that there is a verse in the Quran 
that says: “Terrorize them. Allah will punish them by means of your hands. 
Sometimes that is necessary. (…) For us terrorism is defending yourself against 
your enemy, the suppressor. It is allowed and it even is an obligation”. Because 
she believes that the Dutch support the United States, which makes the 
Netherlands an accomplice to the suppression of Muslims and opposition to the 
Islamic state, she sees the Netherlands as a legitimate target for attacks. She 
argues that the ends of their fight justify the terrorist means, to which she adds: 
“We don’t have an army of weapons, so then you use an airplane or yourself”. In 
her view most attacks are directed at the government and not at women and 
children. Marid is one of the few respondents who mentions explicitly that he 
does not support violence against civilian targets, such as women and children. 
He argues that the Quran prohibits this.35 Thus, there is some difference of 
opinion about who should be the target. 
Regarding these attitudes two nuances are important to make, though. 
Firstly, in terms of putting believes into behavioural practice, none of the 
respondents in this category saw themselves as ‘strong’ enough to actually take up 
arms or they felt it to be sufficient to contribute to the battle indirectly, which 
appears to correspond with their ‘passive’ practice over the years of this study. 
The participants in online discussions show a similar passive promotion of 
violence. Whereas they copy and paste texts of advocates for violent jihad in the 
West, they do not show an intention of acting on their beliefs. They glorify 
Islamic fighters like Osama bin Laden and call for others to support them, 
seemingly also more in words than in illegitimate deeds. This causes them to 
receive labels such as ‘keyboard terrorists’ from other online participants. Some of 
the interview respondents even describe their online ideological allies as young, 
ignorant Muslims with great boast, but little roast.  
Secondly, also convictions concerning the doctrine of violent jihad 
evolve. A couple of the respondents that initially supported terrorist violence 
have changed their opinion and came to condemn it. Among the respondents 
who still support terrorism, there are also some who had a slight change of mind. 
A few years after our first interview, Nidal, for example, still considers violent 
jihad legitimate in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, he has come to realize that 
violence decreases support from other Muslims. Furthermore, he has developed 
more respect for Muslim governments since he has come to understand that it is 
hard to be a truly Islamic state. He thus demonstrates a slightly more tolerant 
and patient attitude, which he attributes to him becoming older. He also admits 
that he no longer believes in the realization of a true Islamic state during his own 
lifetime.  
 
In short, the dominant viewpoint among the Muslims in this study – regardless 
of their religious orientation (non-fundamentalist or fundamentalist) and some 
                                                      
35 Yet, what he considers a civilian appears to differ from the mainstream view. For example, when 
asked about his opinion about the murder of van Gogh he does not want to answer the question, but 
does express that van Gogh was not a normal civilian in his view.  
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changes of thought over time – is that violent jihad can only take place under 
strict conditions. Most use common just-war arguments of self-defence against 
military forces. The vast majority of the participants in this study consider 
violence against other than military targets as well as suicide bombings in 
Western countries un-Islamic. Altogether, only a minority of the fundamentalist 
respondents promote violence in the Netherlands and among them opinions 
differ about whom to target. Over the years the attitudes of some of the violently 
inclined respondents have become milder and none have put their ideas fully into 
practice. 
 
 
2.4 Moderate Muslims versus Orthodox, Radical, and Extremist 
Fundamentalists 
The question that remains for this final section is how the beliefs discussed in the 
former section could help to categorize the respondents. Evidently, as the variety 
of attitudes confirms, it does not suffice to simply distinguish between moderate 
and fundamentalist Muslims. Moreover, the distinction between purist, political 
and jihadi Salafis (see Section 2.2.2) cannot serve us, because of the non-Salafi, 
fundamentalist respondent of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the nuances that Salafi 
oriented respondents make concerning the doctrine of jihad and which do not fit 
these categories. Instead this study distinguishes between three fundamentalist 
attitudes: orthodoxy, radicalism and extremism.  
The use of these terms is far from new. In their leading work on radicalization 
among Dutch Muslims Buijs et al. (2006) have clearly described radicalism and 
extremism, which they distinguish from orthodoxy. For Islamic radicalism they 
mention six cumulative characteristics:  
 
It is mainly characterized by the conviction that: 1) Islam in modern 
society is marginalized and threatened with extinction; 2) many civil rulers 
contribute to this situation and that distrust and resistance against them 
and their social-political order is therefore legitimate; 3) most religious 
leaders accept the loss of the central place of religion in society and thus 
betray the religious foundations; 4) the foundations of religion have to be 
restored by returning to traditional religious norms and values and a 
scripturalist reading of the Quran; 5) the own religion is superior and 
should in fact be the basis of society and the state, and should be the 
political guideline; 6) the true believer should play an active role in the 
realization of the desired society and taking action is a matter of great 
urgency (Buijs et al., 2006: 15).  
 
They describe Islamic extremism as having another three features in addition to 
these six characteristics: 
 
7) the ultimate objective, the desired ideal society and the realization of 
the rule of Allah, is formulated in absolute, utopian terms, that is, as a 
goal that legitimizes in principle all means; 8) the unity and superiority of 
the believers is emphasized and the opponent is demonized; whereby the 
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controversy between the powers of Good and Evil, between the party of 
God and the party of the devil, are made absolute; 9) a specific 
interpretation of jihad is propagated, namely that it is the duty of all 
Muslims to apply any means possible in the battle against Evil and to 
realize the good society (Buijs et al., 2006: 15).  
 
It becomes clear from these descriptions that to be a radical or extremist one has 
to have an activist attitude and commit oneself to one’s cause; radicals and 
extremists see it as their personal responsibility to bring about fundamental social 
change.  
Yet, I argue that earlier studies on Islamic radicalization in the 
Netherlands have applied these terms with insufficient accuracy.36 These studies 
see support for jihad and the promotion of an Islamic state as signs of radicalism 
(e.g. Balogh et al., 2009; Buijs et al., 2006; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Roex et al., 
2010). Thereby they neglect several complications. The main complication 
concerns the transnational and glocal dimensions of the contemporary world. As 
a result of these dimensions some problematic questions are: Should one 
consider it radical if Western Muslims believe violent jihad in a Muslim country 
like Palestine to be justified while using common just-war arguments? And 
should one consider it radical if Western Muslims see an Islamic state in a 
Muslim country as the ultimate ideal because they believe sharia to be better than 
liberal or other forms of democracy? The argument of the remainder of this 
chapter is that it is required to take a closer look at the attitudes of 
fundamentalist Muslims in order to be able to categorize their views in such ideal 
types as those of Buijs et al. (2006). 
 For this reason, Figure 2.1 summarizes the respondents’ attitudes, as 
follows from the interviews and conversations.37 This table categorizes these 
attitudes on the basis of the characteristics that Buijs et al. have given of 
radicalism and extremism. However, unlike Buijs et al., the table distinguishes 
the respondents’ attitudes regarding, on the one hand, Western society and, on 
the other hand, certain Muslim societies. Furthermore, the table compares 
radical and extremist attitudes to ‘orthodox’ and ‘moderate’ attitudes.38 
‘Moderate’ is a label that is common to denote a more latitudinarian 
interpretation of Islam. In sum, the table reflects how this study categorizes the 
respondents on the basis of the nuances in their opinions. These categories – 
moderate, orthodox, radical, and extremist – are ideal types, because there also is 
minor variation of opinion within these categories. Moreover, as the change in 
attitude of some of the respondents demonstrates, these categories are not static: 
                                                      
36 See in particular the study of van den Bos et al. (2009) which appears to apply the label ‘radical’ to 
certain Salafis without sufficient ground.  
37 The respondents were not literally asked for their opinion about the nine criteria of Buijs et al. 
(2006). Instead, I have deduced these opinions from their answers in retrospect. 
38 Esposito (2005) criticizes the fact that non-Muslims tend to apply the term ‘moderate Muslims’ to 
Muslims having similar pro-multicultural views as themselves. He believes that also traditionalist and 
conservative Muslims can be moderate in the sense that they reject extremism. This study, however, 
uses the term orthodoxy to cover the conservative and traditionalist viewpoints that are non-radical 
and non-extremist. 
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some respondents changed from extremist to moderate views, and from 
moderate to orthodox. One converted respondent, Reza, even turned from 
extremist to moderate to orthodox over the course of this study. For the purpose 
of clarity, the following sections summarize the attitudes of these ideal types.  
 
2.4.1 Moderate 
The label ‘moderate’ applies to the respondents who adopt more latitudinarian 
interpretations of religious texts to suit modern life. These respondents try to see 
Islam in its socio-historical context.39 This view leads to room for some 
adaptations and innovations. As mentioned before, this position differs from the 
various fundamentalist ones. Attitudes that reflect a moderate approach to Islam 
are a limited emphasis on absolute truth, a less strict interpretation of rules, no 
objections to interacting with non-Muslims, the view that democracy and Islam 
are reconcilable, and little interest in the form and realization of an Islamic state. 
They believe it to be unproblematic for Muslims to live in non-Muslim 
countries. Finally, the moderate Muslims in this study argue that fights in 
countries like Palestine are legitimate on the basis of just-war arguments like 
self-defence and they hardly base their argument on the religious doctrine of 
jihad. 
 
2.4.2 Orthodox 
The orthodox Muslims in this study consider it – in theory – best for Muslims to 
interact with fellow Muslims. Moreover, they see the Islamic state and sharia as 
the ultimate ideal and thus prefer the Islamic state over democracy for Muslim 
countries. Yet, they claim no role for themselves in realizing this Islamic state 
other than by being good Muslims in their daily life. They attempt to strengthen 
the global Muslim community from the bottom-up and on a local level. They try 
to do so mainly by showing that there is no reason for non-Muslims to be afraid 
of Islam, by doing supplications for fellow Muslims and by trying to please Allah 
in their everyday lives. They present democracy as an appropriate system for 
Western countries and they intend to live in accordance with the Dutch law, 
even though they believe sharia to be better. Some claim to vote. They state it is 
possible to live in a non-Muslim country as long as they can practise their 
religion. Many of them argue that this has become harder due to anti-Islamic 
attitudes since 9/11. Consequently, the majority believes they should eventually 
migrate to a Muslim country. In principle, they consider jihad a legitimate means 
of self-defence against military forces in Muslim countries that attack Muslims, 
but because of their greater focus on rules some of them are critical about 
contemporary battles. They argue that for some of these battles not all conditions 
for jihad are fulfilled such as it being for the sake of Allah.  
 
                                                      
39 I have not discussed their viewpoints in depth, because the focus in this study is on fundamentalist 
Muslims. It therefore suffices to briefly mention what their position is to see how it differs from the 
various fundamentalist positions.  
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2.4.3 Radical and Extremist 
How does one distinguish the positions of the orthodox respondents from those 
of the radical and extremist ones? Concerning social interaction, the radical and 
extremist respondents share the conviction of orthodox Muslims that they should 
preferably interact with Muslims.40 What is different is that they much more 
fiercely reject the liberal, capitalist democracies in the Western countries that 
they live in. Thus, they are principally against liberal democracy and its agents. 
They are equally distrusting of political and religious leaders in Muslim 
countries. They see the fights in various Muslim countries as part of global 
campaign against Islam. In their view Western countries under the lead of the 
United States try to prevent the installation of an Islamic state. They see it as 
their individual duty to take an active role in realizing an Islamic state and end 
the injustices done to fellow Muslims around the globe. Regarding the Islamic 
state, they generally show a pragmatic attitude. Their principal concern is its 
realization in a Muslim country. They believe that a top-down approach by a 
small group that takes the lead is required. The radicals promote a political battle 
in spoken words and in writing in the West, such as the member of Hizb ut-
Tahrir and they reject terrorism, but support the idea of a revolution against 
Muslim governments that they consider insufficiently Islamic and responsible for 
Muslim suppression. They present Western populations as principally ignorant 
victims of dominant powers.  
The extremists, on the contrary, consider it their personal responsibility 
to partake in a violent battle, both in Muslim countries and Western countries 
involved in the conflict. Some of them believe that it is allowed to also target 
citizens, either for the sake of their higher purpose or – in the case of Western 
countries – because citizens ‘are not entirely innocent’. In the view of these 
extremists Western populations are responsible for their democratically elected 
governments and for their failure to learn about Islam, even though they 
simultaneously present Western populations as victims of the media and 
politicians such as Wilders. Yet, they also argue that not all non-Muslims have 
an evil character. 
 
The argument is, in summary, that the distinctive criteria for Islamic radicalism 
and extremism should be 1) a politically activist stance on 2) the basis of 
fundamentalist Islamic viewpoints. In line with these criteria, moderate Muslims 
are not radical, because they lack fundamentalist viewpoints and – in case of the 
respondents – also a politically activist stance. Similarly, orthodox Muslims are 
not radical, because they stay away from political activism. The difference 
between radical and extremist concerns principally the use of violence. In sum, 
legitimating and verbally supporting contemporary battles in certain Muslim 
                                                      
40 Yet, there are fewer people that they consider ‘real Muslims’ as a result of their strict interpretation 
of Islam and the practice of takfir. Chapter 5 will elaborate further on this matter. 
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countries on the basis of common, Western just-war arguments is therefore – in 
itself – insufficient to apply the label ‘radical’, even when the word jihad is used.41  
 
Figure 2.2 represents the positions of the four categories in this study. It shows 
that politically activist or fundamentalist orientations are in themselves 
insufficient to constitute Islamic radicalism and extremism. On the contrary, 
they have to be combined. Furthermore, as mentioned before, these positions are 
not as static and absolute as the figure might suggest. Instead, and of central 
importance, opinions can demonstrate more nuance and change over time.42 
 
FIGURE 2.3 | Political and religious dimensions of moderate, orthodox, radical and 
extremist viewpoints 
 
 
                                                      
41 Based on these definitions one can conclude the following. For one, it is insufficient to call a 
person radical if this person calls it jihad to donate money to an Islamic organization to help 
Palestinian orphans or believes that the Palestinians or Afghans should get their independent Islamic 
state. It is equally insufficient for extremism or radicalism if one believes that Palestinians can defend 
themselves against Israeli soldiers with stones or even guns – in line with just-war arguments – and 
asks others to pray that their suffering will end. Instead, it would be Islamically radical, for example, 
to argue that the battle between Islam and its enemies requires financial support for the sake of non-
violently realizing a ‘true’ Islamic state in a Muslim country. Similarly, seeing it as a personal duty or 
calling for others to participate in the violent jihad against the enemies of Islam in Iraq or the 
Netherlands would be examples of Islamic extremism. 
42 The size of the categories in the figure does not represent the number of respondents in this study, 
but it symbolizes – not on scale – the estimated size of each group in Dutch society. As discussed, 
research indicates that the largest group is moderate. According to previous studies, only a small 
group has fundamentalist viewpoints, and even less Dutch Muslims are believed to have adopted 
radical and extremist beliefs. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has clarified how to conceptualize Islamic fundamentalism, what 
support for Islamic fundamentalist views there is in the Netherlands, and how to 
categorize the Muslims in this study on the basis of the differences in attitudes.  
This chapter has described Islamic fundamentalism as an orientation 
within Islam that is characterized by scripturalism, traditionalism, dualism, and 
millenarianism. According to previous studies, only a small minority of Dutch 
Muslims adopt global fundamentalist ideologies, such as Salafism. Instead of 
turning to Islamic fundamentalism, the majority of Western Muslims construct 
hybrid, liberal Islamic identities in interaction with their local context. On the 
whole, the religiosity of Muslim youngsters in the Netherlands is declining. 
Moreover, within Islamic fundamentalism there are different orientations. The 
main categories that I have distinguished among the fundamentalist respondents 
are orthodox, radical and extremist attitudes. The principal difference between 
these groups is that the orthodox respondents are not political activists, but focus 
on strengthening the Muslim ummah from the bottom up by trying to improve 
as individuals. The radicals and extremists, on the contrary, see it as a personal 
responsibility to become political activists and they want to change society from 
the top down. The extremists distinguish themselves from the radicals by 
accepting all means possible in their striving, including terrorist or non-terrorist 
violence.  
Regarding their practice and attitudes toward non-Muslims, sharia and 
jihad, I have made several observations. Firstly, also within the three 
fundamentalist groups there is variety in attitudes. Secondly, attitudes and 
behaviour do not always correspond. Thirdly, over the course of this study several 
respondents changed their attitudes and behaviour. Overall, the impression is 
that their strict belief system is not as ‘threatening’ as one might expect. 
These initial findings raise many questions. For example, how can one 
explain the differences between some of their words and behaviour? How 
‘foreign’ and hybrid is the Islamic fundamentalist way of life to Western 
lifestyles? And what attracts young Muslims and converts to Islam? Starting with 
the latter question it is these questions that the following chapters address. 
  
  
 
3  
 
CONVERSION AND IDENTITY STRAIN 
 
 
The idea of identity was born out of the crisis of belonging and out of 
the effort it triggered to bridge the gap between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ 
and to lift reality to the standards set by the idea – to remake the reality 
in the likeness of the idea. Identity could only enter the Lebenswelt as a 
task, as an as-yet-unfulfilled task, a clarion call, a duty, and an urge to 
act (Bauman, 2004: 20). 
 
Zygmunt Bauman’s macro-sociological observation reflects some central 
elements that help to explain the turn to Islamic fundamentalism of the Muslims 
in this study. Although Bauman explains the emergence of identity as an idea, 
the importance he attributes to identity, the desire to belong, and the gap 
between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ appears also applicable at the micro and meso level as 
this chapter will demonstrate.  
Considering the importance of ‘identity’ in explaining the respondents’ 
processes of conversion and radicalization (from now on radical conversion), the 
chapter first describes what identity and (radical) conversion are about. Then 
follows a review of existing explanations of conversion to fundamentalism. The 
next section considers the circumstances that incited the respondents’ religious 
quest. How did they become interested in Islam? What turning points occur in 
their development? After a discussion of these questions, the following section 
reflects on how to explain the choice for either moderate, orthodox, or radical 
and extremist views. Finally, this chapter reflects on the role of significant others 
and the strain that the respondents experience concerning their identity.    
Obviously, these topics require an in-depth analysis of the religious 
development of individuals. The online-research and observations did not always 
allow me to go into such depth. This chapter, consequently, results from the 
analysis of the interviews with the 40 respondents and from extensive 
conversations with a little over 25 (mostly orthodox) women during the 
fieldwork.43  
 
 
3.1 Conceptualizing Identity and Radical Conversion: Continuous Processes 
As this and the following two chapters will demonstrate, identity plays an 
important role in the respondents’ turn to Islamic fundamentalism. Then what is 
identity and how do people construct identities? Identity is a controversial term 
                                                      
43 The interviews with the moderate respondents have shed light on the distinctive religious 
development of the fundamentalist respondents. Since the details of the moderate respondents’ 
stories are irrelevant for the purpose of this chapter, the chapter does not contain quotes from their 
interviews. 
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and consequently there are many descriptions of identity. This study approaches 
identity as a process and as something that is always under construction. As a 
result, this study’s definition of identity might contradict people’s personal 
experience of identity, as Erikson indicates in his classic work ‘Identity, Youth 
and Crisis’ (1968). In this book he argues that while people tend to perceive their 
identity as “a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity” 
(Erikson, 1968: 19), identity is the result of an interactive process:  
 
We deal with a process ‘located’ in the core of the individual and yet 
also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in 
fact, the identity of those two identities. (…) The process described is 
always changing and developing: at its best it is a process of increasing 
differentiation and it becomes ever more inclusive as the individual 
grows aware of a widening circle of others significant to him, from the 
maternal person to ‘mankind’ (Erikson, 1968: 22). 
 
By describing identity as such, he recognizes the inherent instability of identity. 
Thus identity is a continuous process, even though people might picture there to 
be a secure and ‘authentic’ self as final outcome of their personal development. 
Similarly, Hall (1996) denies the existence of ‘authentic’ selves and speaks of 
identities as being continuously re-established through a never-ending process of 
identification: 
 
Identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language 
and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we 
are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what we might become, how 
we have been represented and how that bears on how we represent 
ourselves (Hall, 1996: 4).  
 
Moreover, he clarifies identity further by emphasizing that in this interactive 
process of identification identities are established in comparison to what is 
‘other’: 
 
Identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails 
the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to 
the Other, the relation to what is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what 
has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any 
term – and thus its ‘identity’ – can be constructed (Hall, 1996: 4). 
 
In other words, identities only gain meaning thanks to difference, similar to how 
one knows what ‘cold’ means because it differs from ‘warm’, and how one 
determines the meaning of ‘good’ by contrasting it with what is ‘bad’. When 
people construct an image of their own identity, they do this in comparison to 
who/what they consider ‘other’. How identity and the process of identification 
and differentiation relate to Islamic fundamentalism and the respondents’ 
Muslim identities is something that I will return to later in this chapter (and in 
the next two chapters). 
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Scholars also describe the turn to Islamic fundamentalism as a process. Recent 
studies on how and why Dutch Muslims turn to Islamic fundamentalism have 
dealt with this turn in terms of radicalization. Consequently, when scholars 
describe the religious transformation of these Muslims, they emphasize literature 
on the ‘process of radicalization’ while they neglect studies on religious 
conversion. One could argue, though, that the turn to Islamic fundamentalism – 
whether orthodox, radical or extremist – concerns a process of conversion, 
because conversion is a process of “transformation of one’s self concurrent with a 
transformation of one’s basic meaning system” (McGuire, 2002: 73)44 and 
radicalization involves a similar transformation of one’s basic meaning system. In 
sum, this chapter presents research on both Islamic radicalization and 
conversion, as their combination is likely to enlarge the understanding of 
(radical) conversion processes (also see Spalek, 2007). The chapter starts by 
discussing how the process of radicalization takes place. Even though the 
fundamentalist respondents are thus all ‘converts’, I refer – as mentioned before – 
to the respondents from Muslims families as ‘born-again’ Muslims, while I 
reserve the term ‘converts’ for the respondents that are new to Islam.  
 In this process, radicalization studies distinguish clear phases, which 
suggest that radicalization is a linear process that takes considerable time (e.g. 
Sprinzak, 1991; Moghaddam, 2005). In opposition to this image Buijs et al. 
(2006) show that radicals can go through various phases within only a few 
months. Besides, they argue in so many words that radicals can drift45 in and out 
of these phases (Buijs et al., 2006: 239, 275).  Similarly, converts to 
contemporary fundamentalist movements have a record of dropping out after 
                                                      
44 Conversion can take place in various ways. It occurs if one 1) becomes religious after having been 
a-religious, 2) changes from one religion to the other, or 3) adopts a different interpretation within 
the same religion (Paloutzian, 2005). Although broader interpretations of conversion exist that 
include changes in spirituality instead of solely religion (Park, 2005; Rambo, 1993), the narrower 
understanding suffices for the purpose of this study. 
45 I use the term drift in this study, unlike Buijs et al. (2006) did. I have opted for this term, because 
of Matza’s (1964) description of drift. In his view, a delinquent ‘is “an actor neither compelled nor 
committed to deeds nor freely choosing them; neither different in any simple or fundamental sense 
from the law abiding, nor the same; conforming to certain traditions (…) while partially unreceptive 
to other more conventional traditions; and finally, an actor whose motivational system may be 
explored along lines explicitly commended by classical criminology – his peculiar relation to legal 
institutions” (Matza, 1964: 28). As a result of this position of delinquents, Matza argues them to 
‘drift’ between crime and conventionality, whereby they sometimes take one path and at other times 
the other. Obviously, my central focus is not on delinquency, but on various forms of 
fundamentalism. ‘Drift’ is a useful concept, nonetheless, if one exchanges the term ‘delinquent’ for 
‘unconventional’. The respondents display ‘drift’ between the conventional (Western and moderate 
Islamic beliefs and behaviour) and unconventional (Islamic fundamentalist beliefs and behaviour) in 
two senses. First of all, the respondents in this study drift between the conventional and 
unconventional over time. They do so most notably by turning their back to fundamentalism, and by 
adapting or by re-adopting fundamentalist views over time. Second, closer to Matza’s description, 
those who express commitment to their Islamic fundamentalist position also continue to display 
some conventional beliefs and behaviour. Hence, the committed fundamentalist respondents also 
‘drift’ to some extent between the conventional and unconventional. The following chapters will 
demonstrate how this ‘drift’ takes shape.    
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some years (McGuire, 2002: 84, 91-92).46 This general image of variability and 
flexibility corresponds with the process of some of the respondents. These 
respondents went through several turning points, varying from within a year to 
after several decades. Clear examples of such drift are the converts Aarif, Reza, 
Ava and Kaleemah. Reza first converted to Islamic extremism, became a 
moderate Muslim within half a year and a couple of years later he is on the 
orthodox track. Ava started out by converting to moderate Islam and turned to 
orthodox Islam after ten years. Kaleemah also largely fit the description of a 
moderate Muslim for about 25 years until she adopted extremist views. Finally, 
Aarif initially turned to Islamic extremism before becoming an orthodox Muslim 
within about a year. This type of drift, however, is not reserved to the converts in 
this study. Among the born-again Muslims, Moroccan Almahdi had gradually 
adopted some radical beliefs, but returned to a moderate interpretation of Islam 
within a couple of years. Moreover, some of the respondents mentioned that they 
had witnessed some of their orthodox, radical or extremist brothers and sisters 
‘stray off the right path’ over time. The respondents thereby confirm findings of 
scholars on religious conversion such as Austin-Broos (2003: 9), who describes 
conversion as “continuing and practised”. In this sense, the process of (radical) 
conversion does not differ from other human action, about which Cohen (1965) 
says: 
 
Human action, deviant or otherwise, is something that typically 
develops and grows in a tentative, groping, advancing, backtracking, 
sounding-out process. People taste and feel their way out. People taste 
and feel their way along. They begin an act and do not complete it. 
They start doing one thing and end up by doing another. They extricate 
themselves from progressive involvement or become further involved to 
the point of commitment (Cohen, 1965: 8-9).  
 
Despite conversion and radicalization being processes, conversion studies 
demonstrate that converts make their turn suddenly known by adopting certain 
symbols or rituals. For Muslim women, for example, this could be taking on an 
Islamic name and wearing the veil, which most of the female respondents did. 
For men, it could be by wearing traditional clothes and suddenly going to the 
mosque. Such turns usually take place after concrete triggering events and in late 
adolescence or young adulthood (Austin-Broos, 2003; Rambo, 1992, 1993; 
Erikson, 1968; McGuire, 2002: 83; Ullman, 1989). Two respondents form an 
exception to the general age, because their conversion did not take place until 
their late twenties.47 For approximately a quarter of the respondents there were 
clearly observable events that stirred up their lives and apparently triggered their 
conversion process. This is particularly true for the converts. The other three 
quarters of the respondents sketch an image of a gradual development. 
                                                      
46 Disengagement is also a process that takes place through different phases. It takes place either 
voluntary or forced, individually or collectively (e.g. Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Bovenkerk, 2010). 
47 The cases of principally the older respondents confirm, though, that there can be different turning 
points in a lifetime, sometimes involving a conversion within Islam.  
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How this development continuously takes shape in their everyday lives is a 
matter of discussion in the next chapters. This chapter continues with the 
triggering events and resulting turning points in the respondents’ conversion 
process, which are related to the next topic: explanations of (radical) conversion.  
 
 
3.2 Existing Explanations for Conversion to Orthodox, Radical and Extremist 
Islam  
What is already known about why Western Muslims adopt Islamic 
fundamentalist views? What can explain the respondents’ (radical) conversion 
processes? Literature which tries to explain the phenomena of orthodox, radical 
and extremist Islam demonstrates again that radicalization and conversion 
studies are separate scholarly fields. Moreover, and possibly as a result, most 
explanations focus on radicalization and hardly discuss orthodox Islam as a 
distinct phenomenon. This section discusses the findings of previous studies by 
first addressing the matters that contribute to the cognitive opening of 
individuals that makes them want to convert. Subsequently, it discusses the 
attractions of religious views and fundamentalist views in particular. The final 
part of this section presents the explanatory models that scholars have developed 
on the basis of existing explanations.  
 
3.2.1 The Desire to Convert 
Previous research has demonstrated that radicalization and religious conversion 
require a cognitive opening. For the creation of such a cognitive opening, 
radicalization and conversion studies mention similar contributing factors. This 
section presents the factors that scholars have distinguished on the level of 
individuals, interpersonal relations and the broader social context. 
On the individual level previous studies mention two types of factors: 
either relating to an identity crisis or to personal pathology. Above all terrorism 
studies have searched for evidence of personal pathologies. However, on the basis 
of this research scholars criticize the assumption that there are pathological roots 
of radicalization (Bjørgo, 2005; Crenshaw, 2000; Ellens, 2002; Horgan, 2005; 
McCauley, 2002; Ruby, 2002; Victoroff, 2005; Weatherston & Moran, 2003). 
Regarding identity crisis, studies on religious conversion have a different focus 
from radicalization studies in terms of what constitutes the identity crisis and 
fosters the cognitive opening. Conversion studies view personal experiences of 
loss and suffering as responsible for an identity crisis. Examples of such events 
are the death of relatives and personal failure through ‘deviant’ behaviour, such as 
drugs and alcohol abuse. These experiences can lead to an instable, negative self-
image and – as a result – an identity crisis (e.g. Buijs et al., 2006; Hamm, 2008; 
Lifton, 2007; McGuire, 2002: 78, 80-81; Paloutzian, 2005: 336-337; Rambo, 
1993; Wohlrab-Sahr, 2006).  Since religion is argued to offer a sense of identity 
(Aldridge, 2007; Hunt, 2005; McGuire, 2002; Meyer & Moors, 2006; and for 
Islam e.g. LeVine, 2003; Mandaville, 2004; Schmidt, 2004; Yang & Ebaugh, 
2001), these scholars see conversion as a response to an identity crisis. Although 
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some radicalization research also views personal loss and suffering as origins of 
identity crisis (e.g. Arena & Arrigo, 2006), scholars of radicalization usually 
frame the identity crisis as being of a ‘multicultural’ nature. Recent studies in the 
Netherlands and Europe on radical Islam, for example, focus on second-
generation Muslim immigrants and present the crisis as resulting from life in a 
diasporic community and the generational gap between them and their parents 
(Abbas, 2005, 2007; Buijs et al., 2006; de Koning, 2008; Lewis, 2007; Lifton, 
2007; Mirza et al., 2007; Roy, 2004; Werbner, 2004).  
Research findings concerning the interpersonal level show that the 
desire to belong, and thus to have a social (or group) identity can motivate people 
to convert or radicalize. Conversion studies argue that membership of a 
community forms an important motivation for conversion (Jenkins, 2004, 
chapter 10; Wohlrab-Sahr, 2006). Radicalization studies also pay attention to 
interpersonal relations, but they emphasize group pressure instead of the group’s 
attraction. For that reason there is a body of literature on network theories to 
explain the coming into existence and the functioning of radical networks 
(Sageman, 2004, 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2005 and in Sageman’s footsteps Bakker, 
2006; Bokhari, Hegghammer, Lia, Nesser & Tønnessen, 2006; Gartenstein-
Ross & Grossman, 2009; Thayer, 2005). In some of these studies the new 
‘recruits’ come across as rather innocent and ignorant victims of indoctrination by 
– generally foreign – radicals who present themselves as scholars of Islam (van 
Leeuwen, 2005). This rather deterministic view of the recruits contradicts 
voluntarist or rational choice assumptions for participation in these movements 
(e.g. Ross, 1993). Sageman (2004, 2008) argues that there is no support for 
recruitment in the sense of ‘brainwashing’ (cf. Yinger, 1982: 241, for the 
‘recruitment’ by religious countercultures and Silke, 2006, for suicide terrorism). 
Instead of being indoctrinated by these movements, individuals choose to 
become a member because they have a cognitive opening and start seeking, as 
Wiktorowicz (2005: chapter 2) puts it. On the interpersonal level this opening 
relates – according to some – to parental pedagogical failures (van San, 
Sieckelinck & de Winter, 2010). In line with Sageman’s criticism of the 
brainwashing argument, conversion studies warn against deterministic views (e.g. 
Hexham & Poewe, 1997; McGuire, 2002). These studies confirm that 
individuals are not victims of external (or internal) forces, but are active actors in 
their conversion process. 
Explanations on the societal level involve structural factors. These vary 
from the socio-economic position of religious groups to international politics. 
Radicalization studies in particular emphasize these factors, but conversion 
studies also mention structural factors (e.g. Sims Bainbridge, 1992). 
Radicalization can be fuelled by experiences of structural unemployment, 
suppression, social exclusion, injustice, discrimination, international wars and the 
like (Abdullah, 2007; Bin Sayeed, 1995; Bovenkerk, 2009; Devji, 2008; 
Langman, 2005; Marranci, 2007; Meertens, Prins & Doosje, 2006; Mirza et al., 
2007; Nesser, 2006; Oliveti, 2002; Patel, 2007; Shaw, 2002; van den Bos et al., 
2009; Young, 2007). In addition, to explain the emergence of Islamic 
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fundamentalist views, scholars have highlighted global factors such as 
globalization, capitalism and consumerism (Barber, 1995; Castells, 1997; 
LeVine, 2003; Mandaville, 2004; Patel, 2007; Roy, 2004; Young, 2007). 
Furthermore, these modern developments contribute to the difficulties and 
differences of opinion within Muslim communities that fuel radical Islamic 
movements (Cottee, 2006: 156; Silvestri, 2007).  
According to conversion studies such structural factors make individuals 
aware of the failure of their current meaning system, which fosters a feeling of 
crisis (Bailey Gillespie, 1991; McGuire, 2002: 80; Rambo, 1992 and 1993; Sims 
Bainbridge, 1992). Radicalism research also uses crisis-like terminology, but in 
relation to what they see as a failing socio-political system. Dutch radicalization 
studies describe the character of this crisis as principally a loss of confidence in 
political (and/or religious) structures and eventually a crisis of these structures’ 
legitimacy (most notably Buijs et al., 2006, with reference to Sprinzak, 1991). If 
the resulting doubt affects one’s religious worldview, one could become open to 
conversion (Paloutzian, 2005: 336). McGuire (2002: 77) emphasizes that one 
has to take all factors into account without unjustly valuing one over the other.  
 
3.2.2 The Temptation of Fundamentalist Interpretations 
The factors mentioned in the above section help to create a cognitive opening for 
(radical) conversion. But what does Islamic fundamentalism have to offer to 
individuals with a cognitive opening? To answer this question, this section 
discusses previous lessons about the attractions of Islamic fundamentalism. To 
begin with, religion in general is argued to respond to certain human desires and 
needs. It provides meaning, identity, spiritual experiences and a sense of 
belonging through rituals and symbols (e.g. McGuire, 2002: 15-22). Further, 
regarding Islam in particular, some authors argue that it provides an identity for 
uprooted Muslim youngsters in Western countries who experience alienation and 
discrimination. Roy contends, for example, that:  
 
Islam might bring happiness, or at least reconcile the believer with 
himself, by healing a self divided between faith and materialist 
aspirations, between tradition and modernity, between what sometimes 
seems a desolate life and the search for dignity and self-esteem. (…) 
Islamic revivalism goes hand in hand with a modern trend: the culture 
of self. (…) Islam is presented as a cure for suffering, with the aim of 
‘finding peace’ (Roy, 2004: 187, 193-194).   
 
Even though Roy (2004: 193) links this culture of self to more moderate 
interpretations of Islam, such as Sufism, research on (the) sociology (of religion) 
indicates that Islamic fundamentalist movements could especially offer 
reconciliation for the identity problems that Roy sketches. Almond, Appleby & 
Sivan (2003) label fundamentalism as ‘strong religion’ and Hunt (2005) and 
Aldridge (2007: 122) as ‘faiths of certainty’ (also see Towler, 1984: 107). Their 
descriptions point to one of the main attractions of fundamentalism, namely the 
strong identity it offers (Aldridge, 2007: 136; Castells, 1997: 13; Hunt, 2005, 
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chapter 7). Moreover, McGuire (2002) explains the magnetism of absolute 
visions by their dualist and millenarianist character. The appeal of dualism and 
millenarianism supposedly follows from the anomie that people are confronted 
with as a consequence of globalization, fluidity and increasing pluralism in 
modern times (McGuire, 2002: 39-49). Fundamentalist views could especially 
offer certainty to ethnic groups that have migrated to Western countries. By 
establishing clear boundaries with other groups, fundamentalist views confirm 
the identity of immigrants who have to find their way in materialist and liberal 
Western societies while facing pluralism and secularizing tendencies within their 
own religious communities. In addition, such views seem to provide Muslim 
immigrants a way out of the conflicting loyalties of religion, culture and 
nationality by subordinating these loyalties to loyalty to the global ummah 
(Aldridge, 2007: 122-125; Hamid, 2007b; Hunt, 2005: chapter 7; Roy, 2004; 
Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009; Shaw, 2002: 55).  
Previous research on either radicalization or religious conversion does 
not explain the difference in attraction between orthodox and radical or extremist 
views. Explanations are limited to fundamentalism in general being attractive for 
offering a strong religion and identity. Furthermore, previous research suggests 
that orthodoxy could prevent Muslims from radicalizing (Almond et al., 2003; 
Awan, 2007).  
 
3.2.3 Explanatory Models and Links with (Criminological) Theories 
Altogether, research has brought forward a vast amount of explanatory factors for 
conversion and radicalization. Various scholars have attempted to put these 
explanations in perspective, particularly regarding radicalization. Some studies 
evaluate these factors (e.g. Bjørgo, 2005; Crenshaw, 2000; Precht, 2007; 
Sageman, 2008; van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). Other researchers have built 
integrative models in which they incorporate different types of explanatory 
factors (e.g. Post, Ruby & Shaw, 2002a and b; Ross, 1993). The model of Post, 
Ruby and Shaw is probably one of the most inclusive ones, as it integrates 
psychological, group and socio-structural factors.  
 Alternatively, scholars have linked the explanatory factors to existing 
(criminological) theories. Several academics show how extremist groups justify 
their actions in a way comparable to the neutralization techniques that Sykes and 
Matza (1957) developed (e.g. Kittrie, 2000; O’Boyle, 2002; Rapoport & 
Alexander, 1982). Other research focuses on the subcultural qualities of extremist 
groups and their group dynamics (e.g. Alimi, 2006; Hamm, 1993, 2004; Klatch, 
2004; Verkaaik, 2004). Furthermore, scholars have put radicalization in a 
criminological perspective of conflict, functionalism, Merton’s (1938) concept of 
strain, and social constructionism (Ruggiero, 2006).  
Concerning the macro-structural context, religion studies make a clear 
distinction between theories about ‘late modern’ times and rational choice 
theories (Hunt, 2005). Research with a late modernist twist stresses the general 
crisis of meaning and ontological insecurity. This crisis has, according to these 
studies, contributed to a desire for more certainty and thus dualist visions of 
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reality, a stronger identity and a sense of belonging as opposed to the feeling of 
everything being liquid and adrift (Amir-Moazami & Salvatore, 2003; 
Eisenstadt, 2000). Spalek (2007) has used these late modernist assumptions to 
explain radicalization of young British Muslims by combining them with 
criminological notions of subcultural theory. Rational choice approaches, on the 
contrary, focus on the religious market place where supply and demand for 
religious views meet (Finke & Stark, 1988; van Nieuwkerk, 2008).  
 
In sum, previous studies have brought forward multiple explanations of (radical) 
conversion on the personal, interpersonal, and social-structural level, and both in 
terms of the creation of a cognitive opening and the attraction of Islamic 
fundamentalism. This raises the issue of what this study contributes to existing 
explanations. The remainder of this study discusses to what extent existing 
explanations in radicalization and conversion studies cover the situations of the 
respondents. Thereby, this study will consider if different explanations account 
for the turn to Islamic orthodoxy, radicalism or extremism.  
The next step on the search for explanations relates to the individual as 
the following explanations involve personal factors that seem to have contributed 
to their cognitive opening to fundamentalism. While discussing these factors this 
section reflects on the respondents’ experience of an identity crisis and the role of 
significant others. 
 
 
3.3 Multiple Experiences Contributing to Identity Crisis 
The respondents’ conversion reports will help to determine the relevance of 
previous explanations. Are there specific experiences that contributed to the 
respondents’ cognitive opening for Islamic fundamentalism? What personal and 
interpersonal issues become apparent from these experiences? And what 
indications do these experiences give of structural factors? Answering these 
questions helps to build a picture of how the respondents developed a cognitive 
opening to the diverse Islamic fundamentalist views.  
The respondents’ experiences suggest that factors on all levels – 
personal, interpersonal, and social-structural – are involved. When considering 
their conversion reports, several types of experiences become visible. Obviously, 
the respondents do not distinguish between these types nor do they always 
consciously present these experiences as contributing to their conversion.48 All 
four types contribute to a lack of satisfaction about their lives and/or alienation 
from society: experiencing 1) to be adrift in life, 2) personal loss and suffering, 3) 
social exclusion and lack of recognition, and 4) a desire for transcendence. These 
four types are not isolated from one another. On the contrary, some are closely 
related. For example, social exclusion could contribute to a sense of depression, 
                                                      
48  These experiences often came up when I asked them to describe their life prior to their discovery 
of ‘pure Islam’. Wohlrab-Sahr (2006) mentions similar experiences after having asked German and 
American converts to Islam for their life stories, though she uses a different categorization and does 
not mention the desire for transcendence.  
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and a lack of recognition can foster disappointment in being adrift in life. The 
following part takes a closer look at each of these four types on the basis of the 
respondents’ reports. To give a more detailed impression of their experiences, 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the conversion reports of two respondents: Aarif and 
Anna. At the end of this section follows a reflection on how to value the way in 
which they retrospectively reconstruct their religious development.  
 
3.3.1 Being Adrift 
As Aarif’s story shows (see Figure 3.1), he led a deviant lifestyle. He claims that 
he felt ‘he missed something’ and that he ‘lacked direction’. In his view he did 
not set himself limits and was concerned with following his own interest, 
whereby he ‘took’ instead of ‘gave’. He argues that these feelings made him 
realize that he lacked spirituality. As such, he sketches an image of being adrift in 
his life and lacking deeper meaning. In retrospect, approximately one third of the 
respondents share such an image of an ‘empty’ life without clear direction. 
Regardless of their current religious orientation and whether converted or raised 
as Muslim, these respondents feel that they were principally concerned with 
superficial matters such as their own pleasures. However, while they felt they did 
not sufficiently abide by moral guidelines only a small minority transgressed like 
Aarif did (Presdee, 2000; Katz, 1988; Ferrell, Hayward & Young, 2008: 72-73). 
In total four of the respondents – including a female one – mentioned that they 
had committed rather serious criminal offences in the past. Two of them were 
non-Muslim at the time, and two were Muslim. Furthermore, a couple of female 
respondents, both with Muslim and non-Muslim backgrounds, had close 
relations with men involved in drugs or other crimes. 
Thus, most of the respondents who report experiences of being adrift in 
life stayed within legal boundaries. They felt that they acted like their peers and 
enjoyed the material joys of modern consumer society without reflecting deeper 
on life’s meaning. There is no indication that the respondents differ from other 
youngsters in Western society in terms of their lifestyle. For the respondents who 
grew up as Muslims, though, participating (to some extent) in the normal 
pleasures in a Western society like the Netherlands led them to deviate from 
some of their parents’ lessons. Clubbing, drinking or flirting and being intimate 
with members of the opposite sex, for example, is equated in their view witg 
disobedience to Islamic rules. Consequently, they believe that they failed to 
follow the direction that Islamic rules gave them. Born-again orthodox Layla 
phrases their common view as: “Boyfriends, going out and doing things that are 
really not allowed. Then all brakes were gone, let’s say. But at a certain moment 
you think ‘o, is this it?’” Even though Layla claims to have respected certain 
rules, such as not becoming very intimate with boys, she feels that she did 
trespass on Islamic boundaries. The change of heart that the respondents had 
confirms previous research that indicates that many young Muslims consider 
Islam very important in their lives, but see living in accordance with the rules as 
something for when they grow older (Nabben et al., 2006: 68). 
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FIGURE 3.1 | Aarif’s conversion story 
 
  
 
 
Aarif is a son of Irish Catholics who grew up in one of London’s most multi-
cultural, lower-class boroughs. At the time of the interview, he is in his mid-twenties 
and is active in his Salafi community. He wears a beard and Western clothes when 
we meet. He was raised by only his mother without a strong father figure to give him 
the direction that Aarif says to have longed for. Aarif states that he had never been 
religious. Spirituality was something that he regarded as weak, like his friends did, 
despite the Muslim background of many of them. He quit school around age 18 as 
he lacked a perspective on a bright future. Instead he started to work on and off and 
formed part of the typical rebellious, masculine street subculture characterized by a 
strong anti-establishment mentality and involvement in crime. About the period 
from his 16th until he turned approximately 21 years old he says: 
I was selling drugs. That was my main source of income. My family 
did not have money for education. They don’t see the benefit of 
further education and it [drugs] is readily available, all the time. It is 
the next alternative. (…) In areas like this they are not into work 
and school, but in selling drugs, robbing or stealing.  
 
He remembers this period as characterized by indulgence, because “you enjoy the 
benefits of it, but not the process. You enjoy the money, the clothes and the 
women”. (…) “You don’t limit yourself”. In retrospect he was “always taking” instead 
of giving. 
According to Aarif various triggering events occurred that made him 
reflect on his situation. First his grandmother died and then he got involved in a 
violent incident. During a temporary change of environment: “I had a chance to sit 
down and reflect. I realized I didn’t have any direction”. Once back in London he 
lived in another area with his best friend, a guy from a Muslim family he had met in 
prison. When this friend got interested in Islam, Aarif decided to read some of his 
Islamic books. When his best friend became a Muslim, Aarif followed his example a 
few days later. He initially turned to an extremist Islamic ideology that was equally 
anti-establishment: “that was available to me. I thought ‘this is Islam’. You gain 
trust…you get a lot of trust from them, and they helped me for Ramadan”.  
At the time of the interview he looks back on his extremist period with 
disdain for his views. Aarif became aware that the people around him were “not 
going anywhere” and that they were: 
not interested in seeking knowledge. People took one book and gave 
their own spin to it. I saw people who were ignorant. (…) I was 
practising Islam not the Salafi way. I met takfiri people. I was kind 
of up that way until I got married. I saw ‘salafi’ as negative. I was 
negative about the [name] mosque.  
 
Within a year and under the influence of his wife and her family he exchanged 
extremism for an orthodox path. 
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3.3.2 Experiencing Personal Loss and Suffering  
An equal part (one-third) of the respondents report destabilizing events in their 
personal relations, their physical health and/or (resulting) psychological struggles 
prior to their turn to Islamic fundamentalism. A few respondents were 
confronted with the death of a relative or the separation from a parent. Their 
grief inspired them to ask ontological questions about the meaning of their life. 
Reza – initially a convert to extremist Islam and after a moderate period to 
orthodox Islam – who already struggled with his adoptive background, had a 
near death experience. Conversion studies confirm that near death experiences 
commonly are followed by conversion (e.g. Rambo, 1993). 
Furthermore, approximately one third of these respondents say that 
they suffered from depression or burn-out. Anna’s story, as described in Figure 
3.2, demonstrates that there does not have to be a clear cause of the suffering. 
Usually, though, the suffering of the respondents in this group does have visible 
external causes. Common causes are separation and fights between parents, or 
being in a bad relationship oneself. Their stories, however, are with one 
exception less dramatic than Anna’s. Not all of these respondents experienced a 
serious depression. Instead, they talk of sensations varying from ‘emptiness’, 
‘insecurity’, ‘being useless’ to ‘depression’. Among the women in the mosque 
almost half reported such feelings as inspiration to their conversion to orthodox 
Islam. Although a couple of male respondents also admit to such feelings, it is 
principally female respondents who report these experiences. While it is possible 
that the male respondents are less sensitive in this respect, it could very well be 
that they downplay such sentiments to appear more ‘masculine’ and tend to 
develop alternative narratives. Almahdi is one of the exceptions among the men, 
as he does describe his state of mind in terms of mild feelings of depression. He 
came to a point at which he felt “this is not why you’re here. (…) Somehow I 
didn’t enjoy it anymore, I got a bit depressed”. 
 
3.3.3 Experiencing Social Exclusion and Lack of Recognition 
Young (2007) suggests that social exclusion is at the cradle of radical Islam in 
Western countries. About second-generation immigrants in the United 
Kingdom, and those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent in particular, he says: 
“They suffer both an experience of relative deprivation, materially, and a 
stigmatised identity. (…) [There is a] variability of cultural identities which 
evolve out of this (…). But one of these adaptations is fundamentalism” (Young, 
2007: 164-165). To evaluate the role of social exclusion and stigmatization in the 
conversion processes of the respondents several distinctions need to be made. It 
is necessary to distinguish between 1) the respondents from Muslim families, 2) 
the native Dutch converts, and 3) ethnically diverse converts. Moreover, there is 
a difference in the intensity of the exclusion that they experienced, as it varies 
from being rejected to not feeling sufficiently recognized. 
 Regarding the first group of those who were raised as Muslims, 
practically all respondents mention experiences of social exclusion and processes 
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of othering, regardless of their gender.49 On the one hand, their experience of 
social exclusion is related to Western society’s public discourse that presents 
Islam as a threat. On the other hand, their felt lack of belonging results from 
being treated as an outsider for other reasons. Issues that commonly came up in 
the conversations are rejection by family or peers, experiencing discrimination 
and the negative stereotypes in the media. A couple of respondents mentioned a 
lack of justice in the way their hard-working parents or Muslims in general were 
treated in the Netherlands or elsewhere in the world (also see Buijs et al., 2006; 
de Koning, 2008; Slootman, Tillie, Majdy & Buijs, 2009; Korf et al., 2007; Korf 
et al., 2008). In the case of about two thirds of the interview respondents these 
experiences appear to have seriously impacted their religious development. For 
example, extremist born-again Marid argues: “I got more interested in Islam 
because people were against Islam. At school I was seen as the enemy. Then I 
thought ‘well, then I will be the other, the stranger’. I started to rebel”. 
Furthermore, almost half of the women in the mosque argue that such 
experiences raised their interest in Islam.  
The (respondents who look like) native converts, the second group, 
usually started to experience social exclusion after their conversion. Aarif and 
Khadija, an orthodox convert, are exceptions to this general rule, because they 
already felt outsiders. At the time of his conversion Aarif was an outsider in the 
sense that he had an anti-establishment attitude and formed part of a rebellious 
street culture with fellow lower class youngsters. Whether his rebellious attitude 
resulted from him feeling excluded or whether he copied the narrative from his 
social group, or both, is of limited relevance. Key is that he formed part of a 
deviant subculture at the time of his conversion. It appears that while this 
subculture promoted a self-induced social exclusion, it offered a stronger 
masculine identity than a non-deviant lifestyle offered him in his situation. Yet, 
when Aarif came to experience social exclusion and stereotyping through getting 
the formal label of ‘criminal’, being imprisoned and literally excluded from his 
former living area, he reached a turning point. Khadija experienced social 
exclusion too. She remembers herself as never having fitted in with the group: 
“Ever since childhood I was spit out by the group. I didn’t want to participate. I 
had my own way of being and dressing”. Having been raised by a Christian and a 
Jewish parent, she turned to Islam at age 18. That is about 20 years prior to the 
interview and in a time when there were still few Dutch converts to Islam. One 
could say she confirmed her otherness – and justifies the ground of being othered 
– by converting. 
 Finally, the converts with foreign ethnical roots experienced othering as 
well, with the exception of Anna with her Indonesian-European roots. They 
report exclusion on the basis of their ethnic or ethnically mixed background. 
Orthodox convert Summeeyah remembers that the family of her native Dutch 
parent referred to her as the child of ‘a dog’, namely her Surinamese parent. The 
                                                      
49 This is generally also true for the moderate respondents from Muslim families. Yet, they appear to 
deal with these experiences in a different way from the fundamentalist respondents, as the next 
section will show. 
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other children of mixed marriages and Reza who has Latin-American roots and 
has been adopted by native Dutch parents have also been treated as the odd man 
out. Like Summeeyah they felt that they did not belong to either of their parents’ 
ethnic communities (also see Roy, 2004: 317).  
 In terms of social exclusion and stigmatization for being Muslim, the 
respondents generally argue that they noticed an increase after 9/11, and even 
more so after the murder of van Gogh in 2004. They mention different types of 
experiences. First, they report experiences of social exclusion in their personal 
interactions. The negative experiences that they talk of usually occur in the street. 
Some of the women in the mosque, for example, mentioned incidents in which 
bus drivers made discriminatory remarks or did not stop for a girl with a 
headscarf. Other experiences that they reported are people spitting on and 
swearing at them in the street. Being rejected for an internship or a job for being 
a Muslim is something that only a couple of respondents say they have 
experienced themselves. The rest of the respondents only reported that they had 
heard of others this had happened to. The reason that few respondents in this 
study have experienced rejection on the labour market might relate to their 
relatively high level of education and the fact that some of them are still 
studying. Second, as a result of the social upheaval about Islam the respondents 
who were raised as Muslim received more questions about their religion (also see 
Nabben et al., 2006: 64-65). In their social environment they regularly encounter 
non-Muslims who want to know what Islam says exactly, for instance about 
jihad and violence. Even when they did not face such questioning, the public 
attention for Islam raised their awareness of being Muslim and increased their 
interest in their religion. This led quite a few of them to feel that they had 
insufficient knowledge about Islam, which up until then had not occupied a 
major role in their lives. Third, the respondents believe that the media and 
politicians misrepresent Islam and thereby are in large part responsible for the 
stigmatization of Muslims. This appeared to be a particularly sensitive issue, 
since the respondents talked much about these misrepresentations and brought 
the subject up on multiple occasions. Orthodox born-again Zarrah, for example, 
sees the media as responsible for “brainwashing” people since 9/11. “They keep 
repeating it, until people believe it. (…) After 9/11 it really went that way. It 
didn’t use to be that way in the past. Then guest workers were treated well. It is 
important to respect one another”. In her view the media only invite Muslims 
who have entertainment value, for example, because they ‘do not know anything 
about Islam’. Yet, even when they invite people with knowledge, she argues, the 
media distort their message. “You try to cooperate, but they twist your words in 
the newspaper and say that you said that. That is simply bad! We had that here 
too. Journalists would come and talk to little children who don’t know anything 
yet! Go to people from the mosque! Later on one girl says ‘I didn’t say that at all!’ 
They are here with microphones”.  
 Besides experiencing social exclusion, people also reported a lack of 
recognition. A lack of recognition is less clearly observable, because it is about 
‘the positive’ that others can deny you, not ‘the negative’ – of social exclusion – 
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that they do to you. What is more, recognition is highly subjective as it depends 
probably even more on individual expectations. Nonetheless, in a couple of 
conversations respondents expressed that they did not feel fully recognized for 
their potential and self-expression. Born-again orthodox Jala, for example, used 
to make and perform hiphop music. She was raised as a Sufi and she was 
popular; in her own words: “Outside the house, they loved me, because I did 
what they wanted me to do. I wore skinny jeans and converse shoes”. Although 
she does not explicitly mention that she felt insufficiently recognized for being 
herself, this sentiment is present between the lines when she speaks about the 
changes that a producer suggested to her songs: “I didn’t like that. Then it is not 
mine anymore, they manipulate it”. Eventually she turned away from the music 
that she has come to see as un-Islamic, makes critical jokes about fashion victims 
and has moved on to writing poems about Islam. 
While some respondents deny that exclusionary experiences have 
contributed to their turn to fundamentalism, others admit that negative 
responses to Islam made them become more interested and search for ‘true 
Islam’. This is both true for born-again and converted respondents. Extremist 
convert Kaleemah, for example, had been a convert for a couple of decades, but 
used to focus on what she calls the ‘peace-loving’ side of Islam. Until the policy 
responses to 9/11, the rise of Islamophobic sentiments and the Dutch terrorist 
trials, she trusted that Islam would slowly be accepted in the Netherlands. After 
witnessing what she sees as unjust responses and limitations of Muslims’ rights 
she became increasingly convinced that Islam also has a militant side. “It is peace 
and struggle. I didn’t see that until now. (…) It is only the strong believers who 
say ‘we go for it, they’re taking away our rights!” With these strong believers she 
means the Dutch terrorist suspects. Those who did not report feeling personally 
affected by social exclusion did regularly argue that the negative attention raises 
Muslims’ curiosity about ‘pure Islam’ and that Islamophobia thus (ironically) 
seems to contribute to an increased interest in Islamic fundamentalism. Like 
orthodox born-again Eva summarizes it “negative PR is PR too”. 
 
3.3.4 A Desire for Transcendence 
The experiences discussed above are all of a ‘negative’ or at least unpleasant 
nature, resulting in negative realizations or the experience of a void. The fourth 
type of experience, by contrast, is ‘positive’ in the sense that it concerns the 
aspirations of the respondents. However, this experience is likely to be related to 
the other types and might even result in large part from these other ‘negative’ 
experiences. In a way, each of the respondents reached a point at which they 
wanted to transcend their former self, as this is a pre-condition for conversion. 
But this is not the kind of transcendence that this section refers to. This type of 
experience concerns a more mythical form of transcendence. The conversations 
with a little over one third of the male and female interview respondents reveal 
their desire to transcend the ordinary. Some dreamt of the mystical and beautiful 
world of the orient or of fairytales, like several women in the mosque confessed 
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to. Others demonstrated a desire to ‘be special’ in comparison to others,50 as the 
following part shows.  
 In the interviews, the role of orientalist views and elements of fairytales 
are clearly present in the conversion stories of two women. The first one is 
Kaleemah, initially a convert to a more moderate interpretation of Islam who 
later adopted an extremist view. When talking about her original conversion to 
Islam, she shows signs of orientalism. She mentions the interest that she and her 
father shared in ‘foreign peoples’. The Dutch phrase is ‘vreemde volkeren,’ which 
has the awkward ring of the anthropologists of the 19th and early 20th century 
who studied African tribes from an orientalist perspective. She uses this and 
similar terms multiple times during our conversation. She says, for example, that 
as a child she wanted to be a missionary so she could live with ‘foreign peoples’. 
In addition she tells me about how she discovered that she wanted a Muslim 
husband because “he did things that interested me”. She felt more comfortable 
with “strangers”, by which she refers to the first Muslim immigrants. Therefore, 
contact with these “different peoples made me think outside of the box. (…) I 
dared to break away from my home”. The second person is Naima, an orthodox 
convert, who likes to read about Arab culture. Although she says she does no 
longer know exactly what attracted her first, she adds “I liked Aladdin and the 
music”. During our second meeting I ask her about what she liked about Islam. 
Naima answers in similar terms: 
 
In the beginning it was the culture itself, of the people that I met. I still 
remember that I got mint tea in one of those little glasses and date 
cookies. I felt as if I was in the palace of Aladdin.   
 
Besides these romantic images there is also a group of mainly seven respondents 
who demonstrate a desire to be or be part of something ‘special’. For some male 
respondents this desire is reflected in their focus on oppositional, masculine role 
models. Two of them – Aarif and radical convert Hujjat – grew up without a 
father and their life previous to Islam indicates that they were searching for 
masculinity of a rebellious nature. They did this through their involvement in a 
male-dominated crime scene and through promiscuous relations with women. 
The reports of the other five revealed that they did not want to be like anybody 
else. Instead, they wanted to stand out from the crowd. Maysa, a born-again 
extremist, is one of the respondents with such heightened ideals. In our 
conversations she occasionally talks of other people being meek sheep, while she 
says about herself: “I thought it would be horrible to do the same as everybody 
else. (…) I wanted something higher. I was interested in mysterious things at the 
time, like aliens and that’s why I watched the X-files, for example”. 
 
                                                      
50 The next chapter elaborates on the attraction of transcendence. 
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FIGURE 3.2 | Anna’s conversion story 
 
Anna is a child from a mixed marriage of an Indonesian and a Western European 
parent. Her parents were baptized Christians but did not practise their religion. 
When we meet she is in her mid-twenties, second wife to her husband and has a 
young child. She dresses in traditional Islamic clothes. She does not have a job, but 
has plans to go back to University – that she dropped out of – in one or two years.  
Anna’s interest in Islam was raised when she was 16 years old. Anna 
describes herself as a person who had everything that she could wish for. She was 
popular, had nice friends – both male and female – a job she liked, she studied and 
she did enjoyable things. She turned towards an orthodox interpretation of Islam a 
couple of years ago. At that time she considered it important to have: 
The right clothes, to say the right things. That’s how you valued 
yourself. It worked out, but I didn’t find satisfaction in doing that. 
I think that’s why I was unhappy. I had the right clothes, I did the 
right things. I think that’s why I was frustrated and had a negative 
self image. (…) I felt empty and unhappy. I’ve had therapy and 
went to discussion groups, but it was impossible to find out what 
was wrong with me. (…) I had a nice life. I felt very bad about 
myself and even started to mutilate myself. I simply didn’t want to 
go on anymore. 
 
In this period of her life she socialized with Moroccans and started to wonder about 
their religion. Although this motivated her to read about Islam, she did not convert 
until a couple of years later. When she was twenty she became more serious about 
Islam. “I sometimes had those moods in which I felt really bad. Then I would recite 
the Quran. I didn’t know what it meant, but it calmed me”. Her motivation to 
deepen her knowledge about Islam increased as the result of what she describes as a 
spiritual experience in which she saw Allah’s name written in the sky. Subsequently, 
she became an active visitor to Islamic lectures, where her contact with converts 
intensified. She says about this group of converts “back then they welcomed me with 
open arms. (…) Always when they undertook things, it was like ‘come along!’”.  
She still felt reluctant to take the final step and say the shahada because she 
did not wear a headscarf yet and did not yet abide to all Islamic rules that she had 
been taught. “I thought ‘this is really what I should do, but I cannot become a 
Muslima yet; I still make too many mistakes”. While having these doubts another 
convert, however, told her a story about the Prophet Muhammad that showed her 
that he considered it better for people to convert first and then gradually become 
better practising Muslims. After she had heard this, she said the shahada that made 
her conversion to orthodox Islam a fact.  
Her conversion also meant the end of the relationship with her – from her 
view - non-practising Muslim boyfriend at the time. She gave him the choice 
between no more contact or marrying her, a decision that was complicated by the 
wish of his parents that he would marry a Moroccan girl. Anna says that she decided 
to give up on him. “That was a hard step. I loved that boy. Then you make a sacrifice 
for God, while your faith still has to grow. It turned out for the better”. 
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3.3.5 The Common Factor: Identity Crisis and a Quest for Personal Meaning  
Do these different experiences have a common ground? The principal 
commonality concerns the struggle with ontological questions that these 
experiences – either gradually or through triggering events – evoked. The 
respondents report that they felt an emptiness and meaninglessness. It is 
remarkable how many respondents talk of ‘a lack of satisfaction’. In response, the 
respondents came to wonder ‘is this it?’ and became more occupied with 
questions concerning their role in life such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘what is my place 
and purpose in this world?’ In short, they started to question their value and 
purpose as human individuals. Taking a closer look at the four types of 
experiences, the relation between these experiences and ontological questions 
becomes obvious. Feeling unsatisfied about drifting along without a clear 
direction in life could have inspired some of the respondents to search for such 
direction and such deeper meaning. Aarif literally expresses this: 
 
You enjoy the money, the clothes and the women, but you’re never 
satisfied. It’s never enough. Regardless of how much money you 
made, there was always something missing. (…) My family was 
Catholic, but….I saw the direction it can give. I saw: I have money, 
but something is missing. Islam, I saw that that was missing. 
Something clicked. I had been looking for happiness in the wrong 
places. That’s what I’ve done. 
 
Experiences of personal loss confronted respondents with death and the end of 
things, which made them wonder about their personal place in the world and 
their own existence. Feelings of unhappiness and depression are also related to a 
sense of self-worth; a couple of the (female) respondents doubted their own 
worth and – in the words of some – ‘usefulness’ and consequently had a negative 
self-image. Social exclusion, stigmatization and lack of recognition relate to the 
value of oneself (status) in the eyes of others, an image that can be internalized in 
social interaction (Goffman, 1963). The desire for transcendence, finally, 
indicates the desire to gain a sense of value by being (part of something) special.  
It is, therefore, possible to argue that the respondents’ struggle with 
ontological questions reflects a crisis of meaning, or an identity crisis, because, as 
Castells (1997: 6) contends, “identity is people’s source of meaning and 
experience”. And thus, one could argue, the search for personal meaning is 
closely related to a quest for identity. Erikson (1968) describes an identity crisis 
as stemming from the process of identity construction. He denies that such a 
crisis is a cataclysmic event. Instead, he sees it as “a necessary turning point, a 
crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshalling 
resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation” (Erikson, 1968: 16). 
Since Erikson describes the crisis simply as a turning point in a person’s 
evolution, he acknowledges that a crisis can be mild and could be inspired by 
higher ideals (such as the desire for transcendence) instead of by negative 
experiences (see for religious conversion also Rambo, 1993). The experiences of 
the respondents correspond with Erikson’s description of identity crisis: they all 
      Conversion and Identity Strain  | 
 
93 
reached a turning point, inspired by ontological questions, at which time they 
began to move into a fundamentalist direction. As a rule, the respondents do not 
present this turning point as a crisis, but as a natural development. For example, 
the respondents from Muslim families usually describe conversion to 
fundamentalism as part of their natural ageing process in which they start to take 
their religion seriously.  
Thus far, it has become clear that the experiences of the respondents 
contributed to an identity crisis. Their experiences either stimulated them to feel 
bad, insecure, unhappy, unsatisfied, rejected, or they felt a desire for 
transcendence. These experiences challenged their sense of self. Yet, it is still 
unclear how these experiences relate to their conversion to different 
fundamentalist views. First of all, the types of experiences that the respondents 
had are all too common. They are reserved neither for the fundamentalist 
respondents, nor for Muslims51 or other believers. On the contrary, many people 
have such experiences without turning to Islamic fundamentalism. Secondly, not 
all respondents who have had these experiences and ontological questions 
converted to or within Islam. As a result, some questions remain: Why did only 
part of the respondents feel that they had to change direction, that is, to convert? 
To what extent did their social environment play a role in this change? And 
more importantly, how do identity crises and significant others relate to the 
choice for moderate, orthodox, radical or extremist Islam? To clarify these 
matters the following section deals with how the respondents’ social environment 
and the diverse types of experiences relate to their various fundamentalist 
orientations.   
 
 
3.4 Different Directions: A Role of Significant Others and ‘Identity Strain’? 
This section concerns the factors that might have pushed the fundamentalist 
respondents to their turning point and the specific direction that they chose. 
Since radicalization and conversion studies acknowledge that such turning points 
occur in social interaction, the first issue that this section addresses is the role of 
significant others. Secondly, it takes a closer look at the nature of the 
respondents’ identity crisis to see if the intensity and type of experiences can 
clarify the direction that the respondents took at their turning point. 
 
3.4.1 Significant Others 
Since conversion and radical conversion are social processes that do not take 
place in isolation, it is important to consider the influence of the respondents’ 
social environment on their turning point. Overall, studies on radicalization and 
conversion distinguish between two types of converts that could be described as 
active seekers and followers. Whereas the seekers take the initiative, the followers 
let peers introduce them to specific religious or ideological interpretations. Yet, 
                                                      
51 These kinds of sentiments and questions are common to converts (Rambo, 1992, 1993: 48-55; 
Sims Bainbridge, 1992; Ullman, 1982) and often emerge in late adolescence or young adulthood 
(Bailey Gillespie, 1991), such as in the case of the respondents. 
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since conversion is a continuous process, for either type friends, relatives and role 
models in the new group draw them closer to the religious or radical group (e.g. 
McGuire, 2002: 80; Buijs et al., 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2005; de Poot & 
Sonnenschein, 2009; Sageman, 2004; Ullman, 1989).  
Regarding the role of significant others, the converts and the born-
again respondents painted a different picture. The converts usually gave Muslim 
peers a substantial role in their conversion stories. Some of them argued that they 
already were actively searching for answers and spirituality. Orthodox Naima is 
an obvious representative of this group. Since she grew up in a little ‘white’ 
village in the Southern part of the Netherlands, she did not know any Muslims 
when she became interested in Islam, a couple of months prior to 9/11.52 On the 
contrary, she had to ask a classmate in high school to introduce her to a 
Moroccan girl in another class. This girl took Naima to a mosque where Naima 
decided to take Arabic classes. Within a year she took the shahada on the 
initiative of her Arabic teacher. Naima sees these two people as important 
influences, since the Moroccan girl: “was step one, my initiation in Islam. I could 
ask her all sorts of questions at the start. She mainly taught me the basics. The 
teacher has guided me to the second step”. 
Another part of the converts became interested after other Muslims 
introduced them to Islam. They generally had Muslim friends or met Muslims 
through work or school. Orthodox Vanessa, for example, had Moroccan 
neighbours during her adolescence. They asked her why she didn’t become a 
Muslim, ‘because she did not smoke or drink anyway’. Vanessa recollects that she 
then said “give me a book”. Over the years she started to read more about Islam 
and converted when she reached her twenties.  
 The reports of the converts differ from the born-again Muslims in the 
sense that while both emphasize their own initiative, the latter generally present 
themselves as independent, active seekers. Only a minority of the born-agains 
attributes a significant role to peers. This minority acknowledges that they felt 
inspired by people in their environment who became ‘more practising’, such as 
classmates, family members or partners.53 The majority of the born-agains claims 
to have found likeminded people along the way of a gradual development either 
by seeking contact, such as on the Internet, or through the mosque and their 
social network. In some cases they are the only one in their environment to turn 
to fundamentalist views, which makes it plausible that they are active seekers. In 
                                                      
52 It could very well be that – even though she does not recognize this – the events of 9/11 and the 
social upheaval about Islam have fuelled the interest that she already started to develop. Some 
converts (and born-agains) do acknowledge that these events raised their interest. Later chapters deal 
with the role of these events.  
53 The clearest example of this attitude is Azmat who has a moderate Muslim background, but has 
been inspired by his orthodox, born-again and niqab-wearing girlfriend and has come to adopt some 
of her orthodox views. His case shows that women can exert pressure on their men, contrary to the 
stereotypical image of women being pressured into fundamentalist views. Azmat’s girlfriend made 
him choose when she decided to take her religion seriously: either he had to get along or they would 
break up. In Azmat’s view his turn to – still moderate – Islam is because he wanted it himself. His 
turn is not fully up to her (and his) Islamic standards though. Despite his beard and ‘Islamic 
mannerisms’, he admits that – a couple of years later – he still does not pray.  
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other cases they received support from their environment which is likely to have 
stimulated their (gradual) turn and continued development (see for the 
importance of significant others also Dericquebourg, 2009; Berzano & 
Martoglio, 2009). In practice, the line between active seekers and followers is not 
easy to draw, as the example of orthodox born-again Zarrah demonstrates. She 
presents herself as an active seeker, even though she had a brother who turned to 
Salafism a couple of years prior to her. Moreover, she admits that her family 
started to learn more about Islam together, although the other family members 
opted for a more moderate approach. She argues:  
 
We didn’t influence each other. (…) My brother walked on the street 
with me without headscarf. That’s how it should be: as long as you’re an 
example. (…) I was the first one to make the step and ask him. 
 
Thus, while he did not pressure her, he did form an example that inspired her to 
take the ‘initiative’.  
The respondents’ reports about significant others confirm previous 
research. The respondents indicate that there are active seekers and followers 
among them, even though the born-agains paint a more independent picture of 
themselves (e.g. Vroon-Najem, 2007). However, the general tendency of 
converts to present their conversion as an individual decision could explain why 
the born-again respondents in particular tend to downplay the role of others: 
they already formed part of Muslim networks, whereas the converts have to at 
least acknowledge that others helped to introduce them to such networks. 
 
Others as Obstacles to Conversion? 
Significant others could also try to keep respondents away from certain currents 
in Islam, which raises the question if the respondents’ families had tried to talk 
them out of converting. Muslim parents could object to the different religious 
orientation of their born-again children. According to the reports of their 
children, though, the parents’ initial reaction is contentment, because their 
children start practising (also see de Koning, 2008: 114-122). However, they 
start objecting when their children want their parents to implement strict Islamic 
rules (such as no contact between men and women) and when their daughters 
start wearing the khimar and the niqab. This generally leads to conflicts between 
traditional Muslim parents and fundamentalist children, because the parents 
consider these clothes unnecessary and worry about Islamophobic reactions. The 
fundamentalist respondents, however, argue that their parents eventually accept 
their choice, because they show their parents more respect (which they see as an 
Islamic requirement). Consequently, over time parents and children find a 
modus in which they give each other room to practise Islam in their own way. 
For radicals and extremists this can mean that the children refrain from political 
conversations with their parents.  
The parents of converts, on the contrary, are usually strongly opposed to 
their children becoming Muslims. There are some exceptions to this general rule. 
Anna’s parents, for example, reacted relatively positively. Aarif’s mother was 
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initially worried about him, because of his radicalization. Other converts have 
similar experiences. Converts generally postpone telling their parents that they 
have become Muslim. Once the parents find out, they often feel that they have 
‘lost’ their child to Islam and that their child has become a different person. 
Especially if the children adopt an orthodox interpretation of Islam, this is a 
common view of converts’ parents (McGuire, 2002: 79). In several cases the 
parents first seemed to accept the conversion but had a change of heart when 
they realized the conversion was not a fling and their children were visibly 
turning into Muslims. Altogether, the counter forces of parents seem to have 
little impact and can only stall the conversion process. 
 
Significant Others in Relation to Orthodoxy, Radicalism and Extremism 
To say that other Muslims or non-Muslims had an impact on the respondents’ 
religious development does not mean that these people determined the direction 
taken by the respondents. Thus, the (radical) converts are not ‘victims’ of group 
processes involving brainwashing or recruitment.  
 On their religious quest, whether largely self-initiated or stimulated by 
others, the respondents became acquainted with various Muslims. Some of these 
had a moderate view, while others had orthodox, radical or extremist views. 
Altogether, about half of the respondents report serious discussions with 
alternatively-minded Muslims, both prior, during and after their conversion. The 
directions chosen by the respondents do not simply result from the kind of 
Muslims they meet in their everyday life. The respondents’ direction cannot be 
explained as a matter of priority either. Many of the respondents became 
interested in Islam through contact with moderate Muslims, for example, but 
they took a fundamentalist turn later on and lost touch with these initial 
significant others. Thus, significant others can change over time.  
 Even though it is likely that the respondents’ direction depended to 
some extent on coincidences such as the people they met and ‘clicked’ with, it 
appears that this click requires a cognitive opening from the side of the 
respondents. This becomes most obvious from the respondents who searched for 
knowledge and an Islamic community online. The World Wide Web and 
discussion forums such as MVC offer a wide range of Islamic perspectives that 
are all accessible from behind one’s desk. So why is it that some of the 
respondents, for example Maysa, opt for an extremist interpretation when they 
start searching for knowledge? It seems that certain interpretations matched their 
personal situation, whereas others did not.  
  To sum up, significant others are important, but one should be careful 
not to overestimate their role. Significant others cannot explain why the 
respondents adopt moderate, orthodox, radical or extremist views. Instead, it 
appears that this turn largely depends on their cognitive opening. Thus, to 
understand the different orientations of the respondents it is necessary to take a 
closer look at their identity crisis.   
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3.4.2 Gradations of Identity Crisis and (Radical) Conversion  
When reflecting deeper on the respondents’ crises, the direction that the 
respondents took reveals a relation with the intensity of the identity crisis and the 
type of experiences that they report.  
 
Intensity and Conversion 
Regarding the intensity of the identity crisis, the respondents who did not 
convert to fundamentalism seem to have had a relatively minor crisis, whereas 
those who did generally report experiences indicating a serious crisis. Especially 
the moderate respondents appear to have experienced a minor crisis. In itself this 
difference between converts and non-converts is to be expected. McGuire (2002) 
warns against the tendency of converts to present a grim picture of their life 
before conversion to contrast with their current happiness (McGuire, 2002: 76-
77). It could thus be that, in retrospect, the respondents have created an image of 
a severe crisis. This does not mean, however, that as a researcher one cannot take 
their word concerning the kinds of experiences they report. On the contrary, the 
type of experiences can give an impression of the crisis’ intensity. 
Concerning the respondents’ experiences the moderate respondents who 
did not convert report only one of the four types of experiences (being adrift, 
personal loss and suffering, social exclusion and lack of recognition, or high 
ideals), if any. Of the fundamentalist respondents, there are merely a couple of 
orthodox born-again respondents who also report only one of these experiences. 
They feel that they have not gone through a religious re-orientation, but instead 
have continued on the path they were already on. The other fundamentalist 
respondents all appear to have gone through a more serious crisis, since they 
report to have had two or more of the four experiences over a longer period of 
time. 
 
Type of Experience and Conversion 
Moreover, the orthodox respondents on the one hand, and the radical and 
extremist respondents on the other, report different types of experiences. 
Whereas all these fundamentalist respondents report multiple experiences, in 
each group specific types of experiences are overrepresented. Although it is 
impossible to draw general conclusions from the small number of former and 
current radical and extremist respondents, these differences are nonetheless 
striking.  
The orthodox respondents more frequently mention experiences of 
personal loss and suffering than other groups do. Almost two-thirds of them 
claim to have had such experiences prior to their turn – or in their view ‘return’ – 
to Islam. Anna, whose unhappiness drove her to self-harm, is a typical example 
in this respect. In comparison, about one third of the radical and extremist 
respondents report such experiences.  
Among the radical and extremist respondents two types of experiences 
stand out that are less common among the other groups, namely social exclusion 
and a desire for transcendence. However, their stories also point to a difference 
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between the radical and extremist respondents. The three former or current 
radical respondents all describe either an intense perception of social exclusion or 
a desire to be special.54 In addition, each of them claims to have lived a life 
without boundaries and direction, sometimes accompanied by feelings of 
personal loss and suffering. The seven former or current extremist respondents 
mention both intense experiences of social exclusion – or a lacking sense of 
belonging – and a desire for personal transcendence. Only extremist born-again 
Marid does not mention the desire to be special, but he expresses more concern 
with social exclusion than the others. During the interview he brought the 
subject back to discrimination and feelings of rejection on multiple occasions, 
which indicates that these experiences have had a considerable impact on him. In 
terms of the experiences of social exclusion, the extremist respondents describe 
themselves as outsiders in relation to peers, with Aarif and again Marid as the 
exceptions. It could very well be that the desire to stand out and experiences of 
social rejection are communicating vessels; the respondents who were denied 
recognition may as a result want to be recognized as somebody special.55   
Despite the fact that the extremist and some of the radical respondents 
make more mention of social exclusion, there are no objective clues that they 
have experienced more exclusion than the orthodox respondents. This might 
indicate that these radical and extremist respondents are more sensitive to the 
judgement of others and therefore to social rejection and acceptance.56 Thus, 
their reports point to a greater sensitivity to how others value them and – 
regarding the desire to be special – how they are valued in comparison to other 
people. However, it is important to realize that this could be a temporary 
sensitivity and not a description of their personality. As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, people can drift in and out of various fundamentalist 
interpretations, which could indicate that the respondents’ state of mind also 
changes. The reports of the ex-radical and ex-extremist respondents seem to 
                                                      
54 Among the moderate respondents there was one other person who also clearly wanted to be 
special: Raid, a moderate with a tendency – in word, not in deeds – to orthodoxy. He seems to have 
reached his goal by having a job that makes him popular and respected.  
55 Of the orthodox respondents, only convert Khadija reports rejection as a recurrent theme in her life 
and describes herself as being different from others. She always felt an outsider and became a Muslim 
over twenty years ago, in a time when conversion to Islam was still a rare phenomenon. 
56 An alternative explanation could be that sensitivity to social exclusion and being special is part of 
their radical and extremist discourse. Yet, the reports of the respondents contradict this. It is true that 
the radical and extremist respondents have adopted a discourse about Muslims worldwide as being 
socially excluded and about the duty of individual Muslims – such as themselves – to stand up 
heroically for their rights. However, the experiences of social exclusion that most of these 
respondents report concern personal experiences, such as being looked at or being called names in the 
street, or having felt the odd one out at school. In their discourse they deny that they care about such 
personal experiences. Marid too denies that he cares, even though he continuously came back to these 
experiences and admitted feeling relieved when he did not get any remarks for ‘an entire day’. 
Similarly, the respondents’ reports generally indicate that their desire to be special does not originate 
from their radical and extremist discourse, because these reports suggest that the respondents do not 
just want to be special as Muslims. For example, extremist born-again Nidal emphasizes that he 
excelled in both studies and sports at a young age. Another example is radical born-again Fareeha, 
who mentions that she used to be the person whom other people imitated when it came to clothes. 
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confirm this, as these respondents argue that they felt more socially excluded and 
experienced a greater lack of belonging at the time of their turn to radical or 
extremist views than at the time of the interview.  
Considering that the orthodox respondents most often report 
experiences of personal loss and suffering, whereas the radical and extremist 
respondents focus on social exclusion and being special, their crises appear to be 
slightly different. The crisis of the radicals and extremists primarily seems to 
involve their status,57 or ‘social self’, since the crisis reveals a direct concern with 
how they are valued in the eyes of others. One could argue in Cohen’s (1955) 
words, that these respondents suffer from status frustration.58 The crisis of the 
orthodox respondents, on the contrary, could be seen as largely relating to their 
‘personal self’ as the crisis principally reflects an internal or internalized struggle 
about who they are and what their purpose is. This struggle is internalized in the 
sense that they fight it not directly with the outside world, but within 
themselves. 
 From the above it is possible to conclude that an intense crisis generally 
coincided with conversion. Furthermore, there is a difference between the 
various groups of fundamentalist respondents. The orthodox respondents 
reported more personal loss and suffering, whereas radicals and extremists 
showed more sensitivity to social exclusion and the desire to stand out from the 
crowd. Still, this does not explain how these experiences relate to their 
conversion. Nor does it explain why the respondents – with their differential 
experiences – turned to different forms of Islamic fundamentalism. It appears 
that an answer to why they opted for orthodoxy, radicalism or extremism has to 
be sought in what these different fundamentalist beliefs have to offer. The 
following two chapters will address this issue. However, before moving to this 
question the next section deals with the nature of the respondents’ identity crisis 
as a start to explaining how this crisis paved the way for their conversion.  
 
3.4.3 The Nature of the Crisis: Identity Strain 
 
I was looking for happiness. (…) I had a lot of freedom then, but I 
wasn’t happy. I didn’t feel satisfaction. (…) I still felt imprisoned 
because I couldn’t be who I was. – Maysa 
 
It is the final sentence of Maysa’s quote that shows how the various converted 
and born-again fundamentalist respondents with a more intense experience of 
identity crisis perceive this experience. By saying that she felt imprisoned and 
that she could not be who she was, she points at a feeling that more 
                                                      
57 Cohen (1955: 65) describes status problems as “problems of achieving respect in the eyes of one’s 
fellows”. 
58 Cohen (1955) has explained how status frustration comes about. He describes the situation in 
which individuals feel pressured to strive for personal success and “want to be somebody” according to 
standards that fall outside their practical reach. He argues that if these individuals conform to these 
social standards and internalize them, but then lack experiences of success and recognition in 
practice, this can lead to ‘status frustration’ (Cohen, 1955: 87-88). 
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fundamentalist respondents explicitly mention about the moment of their 
turning point, namely, that they were not their ‘real selves’.59 In other words, the 
respondents experienced a discrepancy between what they felt to be their actual, 
‘unauthentic’ self and the ideal image of an ‘authentic’ self. 
To describe the nature of these respondents’ crisis I use the term 
‘identity strain’. This use of ‘strain’ differs from how Merton and other social 
scientists use it. How this study’s use of strain relates to existing strain theories 
(and to culture and social structure), is something that Chapter 7 elaborates on. 
For now, it suffices to explain briefly why I have opted for this term and what I 
mean by identity strain. In criminology, Merton (1938) introduced ‘strain’ to 
denote the tension that people experience when the social structure obstructs 
their attempt to reach cultural goals. In his article Merton demonstrated how the 
structural limitations of social class cause strain regarding the cultural goal of 
economic success. When using the concept of strain, scholars in radicalization 
and conversion studies have commonly followed this traditional, material 
interpretation (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Hafez, 2003; Young, 2007, 2009a; Sims 
Bainbridge, 1992).60 Some academics, though, explicitly recognize that strain 
could result from other goals. For example, in their study on religious conversion, 
Lofland and Stark (1965) argue that strain could also result from non-material 
goals, such as prestige. The converts portrayed in their study all reported the 
experience of a tension:  
 
This tension is best characterized as a felt discrepancy between some 
imaginary, ideal state of affairs and the circumstances in which these 
people saw themselves caught up. (…) Just as tension can have myriad 
consequences, its sources can also be exceedingly disparate (Lofland & 
Stark, 1965: 864).  
 
As possible sources they mention among other things: “longing for unrealized 
wealth, knowledge, fame, and prestige” (Lofland & Stark, 1965: 864). This non-
material description of strain reminds of the experiences of the respondents in 
this study. To fit their experiences, however, I believe it to be necessary to take 
Lofland and Stark’s interpretation of strain one step further and relate it to one’s 
identity. In fact, the prestige that Lofland and Stark mention is an essential 
element in people’s sense of personal worth and thus self-identity. In short, I use 
the term ‘identity strain’, albeit in an untraditional way, because the respondents 
experience – partly in Lofland and Stark’s words – a ‘tension best characterized as 
                                                      
59  George Herbert Mead and William James already pointed to the desire of people to be their ‘real 
selves’.  Mead (1967: 212) does this by contending that humans “seek certainly for that sort of 
expression which is self-expression”. James recognized that people want to feel “most deeply and 
intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: ‘This is the 
real me!’” (Erikson, 1968: 19). 
60 I also use this term in a way that is different from how it has been used in mental health studies 
(e.g. Hayes & Nutman, 1981; Measham, Guzder, Rousseau & Nadeau, 2010; Soddy, 1961). Hayes 
& Nutman (1981) for example, point to the impact of identity strain on feelings of self-worth, yet 
they do not describe a discrepancy between actual and ideal self.  
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a felt discrepancy between some imaginary, ‘ideal’ sense of self and their actual 
self ‘in which they saw themselves caught up’.   
How does this experience of identity strain relate to the respondents’ 
conversion? It could be that the experience of strain led them to feel an urgency 
to take the turn that Erikson speaks of and inspired them to convert. In theory, 
conversion could resolve the identity strain that the respondents experienced, 
because conversion is, according to James (1985: 189): “the process, gradual or 
sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and 
unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in 
consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities”.61 One could thus argue 
that conversion allows people to confront negative experiences of an 
‘unauthentic’ self through creating an ‘authentic’ identity that promises a positive 
alternative. What conversion has to offer to the fundamentalist respondents who 
experienced identity strain, will be addressed in the following two chapters. 
Before moving on to these chapters a final reservation needs to be made. 
This reservation concerns the fact that the kind of identity struggles that the 
respondents experience are of course not exclusive to the Muslims in this study. 
Instead, one could argue that many people deal with such issues throughout their 
lives and religious conversion is obviously not the only possible response to 
identity strain. More importantly, this chapter does not offer an explanation for 
why the respondents chose to convert to Islamic fundamentalism instead of, for 
example, orthodox Protestantism nor for why they did not get involved in 
alternative non-activist or activist subcultures. Yet, it could be that there are 
factors other than the individual ‘push factors’ discussed so far that can help to 
explain the attraction of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, what attracts the 
respondents, or ‘pulls’ them, to Islamic fundamentalist views remains to be seen 
in the following chapters. 
 
  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has explained how the cognitive opening for the respondents’ 
conversion has come about. For that purpose this chapter has reviewed the 
lessons of previous research about the process of, and reasons and motives for 
(radical) conversion. Characteristic to the conversion process is its variability, 
continuity and lack of linearity. Regarding the reasons and motives, 
radicalization studies and conversion studies offer explanations on the individual, 
interpersonal and socio-structural level. Explanations vary from experiences of 
identity crisis on the psychological level to international injustices that feed 
resentment and the role of social interaction with others. Some explanations 
concern the attraction of dualist visions, most notably the security that they offer, 
a point I will return to in the following chapters. 
                                                      
61 Almost equally enlightening is the anthropological perspective of Austin-Broos who argues: 
“Conversion is a type of passage that negotiates a place in the world. Conversion as passage is also 
quest, a quest to be at home in a world experienced as turbulent or constraining or, in some particular 
way, as wanting in value” (2003: 2). 
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In this chapter I also examined what experiences aroused the interest of the 
respondents in Islamic fundamentalism. The respondents’ stories indicate that 
the respondents experienced an identity crisis as a result of 1) disillusionment 
with a lack of deeper meaning and direction, 2) emotional suffering, 3) social 
exclusion and 4) a desire for transcendence. These experiences contributed to 
their cognitive opening. In terms of their conversion, part of the respondents 
report sudden turning points, while others claim a gradual development. Over 
time some drifted in and out of specific interpretations of Islam. Some of the 
respondents present themselves at the time of their turning point as active 
seekers, others appear to have followed the example of others. Yet, even though 
significant others can stimulate or form obstacles to conversion, the influence of 
such others does not shed sufficient light on why the respondents converted, nor 
why they opted for orthodox views and others for radical or extremist views. 
However, it seems that the identity crisis experienced by the respondents can 
help to understand their conversion. In contrast to the respondents who did not 
convert, the respondents who converted had a severe identity crisis, with the 
exception of a few orthodox respondents from Muslim families. I have described 
this situation as ‘identity strain’ which refers to a discrepancy between one’s 
actual, ‘unauthentic’ self and one’s (possibly vague or unconscious) image of an 
ideal, ‘authentic’ self. In addition, there appears to be a link between the 
experiences underlying the identity crisis and the respondents’ fundamentalist 
orientation. The orthodox respondents seem to have an inward focus on their 
‘personal self’, whereas the radicals and orthodox respondents express more 
concern with how others see them, i.e. their ‘social self’.  
Altogether, the respondents’ conversion is a complex, interactive process 
in which personal experiences of strain and significant others all play a part. 
Obviously, the religious development of the respondents is an ongoing process, 
as the examples of respondents who ‘drift’ from one interpretation to the other 
have already demonstrated. How their conversion takes shape in everyday life is 
the topic of Chapter 6. Before turning to this matter, the next two chapters 
address several important remaining questions concerning the explanation of the 
turn to Islamic fundamentalism. These are: what is the attraction of Islamic 
fundamentalism? How do the various Islamic orientations differ in what they 
have to offer? To what extent does radical or non-radical conversion solve the 
identity strain experienced by the respondents?  
 
  
 
 
4  
 
AN ORTHODOX FOCUS ON POSITIVE SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
 
 
Inner peace, more than anything. (…) It gives you those limits and it 
is for everyday life, not just a particular day. You pray every day, it is 
constantly reminding you where you are in the scheme of things. 
You’re a cog in the works, you don’t have to be perfect. It gives me a 
sense of who I am, an identity, who I really am - Aarif 
 
These words of Aarif about what Islam has given him summarize the principal 
attraction of Islamic fundamentalism to the respondents, namely that it provides 
them with a secure sense of identity. More specifically, this chapter will show 
that Islamic fundamentalist discourse gives the respondents a sense of ‘authentic’ 
self. After a deeper reflection on what identity entails, this chapter discusses how 
the fundamentalist respondents develop a sense of ‘authentic’ self and to what 
extent there are differences between the orthodox, radical and extremist 
respondents. The main questions are: How do the respondents construct 
‘authentic’ identities and how do these identities help them cope with identity 
strain? To answer these questions the first section considers how the 
respondents’ fundamentalist meaning system provides a discursive framework for 
their group and their self-identities. The next section reflects on how Islamic 
fundamentalist views contribute to a positive group identity. The third section 
reviews the fundamentalist models for a positive self-identity. As such, this 
chapter is concerned with the ideal, ‘positive self-identification’ of the various 
fundamentalist respondents. The ways in which the respondents put their ideals 
into practice will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
4.1 Identity, Identification and Difference 
Identities are constructed through differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’, as 
argued in Section 3.1. Islamic fundamentalism offers ultimate difference as a 
result of its dualism, as discussed in Section 2.1. Fundamentalist meaning 
systems portray an image of purity as opposed to chaos, of truth as opposed to 
deception, of good as opposed to evil. As such, fundamentalist meaning systems 
create strict boundaries within which one can form one’s own identity. 
Regarding group identities it strictly distinguishes between ‘good’ groups and 
elements to identify with in society and groups that are ‘evil’ and/or ‘other’, 
which should be resisted. On the individual level, such a dualism assumes an 
equally strict distinction between a pious, ‘authentic’ self and a lost, ‘unauthentic’ 
self.  
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The following two chapters will show that the stories of the fundamentalist 
respondents confirm that they developed a sense of ‘authentic’ self through 
‘positive self-identification’ and differentiation. In their process of identity 
construction it is possible to distinguish two principal paths, as presented in 
Figure 4.1: the path of positive self-identification and the path of resistance.62 
For each of these paths their fundamentalist meaning system sets clear 
boundaries on an individual level for their self-identity and on a group level for 
their group identity: on the one hand, by providing ‘true’, religious sources for 
identification and on the other, by pointing out the ‘false’ elements that they 
should distance themselves from, which usually includes the experiences at the 
heart of their identity crisis. The orthodox, radical, and extremist respondents all 
follow both these paths. However, as the title of this chapter indicates, they 
differ in terms of focus. As this chapter and the following one will demonstrate, 
the orthodox respondents are mostly interested in positive self-identification, 
whereas the radical and extremist respondents focus largely on ‘resistance’.  
 
FIGURE 4.1 | Paths to an ‘Authentic’ Identity 
 
 
 
This chapter concerns the path of positive self-identification, although it will 
also lightly touch upon ‘resistance’ due to these paths being two sides of the same 
medal in the process of identity construction. For that purpose, it first considers 
the fundamentalist meaning system as a source of positive self-identification. 
                                                      
62 Chapter 5 will elaborate on the meaning of resistance. In this study resistance has a meaning that is 
different from traditional interpretations of resistance.  
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Subsequently, it discusses how positive self-identification strengthens the 
fundamentalist respondents’ perception of an ‘authentic’ group and individual 
identity. Figures 4.2 and 4.4 present a selection of relevant fragments from the 
interviews held with two fundamentalist respondents, Naima and Nidal, to give 
an impression of how fundamentalism helps individuals to determine their 
Muslim identities through positive self-identification.  
 
 
4.2 Fundamentalist Meaning Systems as a Source of Secure Identities 
 
 [Islam brought me] joy, peace in certain things and hope. As a 
human you’re fully occupied with the world every day. (…) In the 
Netherlands life is entirely dedicated to work. They even talk about 
work at home. Islam brought me peace. Before, I thought ‘why is it 
like this?’ And then I would start thinking about it. (…) For example, 
why I don’t have a father. In Islam that is predestined, I found peace 
therein. Why are all those movie stars rich? But they’re not happy. It’s 
never enough, they never feel satisfied. (…) This world shouldn’t 
mean everything to humans - Zarrah  
 
Some scholars have argued that (Islamic) fundamentalism can provide a sense of 
security to people who struggle with the kind of ontological questions that 
Zarrah reports and that are particularly common in modern times (Herriott, 
2009; Roy, 2004; Young, 2007). Furthermore, Young (1999: 49) contends that 
people who experience ontological insecurity – which is the case for the 
fundamentalist respondents – become nostalgic for old models that symbolize 
their lost security. One could argue that fundamentalist interpretations of 
traditional religions, such as those of Islam, are such models because they 
represent trust (through century-old traditions) and certainty (through absolute 
truth claims). To what extent there is a relation between the contemporary social 
context and the attraction of Islamic fundamentalism to the respondents is 
elaborated on in Chapter 7. For now, it matters only that all fundamentalist 
respondents struggle with ontological, identity-related issues and that they argue 
that Islam gives them a sense of ‘security’ and/or a sense of ‘peace’.63 Thus, in this 
sense the orthodox, radical and extremist respondents do not differ. To illustrate 
this, this section will 1) take a closer look at the respondents’ truth claim, and 2) 
see how their fundamentalist meaning system fosters a sense of security. 
  
                                                      
63 Even though the moderate respondents also reported such a sense of peace, Chapter 2 has shown 
that their approach to Islam is based on faith, whereas fundamentalists make a claim of certainty. 
Because of its absolutist claims, fundamentalism thus constructs a more secure and stable image of 
peace than moderate interpretations of Islam are able to offer.  
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4.2.1 Absolute Truth’s Promise of Stability 
The truth claim of the fundamentalist Muslims in this study leads to a great 
focus on ‘pure’ Islamic knowledge, ilm, and its sources.64 During our 
conversations the fundamentalists told me that they were striving to return to the 
‘pure’ Islam as practised at the time of the Prophet and to purify it from later 
cultural pollution.65  
In addition, the fundamentalist respondents believe that they hold the 
absolute truth. They can prove that it is the truth, they argue, because of their 
rational and logical thinking methods that are up to scientific standards, such as 
the method to get to the most reliable hadith.66 Radical convert Hujjat is a typical 
example of this way of reasoning. He continuously repeats that there is “100% 
proof” of his Islamic truth. He says that “Islamic sources determine what has 
been proven for 100%. The existence of the Creator, for example, has been 
proven by a thinking method that comes to the right conclusion, 100% certain, 
always”. This seems to ignore the fact that there are different fundamentalist 
currents in Islam which all claim to rely on such proof, but disagree about what is 
reliable information and evidence. The fundamentalist respondents resolve this 
dissonance by arguing that the difference does not concern the essence of Islam. 
Instead, they argue, the disagreement results from other Islamic currents being 
wrong and misinformed, while they themselves have ‘absolute proof’. Obviously, 
these other currents say the same. In the mosque, the importance of ‘true’ 
knowledge was something the imam and lecturers regularly stressed. In the 
Brixton mosque, the imam dedicated a Friday sermon to this theme. He warned 
the listeners against people who say that they are doing da’wa, but “don’t”, such 
as those in favour of terrorism. The imam emphasized that each Muslim 
therefore has the obligation to gain as much knowledge as necessary to 
distinguish the Muslims who don’t really do da’wa from those who do and to 
support the latter with their ‘real’ knowledge.  
In sum, the fundamentalist respondents construct an image of ultimate 
stability by ascribing universal validity to their Islamic knowledge. One could see 
the importance that they attribute to gaining knowledge as an attempt to 
safeguard their psychological well-being: it helps them to feel better about 
themselves because their knowledge of the absolute truth puts them on a higher 
moral ground than those whom they see as ignorant of this truth (also see 
Meijer, 2009: 13). 
 
                                                      
64  Truth and evidence also play a large role in the lives of, for example, orthodox Christians (see 
Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005: 380) 
65 These ideas remind us of Mary Douglas’ (1966) theory about the human desire for purity in the 
face of disorder. Douglas argues that rituals of purification are intended to create unity out of 
disorder and the dangerous pollution this disorder represents. 
66 Although fundamentalist Muslims claim to adopt the ‘scientific approach’, Wiktorowicz (2006) 
argues that the reasoning of Salafis cannot be described as rational or logical from a Western point of 
view.  
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FIGURE 4.2 | Orthodox convert Naima 
Naima is a native Dutch convert to orthodox Islam. She is 19 years old and grew up 
in a little Dutch village. Despite the Catholic faith of her parents, religion only 
played a minor part in her upbringing. Naima discovered Islam when she was 12 
years old. Although she did not know any Muslims she says that she became 
interested in Islam through religious classes at school, Arabic music and Disney’s 
Aladdin. Questions about the meaning of life and parental quarrels – eventually 
leading to divorce – appear to have contributed to her conversion within a year. A 
couple of years later she started to wear the headscarf and at age 17 she posted a 
marriage request online and found an equally young and like-minded husband from 
a traditional Muslim family. At the time of the interview she has a one-year-old 
child, wears the khimar and does not have a job. She plans on doing a University 
degree when she turns 21 and she wants to become a school teacher. 
 
We talk – among other things – about what Islam has contributed to her life. Naima 
states: 
Security. I know why I live and I know what happens when I 
die. That gives a sense of peace. (…) I don’t know where it 
comes from. You feel it in your heart…you become totally 
tranquil, as if everything falls into place. You get a broader view 
of things. 
 
More than once, she expresses trust in Allah and in her future prospects in this life 
and the afterlife. She describes the essence of Islam as “God exists and there is only 
one God who made and created everything. That this life on earth isn’t without 
reason, but that it’s all a test to see how you will do.” She expresses the conviction 
that people must do what God intends them to do, which is worship him, for 
example, by praying five times a day. Why it is five times a day is something she 
does not question, because in her view it is God who “made us. He knows best”. She 
then compares people and God’s rules to a DVD-player with instructions: “You 
know you can’t throw it in the water, because it would break. Allah didn’t say pray 
five times without a reason.” 
 Another area in which she puts her trust in Allah is the afterlife: “When 
you are a Muslim, no matter how many bad things you’ve done, you may go to hell 
but after the punishment you will get into heaven after all. No matter what you’ve 
done, God can forgive everything.” Moreover, Naima argues that God has also 
determined the fate of individuals in worldly life, even though they do not know it 
themselves:  “that is also the essence of Islam. That it doesn’t happen without a 
reason. In the womb it has already been determined whom you will marry and when 
you will die.” As a result, Naima argues that she no longer thinks ‘why me’ when she 
has negative experiences. It is her belief that these situations always turn out for the 
best. 
  Naima identifies with the Muslim community, but also with Dutch 
society: “I am Dutch and I feel Dutch”. However, she is particularly positive about 
the idea of Muslim sisterhood: 
It is a feeling of security. You feel happy that you are part of 
something and that people love you unconditionally.  
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4.2.2 The Security of Relying on a Higher Power 
Like any religious meaning system, fundamentalism offers a secure identity 
because it presents human life and individuals as being part of a grand, 
meaningful scheme (cf. Baumeister, 1991; Park, 2005; Molcar & Stuempfig, 
1988). Believers of any religion gain hope and trust through their reliance on a 
higher power (e.g. Watts Miller, 2008). However, the absolute certainty that the 
fundamentalist respondents claim promises greater than average security. These 
respondents describe worshipping as being a servant, or as ‘submitting’ to Allah, 
a description that symbolizes the ultimate trust they claim to put in God. This 
section discusses the ontological security that they derive from two convictions: 
Islamic predictions, and personal fate.67 Even though these are theological 
matters which might seem irrelevant to a criminological study, reviewing them 
could give insight into how they help the respondents cope with identity strain. 
 
                                                      
67 Evidently, moderate Muslims also mention these matters as a source of security. However, while 
these moderates derive ‘faith’ from these sources, fundamentalists argue in terms of ‘certainty’, 
thereby denying doubt and alternative truths (Towler, 1984).  
You feel one and that gives a very powerful, strong sensation. It 
feels very safe. (…) Would there be a war or an earthquake, then 
I would hardly be afraid, so strong is the feeling that I have in 
such a large group. I didn’t have that feeling at school with my 
friends or girlfriends. That really has to do with the belief. (…) 
It gives a very warm feeling. I know that wherever in this world, 
if I have to sleep in another country, in another place, that I only 
have to look for a mosque or somebody with a headscarf and 
explain the situation so that this person has to help me. In 
theory, that is. 
 
Initially, she paints an idealized picture of sisterhood: “sisterhood is a bond of faith. 
That automatically comes with friendship. I also have friends who aren’t Muslim. 
Then it’s about the character, that you like each other.” Yet, she qualifies the 
friendship with sisters a minute later: “with one you become real friends, with the 
other it’s less, but you do have a bond for the sake of faith.” 
 Naima believes that she must follow the role model of the Salafis. In her 
view it is good to “imitate them as purely as possible.” The prophet Muhammad is 
the most important example, she argues, also in dealings with non-Muslims. She 
refers to the commonly mentioned hadith of how Muhammad remained polite and 
friendly to his Jewish neighbour who had treated him badly. She says the man 
eventually converted to Islam. “That already shows that we have to treat everybody 
correctly. Our behaviour is the most important da’wa.”  
 
Overall, she sees a positive influence of Islam on her personal life: “I have more 
confidence and I have become more tranquil. I used to be down more often. Maybe 
that was because of puberty. I have become more stable.” 
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Security through Predictions for the World and the Afterlife 
The respondents derive security from their fundamentalist claim to ‘know for 
certain’ what to expect from life and death. According to the fundamentalist 
respondents, Islamic texts contain exact predictions concerning the world and 
the afterlife which are reassuring and give their lives meaning.  
Although they paint a grim picture of the world, they believe in a positive 
outcome for true Muslims. From Islamic texts they deduce the millenarianist 
belief that current suffering, misery, corruption, decadence and the like are signs 
of the world and Muslim communities falling apart (through fitna). They argue 
that Islamic texts have predicted that the world will end in a war initiated by non-
Muslims against Islam.68 When exactly the world will end, they do not know. 
Extremist born-again Yelda says about the war: “It means that the end of the 
world is coming, but it can take years. Think of the Eighty Years’ War. It is 
explained what the end will look like and that will be scary”. Several respondents 
recommended I read a book about the signs of the end of the world. These 
women claimed that many of the small signs, such as severe earthquakes and old 
people who want to look young, are already visible. Regardless of this ‘scary’ 
picture, the fundamentalist respondents also believe that in the end Muslims will 
come out victorious. The respondents’ arguments suggest that the image of 
victory fosters a sense of strength, as if they do not have to face the challenges of 
the world alone, but have the Creator on their side.  
The belief in fate also reassures the respondents regarding the negative 
reactions which they face as Muslims.69 The fundamentalist respondents adopt 
the discourse that Muslims have always been seen as the outsiders. They say that 
the Prophet Muhammad already had to flee Mecca for his convictions and that 
he has predicted that Muslims will always be considered outsiders. Extremist 
born-again Marid’s words indicate that this discourse provides a sense of 
empowerment:  
 
We don’t feel we are victims. (…) In Islam you do feel like a foreigner. 
Islam has started as something foreign and it will end as something 
foreign. That’s what the Prophet already said. When I think of that, I 
already feel better. It was already predicted back then that the ones who 
really practise, and I hope I may be one of them, Insha’Allah, are seen as 
foreigners. 
 
The fundamentalist respondents argue that they must follow the Islamic way of 
life regardless of complaints or Islamophobic reactions. They believe that this is 
                                                      
68 The expectation of the collapse of the current state of affairs and the revival of the perfect heavenly 
order points to a millenarianist view which is also shared by some new age religions (McGuire, 2002: 
39). 
69 Ellison, Musick & Henderson (2008: 292) confirm that anxiety can stem from experiencing 
discrimination. They summarize the impact of discrimination as “threats to one’s sense of self, [that] 
may foster feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness, as well as shame, anger, and other negative 
emotions”. Social exclusion has also been argued to contribute to the anxiety that people feel in 
modern Western societies (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000, 2006; Young, 1999, 2007; 
Verbrugge, 2004; Elchardus, 1998). 
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part of the test they have to pass to secure them a lofty place in Paradise. The 
discourse of Muslim fate thus helps them to deal with the label of ‘outsider’ 
(Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963) and to frame suppression, ridicule, social 
exclusion and discrimination as a test of Allah. In an online discussion Najib112 
– whose contributions suggest that he has extremist sympathies – expresses how 
these predictions offer a reassuring picture in the long run in comparison to the 
fate of non-Muslims: 
 
Listen, Muhammad, peace be upon him, has already said that our army 
becomes weaker and the Jewish and Christian armies are becoming 
strong. You have to see it like this: their heaven is this life, after that 
they all go to Hell!!! We who are slaughtered and keep our faith in 
Islam shall inshallah go to Paradise, inshallah alla huma amin my 
brothers!!!! Salam wa3ekum 
 
As in other religions, fundamentalist beliefs also involve predictions about the 
afterlife, which help to increase a sense of security. Islamic texts give clear 
indications of what to expect, indications that the fundamentalist respondents 
take literally.70 A well-known example are the predictions regarding martyrs. In 
the fundamentalist respondents’ view, martyrs are Muslims who die while 
striving on the path of Allah (doing jihad). In their view, martyrs will obtain the 
highest level in Paradise. However, the orthodox respondents on the one hand, 
and the radicals and extremists on the other, differ in their description of 
martyrs. The radical and extremist respondents focus on jihadis in battle, violent 
or otherwise, whereas the orthodox respondents focus on everyday, non-political 
issues such as women dying while giving birth.71 Orthodox born-again Zarrah 
puts forward the general feeling of security about the afterlife as:  
 
I wasn’t at peace when I went to sleep. I thought ‘what will happen 
hereafter? Why do we die?’ Now I’m not that afraid of death anymore. 
As Muslim you’re not only allowed to fear, you must also feel joy. 
 
Even though this quote expresses that Zarrah, like the other respondents, still 
feels fear, her fear is now much reduced. This becomes apparent from the 
fundamentalist respondents’ belief that as long as they are still Muslims at the 
time of death, they are guaranteed a place in Paradise, as Naima expresses in 
Figure 4.2. Their concerns are principally limited to which level they will attain 
in Paradise, because even in the worst-case scenario a Muslim will eventually get 
into heaven. 
 
                                                      
70 Islamic fundamentalism provides answers about what happens after death and about how to 
prepare for death. During the fieldwork these issues proved to be popular topics in lectures and 
Islamic reading material. What happens between one’s last breath and one’s arrival in heaven was also 
a prevalent topic in online discussions.  
71 Obviously, as discussed in Chapter 2, the various fundamentalist respondents have different 
opinions about what is a legitimate violent jihad, and consequently they disagree about which fighters 
are actually jihadis and martyrs. 
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Trust in Personal Fate and Suffering 
In addition, the fundamentalist respondents find security in their strict belief in 
personal fate. Personal fate assumes there to be a personal narrative: even though 
individuals do not know their fate, they trust that there is meaning behind every 
event. So what narrative does personal fate offer against identity strain?  
The accounts of the respondents indicate that their trust in personal fate 
helps them to cope with, most importantly, negative experiences or challenges 
that they encounter as individuals. Orthodox convert Bassam offers a typical 
example of how a belief in personal fate can help in case of disappointing 
experiences in everyday life.  
 
For example, today I had my driving test and I flunked it big time. At 
first I thought ‘I hate that guy’. (...) But then I thought ‘it’s fate, let it 
go’. Before [before Islam] I would have thought ‘asshole!’ for days. No 
matter how bad a problem is, it will always turn out right.    
 
What is more, the respondents’ belief in fate helps them to deal with rejection by 
people around them.72 Likewise, in cases of severe emotional suffering, for 
instance when a loved one dies, respondents argue that the thought of fate gives 
them comfort. As orthodox convert Khadija says, who has had several 
experiences of rejection by others which seems to have contributed to her feeling 
depressed:  
 
You always get punched in life, which can make you go outside the 
lines. Islam makes you stay inside. There was a period that I didn’t want 
to live, I was that sad, but as a Muslim you cannot take a life. You learn 
how to deal with pain and sorrow. 
 
Similar to the other fundamentalist respondents she feels that her views offer her 
the tools to deal with painful experiences. The main tool emerging from my 
interviews and conversations in the mosques, is the respondents’ belief that there 
is a reason behind their suffering. Instead of questioning why certain things 
happen, their discourse is that suffering is a test by Allah. Orthodox convert Sara 
phrases this common conviction as “everything is a test in this life”. She argues 
that when she encounters a problem, she interprets it as a test which helps “you 
deal with it and don’t feel like how you used to feel”. Although they do still 
admit to suffering – such as the woman in one of the mosques whose new-born 
baby died – they argue that the thought of a test comforts them. During talks the 
respondents often argued that God does not let a person endure more than he or 
she can handle. Thus, from the point of view of the respondents, the more one 
suffers, the stronger one is in the eyes of God. As a result, suffering could even 
have a positive effect on people’s self-image: they may gain a sense of strength.  
 
                                                      
72  On grounds other than exclusion for being a Muslim as predicted in Islamic texts.  
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In short, this section has shown how fundamentalism promises the respondents a 
way out of identity strain: their fundamentalist discourse appears to offer security 
regarding those aspects that the respondents say they felt insecure about, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Against ontological insecurities, it claims to 
offer an ultimate truth. As opposed to the emptiness of being adrift in life, it 
points to the absolute certainty of guidance and deeper meaning. As comfort to 
personal suffering, it creates a positive interpretation of misery. In response to 
social exclusion, it gives a grand narrative of Muslims as destined to be outsiders. 
In relation to high ideals, it provides the option of service to a higher power. 
  
 
4.3 The Security of Fundamentalist Boundaries in Everyday Life 
The above has demonstrated how the absolutist grand narrative of Islamic 
fundamentalism provides the respondents with a sense of secure meaning and 
personal value. But how do fundamentalist interpretations help to shape their 
identities in everyday life? The key here is the strict boundaries which Islamic 
fundamentalism imposes on the identities of the orthodox, radical and extremist 
respondents alike. Their group identity and self-identities take shape within the 
boundaries of certain rules, the concept of the global ummah and the image of 
character traits shared by Muslims. 
 
4.3.1 Rules as Protection in the Pluralist Chaos of Modern Life 
What all respondents, including the moderate ones, have in common is that they 
present Islam as a way of life which provides rules to regulate modes of conduct 
and other aspects of everyday personal and social life. Köse (1999: 309) received 
the same kind of response from British converts and explains this by 
distinguishing Islam from other religions as “a religion in which more aspects of 
daily life are directly written about or talked about. Also, how one might best 
behave in society is written about or talked about”. The respondents describe 
Islam, in so many words, as a circle setting the boundaries within which they 
move which ‘protects’ them from being led astray in a world full of temptations, 
as put into words by orthodox born-again Muhammad, who picks up the lid of a 
jar, follows its circle with his finger and says: “if this is the religion, then I live 
within it. I try not to cross the boundaries”. Obviously, the fundamentalist 
respondents draw sharper boundaries because of their absolutist, dualist 
approach. One could say that whereas Islam sets flexible guidelines for the 
moderate respondents, it serves as a solid model for the fundamentalist 
respondents.  
 The latter group often mentioned that it was the strict rules which 
attracted them to Islamic fundamentalism, because – as many of them argue – 
‘the rules make life easier’. Orthodox convert Natasha is a telling example with 
her answer to the question what initially attracted her to her interpretation of 
Islam: “I think the strictness in faith; it is far from loose. (…) It fascinates me 
that it is so strict”. She contrasts this with the lack of rules in her mother’s 
interpretation of Catholicism and in her upbringing: “my mother, for example, 
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was raised a Catholic, but I don’t see that at all. I think she is an atheist. (…) I 
was allowed to do anything, go out and have fun, wear as much make-up as I 
wanted”. She shares the opinion of the other fundamentalist respondents that 
Islamic rules make life easier, because they provide a guideline which tells her 
what to do. Orthodox convert Vanessa phrases this shared opinion as follows: “I 
love the rules. It’s a kind of guideline through your entire daily life. I like that. 
When you sit down, go to the toilet, eat, you say something. By doing those little 
things, you’re already doing ibada, worship. You will be rewarded for your good 
intentions, such as making a meal for your husband”. Figure 4.3 is a picture 
taken by extremist born-again Maysa which expresses the same feeling. Her 
commentary on this picture is: “If I try to imagine how I would feel were I not a 
Muslim, then I feel a sense of unrest and aberration. Islam gives me the opposite: 
a thread or rope to hold onto; it guides me”. 
 
FIGURE 4.3 | Islam as a Guideline  
 
 
 
 
As hinted at in Chapter 3 (and in Vanessa’s quote above) the rules that the 
respondents promote are sometimes concerned with rather banal aspects of 
everyday life. Examples are the hand with which to eat, the number of sips of a 
drink one is allowed to take in one go, and which part of the arm one has to 
wash before praying, in which manner and with which number of movements. 
Most questions I heard people ask in the mosque concerned the interpretations 
of this type of Islamic rules. In online discussions, the interpretation of Islamic 
rules is also one of the most popular topics. Questions often start with a phrase 
like “is it allowed for Muslims to….?” A few examples of such questions are: 
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‘What is the judgment on praying in a mosque that has been renovated with 
money from a loan over which interest is being paid?’, ‘Is it allowed to eat fries 
from a pan in which pork is also fried?’, and ‘Is a mother allowed to pick up her 
child during prayer when it has a dirty diaper?’ (also see de Koning, 2008: 229-
231; Roex et al., 2010: 64-65). Another telling example of this type of banality is 
a little book of pleas, du’a, which a couple of women in the Brixton mosque 
claimed to carry around with them. One of the girls enthusiastically showed me 
that “it even has a du’a for what to say when an unbeliever sneezes!” 
The popularity of such seemingly shallow issues is remarkable in the 
light of the deep sense of spirituality reported by the respondents. Questions 
about how to increase one’s awareness of God and other abstract, more 
fundamental issues were generally entirely absent at these gatherings, even 
though some of the lectures did address these matters. It is tempting to speculate 
about the reasons behind the fundamentalist respondents’ interest in banal, 
everyday issues. Firstly, as Baumeister (1991: 61) argues, people long for 
meaning, but meaning seems to be absent in the more trivial daily activities. It 
appears that a strict interpretation and application of Islamic rules can even give 
meaning to everyday activities, as they all are presented as part of a higher plan 
and their correct implementation can become a meaningful act of worship. Even 
so, while this might explain their relevance, it does not explain the importance 
the respondents attribute to such trivial matters. Therefore, a second possible 
reason for the popularity of these rules could be their ‘measurability’. Following 
strict rules governing eating, praying and suchlike, can be used as a measure for 
religiosity: the more closely one follows the rules, the more one confirms one’s 
religiosity to others and oneself. Furthermore, it is easier to measure personal 
progress through following simple rules than it is to measure, for example, an 
increase in patience. Hence, following trivial rules may contribute to a sense of 
satisfaction about oneself.  
How do rules make the fundamentalist respondents feel protected? 
Overall, they argue that Islamic rules form an obstacle to following their desires, 
thereby helping them to stay away from ‘bad’ behaviour. As orthodox convert 
Anna expresses this general view:  
 
Islam is really safe. It can prevent much evil. When I live in accordance 
with these things … when I try to put them into practice, then it can 
lead to much good and prevent evil. It’s a struggle with yourself against 
evil.  
 
So, on a personal level, these rules can pave the way for a positive self-image. 
Yet, also on a social level rules limit the scope within which social life takes 
place. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the fundamentalist respondents believe that 
they should mainly invest in their Islamic group of brothers and sisters. In this 
way, relations with and social exclusion and negative opinions by other groups 
become – at least in theory – increasingly irrelevant.  
Altogether, it appears that fundamentalist interpretations contribute to 
a sense of security precisely in some of those areas of life that scholars argue to 
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fall apart because of increasing freedom of choice (Bauman, 2000; Giddens, 
1991; Young, 2007; Day, 2006: 182). Fundamentalist orientations in Islam limit 
job options, give a blueprint of the ‘ideal’ family, and reset gender roles, because 
they limit the options to more traditional ones. This raises the question what the 
relation between the secure identity that Islamic fundamentalism offers and 
modern times could be. Bauman (2006: 113) gives the following clues about this 
relation: 
 
In the infuriatingly multivocal, confused and confusing world of criss-
crossing yet mutually incompatible messages whose main purpose may 
well seem to be the questioning and sapping of each other’s reliability, 
the monotheistic faiths coupled with Manichean, black-and-white 
world visions are about the last fortresses of the ‘mono’: of one truth, 
one life formula – of adamant and pugnacious certainty and self-
confidence; the last shelters for the seekers of clarity, purity and freedom 
from doubt and indecision. They promise the treasures which the rest of 
the world blatantly and obstinately denies: self-approval, a clear 
conscience, the comfort of fearing no error and always being in the 
right. 
 
In short, it could be that ‘pure’ Islam is literally attempting to purify and create 
order in the chaotic, threatening dirt of modern times (cf. Douglas, 1966). In 
opposition to pluralist chaos and the crumbling of secure models in Western 
societies and in Islam the respondents turn to fundamentalism could reflect a 
nostalgic striving for traditional forms of ‘purity’. I return to this issue in Chapter 
7. 
 
4.3.2 A Sense of Belonging 
Scholars have argued that people want to belong and be part of a community 
(Bauman, 2001; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg & 
Schaller, 2010; Maslow, 1943). Hence, the desire to belong is often argued to be 
the motivating force behind joining religious communities (Baumeister, 1991). 
Belonging, community, meaning and social identity are closely intertwined. As 
Delanty (2003: 3) observes: “the term community does in fact designate both an 
idea about belonging and a particular social phenomenon, such as expressions of 
longing for community, the search for meaning and solidarity, and collective 
identities”.  
There is considerable scholarly work which discusses the concepts of 
community and belonging for Muslims in the contemporary world. One of the 
main conclusions of these writings is that the image of the Muslim community is 
no longer limited to a specific place. Instead, scholars such as Mandaville (2004) 
and Roy (2004) argue that an increasingly transnational Islam is taking shape, 
which promises Muslims a global ummah to belong to. The remainder of this 
section confirms that among the fundamentalists both the converts and the 
respondents from Muslim families have a vivid image of the global Muslim 
community and feel they belong to this ummah. These findings are in line with 
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previous research on Salafism in the Netherlands (e.g. Buijs et al., 2006; de 
Koning, 2008, 2009a; Gielen, 2008; Roex et al., 2010). What this study will try 
to clarify is whether belonging to the ummah helps the fundamentalist 
respondents to deal with identity strain. To unravel the meaning of Islamic 
brotherhood to the fundamentalist respondents the following part continues with 
the image that they construct of this brotherhood. 
 The concept of brotherhood and sisterhood in Islam is of central 
importance to the Muslims in this study, which is also reflected in the 
considerable share of online topics dedicated to brotherhood and the ummah. All 
respondents say that they feel connected to other Muslims in the world and see 
them as their brothers and sisters in Islam, which confirms the transnational 
belonging that Roy (2004) and Mandaville (2004) describe. When they talk 
about the global ummah, especially the fundamentalist respondents mention that 
they feel connected to perfect Muslim strangers because they know they share 
the same worldview. A common way for the respondents to present this global 
connection between Muslims is by using the metaphor of a body. Orthodox 
born-again Saaliha formulates the general feeling in a representative way by 
saying:  
 
The whole Muslim nation is one body. We look after each other. If one 
part of the body hurts, the whole body hurts. If Somali people are dying, 
we feel it. It’s so beautiful, Fiore, we never even met these people, but by 
God, we love them in the dearest way.  
 
This quote illustrates that the feeling of connectedness has a double effect. On 
the one hand, feeling connected leads to positive sentiments of belonging and 
being accepted. On the other hand, being part of the ummah makes the 
respondents aware of the suffering of brothers and sisters in other parts of the 
world. This is particularly true for the fundamentalist respondents who put a 
larger emphasis on the global ummah than the moderate respondents.  
Despite the pain that the fundamentalist respondents claim to feel, their 
reports indicate that Islamic belonging primarily gives them a positive sense of 
security. Since brotherhood comes with rules and obligations between Muslims, 
the fundamentalist respondents gain ‘certainty’ about what they should expect in 
social interactions. Their expectations come down to mutual respect, warmth, 
and support. The fundamentalist respondents emphasize religious rules, varying 
from greeting each other with ‘salaam aleikum’ to helping each other out.73 They 
contrast this feeling of brotherhood to other forms of social connectedness. 
Orthodox convert Aarif, for example, distinguishes the connection between 
Muslims from experiences previous to his discovery of Islam:  
 
It was something I had never experienced before, that closeness. I wasn’t 
much of a family person. (…) Brotherhood gave a real sense of 
                                                      
73 The moderate respondents focus not as much on rules but on moral conduct and speak of 
brotherhood in terms of treating other people right and with respect. 
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community that I never had. People who look after you and who care 
for your welfare. You feel you can go to them as well. It’s like an 
extended community. You feel more loved, more wanted in your own 
community. Your own family is doing its own thing in a rush. I 
wouldn’t trust some people [of his biological family] enough to tell 
certain things. (…) This security you got, it’s like an extended family. 
 
When talking about what brotherhood and sisterhood feels like, the respondents, 
such as orthodox convert Naima, often mention that they felt they were being 
welcomed into a warm bath, particularly in the mosque. One of the female 
converts I met in the As-Soennah mosque made this general opinion clear. She 
described her experience, as other respondents did, as a feeling of warmth that 
overwhelmed her because of the friendliness of the women in the mosque. She 
argued that she never felt this warmth with Dutch people and she expressed the 
belief that this feeling of brother and sisterhood is a main attraction to converts 
like her. Thus, on the level of their everyday social life belonging to the Muslim 
community gives the respondents a feeling of being accepted by other people. 
Some of the respondents mention this attraction consciously, such as the woman 
in the mosque, whereas others are less aware of this longing, but do show it 
indirectly in their answers. When I ask orthodox convert Vanessa, for example, 
what initially attracted her to Islam she first responds “I don’t know what 
attracted me to Islam”. Yet, after this remark she continues to talk about never 
having felt completely at home in the Netherlands or in Suriname, the two 
countries where her parents originate from. She compares this to an experience 
she had just after she had become a Muslim – still a moderate one – and went on 
a holiday to Morocco: “I was immediately accepted. I didn’t feel that I didn’t 
belong there. At first sight they thought I was Moroccan. Only when they 
started to talk to me they realized that I wasn’t”. When they learned that she was 
a convert, they responded even more positively, because “they liked that” (…) “I 
simply liked it that I was just Vanessa there”. The feeling of belonging to a 
transnational, ethnically inclusive Muslim community also formed a major 
attraction to fundamentalist views for the other fundamentalist respondents from 
diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. 
Although the fundamentalist respondents agree on the importance of 
brotherhood, the extent and intensity of this sense of connectedness differs in 
accordance with their religious orientation. The main differences – regardless of 
previous religious convictions and gender – concern the possibility of alternative 
belonging and the groups which the respondents include in the Muslim 
brotherhood.74 In principle, the orthodox respondents consider all people who 
say that they are Muslims to be part of the ummah. Moreover, they see 
alternative ways of belonging, such as being Muslim and Dutch or British, as 
                                                      
74 The moderate respondents are the least exclusive. They acknowledge most clearly the value of 
other identities. They consider brotherhood important, but believe friendship and often the relation 
with their family to be of a deeper nature than the relation with brothers and sisters in Islam, 
regardless of whether their friends and family are Muslim or non-Muslim. In terms of inclusivity, 
some moderate respondents even reason that brotherhood encompasses all of humanity. 
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reconcilable. The orthodox respondents value family and friendship ties usually 
as equally important or more important than the connection with Muslim 
brothers and sisters. The radical and extremist respondents, on the other hand, 
have adopted – intrinsic to their strict religious discourse – a more exclusive 
notion of brotherhood which is limited to what they see as a very selective group 
of ‘true believers’. The extremist respondents present themselves as the most 
exclusive, in line with their most dualist approach.75 Many of them see no reason 
to want to belong to non-Muslim groups, such as the Dutch.  
 In short, the fundamentalist respondents see belonging to the Muslim 
community as an essential part of their group identity. Although they generally 
do not make this explicit, their accounts seem to indicate that their quest for 
community is in part the interactive response to a perceived lack of belonging to 
other groups (Jenkins, 2004: 4-5; Rose, 1996). By idealizing the global Muslim 
ummah they gain a sense of security about being accepted by fellow Muslims, 
which they contrast with the lack of warmth that they experienced in relations 
with other groups. This appears to be particularly true for the radical and 
extremist respondents. Since chapter 3 has shown that they seem to be more 
sensitive to experiences of social exclusion, their more exclusive approach and 
higher valuation of brotherhood could be a coping strategy for their more intense 
perception of rejection. Belonging could then promise them a way out of 
experiences of identity strain. 
 
4.3.3 Islam as Master Status Determining Trait: Being Somebody Good 
The respondents see their Muslim identity not only as coming before alternative 
group identities such as ethnicity and nationality (de Koning, 2009b: 407), but 
also before other possible sources of self-identities. Orthodox convert Bassam’s 
remark “the longer you are a Muslim, the more it determines your identity” 
indicates that – in social interaction – being a Muslim turns into a master status 
determining trait (Goffman, 1963). The all-pervasive nature of the Muslim 
identity is one of the reasons why part of society views Islam as a threat. Yet, 
Section 2.3 has already argued that being a Muslim does not necessarily 
contradict other aspects of the fundamentalist respondents’ self-identities such as 
being a parent, child, partner, citizen, and the like (also see Peek, 2005; 
Duderija, 2007; Hopkins, 2007; Korf et al., 2008). In fact, they believe that 
Islam makes them better parents, children, et cetera. It is possible to clarify this 
                                                      
75 It is not become entirely clear how the radical and extremist respondents differ in terms of opinion. 
Some extremist respondents appear more prone to openly do takfir on especially moderate Muslims. 
In comparison, the few radical respondents distance themselves from takfiris and claim to consider 
moderate Muslims true Muslims – although less practising ones. Yet, present and former members of 
both groups argued that they ceased seeing others as Muslims when they openly said or did 
something contradicting their strict interpretation of Islam, such as expressing support for a non-
Muslim government. Although Hiz-ut-Tahrir member Hujjat’s examples do point to a more 
inclusive approach, the others mention similar examples, which makes the practical results of their 
slightly differing discourse not all that different. See for the complexities in distinguishing groups on 
the basis of takfir also Roex et al. (2010).  
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by considering how Islam brings the fundamentalist respondents’ image of an 
‘authentic’ self within reach and how it gives them a sense of personal value.76  
In the view of the fundamentalist respondents, men and women alike 
and regardless of their orientation, they become better persons by following the 
‘instructions’ of Allah. By fulfilling their task of worshipping servant, they gain a 
sense of personal value. Several respondents used metaphors to explain this 
argument. The most common metaphor among the fundamentalist respondents 
was a comparison of humans to a washing machine that has a function and 
comes with instructions. Like orthodox born-again Eva argues:  
 
Humankind has created a washing machine with a purpose. The maker 
writes instructions, so the washing machine works and the purpose is 
reached. When you use it incorrectly, for example as an oven, you will 
harm the washing machine and yourself. This is how the Creator has 
created us. We got the instructions through the messengers. Without 
knowledge you cannot act.  
  
Human functionality was a recurrent theme that also found expression in the 
respondents’ desire to be useful. Several respondents commented on their 
increased usefulness and the sense of purpose that they experience through Islam. 
Orthodox Khadija, for example, calls it an “Islamic mission” when she talks of 
her wish to “change something in the world in my own way, to do something for 
humanity. That is my personal mission”. 
Thus, the fundamentalist respondents believe that they are fulfilling 
their purpose by following the instructions of what their strict interpretation 
considers halal and haram (also see Buijs et al., 2006; de Koning, 2008; Roex et 
al., 2010). In the words of orthodox convert Anna:  
 
Islam gives you an entire way of life and it fills in a lot of the blanks for 
you. (…) It’s very logical. That gives me a great deal of peace and 
security. I’ve got a kind of instruction for how to live and I also get 
rewarded for that. 
 
Overall, the fundamentalist respondents express the feeling that this makes them 
better people, even though their strictness also raises fears about not living up to 
their own standards and despite the fact that they are careful try not to boast, 
because they believe a Muslim is supposed to be modest. Radical convert Hujjat 
clearly expresses this ambiguous feeling by first saying “I know I’m a better man 
now”. He then argues that he tries to follow God’s guidelines, because: 
 
Then humankind is at its best. I’m not, but I try to be. My feelings 
about myself are mixed: you think you do well, but you can always do 
better. I’m happy when I do something right, but I’m aware of my sins. 
                                                      
76 Concerning the topics in this section the various fundamentalist respondents and the moderate 
respondents differ only in what they consider the right way to be a good, practising Muslim. In terms 
of the importance of their Muslim identity, their arguments are similar. 
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I know the rules and I’m more careful. I try not to hurt people. I don’t 
commit the gravest sins. I wouldn’t steal from my worst enemy.  
 
Consequently, the respondents feel more content about themselves although they 
generally feel that they should still improve. Older respondents also report this 
ambivalence between being content and feeling that they have to do more. Yet, 
even though they argue that their imaan fluctuates somewhat over the years, they 
feel that they are overall becoming better Muslims. Some of them mention the 
Islamic rules and customs that they have internalized as expressions of their 
progress. An example is extremist convert Kaleemah when she describes how 
Islam has become part of her everyday life in her contacts with Muslim sisters.  
 
It happens automatically. (...) It’s in the behavioural rules around you, 
like taking off your shoes before going inside; in ‘where did you get that 
headscarf from’; in what happens ‘did you see the media’ and ‘that 
Albert Heijn [a Dutch supermarket chain] now has halal products’? (...) 
And it’s not once a week, but your entire life is interwoven with Allah. 
But look, I do it very naturally, easily, I have become like that. (…) That 
only occurs when you’ve processed it entirely, when it has become part 
of you. It’s the same as taking up a study. At the end you don’t feel as 
insecure anymore.   
 
In addition, the respondents argue that since all people are born as Muslims this 
is in fact their true nature. Discovering their Muslim identity and worshipping as 
the purpose in life is something that fundamentalist respondents in particular see 
as a step closer to their ‘authentic’ selves. Some of the born again and converted 
respondents explicitly mention that they feel more authentic. For example, 
radical, born-again Fareeha argues:  
 
I really feel me. Before I had ten different masks, faces. I was any 
Fareeha. I didn’t have an identity, no ‘this is me’. I was Fareeha who 
fitted in and was part of everything. I adapted to anything. I don’t do 
that anymore.  
 
Converts also share this perception, as Sara demonstrates: “Everything that I do, 
what’s in the religion, that’s in my nature. For example, not mixing with men 
and covering myself. (…) Now I’m free”.77 Thus, she even experiences her 
conversion as a liberation from societal chains and consequently seems to feel 
free to truly express herself. 
 
 
 
                                                      
77 The question as to what exactly she and other respondents feel liberated from will be addressed in 
Chapters 5 and 7. 
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FIGURE 4.4 | Extremist born-again Nidal 
Nidal is one of the first respondents that I met. At the time he was almost twenty 
years old. Over the years, I followed his development through various levels of 
extremist beliefs. Nidal comes from a Turkish family. According to him, they 
practise Islam in a traditional and cultural way. “Fortunately it all turned out well” he 
says about his development towards ‘pure’ Islam. Nidal initially presents his 
heightened interest in Islam as a natural development, because “I wanted to improve, 
I wanted the best, and then you automatically get to Islam.” However, on a later 
occasion he admits that the American invasion in Afghanistan has aroused his 
religious interest. This occurred when he was an adolescent. Nidal is convinced that 
he should strictly follow the Quran and the example of the al-salaf al-salih, the pious 
ancestors. He believes that this includes taking a militant stance. A few years after 
our initial interview he is still supportive of 9/11, but he no longer believes that 
violence will help the Islamic cause in the Netherlands. Instead, he believes Muslims 
should start small, like the Prophet did. Beside his modest beard he is not easily 
recognizable as a Muslim. Nidal is single at the time of our first meeting and 
engaged when we repeat the interview. After a University study he starts working in 
finance. 
 
Nidal argues that Islam has had a great impact on his life. He claims to have both 
fear and hope and explains the relation between the two by quoting “those who fear 
Allah the most, are the ones with most knowledge.” As he argues: 
Because of fear you live up to your obligations and you do many 
extra things. During prayer you feel as if you’re really facing Allah. 
You’ve met Him. That gives hope and peace. (...) That’s the most 
beautiful thing there is.   
In Nidal’s view people should worship Allah, as he explains with reference to the 
statement ‘the one who confesses that he is My servant, that he is dependent on Me, 
He shall get what he wants and be guided’. According to him that guidance is “what 
you feel in prayer”. For the required knowledge he relies on the Quran and the 
Sunnah. He does not have a high regard for Muslims who follow specific Muslim 
scholars. In his view, these scholars all lack certain knowledge and have made 
mistakes. He believes that Muslims should take their own responsibility in acquiring 
knowledge instead.  
Nidal believes that practising Islam has not only changed his views, but also 
changed him as a person: “You become quieter when you get involved with the 
religion. First I got angry about unimportant matters. You get angry about matters 
that you value. If you don’t value them, you can’t get angry either.” Since he got 
more involved with Islam he stopped valuing a good job and success in worldly life. 
By ‘success’ he used to mean making money and taking good care of one’s parents. 
“When you read, you notice that the material doesn’t count.” Now he considers 
success in the afterlife as real success in this life. He has an optimistic image about 
the afterlife. He believes that true Muslims will end up in Paradise and that their 
future in Paradise is even more secure if they are prepared to die for the sake of Allah 
(i.e. as a martyr). Martyrdom is the highest there is according to Nidal. “The 
Prophet has said that too. ‘I hope I will die as a martyr, come back, and die as a 
martyr again’. I don’t have that hope. That has to do with our weakness.” He 
believes the fighters in Kashmir and Chechnya are such martyrs.  
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Islamic Role Models and Character Traits 
This brings up the issue of how the Muslims in this study construct a more 
‘authentic’ and ‘better’ identity. They do this through the identification with an 
ideal Muslim identity that they derive from Islamic role models. Even though 
the respondents have different ideas about what ‘the Muslim identity’ means in 
I have great admiration for people who leave their family and 
children behind purely to safeguard Allah’s word. I can’t do that 
myself and I don’t think I want to do that. (…) Who knows I will 
go on a later occasion.  
His opinion about 9/11 is equally positive:  
We didn’t even know what Islam was at the time, but when they 
said ‘the Muslims did it’, we said ‘Allahu Akbar!’ That was one of 
the happiest moments of my life. We saw then, for the first time, 
that there are still people prepared to die on the path of Allah. 
Nidal talks with respect of Osama bin Laden, who was still alive at the time of the 
interview. He portrays him as a rich man “and still he is in a cave for the sake of 
Allah.” In his view this contradiction made bin Laden extra special. Nidal considers 
it more important, however, that bin Laden “is a person who is prepared to give his 
life for Allah. That makes him an awesome person.”    
Brotherhood is something that Nidal also greatly values. He mentions that on 
hadj people don’t know each other, but still feel as one: “that is brotherhood”. 
Preferably, he would spend the entire day with his Muslim brothers. The group of 
brothers that he has become part of after our first meeting is mixed: 
It seems that there is nothing that binds us. One is already 30, 
another one has a wife and three kids, another one just got 
married, one is unemployed. Any other person would say ‘they 
have nothing in common’, but in fact we have everything in 
common: we are concerned with the religion 24/7. (…) I almost 
love them more than my own brothers. 
He believes this has to do with the fact that “you don’t have worldly expectations of 
one another, because you get the reward from Allah.” He refers to a saying of the 
Prophet Muhammad who described Muslims as each others building blocks. He 
weaves his fingers together as to symbolize their connection “that’s what I miss with 
the Dutch. I don’t think people here experience that kind of brotherhood.” In his 
opinion “brother has a larger meaning than ‘friend’. Were you to call it ‘friendship’, 
you would diminish it.” Whereas he feels for suffering brothers in other parts of the 
world, he does not care about non-Muslims. “If we see somebody, we will proclaim 
our message, but as long as they’re unbelievers, they can die if it’s up to me. That’s 
bluntly put, but it’s true.”  
In contrast to his excited reports during our first interview, Nidal confesses 
at the time of our second interview that the feeling that Islam gives him has changed 
over the years. Initially, it made him very happy, whereas now he is less happy. He 
argues that at the start he felt really good about himself whenever he behaved in an 
Islamic way. He believes that this feeling has changed because Islam has become part 
of him and he acts as a Muslim more automatically now. Even though he does not 
feel as happy as he used to, he still feels that Islam makes him a better person. 
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practice, all respondents agree that the most ideal role model is the Prophet 
Muhammad (also see Korf et al., 2008: 91). The fundamentalist respondents 
take the companions of the Prophet and – with the exception of non-Salafi 
oriented radical convert Hujjat – the first three generations after him as 
additional, literal examples. They consider principally Muhammad and secondly 
these predecessors as being ‘the best people who ever lived’.78 The idealized 
picture that the fundamentalist respondents paint of their role models is captured 
in a remark made by Saaliha. She compares the status of these first Muslims to 
the status of contemporary pop idols: “In life there are many role models, for 
example Jennifer Lopez for girls. As Muslims we also have role models: the 
Prophet and the predecessors”.   
The fundamentalist respondents feel that they should follow the pious 
predecessors concerning every aspect of life, from the way they dress to how they 
eat and pray.79 For example, in an online discussion about the possible 
prohibition of the burqa, Muslimoen, a male participant, says: 
 
The women of the Prophet are examples for the contemporary Muslima 
(…) To learn how one can reach al djannah one has to learn how these 
women lived, how they behaved, how they spoke, how they dressed,80 
etc insha’Allah. (…) We are supposed to follow their example and strive 
to obtain their qualities. 
 
The above-mentioned tendency to idealize is also noticeable in the 
fundamentalist respondents’ view on the meaning behind the clothing of their 
female role models. During the conversations and interviews several Dutch 
respondents, men and women alike, used the metaphor of women as ‘diamonds’ 
that need to be covered to protect their beauty and value. Some of the female 
respondents even argue that they feel like ‘princesses’ in Islam and that their 
husbands treat them accordingly. Several British women presented a different, 
but equally idealist interpretation of the obligation for women to cover 
themselves by presenting it as a liberation from the looks and advances of men as 
well as from the demands of fashion trends in modern consumer society.81 
Orthodox born-again Saaliha refers to a verse from the Quran confirming that 
covering yourself is liberating, because it says, in her words: “tell your wives and 
believing daughters to cover, so that they are known as free women and people 
will not imitate them”. Besides, several women report a romantic, orientalist 
                                                      
78 In itself, having mythical role models is something that all religions have in common (Porpora, 
1996), but the fundamentalist respondents take these role models very literally. 
79 The principal difference between moderate Muslims and fundamentalist Muslims regarding role 
models is the detail and strictness with which they try to follow their example and the importance 
they attribute to these models. Unlike the fundamentalists strict interpretations, moderate Muslims 
focus on general character traits and rules of good conduct that correspond with common norms and 
values in Western societies. 
80 Even though none of the fundamentalist respondents consider the burqa to be obligatory, most 
fundamentalist male and female respondents consider it the ideal way of dressing in light of the 
example set by the wives of the Prophet. 
81 I will return to this matter in Chapter 5. 
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fascination with the veil that began even before they started wearing one 
themselves. In their view, the veil conveys the ‘mysteriousness’ of the woman 
behind it. Orthodox convert Natasha who wears a khimar expresses this 
viewpoint by saying: “when you’re walking on the street with a headscarf there 
are many people who say ‘there is something mysterious about you’. (…) I also 
used to think that”. The fundamentalist male respondents agree with these ideal 
images and appreciate the idea of having their women ‘all to themselves’. 
To learn about the lessons delivered by their role models regarding 
personality and practice, the fundamentalist respondents rely on a variety of 
Islamic scholars, depending on the Islamic current to which they belong. The 
character traits attributed by the respondents to their role models are modesty, 
patience, friendliness, helpfulness, sociability, empathy, understanding, 
hospitability, respectfulness, contentment, and even humour, among other 
things. In their own perception, the respondents have become more modest, 
patient, friendly, helpful, less irritable, more stable, content, et cetera since their 
turn to Islam.82 Orthodox convert Natasha, for example, says: “The other day I 
asked my mother ‘am I still aggressive and impertinent?’” She then continues 
with the response of her mother, who answered jokingly: “no, absolutely not, but 
you’re still annoying with that weird sense of humour of yours”.    
As a result of the importance of being a good Muslim, the qualities of 
Muslims are popular reading material and a regular topic of lectures in mosques 
and in online discussions. Several respondents mentioned that their favourite 
book was a Dutch translation of ‘The Biography of the Prophet’ by Al-
Mubarakpuri (2006), a book which celebrates the life of Muhammad. During my 
fieldwork in the As-Soennah mosque, our group was assigned to write a paper 
on the Prophet Muhammad. My responsibility was to describe the personality of 
the Prophet. This turned out to be a popular subject in Islamic writing and a 
source of inspiration to many students of Islam (e.g. Hanif, 2004). 
 The fundamentalist respondents also mention more modern role 
models. The orthodox respondents express high regard for certain scholars, 
imams and lecturers with a Salafi orientation. Radicals and extremists generally 
take politically controversial figures as additional examples. They rely on specific 
scholars, preferably those who are in prison. In an online discussion Ilaik explains 
why they consider these men to be reliable scholars: “The scholars that are 
behind bars, Faka Allahu asrahum! When a scholar speaks the truth, they get 
arrested by the kufr government!”83 In addition to these scholars, the extremist 
respondents use contemporary (and to a lesser extent historic) jihadis such as Bin 
Laden as role models (see Figure 4.4). They speak of these jihadis with great 
respect and emphasize the things that they gave up, such as their families, a good 
position in society, or even their lives, for the higher purpose of Islam. Orthodox 
                                                      
82 This is also true for the moderate respondents. 
83 In their eyes, the fact that a ‘corrupted regime’ is against these scholars, proves the scholars to be 
right. Despite the respondents’ claim of ‘rational and logical’ thinking methods this argument 
demonstrates the logical error of affirming the consequent, which leads to an unjustified conclusion: 
evidently, if the rulers are bad this does not prove that the scholars are good. 
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convert Aarif expresses this opinion clearly when talking about his past self and 
his friends: 
 
There were only few of us who grew up with a dad in the house. (…) [A 
need for] direction and a leader, that’s the case for a lot of young people. 
They need someone to identify with. (…) Bin Laden and Al-Zarqawi 
are the loudest, they are the father or hero figure for you. (…) If one 
person is speaking out, it makes you want to do more. A hero figure 
mobilizes you. You aspire to be like them, to emulate them. 
 
Although the other extremist respondents did have a father figure in real life, it 
does seem that they felt equally attracted to these fighters’ aura of strength and 
heroism. The sense of strength derived from identification with radical and 
extremist role models is also noticeable in online discussions. For example, when 
Sjamil, who expresses extremist opinions, is not taken seriously by other 
respondents but put away as an adolescent who does not pose a real threat, he 
responds “that’s what you thought of Mohammed B. too when he was hanging 
around here”. By comparing himself to the murderer of Theo van Gogh when 
confronted with a lack of recognition he reveals that the identification with a 
notorious extremist strengthens his virtual self-identity. 
In brief, the above indicates that whereas the orthodox respondents 
focus on da’wa and on demonstrating ‘goodness’, the radical and extremist 
respondents see it as their task to counter anti-Islamic powers in society and 
become ‘heroic’. Radical convert Hujjat expresses this in a way that captures the 
feeling of the radical and extremist respondents: 
 
Someone would already be happy when…when Obama sends you a 
letter telling you that he wants to employ you and that you will get a 
salary of 400,000 annually. Many people would be truly happy. Then 
what if the Creator of heaven and earth gives you the task to save people 
from delusion, to save them from suppression, to even save the world? A 
larger role you can’t get. 
 
Overall, it appears that the ‘goodness’ of the benevolent character and mythical 
or heroic strength of their role models rub off on the fundamentalist respondents’ 
self-identity and help them to feel more valuable and strong (also see Becker, 
1971: chapter 13; Durkheim, 1960; Greenberg, Kosloff, Solomon, Cohen & 
Landau, 2010; Klapp, 1954; Murshed, 2003; Sullivan and Venter, 2005). One 
could therefore argue that the mythical image of chosen and/or heroic Muslims 
can help the respondents to confront identity strain. This might explain why the 
fundamentalist respondents literally try to follow their role models’ example: by 
doing so they can approach their ‘authentic’ selves. 
In addition, it seems that the type of identity strain and the role models 
of the orthodox, radical and extremist respondents are linked. As argued in 
Section 3.4.2, the orthodox respondents’ strain appears to be more internal or 
internalized which implies a focus on their ‘personal self’, whereas the radicals 
and extremists seem more concerned with how others perceive them, which 
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involves their outward, ‘social self’. When comparing this to the respondents’ role 
models, the orthodox respondents focus on following role models for personal 
self-improvement. Consequently, they emphasize the example of the Prophet 
and his companions in terms of character traits such as patience, modesty, 
friendliness, and the like. They believe that it is by displaying these character 
traits and by setting an example to others that non-Muslims will also be 
convinced of the beauty of Islam. The radical and extremist respondents, 
however, emphasize identification with the militant side of their role models. 
Militancy, violent or non-violent, represents opposition to social pressures and 
symbolizes a lack of caring about what non-group members think of you. One 
could therefore wonder whether the radical and extremist respondents’ focus on 
militantly changing society from the top-down is a way to cope with a perceived 
lack of acceptance by society’s members. The next chapter elaborates on this 
question.   
 
 
4.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show what Islam offers orthodox, radical 
and extremist respondents who are trying to cope with identity strain. It has 
become clear that fundamentalist interpretations of Islam form the basis of what 
the respondents see as their ‘authentic’ identities. The fundamentalist meaning 
system offers a sense of stability and security. It does so, first, through its claim 
on absolute truth and evidence. In addition, fundamentalist beliefs emphasize 
trust in God by submitting oneself to His will and by accepting one’s fate.  
The respondents shape their fundamentalist identities by following a 
number of strict models. The first model involves Islamic rules. The clarity and 
universal character which they attribute to these rules provides them with – in 
their view – stable and secure guidelines. It seems that such an image of security 
neutralizes the lack of security and limits the variety of options available in 
modern Western societies, an issue that Chapter 7 will explore further. 
Moreover, the model of the worldwide Muslim ummah gives them a sense of 
belonging and consequently, a secure group identity. Finally, the fundamentalist 
respondents find a positive self-identity through following idealized Muslim role 
models. Despite their common pattern, there is a difference between what 
orthodox views and radical/extremist views offer the respondents. The orthodox 
respondents have a somewhat more inclusive approach to Muslim brotherhood, 
followed at some distance by the radicals, whereas the ultimately dualist views of 
the extremists appear to result in a highly exclusive interpretation of 
brotherhood.  
Furthermore, whereas the orthodox respondents focus on role models 
for self-improvement, the radical and extremist respondents also opt for 
oppositional role models that symbolize heroic strength in their ambition to 
change society. Hence, both the respondents’ approach to brotherhood and their 
role models appear to match the different nature of their identity strain. 
Orthodox views seem to offer a coping strategy for strain concerning their 
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personal self. Radical and extremist views provide a self-image of being ‘special’ 
(but misunderstood). This view relieves them from the strain of who they are in 
relation to and in the eyes of other individuals (which concerns their social self).  
To summarize, positive self-identification helps the fundamentalist 
respondents to find coping strategies for different types of identity strain. 
However, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the construction of a new 
identity does not only take place through positive identification, but also through 
differentiation. In the case of the fundamentalist respondents this takes the form 
of ‘resistance’. In what way the fundamentalist respondents construct their 
identities through resistance will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
  
  
 
5 
 
A RADICAL AND EXTREMIST FOCUS ON RESISTANCE 
 
 
I wanted to distance myself from everybody, I wanted something 
higher. (…) I had freedom, but I wasn’t happy. I didn’t feel satisfaction. 
In religion there is true happiness … as if you’re taken from the dark. 
You have a higher purpose to feel useful. Finally I would untie myself of 
all those people that were following their own desires. (…) Finally I had 
something higher: business that concerns mankind, not the individual. 
(…) It was harder, because everybody is against you. It is a type of 
euphoria, of ‘it doesn’t matter, it makes me happier’. I still feel that. - 
Maysa 
 
The previous chapter discussed how Islamic fundamentalist views offer the 
respondents a secure model for positive self-identification. However, as Maysa’s 
words demonstrate, identities also result from differentiation. Although this is 
the case for all identities – and thus also for moderate Muslim identities – 
fundamentalist identities involve ultimate differentiation because of the dualism 
which characterizes fundamentalism. As mentioned in the previous chapters, it is 
Islamic fundamentalism’s dualist discourse that seems to form a major attraction 
to the respondents who experienced identity strain, because this discourse 
provides strict criteria to distinguish Islamic from non-Islamic elements, 
Muslims from non-Muslims, and Good from Evil. It thus helps the 
fundamentalist respondents to strictly reject and distance themselves from what 
they consider ‘other’ as much as it allows them to vigorously embrace what they 
identify with as part of their ‘authentic’ self. Because the fundamentalist 
respondents’ attitudes reveal such a strict differentiation, ‘resistance’ is an 
appropriate term to describe how fundamentalism allows the respondents to 
differentiate (also see Giordan, 2009a on conversion as socio-political 
opposition).84 I use resistance to refer to various types of strict differentiation or 
’othering,’ whether it concerns disagreement, distancing, criticism, opposition, or 
actual protest and rebellion. The meaning of resistance in this study thus differs 
from its traditional sociological interpretation in terms of power and domination 
(e.g. Foucault, 1975; Scott, 1990).  
 This chapter demonstrates the extent to which a resistance discourse 
takes shape and what it gives the respondents who experience identity strain. For 
that purpose this chapter first considers the resistant elements in their discourse. 
                                                      
84 I choose to use ‘resistance’ in a way similar to its use in everyday speech. According to the Collins 
Cobuild dictionary (2006), for example, resistance “is a refusal to accept” something, as well as 
politically “fighting back”. The concept of resistance implicitly acknowledges that the respondents 
tend to overstate differences; such overstatements are inherent in dualist views and help the 
fundamentalist respondents to clarify the contours of their ‘authentic’ identity. 
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Since Chapter 2 has already discussed political resistance, the following section 
of this chapter is limited to the other resistant attitudes which the respondents 
demonstrate.85 It subsequently examines how their resistance discourse helps the 
fundamentalist respondents to strengthen their image of an ‘authentic’ self and 
cope with identity strain. Finally, it reflects on the difference between the various 
fundamentalist respondents and the ‘resistance identities’ (Castells, 1997) of the 
radical and extremist respondents.  
 
 
5.1 Discourses of Resistance  
It is possible to deduce various discourses of resistance from the conversations, 
observations, and internet analysis. Besides politically resistant attitudes these 
data sources allow for a distinction between resistance to the respondents’ former 
life, Western culture, other religions, external labels, Muslims with alternative 
views, and social exclusion. To clarify how the fundamentalist respondents 
display this resistance, Figures 5.2 to 5.4 present the attitudes of three 
respondents – orthodox convert Summeeyah, radical convert Hujjat and 
extremist born-again Maysa – toward each of these matters (their former life, 
Western culture, et cetera). It will become clear that the fundamentalist 
respondents show resistance with a differing intensity and variety in focus. 
 
5.1.1. Distancing from Former Life 
An obvious consequence of conversion is that the fundamentalist respondents 
develop negative feelings about their former life, including certain people and 
things that they used to value.86 Overall, this study’s findings are in line with 
previous research on conversion which demonstrates that new converts and born-
again believers reject their old identities and world view. As a result, they tend to 
distance themselves from people who form part of this old world view and who 
might argue against their conversion and new world view (McGuire, 2002: 82; 
Berzano & Martoglio, 2009: 238). 
 Regarding their previous life and social circle, one can detect some 
differences in the fundamentalist respondents’ attitudes. A first essential 
distinction concerns the extent to which they resent their former life. The 
respondents who present their conversion as a ‘natural development’ and who 
believe that they were already on the right track when they discovered Salafism 
hardly express any resentment concerning their previous lifestyle. Orthodox 
convert Khadija is one of them and claims, for instance: “My position in life and 
in puberty was very pure. I didn’t like things that could damage me, like sex, 
drugs, and one-nightstands”. In retrospect, the others present their lives as 
insufficiently Islamic or un-Islamic and feel that they gave in too much to 
‘hedonist’ tendencies. Part of them expresses regret about their former lifestyle, 
such as extremist born-again Marid. He looks back on the period in which he 
                                                      
85 Obviously, attitudes and behaviour can differ. How resistance takes shape in the respondents’ 
behaviour is the subject of Chapter 6. 
86 The moderate respondents from Muslim families hardly express feelings of resentment. 
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sometimes skipped prayer and hung out with friends as ‘wasted years’. He adds 
that, even though he considers this as part of his fate, “I’m not proud of it”. 
Another group frames these experiences as having helped them to eventually find 
‘pure’ Islam. Orthodox born-again Alifa expresses their argument as: “I would 
like to make things undone, but without those mistakes I wouldn’t have become 
who I am now”. A final attitude that can be distinguished is the resentment that 
a couple of former and current radicals and extremist respondents express, such 
as former extremist and now orthodox convert Aarif: “I feel disgusted about what 
I have done … the music, the people, the indulgence. You don’t limit yourself. 
That’s negative … spiritually. There were no barriers, no self-discipline”. 
 The second distinction relates to the fundamentalist respondents’ 
former social circle in their lives prior to ‘pure’ Islam. Some orthodox 
respondents stayed friends with moderate Muslims or non-Muslims and believe 
that ‘pure’ Islam has improved the relations with their native Dutch or Muslim 
family. Even though the radical and extremist respondents also still value the 
contact with their families, only extremist born-again Yelda reports maintaining 
a friendship with a moderate Muslim woman. Other (orthodox, radical and 
extremist) respondents argue that their former friendships ended naturally, 
usually helped by a change of social environment, for example, after leaving 
high-school. Orthodox convert Bassam represents this group when he argues he 
largely lost contact with former friends because “back then I was involved in 
music. That was where many of my friends were from, but then I quit the 
music”. The radical and extremist respondents in particular emphasize that they 
have hardly anything in common anymore with previous friends. Moreover, the 
extremist respondents tend to be more negative about their old friends and in 
one case about their family. Most notably extremist born-again Maysa (see 
Figure 5.4) disapproves of her former Muslim friends. Extremist convert 
Kaleemah is most negative about her non-Muslim family. At the time of the 
interview she no longer believed in a dialogue with non-Muslims and decided to 
break with her family, because of their negative opinions about her and Islam. 
However, a couple of years later I meet her in a context where she was once 
again seeking to enter into a dialogue with non-Muslims. When I confronted 
her with this paradox she admitted that she had had a light change of heart and 
that she had also re-established contact with her family. 
Overall, most of the fundamentalist respondents come to see their 
previous lifestyle as insufficiently Islamic. What is more, some of the radical and 
extremist respondents seem to express somewhat more resentment toward their 
previous lifestyle than the orthodox ones. The extremist respondents 
demonstrate the most resistance towards their previous social environment.  
 
5.1.2 Resistance to Western, Dutch Culture 
Fundamentalism also provides a discourse of resistance to certain characteristics 
of the Western societies that the respondents used to feel – to greater or lesser 
extent – part of. Both converts and born-again fundamentalists mention, for 
example, that they liked Western music, clothes or indulged in other aspects of 
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the materialism promoted by consumer society. Yet, Islamic fundamentalist 
views strongly oppose materialism and following one’s desires. It is for this 
reason that respondents say that they no longer value, or instead even resist, 
several elements of Western society. The following section discusses those 
elements that the fundamentalist respondents express most opposition to: 
materialism, the liberal attitude towards contact between men and women, 
sexuality and drugs, and individualism.87  
 First of all, while all respondents express the belief that Western citizens 
value the material elements of this dunya (material world) too much, the 
fundamentalist respondents in particular argue that the Dutch, like other 
Westerners, go overboard in following their desires by buying things that they do 
not really need and trying to obtain social status.88 Extremist born-again Yelda 
represents their opinion by saying about non-Muslims that “they would give 
anything to accomplish something in this world. Then you don’t really have a life 
anymore. (...) People love this life too much”. The rejection of worldly matters 
and indulgences are obviously not unique to Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. 
Indeed, such a rejection characterizes religions varying from Buddhism to ascetic 
currents in Hinduism and Christianity (e.g. Durkheim, 1960; Weber, 1956).89 
Non-religious ideologies have also disseminated criticism of capitalism, most 
notably Marxism (Marx & Engels, 1969).  
 
FIGURE 5.1 | ‘Liberation’ 
 
 
                                                      
87 The respondents tend to equate Dutch or British culture and society with Western culture and 
society. Thus, when asked for their opinion of their country of residence, they often respond in terms 
of the West in general. 
88 The extent to which the fundamentalist Muslims in this study display individualism and consumer 
behaviour themselves will be the topics of further discussion in the following chapters. 
89 In fact, as Weber (1956, 1991) claims, an ascetic attitude and thriftiness are the very essence of the 
protestant ethic at the basis of modern day capitalism. 
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The fundamentalist respondents distinguish themselves especially in their 
criticism of liberal Western attitudes toward sexuality and contact between men 
and women90. They argue that contact between men and women can lead to the 
grave sin of adultery, which some of them present as wrongfully accepted 
behaviour in Western societies. In addition, although Western societies worry 
about women in Islam being suppressed, these respondents have the opposite 
concern. When the conversations turned to sexual norms, fundamentalist 
respondents – also female ones – said that nude women on billboards and 
women wearing mini-skirts illustrate that women in the West have been reduced 
to sex objects. Consequently, they argue, Western women feel pressured to dress 
in tight, revealing clothes to get the attention of men. In one of the online 
discussions that criticized Western culture, for example, an apparently – as is 
evident from other contributions – radical participant Henkjann concludes:  
 
We have reached a conclusion. The Western woman doesn’t get 
attention without walking around half naked and Western men use this. 
(…) Look at Western films. Look at music stations. Even at bus stops 
Dutch women are used as advertising to lure men. 
 
During several conversations in the mosque the women contrasted this with the 
value that they believe a woman has in Islam. When I asked some women to take 
pictures of what Islam meant to them, a woman in the Brixton mosque took a 
picture of a woman in khimar and niqab (see Figure 5.1) and explained that it 
represented ‘liberation’ from the suppression of sexuality and the focus on looks 
in the West.91  
Another fierce objection of the fundamentalist respondents concerns 
certain consequences of individualism. Especially respondents from Muslim 
families were likely to argue that Dutch children show insufficient concern for 
family life and the wellbeing of their parents due to individualism. These 
respondents criticize Dutch people who visit their parents as little as once every 
few weeks or even months. On a couple of occasions, they illustrated their 
argument with news stories about old people found dead in their apartments 
weeks or months after they had died, like orthodox born-again Muhammad who 
argues: 
 
I don’t think it can go on like this. Society will destroy itself through 
individualism. In the 1950s grandfather and grandmother were still part 
of the family here. Then it became parents and children, and now even 
that is torn apart. Sometimes you hear stories about somebody who was 
lying dead in the house for about 10 days. That isn’t right. (…) You 
don’t only need each other financially. 
 
A couple of differences become apparent between the orthodox respondents and 
the radical and extremist respondents. When asked about their opinion of Dutch 
                                                      
90 Unlike the moderate respondents who do not object to mixed contact. 
91 Chapter 7 returns to this argument to consider it in the broader context of modern societies. 
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society the orthodox respondents had no problem in thinking of several examples 
that they considered to be good about its culture, such as human rights and the 
focus on education. The radicals and the extremists usually declared that there 
was ‘nothing positive at all’ about Dutch culture. Extremist convert Kaleemah 
represents the general negative opinion by contrasting the current situation to 
the past: “Now they are talking about a lot of norms and values, but there is 
nothing left of these things. (…) I grew up in a good period with norms and 
values, but it’s now a society in decay”. The discourse of the fundamentalist 
respondents thus involves a distancing from Dutch culture although the radical 
and extremist respondents demonstrate distancing in a more resistant form. 
 
5.1.3 Superiority to Other Religions 
Another sense in which the fundamentalist respondents differentiate strongly is 
in relation to other religions. The dualist approach and the belief in absolute 
proof of the fundamentalist respondents involve an absolutist claim that other 
religions are inferior to Islam. Their general narrative is that monotheist religions 
are superior to other religions, because Judaism, Christianity and Islam share the 
same basis and Prophets. Consequently, the Quran calls them the three ‘peoples 
of the book’. During the conversations in the mosques, the women explained to 
me that they consider Islam to be the best of the monotheist religions because 
they regard Mohammed as the last Prophet and the Quran as God’s only 
uncorrupted and last message92. Radical born-again Fareeha formulates this 
conviction as follows:  
 
The Torah has been sent down by God and has been falsified. Then 
God reacted with Indjir [the Bible], but that has also been falsified. 
That’s why God sent a new Prophet and a book that cannot be falsified. 
If you change one word, then the sentences and verses don’t make sense 
anymore.  
  
Although the respondents share this basic argument, there is a major difference 
between, on the one hand, the orthodox respondents and, on the other hand, the 
radical and extremist ones. Even though the orthodox respondents claim Islam 
to be superior, most of them explicitly acknowledge that they have certain things 
in common with believers of other religions, such as certain norms, values and 
outlook on the world. A couple of orthodox respondents have Christian or even 
Buddhist friends and some of them say that they vote for the Christian 
Democrats. By acknowledging the basis that they share with other religious 
people, they appear to distinguish different types of non-Muslims, ranging from 
religious people who have gone astray to total unbelievers. In contrast, the 
extremist respondents often talk only of Muslims and unbelievers or non-
Muslims, and when they talk about alternatively-minded people the extremist 
                                                      
92 The fundamentalist respondents share these arguments with the moderate respondents who also 
believe this. Yet, as mentioned at the start of this chapter, the fundamentalist respondents commonly 
phrase their beliefs in terms of absolute truth, whereas the moderate respondents speak more in terms 
of ‘for me that is the truth’. 
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respondents stress the differences. Extremist convert Kaleemah does this, for 
example. She does not refute that the monotheist religions share the same basis, 
but then emphasizes that Judaism and Christianity have become so corrupted, 
that there is not much left of this basis anymore. Kaleemah thus presents true 
Christianity as something from the past. In her view Christian norms have 
disappeared and “Christianity has failed, Islam is the final stage”. The two radical 
respondents at the time of the interview appear to take a middle position 
between the orthodox and extremist respondents. Similar to radical convert 
Hujjat (see Figure 5.3), radical born-again Fareeha emphasizes the differences 
between other religions as opposed to Islam, but also mentions similarities. 
Besides, she talks positively about a meeting with some Israeli Jews who she 
considered to be sympathetic.   
 In line with their views, the various fundamentalist respondents 
occasionally emphasize the inferiority of other religions. They appeared most 
concerned with the monotheist religions, possibly because these are closest to 
Islam. The fundamentalist respondents are particularly critical of Judaism, which 
seems to be for both religious and political reasons. The religious argument is 
that the Jews fail to recognize Jesus and Muhammad as Prophets, while 
Christians at least recognize Jesus. The political reason is that most of them 
consider Israel and Jews as principally being responsible for the suffering of 
Muslims in Palestine and some of them regard them as the lobby behind the ‘war 
against Islam’. Yet, the orthodox respondents demonstrated special concern 
about the differences between Islam and Christianity. In the Salafi mosques, for 
example, books are spread about what the role of Jesus is in the Quran and how 
the existence of Muhammad had been predicted in the Bible. Furthermore, at a 
conference we watched a video, which provided arguments against Christianity’s 
claim to the truth. In the video an Islamic scholar reports about what happened 
when a Christian was questioned about Jesus being the son of God. The 
Christian did not have any convincing answers to any of the questions according 
to the scholar, such as ‘so if God likes children, why did he only have one?’. In 
the light of this kind of ridicule it is no surprise that the former Christian 
converts in this study shared the narrative that they ‘had never really understood 
the Holy Trinity’ (also see Wohlrab-Sahr, 2006).  
 In sum, the viewpoints of the orthodox respondents and those of the 
radical and extremist respondents reveal a different attitude toward non-
Muslims. The orthodox respondents pay attention to what distinguishes them 
from other beliefs, as well as – to a lesser extent – to what they have in common. 
The discourse of the extremist respondents, on the contrary, is more resistant 
since they focus almost solely on what distinguishes them from people from 
other religions. The few radical respondents seem to take a middle position.  
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FIGURE 5.2 | Orthodox convert Summeeyah 
 
Summeeyah is 20 years old when we meet. She converted to orthodox Islam 
approximately one and a half years ago. She wears a long khimar, which completely 
obliterates the shape of her body. Her parents have different ethnic backgrounds, 
one parent being Dutch and the other being of Surinamese descent. She says that 
her Dutch parent’s family never fully accepted them and called her the ‘child of a 
dog’. In her youth she had several problematic experiences, particularly with men 
who treated her badly. She dropped out of school and at her deepest point of 
depression she started to wonder about the afterlife. In part because of a – in her eyes 
non-practising – Muslim boyfriend this question stimulated her interest in Islam. 
After she had decided to become a Muslim she ended the relationship with the boy. 
At present she is married to a hard-working Muslim from a traditional Muslim 
family who shares her orthodox interpretation of Islam. She has a blue collar job 
which enables her to be in a men-free working environment.  
 
Summeeyah expresses feelings of regret regarding her previous life before Islam. She 
says “when I found the truth, I felt so guilty, particularly regarding Allah. I had been 
so ungrateful and I didn’t believe before.” Now she wants to forget about her past 
and her past suffering, as she describes with a metaphor: “Somebody who lives in the 
past is like a woodcarver who continues to saw up sawdust”.  
Concerning Western culture, there is one thing in particular that 
Summeeyah objects to which distinguishes it from Islam. In reference to evening 
television programmes she says: “in the Netherlands and in the West women are 
seen as sex objects. That bothers me. (…) We have shame.” 
Other religions are not a great concern to Summeeyah. When they come 
up in the conversation, she only says that these other religions simply did not attract 
her. She indirectly elaborates on her opinion about other religions by differentiating 
them from Islam. Islam did attract her, she argues because it does not make life 
“more beautiful than it is. Life is tough and you have to go on. That’s what I felt 
such a strong connection with. I felt understood by Islam.” 
 
Summeeyah does vigorously oppose to the use of the term ‘radicalism’ for Muslims 
who try to follow the example of the Salafis, like herself: 
What is radical about that? Because we live in accordance with 
Islam? We don’t do anything wrong. (…) It’s a shame people 
judge you so quickly on the way you look. (…) You’re already a 
radical when you wear a beard. How many professors have 
beards? It radiates wisdom, it’s manly. But they don’t regard 
professors as being radical. They make a mountain out of a 
molehill, maybe even two. 
 
She believes that “what my husband and I believe, that is true Islam. That’s free of 
culture. Islam is the Sunnah.” She contrasts this with the cultural Islam that some 
other Muslims settle for, such as her in-laws.  Yet, even though she considers cultural 
Islam not as ‘true’ Islam, she is careful not to be judgemental of moderate Muslims. 
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5.1.4 Resistance to External Labels 
Another observable element of resistance concerns the rejection of labels. Labels 
are a sensitive issue, especially to the fundamentalist respondents (also see Roex 
et al., 2010). They are mainly allergic to external labels, whether these are 
applied by non-Muslims or other Muslims. Among the labels that the 
respondents – regardless whether they are orthodox, radical or extremist – 
generally reject are the labels used in this study (fundamentalist, orthodox, 
radical, extremist), apolitical, political and jihadi Salafi, telefi, and takfiri. How 
does their resistant attitude then take shape? 
The respondents use several arguments for their rejection of labels. The 
principal argument is of a religious nature. In their view the divides between 
Muslims undermine the ideal of a worldwide Muslim community. This fitna, as 
they refer to the divides, should be avoided. Consequently, the fundamentalist 
respondents do not want to confirm fitna by using labels for different currents. In 
addition, the fundamentalist respondents contend that certain labels are too 
easily applied to Muslims, such as the label ‘radical’. Another argument is that 
many of these labels are not their own, but are invented by other social groups 
(thus etic), such as the radical born-again Hujjat points out (Figure 5.3) when he 
refers to radicalism as a label of the West.  
 Nonetheless, the fundamentalist respondents are positive about the 
meanings of certain external labels. Several orthodox Muslims regard it as 
 In response to a hypothetical situation of a person who does not pray five times a 
day she contends that she is certain that a person who does not say the shahada is no 
Muslim. “Further it is between Allah and that person. I don’t dare to say anything 
about that.” 
Negative opinions about Islam do bother her. She argues “I understand 
that they are afraid of terrorism”, but she does not understand why media and 
politicians generalize about Islam. In her view: 
It’s mostly the media and politics that make a fuss and cause 
trouble. That can irritate me enormously. When a Moroccan 
has committed a robbery, they immediately say ‘Moroccan’ and 
‘rotten Muslim’, but if a Moroccan has saved a dog, then they 
say ‘Dutch guy’. They only use it the way it suits them. I don’t 
like the media. I don’t like watching it either. It makes me sick. 
Every day it’s the same tune: Muslim, Muslims. 
 
In particular Wilders’ words get to her: “We are continuously confronted with things 
that we don’t do. He generalizes. That does make me sad.” Also comments that 
Muslims should return to their countries of origin offend her, as indicated by her 
starting to talk faster and faster. “But where to? (…) We work. My husband works 
double as many hours as an average Dutchman. I’m social, I adhere to Dutch laws 
but I still would not be sufficiently integrated, because I wear a headscarf!” 
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flattering to be called ‘fundamentalist’. Orthodox born-again Layla says, for 
example:  
 
Fundamentalists are people who want to hold on to the foundations of a 
religion. That is what a practising person wants, so (…) then it is a 
compliment. (…) Because what you are actually saying is that: you’re 
somebody who persistently holds on to the foundations of Islam. Well 
thank you, there’s nothing wrong with that. 
 
Similarly, some of the radical and extremist respondents, such as extremist born-
again Nidal, say that it is a compliment to be called ‘radical’ if it means living 
strictly in accordance with (his interpretation of) Islam. 
Sometimes, moreover, the respondents attribute an alternative meaning 
to labels. When asked about what they consider radicalism and extremism to be, 
the fundamentalist respondents often gave a theological interpretation. In 
opposition to the political interpretation of these terms in Western societies, they 
argue that Muslims should follow the ‘middle way’. In their view this means not 
becoming ‘overly religious’ or extremist. As examples of ‘overly religious’, several 
fundamentalist respondents mentioned praying all night or fasting all year. In 
their own view they do not take Islam to the extreme. 
The only emic label, which all respondents accept is that of Muslim and 
Sunni, sometimes with ‘practising’ as an addition. One exception is formed by 
the group that scholars commonly refer to as apolitical Salafis. Although these 
orthodox respondents reject the addition ‘apolitical’93 they do apply the label 
Salafi to themselves. In this sense they differ from the respondents who I met in 
the Dutch Salafi centres. In their view other ‘Salafi’ currents have polluted the 
label. Furthermore, they argue that also this label supports fitna.  Instead, the 
Muslims in these centres prefer to call themselves Muslims (or Sunnis) who 
follow the example of the Salaf al-salih, the pious ancestors.  
 A final remark about the resistance to labels concerns the use of 
humour. During a conversation with orthodox women in a mosque, one of the 
women asked me what the dictionary entry for ‘radical’ is. Another woman 
responded on my behalf, in a joking manner “probably: Muslim” as a result of 
which the other women started laughing. This incident illustrates that despite 
the fact that negative external labels offend the fundamentalist respondents, 
some are capable of joking about it. Such humour is a form of resistance as 
previous research has demonstrated (e.g. ‘t Hart, 2007).  
 Online this kind of humorous resistance is very common and is 
apparent, for example, in the virtual names that the participants adopt. One – 
apparently Moroccan Muslim – presents himself as ‘Goatherd007’. Goatherd is a 
common word which native Dutch non-Muslims use to call Moroccan Muslims 
                                                      
93 The explanation that the respondents gave me was that Islam is inherently political: they only have 
a different, less public approach to politics. 
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names.94 The person adopting this virtual identity turns the criticism around by 
linking the goatherd to James Bond, thereby transforming it into a Western hero 
in Islamic disguise. By doing this he resists the negative label in a humorous way. 
By ascribing a positive meaning to the label (which implicitly contradicts the 
clash of civilization thesis) Goatherd007 empowers himself to determine how he 
is defined. 
 In sum, the orthodox, radical, and extremist respondents all commonly 
resist the external labels, which are applied to them, sometimes through the use 
of humour. At times, however, they adopt these labels by attributing a positive 
meaning to them. By refuting or changing the meaning of external labels, the 
Muslims in this study claim the power to determine on which grounds they want 
to exclude themselves from other groups. Thus, a resistant attitude can provide a 
sense of empowerment. 
 
FIGURE 5.3 | Radical convert Hujjat 
                                                      
94 This label is derived from the Prophet Muhammad having been a goatherd and from the 
primitiveness that critics of Islam attribute to Islam and Moroccan culture. Theo van Gogh, the 
filmmaker who was murdered in November 2004, was one of the people who used this term. 
Hujjat is 27 years old when we meet. He wears a suit and shaves his beard. He has 
been raised by his mother alone, who is from Surinamese descent. Although Hujjat 
was raised as a Christian, he says he never paid it much attention, because he used to 
think “nobody holds the truth, belief remains an assumption.” At a later age he 
became involved in crime, just like his older brother, and ‘always had girlfriends’ who 
he cheated on. This caused his mother considerable concern. Hujjat became 
interested in Islam through a Muslim colleague who told him about the connection 
between Jewish, Christian and Muslim Prophets. Because of this interest in Islam, 
Hujjat feared that he would have to account for all his actions. He started reading 
and asking questions about Islam and within half a year he had converted to the 
religion when he came to the realization that “this is 100% the truth”. It took him 
almost another two years and a reprimand by another Muslim to abandon his old 
lifestyle. During the years to follow he became acquainted with Hizb-ut-Tahrir and 
became an active member of the movement. Hujjat is married to a woman from a 
Muslim family and has a child. He has a job at a University of Applied Sciences 
level, even though he did not finish his degree. 
 
Hujjat is critical of his life prior to his conversion. He regards it as only evolving 
around money and girls: “there wasn’t anything else…well yes, my Mum”. When he 
really started practising his religion he distanced himself from his previous 
behaviour, because “a Muslim isn’t free. (…) Before a Muslim acts, he has to know 
what the Creator’s judgement of this act is.” While gaining knowledge of these 
judgements, he gradually abandoned aspects of his previous lifestyle. He reconstructs 
his thought process to explain this, starting with his discovery that drinking alcohol 
was not allowed: “Then we have to stop with alcohol. Oh, blowing joints is not 
allowed either, then I have to quit. (…) Then you change almost totally”.  
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Hujjat speaks of a “personal renaissance” that he went through, but his friends did 
not: 
Then there are two options: either my friends stop drinking 
when I’m there or you don’t go out with them anymore. 
Eventually it resulted in me not hanging out with them anymore 
like I used to. I still speak to them every now and then, but they 
are no longer friends. They have become acquaintances. 
 
Hujjat’s fiercest criticism regards Western culture. As an apparent result from his 
membership of Hizb he talks not of Western culture, but of what he considers to be 
the Western ideology: Capitalism. In line with his focus on Capitalism he also 
expresses his criticism of Islamophobia and non-Muslims as a critique of Capitalism: 
“It is a conspiracy against Western people. Fear is being spread about Islam, as if it is 
Barbarian”. He says “the majority of the population is good”. He sketches a 
Huntington-like picture of a clash of ideologies by arguing that “there are only three 
ideologies in the world: Communism, Capitalism and Islam”.  
He believes that the advocates of the capitalist ideology have engaged a 
battle against the Islam because it is gaining power, particularly since Communism 
has failed. According to him, the 9/11 attacks and some other terrorist acts are also 
part of the conspiracy and were not committed by Muslims. Of other Islamic 
extremist violence he says that these are only incidents: “It is clear what Muhammad 
B. did, but Western countries use violence all the time to spread their ideology”.  
Since he links Western culture with the Dutch State and a capitalist 
conspiracy, he fails to see anything positive about the Netherlands: “There are no 
things in the Netherlands that go well. What is good? Being aware of the truth, 
that’s good. Not to be fooled. At least, that’s what it is from a religious perspective”. 
In Hujjat’s view the supporters of the Capitalist system, such as national 
governments and intellectuals are afraid of Islam and keep the populations ignorant 
because:  
Islam can convince [people] of the truth. I can convince 
anybody within 10 minutes of the truth of Islam, whether they 
become Muslim or not. A down-to-earth Dutchman will 
become a Muslim immediately, because it is not airy-fairy, but 
there is proof. (…) That is also the essential difference with 
other religions. That is the difference with Christianity.  
He refers to Western philosophers who said that Christianity is “a religion of 
‘certainty without proof’.” 
 
Finally, Hujjat also rejects Western labels. He says “moderate and radical, they are 
only Western labels. There is only a distinction in living or not living in accordance 
to the law (…) I don’t accept these terms”. In his following explanation of when 
somebody still lives in accordance with the law and can be called a Muslim he argues 
that a Muslim who accepts the capitalist ideology can still be a Muslim, because he 
distinguishes between having a conviction and acting on that conviction:  
For example, a Muslim can think ‘homosexuality is forbidden 
and I accept that, but I am weak’.  That person is a Muslim. 
When you say ‘it is allowed’, then you’re no Muslim. It has been 
proven for 100% and if you deny it, then you’re an unbeliever. 
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5.1.5 Criticism of Other Muslims 
The fundamentalist respondents also resist other currents in Islam. The Muslim 
respondents regularly warned me against other currents, particularly the radical 
ones. They expressed four types of criticism: 1) of moderates, 2) against orthodox 
interpretations, 3) between different orthodox currents, and 4) regarding radical 
and extremist viewpoints. The four types of criticism clearly show the fitna, 
which exists among and within the various currents in Islam. While 
differentiating the various currents, the fundamentalist respondents regularly 
applied labels to other groups of Muslims, even though they reject labels being 
applied to themselves.  
 
Criticism of Moderateness 
Firstly, all fundamentalist respondents criticize moderate Muslims because they 
believe that their ‘cultural’ Islam is full of innovations and thus far removed from 
‘pure’ Islam. Fundamentalist respondents also criticize their parents’ 
interpretation of Islam, an interpretation that they attribute to a lack of 
knowledge (also see Hamid, 2009: 391; Buijs et al., 2006; Roex et al., 2010). 
Converts also reject the ‘cultural’ Islam in which Muslim parents raise their 
children in the Netherlands. The respondents who follow the example of the 
Salafis are critical of Sufis in particular. In their view Sufis focus too much on the 
heart and too little on the rules.  
Moderate representatives of Islam who are frequently in the news, such 
as Moroccan and Turkish politicians, are also subject to criticism. Layla openly 
expresses her, somewhat emotional, disapproval of these Muslims:  
 
I find those ‘cuddle-immigrants’ really horrible, real theatre, really 
horrible that they are continuously in the media allegedly speaking for 
me. Really disgusting. They think that they will make the government 
and Dutch people content by behaving like that. (…) Those guys don’t 
speak for me at all, those polder immigrants. In fact, I think they are 
worse than Wilders. I’d rather have 1,000 Wilders than them, because 
they really ridicule Islam and they ridicule practising Muslims in 
particular.  
 
Thus, like the other fundamentalist respondents, Layla views these public figures 
as advocates of moderate viewpoints who are against fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam. 
 
Criticism of Orthodox Interpretations 
The second type of criticism is that against orthodox interpretations.95 Radical 
and extremist respondents believe that orthodox Muslims rely on the wrong 
scholars. They argue that the most reliable scholars are imprisoned (as discussed 
                                                      
95 Obviously, the moderate respondents also express criticism of orthodox Islam, with the exception 
of the few moderate respondents who are interested in Salafism. Overall, the moderate Muslims feel 
that orthodox Muslims in the Netherlands take Islamic sources too literally and fail to view the 
message of Islam in its socio-historic context.  
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in Section 4.3.3) and that one should not ‘blindly’ follow lecturers or Imams in 
the Netherlands who do not take a fierce stance against the ‘kufr’ government. 
Further, the extremist respondents emphasize that orthodox Muslims follow 
scholars uncritically and fail to take their own responsibility. They therefore 
generally talk of Dutch lecturers, imams, orthodox scholars and their students in 
a condescending tone, such as Maysa does (see Figure 5.4). Online this argument 
against orthodox Muslims is also present, such as in a discussion where topic 
initiator NaasihunAmien criticizes Abu Ismaiel, a popular youth lecturer at the 
As-Soennah mosque, with reference to a jihadi scholar: 
 
What would Soufian Ath-Thawry have said about the fact that 
nowadays there are people who claim to be Muslim, but work as ICT 
soldier in the army of the crusaders. Thereby fighting the Muslims in 
the east and in the west who have been abandoned by the Ummah! 
 
Fallujah20 gives the answer to this rhetorical question: “I think that he would 
not consider him a Muslim wallahu’allam”.  
All in all, both the radical and extremist respondents believe that 
orthodox Muslims are misguided and that their lack of knowledge prevents the 
orthodox currents of the religion from becoming activists who may be violently 
inclined. 
 
Disagreement amongst the Orthodox Currents 
Thirdly, there is disagreement between the different orthodox currents. To the 
non-Muslim outsider their disagreement would appear to consist of mostly 
minor details. However, these details are very important for the respondents. 
When explaining their difference in opinion they refer to disagreement about 
scholars whom they consider to be knowledgeable and the type of evidence that 
they consider sufficient for a hadith to be trustworthy. Moreover, a couple of the 
Dutch respondents and those from the Brixton mosque are more supportive of 
Muslim governments than the other orthodox respondents. The former 
respondents suggest that scholars should only give written (and thus private) 
advice in the case of un-Islamic policies, while the latter believe that one is 
allowed to publicly criticize regimes in Muslim countries. As a result of these 
differences, the orthodox Muslims in this study claim to share the same aqeeda 
(creed) but follow a different manhadj (methodology). They consider that the 
others have strayed from the right path. Orthodox convert Bassam is part of the 
former group (and does call himself Salafi). He puts this group’s argument as 
follows when he criticizes Fawaz, the Imam at the As-Soennah mosque: 
 
Fawaz has taken lessons in Syria. He was sent away from there, because 
he allegedly spoke out against the government. You can’t be critical like 
that in an Islamic state. If you do have criticism you have to be patient 
or you have to put it neatly in a letter, but you shouldn’t shout it out in 
public. (…) There is a hadith that says ‘who dies at one hand span from 
the group, that person has strayed and dies in ignorance’. 
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Similarly, Imams and lecturers warn their flocks about the mistakes made by 
other currents in Islam and discussions regarding these quarrels flourish on the 
Internet.96  
 
FIGURE 5.4 | Extremist born-again Maysa 
 
                                                      
96 Respondents in their twenties and older criticize the participants in these discussions. In their view 
they are only adolescents who have recently discovered Islam and still have limited knowledge who 
are criticizing others online, thereby increasing fitna. Older orthodox respondents also disagree with 
other currents in Islam, but say that they are not in a position to make judgements. 
Maysa is in the second half of her twenties at the time of our first interview. She 
wears an abaya and a hijab. She has been raised by Muslim parents, one of them of 
Moroccan descent and the other a Dutch convert to Islam. Her parents always 
emphasized the importance of Islam and practised it in a traditional way. Her father 
in particular wanted her to perform well at school and study Islam. As a child from 
an ethnically mixed marriage Maysa used to feel the odd one out and was bullied at 
school. Later on she became slightly more popular, she argues, because she started to 
rebel against her teachers. She also felt drawn to ‘bad’ boyfriends, because she 
wanted something out of the ordinary. She describes herself as ‘not being like a 
sheep’. At the time of the 2nd Intifadah she became more interested in political 
issues. This interest grew after the events of 9/11 and inspired her to adopt an 
extremist interpretation of Islam. About this time she expresses a desire to be 
‘useful’. She quit her studies at a University of Applied Sciences and eventually quit 
her job. She is married and has children. Her husband has viewpoints similar to hers.  
 
Maysa developed a negative attitude towards her former lifestyle. Even though she 
says that she has always practised Islam, she also enjoyed herself by having coffee 
with friends and having relatively innocent relationships with ‘bad’ boyfriends. In 
line with what she considers to be Islamic rules she did not drink alcohol, did not go 
out and always wore her headscarf. It took her till 2001-2002 to become interested 
in radical and extremist views. She describes herself at that time as having a tendency 
to think negatively, feel depressed and be influenced by the images of suffering of 
Muslims in countries such as Palestine and Afghanistan. As she says:  
I entered into a very grim world and I couldn’t feel enjoyment 
anymore. I would be sitting at an outdoor café, but I was 
thinking ‘look at us!’. My friends didn’t want to talk about it. I 
would then think ‘you’re so selfish!’. I couldn’t enjoy myself 
while another person is suffering. 
In contrast with the suffering of others she came to see her life as full of petty 
concerns, such as having love affairs: “I thought my life was pathetic. How could I 
care about a boy that I couldn’t get and have sleepless nights when this was 
happening on the other side of the world?” Her resistance to friends, however, does 
not end after her adoption of extremist Islam. On the contrary, at the time of the 
second interview she felt depressed again because of memories of extremist friends 
with whom she had had fights and who had abandoned her.  
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She expresses her disappointment in their lack of support by distinguishing herself 
from them in a positive manner. She argues that the Islamic practice of these women 
shows that they are “trying to be something … for me it is very different.” 
Maysa also distances herself from aspects of Western culture, such as 
going out and drinking alcohol. She argues that for her “it isn’t freedom to drink 
yourself into a coma” or to “let go” in a discotheque. Furthermore, she is very critical 
of Jews and Christians. She talks of Jews in the time of the Prophet as “terrorists”. 
For modern Christians she also expresses little esteem by contrasting their practice of 
going to church once a week with the large impact that the Islamic lifestyle has on 
the everyday life of Muslims.  
In line with her religious convictions, she calls herself a Muslim and a 
‘muwahideen’ (a monotheist) at the time of our first interview. Three years later, she 
argues that she never applied that label at her own initiative, but that the sisters that 
formed her social circle at the time used this term. At the time of the second 
interview she says about labels “I want to get rid of those. It makes me totally sick. 
I’m simply a Muslim.” 
 Besides the women who she used to consider sisters, there are other 
Muslims whom Maysa criticizes. For example, she criticizes her father because in 
her view he does not know what true monotheism is about and does therefore not 
abide by the basic requirement of tawheed. During the years, Maysa has maintained 
an equally negative opinion of Muslims who go to lectures at Salafi mosques. She 
regularly uses the term zustertjes, which means ‘little sisters’ in Dutch, in a 
condescending tone. She suggests that their outward appearance of ‘pure’ Muslims is 
in fact a thin layer to cover religious superficiality. She repeatedly expresses disdain 
about their study circles. She says about Islamic lectures: 
I’m no fan of lectures. I don’t like them at all. I’ve been to some 
occassionally, but they mostly discuss basic issues. Usually 
somebody reads a book and then talks about it. (…) It is mostly 
about being interesting. (…) I think it is more for the sake of 
being together. (…) The audience is generally rather simple-
minded. Those people know little of Islam. 
There are also some nuances detectable in her views. Firstly, regarding the Dutch 
negative opinions about Muslims she does not blame the entire population and even 
sees a point of agreement between her and Wilders’ thinking, namely that Muslims 
“don’t belong here”. In her view it is the people involved in politics who are 
responsible for the negative opinions about Islam: “The people are manipulated by 
the government. I think that is rubbish, barbarian even. The people are simply used 
by the government”. Secondly, Maysa becomes more careful in practising takfir in 
the course of time. Whereas she had a strict conviction about who is and who is not 
a Muslim at our first meeting, she says during our second interview: 
A couple of years ago I was so afraid to be with the wrong people that I judged too 
quickly. You can’t judge people to be Muslims or non-Muslims that easily. You can 
destroy a lot like that. (…) The ummah and family bonds. (…) I’m not so worked up 
about it anymore. In the past I thought ‘I have to practise takfir or I won’t be a 
Muslim myself anymore’. 
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Opposition to Radical and Extremist Opinions 
Finally, the orthodox respondents resist radical and extremist currents in Islam 
principally concerning two issues.97 Firstly, they oppose the practice of takfir, 
which is declaring other Muslims unbelievers (kafir). In the opinion of the 
orthodox respondents Muslim radicals and extremists are too quick to call 
someone a kafir, for example, because this person votes.98 The orthodox 
respondents commonly argue that such acts do not automatically mean that 
someone is an unbeliever and that it is not up to Muslims to make this 
judgement. Some of the radical and extremist respondents agree with this 
criticism and distinguish themselves from the eagerness of others to practise 
takfir, but they disagree with the argument that they cannot make such 
judgements at all. They argue that when they see Muslims commit shirk, they 
will have sufficient proof to call them non-Muslim. Online there are quite a 
number of topics where discussions about takfir are taking place. One example is 
the above-mentioned discussion in which NaasihunAmien questions Abou 
Ismaiel’s Muslimhood. In another discussion an opponent expresses his concerns 
regarding takfir as follows: 
 
But people make mistakes… that is the essence (…) Takfir is quite 
something … How do you know you won’t make a mistake? If Muslims 
could label each other as kafir … everybody could independently start 
murdering and robbing like the khariji’s did . What do you do if fake 
Muslims start to accuse real Muslims? 
 
Secondly, the orthodox respondents criticize the politically activist approach of 
radicals and extremists. They are most critical of the extremists’ support of 
violence to realize an Islamic state and the legitimization of terrorism and suicide 
bombing in the name of Allah. They believe that these differences of opinion 
stem from the lack of knowledge that radicals and extremists have and their 
consequential misinterpretation of Islamic texts. Orthodox convert Naima 
represents this common opinion when she discusses how the knowledge that she 
has gained over the years could help to refute the image of Muslims as 
supporting terrorism: “When the media would say ‘the terrorists rely on those 
verses,’ then I could say that they have been taken out of their context, because 
their revelation took place in that and that period”. 
 Even though the radicals do not consider that violence should be 
endorsed, they dedicate little time to refuting the arguments for it. Radical 
convert Hujjat (see Figure 5.3) either dismisses terrorist attacks as part of anti-
Islamic propaganda or presents them as mere incidents in comparison to grand-
scale Western violence. Radical born-again Fareeha only expresses the opinion 
that she does not believe that terrorist acts are permitted. There are no clear 
indications of criticism from the extremist Muslims in this study toward radical 
                                                      
97 Clearly, the moderate respondents also criticize the radicals and extremists. They share the 
criticism of the orthodox respondents, but add criticism of the radicals’ and extremists’ scripturalist 
approach.  
98 The ‘takfiri’ regard voting as an act of shirk, or worshipping something else than Allah. 
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Muslims specifically. They appear to be more concerned with criticizing other, 
non-activist currents in Islam. 
Thus, amongst the fundamentalists the orthodox respondents are the 
principal critics of both radical and extremist Islamic views. They contend that 
extremists in particular, but also radicals, take the verses from the Quran out of 
context. They commonly attribute this misinterpretation to the radicals’ and 
extremists’ failure to rely on real Islamic scholars.  
 
5.1.6 Criticism of Islamophobia 
The final resistance discourse that can be deduced from the data is resistance to 
Islamophobia. Some of the former sections also indirectly concern this type of 
resistance. For example, the respondents who resist external labels indirectly 
resist negative opinions. Yet, they also express direct opposition to Islamophobia 
and exclusion, which are a common cause for frustration among the respondents.  
First of all, the respondents object to the negative opinions about 
fundamentalist Muslims on religious grounds.99 The orthodox respondents 
acknowledge that some Muslims provide a bad example, but oppose the image 
that ‘truly practising’ Muslims such as themselves are bad. In this they refer to 
the possibilities they see for living and functioning in Western societies as long as 
they are granted sufficient religious freedom. Besides, both orthodox and radical 
and extremist respondents argue occasionally that their critics are ignorant of the 
truth and therefore cannot see that their fundamentalist views are in fact right. In 
the online context, heated discussions between the critics of Islam and Muslim 
participants in which these arguments find expression are the order of the day. In 
one discussion, for example, a non-Muslim and supposed native Dutch 
participant @bracadaver criticizes a Muslim girl, Majdolina, by saying 
“congratulations you are with right the weakest link in our society! All 
backwardness of the followers of Muhammad united in one person, how did you 
manage that?”.  Majdolina’s response is of a similar level and reflects the 
stereotypical names that the participants use to insult each other: 
 
Ah, get lost cancer patient, your picture says it all. I’m not a follower of 
Muhammad or whatever you call it. I’m simply a Muslim who believes 
that our prophet Muhammad was the messenger of Allah swt [short for 
‘peace be upon him’ in Arabic] and I believe in all the other prophets 
too. Now my question to you is how do you know that I’m the weakest 
link? I wouldn’t bet on it if I were you. You think you can trap me but 
who do you think will end up trapped??????????????? Ai bye dirty cheese-
head and make sure you never turn into a rat, because you never know 
with all these ignorant Hollanders [a word for Dutchmen]  .100  
                                                      
99 Again, obviously the moderate respondents make this argument too. Their main argument is that 
their Islam is not the Islam of fundamentalist Muslims. 
100 A commonality of online discussions that this interaction demonstrates concerns the name-calling 
in this quote which serves othering. The term cheese-head refers to the Dutch cheese tradition and is 
used online both as a term of abuse by the Muslim participants and as a label that some non-Muslims 
apply to themselves to express their Dutch origins with apparent pride. The term Hollander has a 
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With her suggestion that @bracadaver will prove the weakest link she refers to 
the Islamic discourse that the Muslims have the ultimate truth and will thus end 
up as the ‘strongest link’ on Judgement Day. This discourse thus helps her to 
resist @bracadaver’s Islamophobic attitude.101  
 A second way in which the fundamentalist respondents resist 
Islamophobia is by criticizing attitudes and behaviour that they see as 
discriminatory and signs of double standards. They principally object to the 
inequality of how they are treated in comparison to other citizens. Interestingly, 
they focus on discrimination on religious grounds and do not object as much to 
their socio-economic position per se. Amongst the various fundamentalist 
respondents the arguments differ slightly in line with their religious view of the 
extent to which they are part of Western society.102 The orthodox respondents, 
converts and children from Muslim migrants alike, contend that they are Dutch 
(or British) besides being Muslim. Consequently, in opposition to societal fears 
that Muslims do not adjust to Dutch or British culture, the orthodox 
respondents present Islamophobic responses as the real threat to the possibility 
of living in a Western country. In their view it is anti-Islamic policies and 
limitations to the constitutional right of freedom of religion that make it 
increasingly hard for them to obey to both Islamic and Western rules. They 
argue that it is to a great extent due to these social developments that their 
ultimate ideal to migrate.103 In short, the orthodox respondents wish to have 
their constitutional rights as common citizens to be respected. Contrary to 
general images Islamic fundamentalism, the expectations of being given equal 
treatment and opportunities are indicative of the respondents’ liberal Western 
values.104 
The radical and extremist respondents also appear to have internalized 
these Western values. This becomes apparent in their strong indignation when 
actual practice does not meet the expectations that these rights give rise to. Yet, 
                                                                                                                          
similar connotation. Instead of using the word ‘Dutchman’, which is Nederlander, the participants use 
the term ‘Hollander’, which traditionally refers to Dutchmen only from North and South Holland. It 
seems that this word is making a comeback in the Netherlands, because it allows the Dutch to 
distinguish between people with the Dutch nationality, which includes first and later generation 
immigrants, and the native population. 
101 However, it also becomes clear here that the attitudes of the Muslims in this study are not static. 
Majdolina commented on her contributions a couple of years later when somebody else re-activates 
the discussion. She makes fun of herself for her aggressiveness and swearing. It would thus seem that 
the passage of time has helped her to put things into a different perspective. 
102 The moderate respondents in this study, regardless of their ethnic and religious background, stress 
that they have been raised in the Netherlands (or Great Britain) and are therefore to a great extent 
Dutch (or British). Their resistance to Islamophobia is based on the argument that Islam and life in 
Western society can be reconciled and that they demonstrate this by their conformity to the society 
that they live in. 
103 In the course of this study, two female respondents acted on their intention to move from the 
Netherlands to a Muslim community in Great Britain. They believed that orthodox Muslims in 
Great Britain have more liberties to practise their religion. The British orthodox Muslims share the 
impression that they have more freedom than Muslims in other European countries. 
104 The Western character of the religious orientation of the respondents is something that will be 
considered in Chapter 7. 
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they do not try to convince the critics of being wrong through dialogue like the 
orthodox respondents do. Instead, they argue that the unjust exclusion and 
humiliation of Muslims de-legitimizes the powerful groups that they consider 
responsible. They frame Islamophobic sentiments in terms of a ‘war against 
Islam’ that is taking place and believe that they have to stand up to the enemies 
of Islam. Former radical and born-again Almahdi clearly summarizes how 
Islamophobia can inspire a discourse of rebellion. He claims that the words of 
some of the harshest critics of Islam in the Netherlands at the time of his 
radicalization – Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Theo van Gogh, made him 
feel humiliated. He claims that, in response, he developed an image of the 
Netherlands and non-responding Arabic countries as enemies and then states 
about his animosity: 
 
It was also a bit out of pride, like ‘we can strike back, fight back. Maybe 
the time will come that we come to power and strike back’. That time 
has been there in the past. (…) The result would be that we are not 
weak. That we don’t accept it. That they let us be the way we want to 
be. 
 
In brief, unlike the orthodox respondents who aim at convincing their critics that 
they are wrong, the radical and extremist respondents adopt a discourse of 
rebellion against the groups in power to end anti-Islamic practices. As Almahdi’s 
words indicate, this discourse offers them a sense of empowerment and can help 
to re-establish their pride. That leads to the next topic of this chapter, namely 
how the various discourses of resistance can help the fundamentalist respondents 
cope with identity strain. 
 
 
5.2 Resistance as Coping Strategy for Identity Strain? 
The principal question of this chapter is what attracted the respondents to 
different Islamic fundamentalist interpretations. This chapter has therefore 
reviewed the discourses of resistance that fundamentalist views offer, based on 
theological argumentations and in-group processes. For example, in the case of 
resistance to external labels the religious grounds are that fitna is not allowed, but 
the use of humour to deal with labels is shaped in social interaction amongst 
group members. But how does resistance contribute to identity formation?105 As 
discussed above, the process of identification requires differentiation. Islamic 
fundamentalist views offer discourses for strict differentiation that are based on 
dualist distinctions between the Islamic and un-Islamic. Such strict 
differentiation is a prerequisite for secure fundamentalist identities, because the 
claim to have the absolute truth transforms alternative truth claims into threats: 
threats to the stability and security of the meaning system and, consequently, 
identity (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1966). To secure their truth, fundamentalists 
                                                      
105 The idea that resistance and protest can contribute to identity formation is confirmed in studies on 
social movements for the group level (see Klandermans, 1997: 204; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). 
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thus have to discard and resist other visions as ‘deceptions’. This type of 
resistance is visible in the respondents’ criticism of other religions and alternative 
currents within Islam. Through resistance to other beliefs they eradicate doubt 
and without doubt the way to certainty is paved: the fundamentalist respondents 
can aim for the highest pinnacle in Heaven while others are destined for its lower 
levels and Hell. Similarly, their resistance secures their individual and group 
identity: by viewing non-Muslim groups and individuals as religiously inferior 
they strengthen their sense of belonging to the superior social group and of 
having the right guidelines to become a better person in everyday practice.106 In 
short, it appears that these discourses are attractive because they help the 
respondents to forcefully distance themselves from non-Muslim identities, 
stereotyping and insecurities. Considering the way identities come into being, 
this type of distancing, or resistance, could thus – in turn – help them to 
approach their ‘authentic’ identities. 
 Besides this apparent common ground, however, the various 
fundamentalist respondents demonstrated different levels of resistance. So could 
there be a relation between the respondents’ experience of identity strain and the 
discourse of resistance that they choose? Unsurprisingly, the respondents do not 
present their resistance as a reaction to subjective experiences. From their 
perspective their resistance is based on objective facts. Nonetheless, throughout 
the interviews and conversations it became clear that their resistance corresponds 
to some extent with personal experiences and thus appears to be – at least in part 
– reactionary. As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, the orthodox respondents’ identity 
strain appears to be more inward and hence to principally concern their ‘personal 
self’, whereas the identity strain of the radical and extremist respondents seems to 
relate to their ‘social self’, that is how they relate to and are perceived by other 
people. To see what the relation is between these types of strain and the various 
discourses, the following sections review the differential attraction of orthodox, 
radical and extremist views by discussing Summeeyah’s, Hujjat’s and Maysa’s 
illustrative stories as presented in this chapter’s Figures 5.2-5.4. In this, these 
sections will consider how resistance forms a coping strategy for their different 
kinds of identity strain. 
 
5.2.1 The Orthodox Respondents: An Inward Focus 
Considering that the orthodox respondents principally experience identity strain 
concerning their personal selves, how does this relate to their discourse of 
resistance? They generally distance themselves from their former lifestyle and 
attitudes, but do not always let go of former friends. Moreover, while they reject 
certain aspects of Western culture, they also express appreciation for some of its 
other cultural aspects. Furthermore, even though they consider Islam superior to 
other religions, they still see some commonalities with other monotheist 
                                                      
106 Thus while the idea behind the submission to Allah’s judgement, rules and role models seems to 
be that one should not want to know the unknowable and not judge other people too easily, the claim 
to be the one true religion and the judging of others in line with this claim is the order of the day 
amongst different currents in Islam and towards non-Muslims in this study. 
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believers. They are critical of other currents in Islam and argue that they have 
gone astray, but are wary of practising takfir and therefore prefer not to call other 
Muslim groups unbelievers. Finally, they resist Islamophobic sentiments and 
negative labels, but do this by trying to convince those who have negative 
opinions and labels that they are wrong through dialogue. Altogether, it is 
possible to summarize their approach as resistance to alternative meaning 
systems, negative opinions and aspects of their own life, and a milder approach 
to the people involved. A closer look at Summeeyah’s case can help to clarify 
what this implies for the relation with the identity strain that the orthodox 
respondents experienced.   
Summeeyah’s story indicates that multiple significant men in her life 
deprived her of respect and love, which seems to have contributed to a low sense 
of self-esteem. She also experienced social exclusion from her native Dutch 
family, which – as her report indicates – confirmed her feelings of self-doubt. 
Her story is thus representative for the orthodox respondents as it points to an 
identity strain of primarily a personal nature. In comparison to her resistance, she 
mainly distances herself from three things. Firstly, she distances herself from her 
former lifestyle. She expresses feelings of guilt about her life and stresses the need 
to let the past go. Through the discourse of guilt she confirms that she wants to 
start with a clean slate and by arguing to ‘stop sawing sawdust’ she tries to leave 
painful experiences behind. Secondly, she objects to sexual norms in Western 
culture. In her view Western culture reduces women to sex objects. This 
objection demonstrates a parallel with the lack of respect and abuse that she has 
experienced from men. It thus seems that by attributing such a lack of respect to 
Western culture and turning her back to this culture she feels protected from 
such experiences in the future. Thirdly, she refutes negative opinions and labels 
about Muslims. In her view these are unjustified and she therefore opposes to 
being excluded on religious grounds. It could be that her opposition is a defence 
mechanism to prevent negative judgements by others from threatening the 
positive feelings she has about her newly found Muslim identity. In short, each 
of these three discourses of ‘resistance’ seem to help Summeeyah to construct a 
new, positive identity.  
Altogether, Summeeyah’s example shows how the resistant discourses 
of the orthodox respondents – against alternative meaning systems, negative 
opinions and their former life – could provide a coping strategy for the type of 
identity strain that they experienced. The fact that they display limited resistance 
to other people also strengthens the impression that their resistance serves to 
cope with identity strain concerning their personal selves: it reflects their inward 
concern. This could explain why the orthodox respondents do not adopt a 
discourse of social activism, but focus on improving their position within their 
social context. They argue that they have the right to disagree with (‘resist’ the 
views of) others and still be accepted. Besides showing that they want to be 
accepted, their emphasis on da’wa reflects that they adopt a constructive 
approach – at least from their viewpoint. They believe that ignorant non-
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Muslims could eventually come to see the light, which implies a less harsh 
rejection, more patience and a willingness to ‘help’.  
 
5.2.2 The Radical and Extremist Respondents: Resistance Identities 
Just as the previous section has demonstrated for the orthodox respondents, this 
section considers how the identity strain of the radical and extremist respondents 
relates to their resistance discourse. Their discourses are all in all more resistant 
than those of the orthodox respondents. Regarding their former life they 
generally distance themselves more forcefully from their previous activities 
and/or social circle than the orthodox respondents do. Their criticism of 
Western culture is also more far-reaching as they can find hardly anything 
positive to say about it. Likewise, the extremists in particular focus more on the 
differences between themselves and believers from other religions and make a 
stricter distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. The latter group 
includes, in their view, Muslims from other currents in Islam who commit shirk. 
While they resist negative external labels in a similar manner to the orthodox 
respondents, their resistance to Islamophobia takes a different shape. Unlike the 
orthodox respondents they see their claim to universal truth as a legitimation for 
political activism against exclusionary practices and the people that they hold 
responsible for them.  
While the radical and extremist respondents have this more resistant 
attitude in common, they differ in terms of the matters they resist most. The 
radicals mainly ‘resist’ their previous lifestyles, and alternative meaning systems 
and out-group behaviour, which they perceive as oppression. The resistance of 
the extremists, on the contrary, is more personalized, which becomes especially 
clear in their rejection of unbelievers. Their previously discussed views on jihad 
are also more personalized. Even though they consider the general public to be 
victims of their governments, they believe that non-Muslims should not be 
pardoned for their ignorance, because they have a personal responsibility to learn 
about Islam, a religion that they know exists. In contrast, the radical respondents 
present the population largely as ignorant victims of the government. The 
remainder of this section presents Hujjat’s and Maysa’s case in order to clarify 
the relation between radical and extremist resistance and identity strain.   
Hujjat’s story in Figure 5.3 reveals an interest in oppositional, masculine 
identities, which radiate strength, as indicated by the criminal scene he became 
part of and his promiscuous behaviour. Yet, at a certain moment he became 
occupied with ontological questions under the influence of two Muslim men 
whom he met. According to his reading, these questions and the prospect of 
having to account for his deeds inspired him to seek a new direction. His mother 
supported this at that time, because after his conversion “my mother was no 
longer afraid that the police would come, that I would knock up a girl or end up 
in prison”. All in all, the role of others in his conversion to Islam, as well as his 
particular attraction to oppositional masculinity, appear to reveal that Hujjat is 
sensitive to the opinions of significant others and is concerned with how strong 
he appears to these others. This sensitivity seems to point to identity strain 
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concerning his ‘social self’. So how does his experience of this strain relate to his 
discourse of resistance?    
Hujjat expresses resistance on every level, but only to a certain extent. 
His fiercest criticism concerns Western culture, external labels and 
Islamophobia. He equates Western culture with the Capitalist ideology in which 
he sees nothing good, because it opposes to the truth that he believes the Islamic 
ideology provides. Labels and Islamophobia are in his view all the result of a 
Capitalist conspiracy against Islam. He displays a more nuanced view in his 
attitude toward his former life, and toward alternatively minded people and 
Muslims, as he disapproves of his former lifestyle but does not hold a grudge 
against his former friends. What is more, he is critical of alternative ideologies 
(more than of other religions), but he considers most people to be victims of a 
conspiracy who could be convinced of the truth of Islam within 10 minutes. 
Towards followers of other currents in Islam he hardly expresses any criticism: in 
his view they are all Muslim brothers or sisters, some of whom are more and 
others less seriously ‘practising’. He places all un-Islamic elements and criticism 
of Islam under the banner of a single counter-ideology, thus creating a dualist 
image of a single major threat to his claim to the ultimate truth, which he can 
then target. It would seem therefore that his focus on the Capitalist ideology 
helps him to maintain the positive meaning of the new Islamic direction that he 
has been searching for. In addition, this image of an enemy and the oppositional 
discourse of Hizb-ut-Tahrir allow him to take up the masculine, even heroic, 
role of a fighter for the eternal truth. It could be that Hujjat hardly expresses 
resistance to individuals, because negative experiences with individuals are absent 
in his account as a result of which he might not feel the need to personalize his 
resistant attitude.    
Maysa’s accounts mainly indicate two things. On the one hand, the 
judgements of her by others seem to have had a serious impact on her in her 
youth, because she experienced a lack of acceptance in the outside world (because 
she was bullied) and felt pressured by high parental expectations at home (since 
her father strictly ensured that she studied and followed Islamic rules). On the 
other hand, Maysa expresses a desire for transcendence: to be imbued with 
special meaning. She repeatedly presents herself as somebody who does not 
follow the crowd and who seeks to be part of something special (such as being a 
rebel at school, initially having ‘bad’ boyfriends and by wanting to become more 
‘useful’ at a later age). She attributes her feelings of depression to experiencing a 
lack of ‘usefulness’. As argued in Section 3.4.2 for the radical and extremist 
respondents in general, her experiences relate primarily to her ‘social self’, 
because of the concern she expresses about who she is in the eyes of or in 
comparison with others. To what extent then does her extremist resistance 
discourse match her experience of identity strain?    
Maysa has adopted each of the discourses of resistance discussed in the 
former section. In short, Maysa distances herself fiercely from her former friends 
who she now considers ‘superficial’ or hypocritical, her father who does not 
practise ‘real’ Islam and a society which offers fake liberties and whose population 
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are ‘like sheep’ and who have a negative opinion of her and other Muslims. All in 
all, Maysa’s discourse allows her to disqualify – and thus distance herself from – 
the people by whom she feels judged and excluded. By adopting such resistant 
discourses she seemingly finds religious grounds to turn the painful experience of 
being criticized and judged into the conviction that she is a member of a group 
of misunderstood true believers. As such she ends up on a higher moral ground, 
which confirms that she is in fact special. Maysa’s extremist discourse thus 
appears to offer a coping strategy for the identity strain that she experienced. 
Thus, Maysa’s example could also mean that the extremist respondents’ 
resistance is linked to their more outward identity strain. Their resistant 
discourses allow them to neutralize the strain concerning their social selves – 
such as the one which stems from social exclusion – by a ‘rejection of the 
rejecters’ (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Instead of acknowledging the power that 
others exert by excluding them, they contend that they do not even want to 
belong to these others and that in fact these others do not belong to them (also 
see Castells, 1997: 9). Thus rejecting Western culture and excluding alternatively 
minded people who criticize them from their lives and the Muslim brotherhood, 
could help them to feel better about themselves.  
This logic might explain why resistant discourses play such an 
important part in the construction of the ‘authentic’ identities of those 
respondents who experience the greatest degree of identity strain concerning 
their social selves. The radical and extremist respondents appear to manifest 
themselves principally in ‘opposition to’ an enemy. As Christie (1986) has 
demonstrated, an enemy can contribute to a sense of unity and stability107 by 
directing attention away from inner threats towards outer threats. In this case 
these are threats to a positive identity. The radical and extremist respondents’ 
fierce resistant discourses thus seemingly indicate that they direct their inner 
struggles outward and make the ‘Other’ into an enemy. The radical and extremist 
respondents could thus be argued to form the ‘resistance identities’ which 
Castells (1997) describes as: 
 
generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued 
and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of 
resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or 
opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society (Castells, 1997: 
8).108 
 
Even though Christie’s and Castells’ ideas concern the societal level and involve 
group identities, their thoughts could equally apply to the individual level. To 
                                                      
107 Christie (1986) says about enemies: “Enemies are not always just threats, they may also be useful. 
They unite the other side, make it possible to change priorities, to focus all attention on certain 
phenomena, and to forget about others” (Christie, 1986: 42). 
108 There is one aspect to this definition which could be questioned. By speaking of ‘actors’ who are 
‘devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination’ he appears to suggest that resistance 
identities come into being in reaction to domination, whereas they are likely to result from a complex 
interaction which I try to capture in my concept of ‘identity strain’.   
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clarify this, Cohen’s (1955) ideas on the relation between status frustration and 
reaction-formation are useful. Cohen has argued that people who suffer from 
status frustration can seek a solution in an alternative moral order, such as that of 
a religious group.109 This solution, however, has a downside according to Cohen. 
Cohen refers to psychological studies to explain that once a moral order is 
internalized, it is hard to get rid of. Instead of this order being put aside it 
“usually continues to press for recognition” and thereby forms a threat to the new 
moral order (Cohen, 1955: 133). To counter the tensions of the resulting 
internal struggle, he argues, a process of ‘reaction-formation’ comes into being. 
Through reaction-formation people try to create a defence to their inner struggle 
by becoming disproportionately hostile to an external enemy: the moral order 
that they are fighting against or its representatives. When applying these ideas to 
the radical and especially the extremist respondents, one could argue that their 
discourse of resistance might serve to hide from themselves and others that they 
still value the moral order and its representatives that they are resisting. 
Following this line of reasoning, they are still likely to care about their 
recognition by its representatives. In sum, it could thus be that to build a mental 
defence to their inner struggle, the radical and extremist respondents lash out 
disproportionately at their enemy: the moral order involved and – in the case of 
the extremists – its representatives to whose negative opinions they were 
particularly sensitive. Whether this theoretical assumption applies to the radical 
and extremist respondents in this study has become insufficiently clear. An 
apparent exception are the stories of the one former radical and two former 
extremists. In retrospect these respondents say, in so many words, that radical 
and extremist views helped them to compensate for a sense of personal weakness. 
Former extremist convert Reza says that he believes that he was – and other 
extremists are – “fighting their own mirror-image” or “alterego”.  
Reaction-formation or not, there are some indications of radical and 
extremist respondents still caring about the opinions of others. As such, it could 
be that radical or extremist resistance identities only form a coping strategy for 
identity strain. Extremist born-again Marid is a telling example in this respect. 
While he acknowledges that he “wanted to belong” in his youth, he claims that 
now he has become ‘the stranger’ he does not want to be regarded as a victim and 
does not care about negative opinions anymore. Throughout the interview he 
seems to contradict himself though. He idealizes brotherhood and continuously 
expresses disappointment about his experiences of social rejection so that he 
seems to confirm that he still desires to be accepted.  
 
In brief, if it is the goal of the Muslims in this study to have a positive and stable 
identity, then resistance is a way to neutralize the opposite feelings. Resistance 
thus helps the respondents to approach their image of an ‘authentic’ self within a 
secure and stable meaning system. As such, the processes of resistance, on the 
                                                      
109 Previous research confirms that belonging to a religious community can offer a powerful, 
sublimated way of protest against experienced injustices such as lack of social acceptance (e.g. Kurien, 
2005; Ho, 2005; Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis & Otten, 2009; Radwan, 2006). 
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one hand, and identification with an ‘ideal’, on the other hand, are 
communicating vessels. The extent to which reaction-formation could be taking 
place is a question that requires more research. 
 
 
5.3 Summary  
This chapter has demonstrated how the resistance to what is ‘other’ is an 
essential element in the creation of the ‘authentic’ identity for the Muslims in 
this study. In constructing their new identity the respondents resist what they do 
not or do no longer want to identify with. The discourses of resistance, which 
have been discussed in this chapter are their former lives and social circles, 
Western culture, other religions, external labels, other currents in Islam and 
Islamophobic sentiments and practices. The focus of resistance differs, however, 
for the orthodox respondents and the radical and the extremist respondents. It 
appears that the different discourses of the respondents match the differences in 
their identity strains. On the one hand, the less resistant and less condemning 
discourses of the orthodox respondents reflect their more inward focus. On the 
other hand, the discourses of the radical and extremist respondents are more 
resistant and directed at individuals, which seems to match their greater concern 
about the judgements of others. It appears that they form resistance identities to 
arm themselves against the internal struggles concerning feelings of exclusion 
and a sense of self-worth. 
 To summarize, the respondents’ discourses of resistance help them to 
secure their self-image. Their dualist approach helps them to create a more 
positive Muslim identity, not only through identification, but also – or mainly in 
the case of the radical and extremist respondents – by resisting un-Islamic 
elements. There are still many questions, which remain unanswered, however. As 
mentioned before, this study has so far only discussed the respondents’ discourses 
about their conversion and their processes of identification and differentiation. 
The principal issues which still need to be addressed here are how the Muslims 
in this study shape their Muslim identities in practice which will be addressed in 
Chapter 6 and how the choice for Islamic fundamentalism can be understood in 
the broader perspective of the contemporary social context which will be the 
subject of Chapter 7.     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
6  
 
REPRESENTING PURIFICATION AND RESISTANCE 
 
 
I’m a representative of Islam. (…) That is constantly in my head. All 
Muslims think of this. We have a task to do. - Saaliha 
 
That they are representatives of Islam is something that all the respondents try to 
express in their behaviour, as Saaliha’s words indicate. But how do the 
fundamentalist respondents give form to their self-identification with ‘pure 
Islam’, the global ummah and the Muslim personality in everyday life? And in 
what sense does their behaviour display resistance, regarding the topics discussed 
in the previous chapter? These are questions that will be dealt with in this 
chapter. The aim of this chapter – in relation to the previous ones – is thus to 
show how the fundamentalist respondents commit themselves to their 
fundamentalist self and group identity. By shedding light on their commitment I 
hope to find out what fundamentalism offers the respondents. To achieve this 
aim, this chapter consists of four sections. The first concerns how the 
fundamentalist respondents express their Muslim identities and as such represent 
Islam. The second section discusses the role of social control and impression 
management in the religious commitment to the group. The section then reflects 
on how the various ways of representing Islam, social control and impression 
management contribute to the internalization of the respondents’ Muslim 
identity. The final section considers the merits of representing Islam and 
commitment to the group in terms of respect and status.  
 
 
6.1 Becoming a Fundamentalist Representative of Islam 
How do the fundamentalist respondents represent their Muslim selves in 
everyday life (Goffman, 1959)? In this study several practices became apparent 
which seem to serve as ways to represent Islam. These practices involve 1) the 
use of names, 2) language, 3) physical appearance and personal environment, and 
4) behaviour and activities. 
 
6.1.1 Presentation of Self through Names 
One way in which the respondents represent their religious affiliation is through 
their names. The respondents who were raised as Muslims usually already had 
Muslim names. For converts it is common to adopt an Islamic name, regardless 
of their Islamic orientation. Although some respondents adopted names that 
fellow members of their new group thought appropriate for them, many of them 
chose their own Islamic names. The orthodox converts commonly chose a name 
of one of their role models, such as Muhammad or for the women, the name of 
one of the Prophet Muhammad’s wives. As there are many hadith revealing the 
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character and behaviour of these role models, the names seems to reflect what 
the respondents want to be like and how they wish to be regarded. Yet, 
approximately half of the converted respondents still used their Dutch names, 
even though they also have Islamic names. This could indicate that they do not 
consider their names as the most important way to express their Muslimhood. 
Moreover, some of the extremist respondents adopted new Islamic names that 
they use among their Muslim brothers and sisters and with me so they did not 
have to reveal their real names. The name of one extremist respondent clearly 
represented his resistant attitude as it originated from a popular jihadi martyr.  
As every participant in online discussions has to create a virtual identity, 
online names offer an important opportunity to present oneself in the way that 
one wants to be perceived. In the virtual context participants can invent names 
that do not have to resemble real-life names. Consequently, online names can 
more easily present an ethnic background, and religious or political orientations. 
Online names that reflect ethnic backgrounds include the names of countries as 
an element, such as MocroRoosje, which means something like ‘Moroccan 
Rose’, or ethnic groups, such as in the case of a participant called ‘Berber2’. 
Several participants expressed their religious orientation in their names, for 
example in the case of a participant who calls himself ‘Muwa7eed’, which means 
‘monotheist’. Names can also represent religious role models, such as ‘Abu_Bakr’, 
after a companion of the Prophet. Names that express resistance, for example, 
include words such as ‘Palestine’, such as in the case of just_palestine, to show 
their support for the Palestinians and there were various variations of ‘Umm 
Osama’ or ‘Abu Khattab’. Umm means mother in Arabic and this is a word that 
several of the women that I met put before their name, even if they were not yet 
mothers. So a woman using ‘Umm Osama’ would appear to present herself as an 
admirer of Bin Laden. Abu means father and Abu Khattab was the name of a 
Chechnyan jihadi who became a martyr. So it appears that by adopting this 
name they are showing that this fighter is a role model.  
 In sum, both in ‘real’ life and online the Muslims in this study use 
names to demonstrate affiliation with certain groups and thereby influence how 
others perceive them. These names thus indicate whom they wish to identify 
with and what the areas of their resistance are. 
   
6.1.2 Linguistic Expression 
In group settings the fundamentalist respondents also continuously affirm their 
Muslim identity through language: most notably through the use of Arabic, 
shared narratives and elevated language. Regarding the Arabic language, they 
frequently use expressions such as ‘alhamdullillah’ (praise to Allah), ‘bismillah’ (in 
name of Allah) or ‘insha’Allah’ (if Allah wants it). Some of the respondents 
explained that these expressions are little acts of worship, because by saying these 
words, they acknowledge God’s existence and power. The respondents scattered 
these words throughout their Dutch conversations in the mosques. In addition to 
the use of Arabic words, Islam is a common topic for conversation. During the 
observations they usually talked about ordinary issues, such as raising and 
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educating their children, study, work, vacations and clothes. Yet, the 
fundamentalist respondents had a tendency to bring up Islam sooner or later, for 
example, by discussing the Islamic rules for raising children. 
Online, language seems an even more important way to present oneself 
as a Muslim. On the Islamic forum participants use Arabic much more 
extensively than the respondents did in conversations in the mosques. Several 
online participants even submit purely Arabic contributions to a discussion, 
whereas others use some recurrent Arabic sentences, for example the wish that 
another participant will be blessed by Allah. Arabic phrases and quotes from 
hadiths or Quranic verses also make popular signature texts, which accompany 
the participants’ postings. The signature texts are very diverse in terms of content 
and often reflect the attitude of the participant towards Islam and society. For 
example, some use a quote that presents Islam as peaceful, whereas others add 
texts that present Islam as source of power and resistance. Amatoe_Rahmaan 
who adds as subtitle ‘lioness’ to her profile has such a signature text, which she 
derives from a hadith, as the text between brackets indicates:  
 
He, who equips a warrior on the path of Allah, is like a fighter himself, 
and he who takes good care of the family of a warrior on the path of 
Allah, is like a fighter himself [narrated by Imam Al-Bukhari and Imam 
Muslim, rahimahum Allah]. 
 
Despite this love of Arabic phrases, only a minority of the participants seemed 
capable of fully understanding large Arabic texts, let alone speak Arabic. For 
instance, it regularly occurred that another participant would ask for a 
translation. In most cases, however, the respondents would translate English 
texts into Dutch – including texts of a radical or extremist nature – that had 
originally been published in Arabic. Similarly, few of the women in the mosque 
and the respondents of the interviews mastered classic Arabic. Instead, the 
respondents from Muslim families spoke their parents’ tongue and usually had 
only some basic knowledge of classic Arabic. The ones who do understand classic 
Arabic also generally read Islamic texts in Dutch, such as extremist born-again 
Yelda who says: “I read the books that I can buy, simple ones that are translated 
into Dutch. I can read Arabic and understand it, but still Dutch is easier”. 
Obviously, converts in particular lacked knowledge of the language, which some 
of them tried to remedy by attending Arabic classes in the mosque.  
Besides the use of Arabic language, the respondents share narratives 
varying from metaphors about Islam to stories about conversion and their Islamic 
role models. Examples of metaphors are the comparison of humans with washing 
machines and of women with diamonds. Online the participants share stories 
about themselves and their role models. Several of the female respondents in the 
Salafi mosques enjoyed reading people’s conversion stories online and 
recommended that I read such ‘miraculous’ stories. Others recommended that I 
watch a documentary about Dutch female converts to Islam or read specific 
books with autobiographical reports of conversion (such as Robert, 2005). One 
of the respondents, extremist born-again Marid, said that he had also put his 
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autobiographical conversion report online for others to read. Regarding their role 
models, the participants share stories reflecting their remarkable character traits 
such as friendliness or strength. Responses to these postings indicate that the 
online participants find such stories stimulating, even though the extent to which 
they actually want to emulate their role models remains unclear. This is 
particularly the case for the jihadi role models of those participants who appear to 
have extremist sympathies. In a particular discussion about martyrdom, for 
example, the online participants express admiration for those who are prepared 
to die as a violent jihadi, such as a female participant Juwayriyah. She says about 
a Palestinian woman who stimulated her son to become a violent jihadi: 
“Masha’Allah, that is a real woman!”. Yet, besides this admiration, the 
participants hardly say anything about whether they want to follow the example 
of their role models. As such it appears that the Muslims in this study principally 
share such narratives to confirm their religious affiliation and thereby to confirm 
their group identity. 
The elevated language that some use – mainly in online discussions, but 
also in certain lectures – is a further linguistic aspect, which is worthy of note. 
Such elevated language is used, on the one hand, in lectures and online 
discussions about the personality of the Prophet or the good behaviour of the 
first generations of Muslims. On the other hand, such language is present in 
online discussions about the heroism of individual Muslims and militancy of 
Islam, for example, through presenting battle stories. A discussion of the merits 
of martyrdom in Islam offers several typical examples. The first concerns a 
translated text that the participant Ibn firnas 23 posts of extremist Al-Zarqawi 
which criticizes Muslims for not taking action against humiliation by non-
Muslims: 
 
Beware my nation. Your honour is in the hands of the Cross 
Worshippers. They tinker with it, but you do not stir. Each victor 
liberateth his slaves, but our women are still in captivity. The whips of 
humiliation drip with blood and I can see the flesh of our prisoners on 
these whips. We have so much fear for death by the sword, now death 
even despises us. 
 
Another representative example is the contribution by a participant called 
Redouan17. In response to Ibs firnas 23’s post he expresses his agreement while 
somewhat mimicking Zarqawi’s elevated language:  
 
I love you brothers and sisters who take it on for and defend the 
mujahideen against the hypocrites and unbelievers who contend 
falsehood and call them irhab. Truly it is them who preserve the ummah 
together with the ulama. May Allah reward you with djanat al Firdaus. 
Victory or Paradise. 
 
It seems that this kind of language helps the participants to identify with the 
transcendental, mythical character that they attribute to Islam and their heroic 
      Representing Purification and Resistance  | 
 
161 
role models, while it simultaneously distances them from the ‘ordinary’ and ‘non-
Islamic’. 
 Altogether, considering the limited knowledge of Arabic, which is none 
of the Muslims in this study’s first language (that is for the main part Dutch), it 
seems likely that their use of Arabic phrases helps them to remind themselves 
and others of their Muslimhood and their connectedness. As the same time their 
use of Arabic confirms their group’s boundaries as it distances them from out-
group members who do not understand Arabic at all. The use of elevated 
language, in addition, seems to strengthen the perception of their role models’ 
transcendent character, or – in the case of the radical and extremist respondents 
– of the mythical dimension of their heroic struggle. As such, the elevated 
language confirms their distance from non-Islamic ordinary and non-heroic 
realities.   
 
6.1.3 Physical Appearances 
Previous research has pointed out that one of the principal instruments to show 
one’s religious conviction to the outside world is through one’s body 
(Winchester, 2008). The respondents also use embodied expressions to confirm 
their membership to local Dutch and British Muslim communities and to help 
them internalize their Muslim identity (cf. Klein, 2003). The principal way in 
which the respondents use their body is through clothing (also see de Koning, 
2009a). The female fundamentalist respondents in particular dress in a way 
which makes them recognizable as Muslims. While this seems logical 
considering the stricter rules for covering for women, it also is a choice that they 
make. As orthodox born-again Saaliha says about her choice to cover all her 
bodily features despite her family’s protest: “I wanted to be closer to the wives of 
the Prophet. (…) I wanted that identity, that I am a Muslim woman in the 
street”. Contrary to the dominant public image that principally radical Muslims 
cover themselves, the orthodox respondents dressed more traditionally than the 
radical and extremist respondents did.  
Yet, even though the respondents who use the Salafi as role models 
have rather stern rules for clothing, there are only a few who wear what they 
consider ideal garments. The ideal that the orthodox women mentioned is a 
khimar and a niqab, a combination that is commonly referred to as the burqa. 
Consequently, the British orthodox respondents usually wear both when they go 
outside. With a couple of exceptions the orthodox Dutch women generally opt 
for only a long khimar. During Dutch Salafi lectures an equal number of the 
women wore an abaya and a hijab, which conceal the body somewhat less. The 
male Muslim respondents are overall less recognizable as fundamentalists. 
Despite the ideal of a beard and trousers, which leave the ankles bare, the 
orthodox men are generally only recognizable by their – mostly short – beards. 
Like the women, they tend to dress more traditionally when they go to the 
mosque. Moreover, on average the converts in the orthodox mosques dressed 
more traditionally than the children of Muslim parents. 
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The radical and extremist respondents dress less traditionally than the orthodox 
ones. With the exception of one male respondent who wears a long beard and 
trousers to just above the ankles, the other men generally only grow modest 
beards and wear regular Western clothes in their everyday lives. Moreover, of the 
radical and extremist female respondents only radical born-again Fareeha wears a 
khimar. Of the three extremist female respondents, two dress themselves in a 
traditional abaya and a hijab. One, born-again Yelda, wears a regular headscarf 
with rather tight, Western clothes, even though she believes that she should not 
wear such revealing clothes. A year after our initial interview she was still 
wearing them and argues that she simply likes them and that they are 
comfortable. As Groen and Kranenberg (2006) have shown there are of course 
female supporters of extremism who wear the niqab and the khimar. Yet, the fact 
remains that some do not and this might be surprising, since one might expect 
that the most resistant groups would adopt the most resistant style. 
Several female and the more traditionally dressed male respondents 
described their clothing as a ‘protection’ against ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour. They 
explained this by the fact that their Islamic looks remind them that they have to 
represent Islam and thus have to behave like a good Muslim. Extremist born-
again Marid, for example, says that his beard makes him feel like a “calling card” 
for Islam. Similarly, some of the women that I met in the mosques said that their 
Islamic clothes, particularly the niqab that they are continuously aware of, remind 
them of being a Muslim. 
 
Pragmatic Choices 
It seems that the differences in appearances largely result from a pragmatic 
attitude. A major indication of such pragmatism is that the choice for traditional 
Islamic clothes depends on the social context. The male and female respondents 
usually dress more traditionally when they go to the mosque and when they are 
at home than at other occasions (also see Roex et al., 2010). Despite the 
orthodox women’s greater focus on clothes, many of them admitted that they 
compromise, mostly at work. This appears to be especially the case in the 
Netherlands. The women who do not always wear their ideal garment give two 
types of reasons. Some of them claim not to feel sufficiently strong to express 
their Muslim identity through clothing. One of the women in a Salafi mosque 
explained, for example, that she does not dare to wear a headscarf at work, 
because she fears the negative reactions. Others say that they compromise not 
because they feel weak, but for the sake of expectations of non-Muslims at work 
or at home. Some female converts therefore choose to wear a regular hijab when 
they visit their parents. Orthodox convert Ava also represents this group as she 
adapts her clothing to her work environment. While she believes that women 
should cover themselves thoroughly, she says: 
 
Maybe if I lived in another country I would wear the niqab too, because 
I think it is recommended at the very least. And here in the Netherlands 
I can’t do that, I can’t make others accept it either, I think. (…) At work 
I wear the hijab and at home I wear the khimar.  
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Overall, the female respondents in London appeared to have less trouble 
showing their Muslim pride in clothing. It seems that even though they struggle 
with negative responses, they find support in the fact that traditional Islamic 
garments are relatively common in large British cities like London. Yet, also in 
the British context, women make pragmatic choices. Orthodox born-again Jala, 
for example, normally wears the niqab. During our interview in a restaurant she 
took it off in a private corner, but self-consciously pulled it up every single time a 
waiter passed by. In this way she prevented him from even catching a glimpse of 
her face. Yet she chooses to take it off at work, despite the presence of male 
colleagues. Although these women cover themselves in accordance with the 
minimum of their standards, the choice to cover less at work and more in leisure 
time – in the Dutch case often in the presence of their husband if they have one, 
because with him they feel more secure – seems at odds with one of the principal 
ideas behind covering themselves. They believe that showing their beauty to men 
could lead to adultery which they consider to be a very great sin. One would 
think, therefore, that it is particularly important to cover themselves at work, 
because in most of their work settings they have regular contact with men and 
thus there is a greater ‘risk’ of inappropriate feelings than by simply seeing 
unfamiliar men on the streets, especially when their husband is around. 
Similarly, the less traditional clothing style of the radical and extremist 
respondents could reflect pragmatism. Two male extremist respondents 
mentioned that they do not wear traditional clothes and a long beard because of 
the attention they would attract from the criminal justice system, which already 
had them under observation. Alternatively, radical convert Hujjat argues: 
 
The reason that I shaved off my beard is that 1) the evidence shows me 
that it is recommended and not obligatory and 2) the beard has been 
projected as an image of terrorism. A non-Muslim, therefore, will not 
dare to listen to you if you have a beard and then I wouldn’t be able to 
propagate the message. They would immediately think ‘is that one of 
them?’. There are certain priorities and it shouldn’t form an obstacle. 
 
Hujjat stresses that he is not allowed to shave off his beard for the sake of his job 
but that he shaved it off for these two reasons. So, according to these radical and 
extremist respondents’ accounts, the reason for dressing less conspicuously and 
shaving off their beards is to be able to realize their tasks as activists. 
 
Ambivalence in Resistance to Western Fashion 
The fundamentalist respondents’ attitude and practice regarding their physical 
appearance is ambivalent. On the one hand, traditional clothes for women and a 
beard for men reflect not only identification with the first ‘pure’ Muslims, but 
also opposition to the glorification of the body in Western societies such as the 
Netherlands. Instead of showing or flaunting one’s body these respondents 
choose to cover it. In addition, opting for traditional clothing implies that they 
ignore the materialist and consumer attitude of modern fashion. So, while in 
Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia traditional clothes represent conformity to 
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mainstream dressing norms, in a Western country such as the Netherlands such 
clothing could be seen as a form of ‘resistance’.  
On the other hand, however, many of the orthodox respondents in 
particular admit in words or behaviour that Western gadgets, clothes, brands, 
accessories and make-up continue to play a role in their lives. For example, some 
women in the mosque wore designer items to accompany their Islamic outfits. 
Headscarves with names such as Chanel, Gucci, Dolce & Gabanna and Calvin 
Klein and Louis Vuitton bags were an exception, yet some were present in the 
Salafi centres. Similarly, some of these women still wear make-up on their eyes 
even though the dominant opinion was that women should not beautify 
themselves, especially if they do not cover their face.110  
 
FIGURE 6.1 | ‘Red Light Fashion Tour’ 
 
 
 
 
Another remarkable observation in the As-Soennah mosque was a baby of about 
six months who I once saw dressed in Tommy Hilfiger and another time in 
McGregor designer clothes. His mother explained that she dressed him like this, 
because she likes brands. In addition, several women – orthodox, radical and 
extremist alike – admitted, for example, that they still like Western or sexy 
clothes and wanted to wear them. These respondents say that they wear them at 
home or under their Islamic outfits. Orthodox born-again Layla is the most 
notable fashion lover who I met. While dressing in a hijab and an abaya herself, 
she is a walking fashion encyclopaedia who keeps up to date through reading 
                                                      
110 In some Islamic shops women could also buy ‘Islamic’ make-up, such as kohl pencils. Some 
fundamentalist respondents argued that this make-up is in itself Islamic, because the wives of the 
Prophet used this type of make-up.  
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international fashion magazines. To be able to see the work of some famous 
Dutch designers, she even went on a ‘red light fashion tour’ with a designer 
friend of mine and a moderate Muslim friend of hers. The tour was so-called 
because the designers work was displayed amidst the red lit windows in 
Amsterdam’s red light district (see Figure 6.1). 
It even seems that Islamic clothes have become fashion objects in their 
own right, as women frequently complimented each other on the colour, fabric 
or design of an abaya or khimar. Besides, the women also appeared to develop 
their own ‘Islamic’ trends, such as the nose piercings of many and the coloured 
lenses worn by some women in the Brixton mosque, even though they did not 
consider that they were allowed. In sum, fashion and trends stay relevant despite 
fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. The argument that some of them gave 
for their continued appreciation of Western style fashion is that they can enjoy it 
as long as they do not value it too much and if they wear it in private. 
 
Online Appearances 
People physically express their belonging both in the material and the virtual 
world (Miller, 1995; Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997; Lövheim, 2004; Lövheim & 
Linderman, 2005). Thus the participants to online discussion forums also 
‘physically’ express their convictions. They create a ‘virtual veil’ or add pictures to 
their profile. By a virtual veil I mean that certain women, but also some men, 
translate the prohibition for men and women to mingle in the material world to 
the virtual world. A regular subscription which participants use is therefore ‘no 
pm [personal message] please’.  
The most obvious virtual expression of self, though, occurs through the 
pictures that the participants, men and women alike, add to their profiles. On 
the news forum non-religious pictures are most common. Participants on the 
sub-forum about Islam, however, often add Islamic pictures to their profile.111 
The images include, for example, pictures of a veiled woman, which would seem 
to reflect what participants look like in real life. Other examples are romantic, 
dreamlike images of the Quran, which flies through the air above the Ka’ba in 
Mecca or a Muslim warrior with an Islamic flag. Participants also use 
photoshopped pictures of coloured landscapes and sunsets. During the fieldwork 
the women explained that this kind of image reminds them of the magnificence 
of Allah’s creation. These pictures thus give the participants considerable 
possibilities of expressing their Islamic orientation. 
Ught_fiedien, which means ‘sister in belief’, is a typical example of 
somebody who presents herself in a romantic way (see Figure 6.2), similar to 
male participant Abyad (in Figure 6.3). While Abyad represents himself with a 
picture of the beauty of creation, Ught_fiedien combines the beauty of flowers 
with an image of the Ka’ba in Mecca and an Islamic text in the background. 
Voetballady (football lady) and Rassoel (messenger) are examples of participants 
who present themselves as devout Muslims. Rassoel’s image of a praying Muslim 
                                                      
111 Online the communities are relatively segregated: the participants generally only participate in one 
of the two forums, not in both.  
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suggests that he submits to Allah’s will. Voetballady’s picture seems to reflect her 
intention of presenting herself as a covered woman who follows Quranic 
guidelines.    
 
FIGURE 6.2 | Female Presentations of Self  
 
        
    ught_fiedien          voetballady                    Zuster_batata        Oum_Dujanaah 
 
 The profile pictures of the remaining participants emphasize resistance. 
Zuster_batata (sister sweet potato) presents herself as a fighter for Allah 
(mujahida) in the Dutch ‘polder’ context. The flags of Oum-Dujanaah’s112 profile 
picture show support of jihad in the name of Allah. Zarqawi anna’s113 name and 
the pointing finger suggest that he regards it as a personal responsibility for every 
Muslim to participate in Al Qaeda’s battle.114 Finally, DEMO, who is active on 
the less religiously inclined news forum, presents himself in terms of non-Islamic 
‘graffiti’ subcultures. Moreover, his picture seemingly reflects the opinion that 
the Jewish Anne Frank would support the Palestinian cause if she were alive 
today. 
 
FIGURE 6.3 | Male Presentations of Self 
 
                                   Abyad               Rassoel             DEMO                        Zarqawi anna 
 
 
Creating an Islamic Home 
The respondents do not only represent Islam in their personal appearance, but 
also in their home environment. Ideally, the fundamentalist respondents do not 
watch television. Consequently, a couple of them mentioned that they banned 
the television from their living room or the house, though sometimes only for a 
                                                      
112 This name refers to the mother of a martyr called Abu Dujanaah. She stimulated her son to fight 
jihad in Kashmir. After his death in battle she is said to have kept supporting the fight. 
113 Al-Zarqawi used to be one of the principal figures in Al Qaeda. 
114 The pointing finger recalls that on the posters for American army recruitment.  
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while. Another example is that they generally avoid pictures of living beings in 
their house, because they consider such pictures un-Islamic. Instead they put up 
prints of Islamic texts or ornaments that remind them of Islam. Other 
expressions that were observable during the interviews are bookshelves covered 
with Islamic literature, the Quran and the apparent absence of alternative 
reading material.  
  
6.1.4 Islamic Behaviour and Activities 
The Muslim respondents also express their Muslim identity through Islamic 
behaviour such as rituals, expressing Muslim character traits in their behaviour 
and Islamic activities, such as gaining religious knowledge (also see de Koning, 
2009a). Similarly, avoiding un-Islamic behaviour confirms their Muslimhood.  
 
Adopting Religious Rituals 
One of the principal conditions for being a good Muslim is to fulfil what 
Muslims regard as their religious obligations. The principal obligatory activities 
are saying the shahada, praying, fasting, going on pilgrimage and paying the 
zakaat. All fundamentalist respondents claim to behave in accordance with these 
obligations. Yet, the extent to which they follow these rules in practice remains 
unclear, because not all of these activities were observable. 
In the mosques, however, it was possible to witness the practice of 
prayer. Prayer is a ritual that clearly fosters a local sense of connectedness and 
demonstrates commitment. In prayer, the women are shoulder to shoulder, foot 
to foot – ‘so as not to let the devil, sjaitaan, get in between’ - for certain periods 
of time. The respondents admit that performing this ritual in such a literally and 
symbolically connected way does make them feel connected. Thus, through 
prayer the respondents confirm to themselves and others that they belong to the 
Muslim community.  
 
Showing Muslim Character Traits: Brotherly Behaviour and Da’wa  
Section 4.3.3 has shown that the respondents’ consider it their obligation to 
adopt character traits that are suitable for good Muslims, such as being helpful, 
patient, friendly and modest. Research has indicated that religious people form 
an image of themselves as having adopted these traits and having put them into 
practice (Maclean, Walker & Matsuba, 2004). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
respondents in this study also report that they feel that they have become more 
friendly, patient, helpful and modest since they have become practising Muslims. 
The most commonly mentioned examples of improved behaviour are showing 
respect for other people, including parents and helping out those in need – both 
Muslim and in the case of the orthodox respondents, also non-Muslims. In 
addition, several women that I met in the mosques do volunteer work or shop for 
groceries and prepare meals for non-Muslim elderly neighbours, to give some 
examples. When talking about the reasons for such behaviour the respondents 
made a distinction – in so many words – between being friendly et cetera towards 
fellow Muslims and towards non-Muslims. Towards Muslims the 
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fundamentalist respondents believe that such behaviour is a religious obligation 
for the sake of brotherhood. In terms of non-Muslims, the orthodox respondents 
said that such behaviour is an important way of inviting them to Islam, because 
they feel that it gives non-Muslims a positive impression of Islam. 
In terms of in-group behaviour, the emails that I regularly received 
through mailing lists of female respondents offer a main indication of the 
respondents’ desire to help fellow Muslims. In these emails the sender asked 
other women to help out their brothers and sisters in Islam. In some cases the 
request for help was limited to carrying out an act of supplication or du’a, for 
example, for the Muslims in Palestine who are suffering from violence. In other 
cases the emails were accompanied, for example, by photos or stories of sick little 
children with a request to send money for an expensive operation, or to visit 
somebody in the hospital.115 Although more research is required to determine the 
exact meaning of such emails, my impression is that they help to raise awareness 
of the suffering of the respondents’ Muslim brothers and sisters. Specific emails 
that request acts of supplication are not intended to produce practical help. By 
the very fact of forwarding such emails the respondents demonstrate that they 
care about other Muslims and as such they confirm that they feel connected to 
the Muslim community. Another in-group practice are the interactions between 
women who entered the mosques. After greeting each other with salaam ‘aleikum 
they often shook each other’s hands, even if they did not know each other. When 
they had become better acquainted they generally embraced each other. Through 
this way of greeting they seemed to confirm each other’s membership and make 
each other feel welcome in the community. 
 
Becoming Knowledgeable 
Since the fundamentalist respondents emphasize the importance of Islamic rules, 
they see it as an essential Islamic activity to gain knowledge about their religion 
and its rules.116 Consequently, a large number of the fundamentalist respondents, 
regardless of gender, attend Islamic lectures and conferences or form little study 
circles at home, called halaqa, or had done so in the past.117 On the occasion of 
the popular conferences in the Salafi mosques sometimes hundreds of women 
gathered and listened to the messages of the lecturers. Lectures at conferences 
concerned, for example, the deplorable state of the ummah (ascribed to a lack of 
knowledge about Islam) and the failure to obey religious obligations. Other 
                                                      
115 How many of the women actually respond to financial aid requests (and how many of them are 
honest requests) I do not know. 
116 When this topic came up in interviews and conversations the respondents explained that they 
derive this obligation from the first word of the archangel Gabriel to Muhammad, namely ‘ikra’ 
which means ‘read’. Because the respondents interpret this instruction broadly, most also make an 
effort to graduate from school or get a university degree. In this sense they do not distinguish 
themselves from the moderate respondents. The distinction concerns their absolutist claim that 
fundamentalists make on true knowledge. 
117 Also Mohammed B. used to form part of such a study group. The Dutch Intelligence Service is 
therefore suspicious of what they came to label as ‘huiskamerbijeenkomsten’, which translates as ‘living 
room gatherings’. 
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topics were the necessity of being a good Muslim, warnings of punishments in 
the afterlife, the qualities of the first Muslims, and suchlike. The Friday 
afternoon sermons that I attended had similar topics. The speakers there also 
issued warnings and gave general directions for a greater level of Islamic 
behaviour. In terms of Islamic knowledge the conferences were generally of a 
very basic level. This might explain the fact that women frequently chatted away 
and were at times too occupied with each other or their children to pay attention 
to what was being said. Some of the women did not take notes either. When 
asked about the value of the conferences the women generally claimed that they 
learned some new things but said that the main value of being there was to 
strengthen their imaan and motivate them to become more devout. A couple of 
the respondents in Islamic study groups confirmed that their imaan increases 
when they attend meetings (and can decrease when they do not), which they 
attribute to the support of their Muslim brothers and sisters. It appears that an 
important if not the main value of conferences and sermons is therefore to 
enhance the commitment to the Muslim community. The weekly lectures in the 
Salafi mosques generally dealt with more specific topics, which were discussed in 
more depth. The students in these classes had to study specific literature that 
they were tested on. For example, in the As-Soennah mosque the women had to 
study fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, and were examined at the end of the lecture 
cycle. In these classes there appeared to be a greater focus on gaining knowledge 
than in the other sermons and conferences. 
In addition to attending lectures and study circles, Islamic books and 
the Internet are essential sources of knowledge for the fundamentalist 
respondents (for the importance of Internet see Angkor & Mo_nl, 2001; de 
Koning, 2008). The fundamentalist respondents also search for answers to their 
questions online and read books from Islamic bookstores. Especially the 
extremist respondents rely on the Internet and electronic or regular books, 
because – as discussed in Section 5.1.5 – they show less regard for lectures and 
conventional scholars and Imams. In terms of gathering online information, the 
fundamentalist respondents use international and national websites, which 
correspond with their religious orientation. Overall the respondents mentioned 
various sites, although there were a few that came up regularly. Some of the 
orthodox respondents, for example, consider www.salafipublications.com a 
reliable source of information. In addition, www.al-yaqeen.com, the website of 
the As-Soennah mosque, proved to be a popular source of information for some 
orthodox respondents. The Islamic forum Morocco.nl also discusses topics 
related to Islam, from the detailed rules about rituals such as the washing ritual 
and prayers, to what is considered halal and haram, et cetera. Some of the 
participants to online discussions share their knowledge by copying texts from 
other sites. At times they simply post the link, while on other occasions they 
translate texts into Dutch. Since their opinions and their choice of texts often 
give indications of their religious (and political) orientation, the online 
participants’ contributions express which current in Islam they feel to belong to 
and which they resist. 
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Avoiding Un-Islamic Activities 
The fundamentalist respondents try to distance themselves from what they 
consider un-Islamic activities, such as drinking alcohol, listening to non-Islamic 
music,118 watching un-Islamic programmes on television, and the mingling of 
men and women. Consequently the respondents say that they do not join non-
Muslim colleagues, fellow students or friends when they go to bars, because they 
believe it is prohibited to be with people who are drinking alcohol. However, 
they believe that they can be present in a bar if there is ‘no alternative’, as long as 
there is no alcohol on their table. As a result of this escape route, I occasionally 
met with orthodox, radical and extremist respondents in bars. For example, a 
conversation with radical convert Hujjat took place in a bar with people on the 
table next to us drinking alcohol. Moreover, while we were talking the song ‘I’m 
so horny’ was played. He did not consider this an inappropriate place because he 
argued there was not a good alternative.  
 In terms of music, the fundamentalist respondents say that they ban un-
Islamic music from their collections. For example, orthodox convert Ava threw 
out all her CDs to confirm her Salafi conversion a few weeks after a party at her 
home where she had still played popular Western music. Although she admits 
that she misses the music, some other respondents argue that they do no longer 
like this music anyway, because ‘all the lyrics are the same or superficial’, or 
because the music ‘disturbs their sense of peacefulness’. Similarly, fundamentalist 
respondents try to avoid un-Islamic television shows, particularly ones in which 
images of nudity and promiscuity are expected to occur.  
The fundamentalist respondents also try to refrain from contact 
between men and women. To live up to their strict interpretation of rules, they 
generally spend their leisure time in the company of members of their own 
gender. Furthermore, a limited number of the fundamentalist respondents found 
a working environment without the opposite gender. Orthodox convert Bassam 
is a representative example as he refrains from contact with women outside work 
and stays away from what he sees as inappropriate public hobbies. He says that 
he stopped hanging out with women in part because he does not want to provide 
a bad example to younger boys who are being raised as Muslim. Similarly, he 
argues that he no longer goes to football games, despite his love of football and 
tries to behave like a Muslim:  
 
Look, imagine … you’re watching Ajax on television and suddenly you 
see a man with a beard on screen. That’s simply … if I hadn’t had a 
beard, I might have gone, I’ll be honest. (…) It simply attracts the 
attention … I think in that sense you’re a signboard for Islam. That’s 
the advantage of having a beard: that whilst you’re in public you limit 
your sins in terms of bad language and yes, shouting. (…) Because you 
don’t want to contribute to the bad image. (…) To give an example, 
when a woman walks on the street, haha, in the past you would have 
followed her with your eyes. You would even turn around. But if you 
                                                      
118 The only music that the respondents see as Islamic is music with the duff (a traditional drum) as 
instrument.  
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have a beard and you turn around, that isn’t possible, is it? So it stops 
you. Well, by now it’s second nature, but in the beginning it was really 
something that stopped me. 
  
As pointed out in Section 2.3.1, avoiding un-Islamic behaviour does not mean 
that the fundamentalist respondents stop undertaking non-Islamic activities. On 
the contrary, they believe that if Islam does not explicitly forbid an activity they 
can adapt it to Islamic standards. For example, extremist born-again Marid likes 
martial arts and describes how such sports can be adapted: “People who do 
martial arts, cannot hit another person in the face, for example, and they cannot 
bow, because you don’t bow for anyone but Allah”. Similarly, one of orthodox 
convert Vanessa’s social groups organizes aerobics classes. These are only 
admissible to women and as such they are not forbidden under Islamic rules. 
Some orthodox women in the mosques even play football or do kickboxing with 
other Muslim women. 
 
Drifting between Islamic and Western Lifestyles  
As the above-mentioned meeting in a bar with radical convert Hujjat illustrates, 
the practice of the fundamentalist respondents is not as black and white as it 
would seem from some of their discourses and behavioural ideals. Throughout 
this study multiple nuances emerged with regard to Islamic behaviour and the 
activities of the respondents.  
Firstly, considering the high demands dictated by their Islamic 
fundamentalist views, it is hard to always live up to these standards in practice. 
Some main examples of such difficulties concern behavioural norms, such as not 
listening to music and not watching inappropriate television shows. In terms of 
music, I regularly heard orthodox women’s’ ringtones, usually Arabic songs, but 
using other instruments than the duff. With regard to television programmes 
several female respondents – including extremist born-again Maysa – told me 
that their favourite shows are ‘CSI Miami’, ‘24’, and/or ‘As the World Turns’. 
When asked about the music in these shows a number of them said that they 
turned the sound off, but others leave it on. In the case of un-Islamic scenes, 
such as romantic moments, they claimed to change channels for a while. It seems 
to be even harder, though, to adopt Islamic character traits. A telling example is 
the criticism that the fundamentalist respondents have about like-minded 
Muslims who fail to live up to these standards. Some of the respondents 
criticized their Muslim brothers and sisters for failing to offer help in practice. 
Regarding character traits, they particularly present modesty as a pitfall in others. 
Several of the respondents therefore criticized fellow Muslims for showing off to 
others, for instance, about the extent to which they practise their faith, know the 
Quran by heart and speak Arabic. The critics argue that the ones who look and 
seem to act most like Muslims could in fact be practising their religion less, 
because they should not act as a Muslim for the sake of others, but for the sake 
of Allah. An example of such a contradiction took place right after a lecture in 
the El Tawheed mosque on the humility that Muslims are supposed to display. 
On this occasion one of the students demonstrated a competitive attitude in a 
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conversation with another girl. Both of them were married to men who had a 
different ethnic background than they had. The competitive girl slightly 
condescendingly expressed surprise about the other girl still not having mastered 
the language of her husband’s family whereas she had made an effort and was 
already very good at it. She thus implicitly placed herself above the other girl 
with seemingly no regard for the lesson that she had just received. Other 
incidents during lectures in the mosques concern women who flaunted their 
knowledge. I witnessed some converts in particular doing this (although other 
converts did clearly demonstrate modesty because they felt they lacked 
knowledge). Furthermore, online some participants overwhelmed others with 
Islamic texts that they had translated. Although sharing knowledge is obviously a 
brotherly thing to do, the way and extent to which the sharing takes place – 
namely by assuming the attitude of a teacher – created the impression that some 
of the fundamentalist respondents were trying to show off their knowledge. So 
by trying to make an impression it appeared that they cared about how others 
view them, despite their conviction that they should only care about how Allah 
views them. 
Secondly, the fundamentalist respondents sometimes engage in 
behaviour and activities, which seemingly contradict their strict interpretation of 
Islam. With regard to gender roles, for example, one might expect that their 
traditional views would mean that they marry at a young age and that – in line 
with common images of traditional gender roles – the women would take care of 
the children and household chores while men provide for the family. In practice, 
however, about half of the female fundamentalist respondents (with an average 
age of early to mid-twenties) were single at the time of our conversations.119 The 
women complained about the reason for not being married on multiple 
occasions: there was a lack of good, practising Muslim men and they themselves 
were picky. A common argument was that they wanted a man who respects their 
female rights and liberties in Islam, such as the right to follow an education, and 
help them in the household and raising the children.120 So most women were 
opposed to what they present as the practice in traditional Moroccan families 
that women carry out all the chores and men do nothing. Instead, the 
fundamentalist respondents argued that the Prophet Muhammad helped his 
wives with the household and the children, and that Muslim men should follow 
his example. In the case of a woman I met in the As-Soennah mosque this led to 
a particularly untraditional everyday practice. She told me that she studied in a 
different city and so has to travel a lot. According to her account, her husband 
had already put their child to bed and had prepared her a meal when she came 
home at night. Overall, the fundamentalist female respondents emphasize that 
                                                      
119 This includes women in the mosques. More of the older women were married, but among them 
there were also quite a number who were divorced, remarried or divorced again. With a couple of 
exceptions, the fundamentalist men taking part in the interviews were all married, see Appendix I.  
120 Several of the fundamentalist respondents explained that they negotiate all mutual expectations 
before getting married. When potential partners disagree about issues such as how many children 
they want and how many days a week the woman can have a certain job, the marriage is unlikely to 
follow through.   
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they want to be treated as an equal by their husbands even though they have 
different gender roles. The fundamentalist male respondents say they agree with 
this female viewpoint.  
Another apparent tension concerns activities for which Islamic rules are 
less clear. This is particularly the case for activities that did not exist at the time 
of the Prophet, such as playing computer games. A couple of the orthodox 
respondents and an extremist one said that they liked to play computer games. 
Extremist born-again Marid, for example, told me a couple years after our first 
interview that until recently he had played a ‘Call of Duty’ game in which he was 
– in his own description – a Western soldier who ‘had to shoot terrorists’. In his 
view it was better to not play computer games as a Muslim, but he did not see a 
particular problem with this game, because “it is just a game”.   
Thirdly, the fundamentalist respondents sometimes make exceptions to 
their common practice because of contextual factors. Most importantly, the fact 
that they live in the Netherlands requires them to compromise. The majority of 
the fundamentalist respondents study or work in what they consider to be an 
insufficiently Islamic environment because in this environment both men and 
women are present. Considering the fact that they choose to live in the 
Netherlands, they do not see this as a major issue, although some of them argue 
that they would prefer an environment that is in accordance with their Islamic 
rules. The wife of orthodox born-again Naqeeb, for instance, works in a 
company with men. Naqeeb says about this situation “as long as there is no 
trespassing of borders, she can work with men. Though, it is better to work with 
groups of women”. One of the borders that he mentions is shaking hands. 
Opinions differ about the limits to compromising, however. Like some of the 
other fundamentalist respondents, orthodox convert Ava also prefers an Islamic 
work environment, but she does shake hands, because her job position requires 
her to meet with men on a regular basis. Another apparent compromise concerns 
the rules regarding female liberties. According to the respondents’ 
fundamentalist views, women should be accompanied by a mahram, a male close 
relative, when they go out or on trips. Yet, whether they were from traditional 
Muslim or non-Muslim families, the female fundamentalist respondents were 
generally used to move around freely. Even though some of them mentioned that 
they would prefer to go out with a mahram, most of them simply went their own 
way. Orthodox born-again Saaliha, for example, goes around without male 
company. She is unmarried, does not have like-minded brothers and instead 
regards her khimar and niqab as protection. Some of the orthodox women that I 
met even planned trips abroad by themselves or with female family members. It 
thus appears that these women compromise on the rules concerning a mahram, 
because they are not willing to give up on their freedom (also see Bartkowski & 
Read, 2003; Bhimji, 2009).  
Besides these exceptions for the sake of compromise, the fundamentalist 
respondents occasionally (and temporarily) put aside some of their ideals for the 
sake of specific events or circumstances. For example, orthodox convert Bassam, 
who said he would not go to football matches, started watching the 2010 World 
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Cup dressed in orange and with a Malt beer on the couch. Yet, when the Dutch 
team’s success became apparent, he and his wife watched the matches in public 
places in the midst of non-Muslim, alcohol drinking football fans. Another 
typical example is extremist born-again Maysa, who put aside the rule of not 
listening to music. Because she was feeling down and wanted to take classes, 
which involved Western music she searched for rulings online that “allow it 
under certain conditions. It simply is good (…) I feel good. With many things 
that I have doubts about, I immediately feel uncomfortable”. Thus, Maysa 
believes that she is able to feel the difference between good and bad behaviour 
and has found a legitimization for her behaviour by ‘shopping’ online. 
Finally, on some occasions fundamentalist respondents were seemingly 
unaware of tensions between their viewpoints. Orthodox convert Natasha 
constitutes a representative example of these respondents. While her ultimate 
ideal is – like that of most other fundamentalist respondents – to live in an 
Islamic country, she also argues that she would like to live in New York although 
she has never been there: 
 
I would like to live in New York, I’m totally in love with it. It’s so big, 
everything is possible there. (…) New York isn’t Islamic, but there are 
many Muslims living there and there are mosques. Anything is possible 
there as long as you have money. I would go shopping there. I’m not so 
fashionable anymore, but my [non-Muslim] sister is totally in love with 
designer clothing.  
 
With these words she expresses the classic image of the American Dream that 
seems at odds with her anti-materialist Islamic vision and the critical opinion 
that she has of American politics.  
 
In short, as Dutch citizens the fundamentalist Muslims in this study develop 
various lifestyles that reflect both their Islamic ideals and the Western society 
that they are part of. Thus, it would seem that they ‘drift’ between practices and 
activities, which are more and less Islamic.  
 
 
6.2 Keeping the Community Together: Social Control and Impression 
Management 
The former section discussed the ways in which the fundamentalist respondents 
try to represent Islam, also in group contexts. This section elaborates on the 
group context by discussing those fundamentalist group processes, which serve to 
keep the group together, as became apparent in live group interaction in the 
mosques and on the Internet. After a brief reflection on the characteristics of the 
fundamentalist groups of the Muslims in this study this section will take a closer 
look at social control – on the positive side through confirmation and stimulation 
and on the negative side through critique – and impression management 
(Goffman, 1959) within their communities.  
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6.2.1 Introducing the Fundamentalist Communities 
So what are the basic characteristics of the communities that the fundamentalist 
Muslims in this study are part of? Naturally, the fundamentalist respondents are 
also part of non-fundamentalist groups through close bonds with moderate 
family members, former friends or moderate Muslims and non-Muslims at work, 
in their hobbies and at school.121 Furthermore, the strength of the bonds with 
either moderate or fundamentalist groups seemingly varied amongst the 
fundamentalist respondents, regardless of whether they had orthodox, radical or 
extremist viewpoints. Since this study aims at understanding the motives and 
reasons for becoming part of fundamentalist groups, its focus is limited to these 
fundamentalist communities. To gain insight in what the respondents’ 
fundamentalist communities are like, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
‘real-life’ communities – and their inner and outer circle – and the virtual 
communities.  
 The following sketch of the fundamentalist respondents’ real life 
communities is a result of, on the one hand, their own accounts, and on the other 
hand, from the observations in the mosques and a couple of activities which 
female respondents organized.122 On the basis of the accounts and observations 
the general impression is that the respondents form part of an inner circle of 
Muslim brothers or sisters with whom they feel a deep connection and 
friendship. They undertake social activities with these friends in their leisure 
time. The women commonly reported that they went shopping, organized 
dinner or lunch parties, went out for a coffee, participated in events in one or 
more mosques and chatted on MSN. The men principally mentioned activities 
such as playing sports with their closest friends besides going to the mosque and 
staying in touch through MSN. According to several fundamentalist respondents 
their group of friends is mixed in terms of ethnic background. A couple of 
converts, on the contrary, reported having native Dutch converts as closest 
friends, because they felt that they had more in common with them. In addition, 
while some mentioned that their peers were of a similar age and religious 
orientation, others said that there was a ‘great variety’ in age (between about 20 
and 35 years of age) within their inner circle, whereas the orthodox respondents 
in particular also mentioned having Muslim brothers or sisters who practised less 
as their friends. Typically, and despite their contact with more moderate 
Muslims, the fundamentalist respondents did not have close relations with 
fundamentalist Muslims from other currents in Islam. For example, orthodox 
convert Bassam made it explicitly clear that he stays away from alternatively-
minded fundamentalists, such as members from Hizb-ut-Tahrir and those in 
favour of terrorism. 
                                                      
121 Furthermore, I have been present at several social activities that some female orthodox and 
extremist respondents undertook with female moderate Muslims and occasionally non-Muslims. Yet, 
the focus of this study was on settings where fundamentalist Muslims met like-minded people: either 
in the mosque or online. 
122 As discussed in Chapter 1, the observations were limited to female communities as I am a female 
researcher. 
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Besides this core group, the respondents formed part of what one could refer to 
as their outer circle of Muslim brothers and sisters. This group they seemed to 
principally (or only) meet in the mosques for lectures (also see Roex et al., 2010). 
It is hard to estimate the size of these groups, because in some of the mosques 
there were different students each week. In the case of weekly classes, such as in 
the As-Soennah mosque and the Brixton mosque, however, there were groups of 
between 15 and 30 regular students. In the El-Tawheed mosque the observations 
took place when the classes had just started again and this might have led to a 
more mobile group of on average approximately 15 students. In the case of 
conferences, students from the various Salafi centres came from one city to 
another. However, the community in the mosque was not limited to the groups 
who attended the weekly lectures. The Friday sermons that I observed in some 
mosques attracted many more women and the various conferences even attracted 
several hundreds of visitors. Although the participants at such conferences 
obviously did not know everybody, many did become acquainted over time. Since 
several participants and their lecturers travelled between the various Salafi 
mosques, many of the women that I met in one city I later encountered in 
another and it regularly occurred that they already knew others whom I had met. 
It appears that as a result of this local movement the respondents have shaped a 
community, which exists between different Dutch cities. The respondents in the 
Brixton mosque reported a similar situation for the orthodox ‘Salafi’ community 
in the United Kingdom. Whereas several of these respondents attended classes 
and lectures in diverse mosques and public places in London, some of them also 
occasionally went to conferences in other British cities, such as Birmingham, 
which they regard as the Salafi capital of the country.  
The students at the various gatherings in the mosques were, with a few 
exceptions, between 15 and 45 years old, with the majority of the women being 
in their early twenties. In terms of ethnicity the groups were mixed. While the 
majority in the Dutch mosques seemed of Moroccan decent, there were generally 
also Indonesian, Turkish and Somali Muslims. Further, there were a 
considerable number of converts present. At some conferences up to 20 percent 
of the students seemed to be native Dutch converts. The exact number of 
converts is hard to estimate though, because there were also converts with a 
different or mixed ethnic background who were less distinguishable as converts. 
Several times I therefore discovered that someone was a convert when engaging 
in conversation with them. On another occasion a woman appeared to be a 
convert but turned out to be a child from a mixed marriage who was raised as a 
Muslim.            
 The fundamentalist respondents also formed online groups as the 
virtual world offers the opportunity to create virtual communities, also for 
fundamentalist Muslims in the Netherlands (Benschop, 2006; Bunt, 2003; 
Chayko, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Dawson, 2004; de Koning, 2008; Kahn & 
Kellner, 2003; Kim, 2005; Laney, 2005; Lee & Leets, 2002; Miller & Slater, 
2003; Morley & Robins, 1995; NCTb, 2006; Stahl, 2003; Sudweeks, 
McLaughlin & Rafaeli, 1998; Tsfati & Weimann, 2002; Rogan, 2006; Watts, 
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2001; Williams, 2006a). Despite the large number of members to the MVC 
website – that the two forums studied form a part of - like-minded members 
formed cliques in relatively small subgroups.123 They did this first of all by usually 
only participating in discussions on one of the two sub-forums analyzed. As a 
result the news forum attracted a seemingly more diverse group of participants 
ranging from anti-Islamic Dutch participants, Muslims with moderate opinions 
to occasionally participants who expressed fundamentalist viewpoints. In the 
discussions analyzed fundamentalist opinions were primarily present at the 
Islamic forum, although the majority of this forum’s participants seemed to be 
moderate Muslims. Within these sub-forums the participants also appeared to 
form cliques. When selecting and analyzing the discussions on the Islamic forum 
I came across multiple discussions which largely took place between like-minded 
participants and which hardly contained any divergent opinions. This was the 
case, for example, in a discussion, which glorified violent jihad, whereas in other 
discussions in the same period other participants expressed opposition to such an 
extremist interpretation. Moreover, in the discussions on each of the discussion 
forums I regularly encountered the same group of core participants. All in all, I 
received the impression that the participants select discussions to participate in 
not only on the basis of the topics which interest them, but also – and maybe 
more importantly – because they already know and share ideas with the person 
initiating the topic and other participants.  
 Before continuing with the processes within these groups, the relation 
between the online and ‘real life’ fundamentalist communities demands some 
attention. The majority of the respondents to the interviews and in the mosques 
was rather critical of MVC and said they stayed away from the fruitless 
discussions they believed were engaged in by online participants. Orthodox 
convert Vanessa said representatively: “I find them annoying, it’s yes-no all the 
time. (…) There is an oral tradition that says ‘there is a place in Paradise for the 
person who stops discussing’. I’d rather not even start”. Nonetheless, several of 
the respondents did admit that they participated in online discussions. At a 
conference an orthodox woman in the As-Soennah mosque introduced me to a 
native Dutch convert who she had met on MVC and had invited to the mosque. 
The extent to which such ‘real life’ contacts follow from online interactions, 
however, remains unclear.  
In sum, the fundamentalist respondents form communities of like-
minded people in the mosque and online. These communities include Muslims 
of different ages, ethnicities and from various cities. Within these communities 
the respondents develop friendships with some Muslim brothers and sisters that 
they feel closer to. The interviews, observations and internet analysis offer hardly 
any clues of close transnational contacts. Despite the global image of the ummah, 
the Muslims in this study thus principally seem to connect on a local and 
regional level. 
                                                      
123 Because of the relatively small number of discussions analyzed it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions on the size of these subgroups. It is only possible to say that the average number of 
participants in the discussions analyzed was about 20 per discussion.   
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6.2.2 Confirmation and Stimulation 
The first aspect of the fundamentalist group processes concerns the social control 
that the members of these groups exert on one another through confirmation 
and stimulation. This confirmation and stimulation takes the shape of paying 
compliments to each other for having the correct Islamic look and activities, and 
motivating each other to do better. It appears that the respondents receive more 
respect from group members when these group members notice that they try to 
act in accordance with Islamic rules.124  
The observations in the mosque offer numerous examples of such forms 
of positive confirmation. The most common form of confirmation is through 
words such as ‘masha’Allah’ and ‘alhamdullilah’ in response to stories by women 
who show that they are striving to be good Muslims, for example, telling each 
other about how they summoned up the mental strength to wear the khimar in 
public or their defiance of Muslim or non-Muslim parents. The most notable 
confirmations were observable in the interactions with converts. In particular 
when the women had not yet met the converts or when they came to do the 
shahada the women praised these new Muslims and stressed that they were 
welcome in the group. For instance, on one Friday afternoon after prayer two 
women entered the Brixton mosque and told the women present that one of 
them wanted to say the shahada. The response of the Brixton women was 
remarkable as their faces lightened up immediately and they started an animated 
conversation about what the shahada meant and how this would change the 
woman’s life. They tried to stimulate the woman to gradually practise her faith 
more and to take classes in the mosque to gain knowledge about Islam from the 
‘right sources’. After the shahada had taken place and the woman had left – even 
though she had been invited to stay for the class – the women explained that 
they responded so enthusiastically because it made them sincerely happy to see 
somebody become a Muslim. They argued that it was beautiful that another 
person had found the truth.  
In online discussions, a similar type of confirmation takes place. This is 
particularly the case on the Islamic forum where the participants form more like-
minded groups and where less non-Muslim outsiders are present than on the 
forum about news and actualities. The main way to confirm one’s belonging 
appears to be by complimenting another participant on the topic that this person 
initiated or by thanking him or her for the knowledge, which the person shares. 
The following quote provides an impression of such responses. It is a response to 
a topic that Hmmz20 starts about the deplorable state of the Muslim ummah. He 
argues that the spirit of brotherhood is crumbling because of gossip amongst 
Muslims, lack of honesty and internal hatred. In his opinion the solution has to 
be found among the Muslims themselves who should make efforts to improve.  
                                                      
124 Obviously this kind of interaction occurs within any social group when members confirm each 
other’s group membership. 
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In response, Mocro_girl says: 
 
Salaam ‘aleikum. Jazak allah u gairan for making this comment brother. 
Really very beautiful masha’Allah, I’m happy that many brothers and 
sisters open topics about Islam alhamdullillah. I think it is very good, 
instead of looking for somebody or opening nonsense topics.125  
 
Besides complimenting each other for ‘correctly’ expressing Islam, the 
respondents also motivate each other to practise their faith more. As far as 
clothing was concerned, for example, the fear of Islamophobic expressions in the 
Netherlands and to a lesser extent in London kept some women from wearing a 
khimar or a niqab, which they resolved by giving each other words of 
encouragement or by starting to wear these traditional clothes together to give 
each other mutual support. Moreover, in the mosque I regularly witnessed 
women stimulating each other to gain knowledge, exchanging Islamic books and 
inviting each other to other Islamic lectures or social gatherings with sisters. 
Online the principal way of stimulating each other is by opening a topic and 
posting information about how to be a better Muslim. Examples are topics such 
as: “How are we supposed to deal with unbelievers?” and “Everything about 
Tawhid” which present the participants with answers to the implications of 
Islam in the Western context of their everyday life.  
Finally, the interview with extremist born-again Nidal provides an 
interesting example of how respondents confirm their spirit of brotherhood. 
Because I was a female interviewer initially Nidal and Marid only agreed to an 
interview with the three of us, as a result of which it became possible to witness 
some brotherly interaction. When Nidal says “I’m grateful that I’m seeing Marid 
today. He’s my brother and I love him for the sake of Allah and I hope that this 
is mutual”, Marid responds with “of course”. The exchange of these words was, 
moreover, accompanied with looks of affection and emotion, which came across 
as a deeply felt demonstration of connectedness. However, despite their sense of 
connection at the time, they did loose touch with each other within a year.  
Altogether, it appears that the respondents focus on the experiences 
that confirm their sense of connectedness and tend to ignore those that 
contradict it. Besides the example of Marid and Nidal who lost touch with each 
other, I regularly heard the women talking about ‘all the converts’ who came to 
take the shahada in their mosque. Yet, it appeared that some of them did not 
show their faces again (or in the case of the above-mentioned woman in the 
Brixton mosque at least not in the months when I conducted my fieldwork, 
despite the invitation to come to lectures). The respondents’ tendency to ignore 
this gave me the impression that one of the principal functions of confirming and 
stimulating others is to strengthen their own convictions and sense of being a 
Muslim and a member of the Muslim community.  
 
                                                      
125 By ‘looking for somebody’ she hints that certain online participants are looking for a partner. 
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6.2.3 Critique 
Other than critique of alternative truths which the fundamentalist respondents 
generally accepted, personal critique proved to be a much more sensitive topic. 
As Section 5.1.5 has shown, it is especially the orthodox respondents who believe 
that they should be careful not to judge others too quickly. Orthodox convert 
Vanessa explained why one should be reticent to criticize others: “if you point a 
finger, you should know that there will be three pointing at you”. This does not 
mean, however, that the respondents refrained from voicing critique of their own 
group members. On the contrary, such critique proved to be rather common 
among the various fundamentalist respondents. Those who mentioned having 
been confronted with ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour said that they did or wanted to 
reprimand the Muslims who demonstrated this behaviour. In their view such 
critique can make Muslims aware of their flaws and help them to become better 
Muslims. I deduced several types of internal critique from the observations in the 
mosques and online discussions: 1) generalized criticism directed at the 
community at large, 2) criticism directed at anonymous members of the group 
present at a specific moment and 3) criticism of identifiable individuals, either 
directly to them or indirectly through gossip.  
The first type, generalized criticism, was apparent in lectures, sermons 
and online. Such criticism concerned, for example, the lack of religiosity among 
Muslims or, in the case of the internet forum, participants using the forum as a 
dating site. The participants who responded to this criticism usually agreed with 
the internal critique and sometimes expressed the intention of behaving 
otherwise. The extent to which they considered this criticism applicable to 
themselves and how they then put these intentions into practice was not usually 
apparent.126 It could be that those expressing and agreeing with the criticism feel 
that they do not behave in such a way or are at least careful not to. The following 
fragment from an online discussion confirms this possibility. In this discussion 
Pumba20 and Zeinab – both female participants – criticize other women’s 
hypocritical behaviour concerning men. Pumba20 starts by arguing: “Sisters 
often talk about brothers to make it seem halal, because if they say GUYS (what 
they in fact are), then it doesn’t sound so ‘halal’ anymore and not so 
‘masha’Allah’…so it is brother, brother, brother all the time”. Zeinab responds: 
 
Well spoken sister. Nowadays I see sisters only talk about brother this 
or that. I even hear that they get their numbers and msn (in my 
environment). And when you say something about it, gossip 
immediately starts behind your back.  
 
Thus, while she confirms Pumba20’s opinion she implies that she does not make 
this mistake herself but instead warns other women. 
                                                      
126 A clear exception to this general rule was an online discussion that was not part of the formal 
analysis, but in which some participants argued that the prohibition for men and women to mingle 
was also applicable online. In response one of the participants left the forum, yet started to participate 
in discussions again after a period of absence. 
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The second type of criticism occurred regularly during lectures and conferences 
in the mosques, particularly in the case of large, anonymous groups of people. At 
the As-Soennah mosque, for example, the conference audience did not always 
act in accordance with the norms of conduct. Occasionally, lecturers or fellow 
Muslims issued reprimands for talking during classes or for making a mess in the 
mosque. Particularly at the end of the day, when people were tired, it would 
quieten down for only a couple of minutes. This demonstrates the well-known 
phenomenon that in large groups with many participants, individuals feel secure 
in their anonymity and apparently feel less pressured to respond to the criticism. 
This is different for general criticism when the ‘wrongdoers’ are clearly apparent. 
For example, at a the lectures by a Salafi preacher in Amsterdam one of the 
women asked whether or not it was allowed to pray with bare feet. When the 
lecturer responded that women should not be bare-footed in the mosque, one 
new visitor who had already seemed to feel a bit out of place because of her 
Western clothes immediately hid her bare feet by sitting on them.  
 The third type involves personalized criticism of the fundamentalist 
Muslims between themselves. Sometimes they did so in a surprisingly unfriendly 
manner, which did not appear to correspond with their own image of correct 
Islamic behaviour. Examples from the fieldwork are an occasion when a woman 
was reproached for feeding her baby while food in the mosque was not allowed 
and another moment when a clearly annoyed woman told another woman to take 
her nagging children outside. Among women who knew each other I witnessed 
more friendly forms of criticism and even jokes about un-Islamic behaviour or 
looks. The trend of wearing coloured lenses in the Brixton mosque provides a 
representative example. The women considered wearing coloured lenses to be 
un-Islamic, because they beautify them. At a certain moment, when a woman 
wearing them admitted that they were not allowed I asked why she was 
nonetheless wearing them. One of her Muslim sisters repeated in a teasing way 
‘yes, why do you wear them?’ and said that she should take them out. Initially the 
woman with the lenses did not respond, but when a friend of hers came in 
wearing such lenses and was also subject to similar joking remarks, both of them 
left and returned a little while later without the lenses.   
 Online personalized critique takes a slightly different shape. Unlike in 
the mosques in this study, online Muslims with different religious orientations 
meet each other. Instead of criticizing the in-crowd of like-minded Muslims the 
participants in the discussions analyzed principally direct their attention to 
alternatively-minded Muslims. Moreover, they show much more animosity 
towards each other and regularly use foul language. For example, in a discussion 
about whether or not it is allowed to live in a non-Muslim country a male 
Muslim participant, Djoko, criticizes the Muslims who believe that they should 
undertake hijra to a Muslim country and contends that they are too weak to 
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actually do so. A female participant named Xxikramx, who appears to have an 
extremist orientation,127 responds: 
 
Djoko, May Allah give you a disease that makes you suffer so much that 
you wish to die and to thereafter suffer so much again that you will 
desire to live again but can’t go back. Say Ameen! Ameen. 
 
Such language illustrates the reality of internal struggles as opposed to the ideal 
of a strong Muslim community. 
 Another form of personal critique – though in the absence of the person 
it concerns – is gossip. In their discourse the fundamentalist respondents are 
strictly opposed to gossip. Nonetheless, in practice they did express criticism 
behind other people’s backs or complained about how common gossip was 
within their fundamentalist circle. For example, after orthodox convert Vanessa 
had argued that one should be careful in criticizing others, she also talks critically 
of a Muslim sister who gave another sister looks of disapproval: “That gets to 
me. I was annoyed the entire evening. What gives you the right to judge others 
like that? (…) That’s gossiping without words”. Like Vanessa, several other 
fundamentalist respondents mentioned situations where they saw others acting 
contrary to their group’s norms. While talking about these other Muslims they 
did not seem to feel that they were gossiping themselves. Only orthodox convert 
Naima says that she does not want to gossip and therefore she does not mention 
names. So in her view – and maybe also Vanessa’s and the others who did not 
mention any names – there is no gossip when the people criticized remain 
anonymous. In online discussions gossiping took similar shapes. In several cases 
participants did not mention the name of the person in question, whether a 
fellow participant or a publicly known Muslim. In other cases they did mention 
the name. On several occasions other participants criticized those who started 
such a topic. In one discussion about whether Osama bin Laden is right or not, 
participant ‘Arabischelessen’ considers this gossip: 
  
O, you who believe, remember your tongues. Guard your tongues, 
because your tongues will testify for you on Judgement Day. This is 
gossip regarding Osama Bin Laden. Fear Allah and guard your tongues. 
(…) May Allah forgive you all and I advise the one who opened this 
topic to close it.  
 
It seems that both gossiping and the critique of gossiping confirm in-group 
norms. Moreover, criticism implies that the person who expresses critique or 
condemns gossiping would not behave in such a way, whereby this person 
confirms his or her own membership of the group.  
 This study offers a couple of indications that the respondents who form 
part of extremist groups might be subject to harsher criticism from other group 
                                                      
127 Her profile picture is a black flag with an Arabic text and a sword below it. Additional texts in her 
profile include ‘Assalafiya’ and “When you warn against extremism, do not forget to warn again 
negligence. When you promote al-Wala, do not forget al-Bara”. 
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members than the other fundamentalists. This would be in line with their more 
resistant discourse. As Section 5.1.5 has demonstrated, they adopt stricter norms 
for when somebody ceases to be a Muslim, most of them consider takfir to be an 
obligation, and they are more focused on resisting other people. It seems that 
this also affects the relations within their own group. Extremist born-again 
Nidal, for example, admits on one occasion that within his group there is 
considerable internal pressure to act like a good Muslim and that he can imagine 
that some former members were afraid to oppose this group pressure. Extremist 
born-again Maysa describes how the group of sisters that she used to be part of 
demanded that she pay attention to the smallest details:  
 
Then they would check if I didn’t have any images in the house. And 
then there would be a little bag from the Kruidvat [a Dutch chemist’s] 
and then they said ‘yes sister, shall we cut it [the human images on the 
bag] out with scissors?’. Or the teletubbies were on and then they would 
say ‘yes sister, music, that is not allowed’ or then I was wearing my 
headscarf in a certain way and then they said ‘yes sister, that is not the 
Sunnah, is it?’. And then I thought, ‘mind your own headscarf!’. 
 
Although such internal social control could indicate that the extremist 
respondents feel closer, it prompted Maysa to lose touch with this group of 
sisters. In addition, it could also lead to less cohesive groups as there is distrust 
between the members. Some online participants wondered if certain others were 
undercover agents. Extremist born-again Marid also reports that he feels a bit 
paranoid at times about being watched and even suspected a person in his close 
circle of doing this. To reduce the attention he felt attracted to him he took 
distance from his circle of brothers.  
 Overall, it appears however that critique plays an essential part in 
keeping the respondents’ local communities together in two ways. Firstly, 
criticism can make group members aware of their own anti-Islamic behaviour 
and stimulate them to adapt accordingly. Secondly, expressing critique of 
inappropriate behaviour confirms the group’s norms,128 which can strengthen the 
sense of connectedness. In addition, critique confirms the group membership 
and status of the person who criticizes because expressing criticism implies that 
the critic does comply with the rules and thus claims the moral high ground in 
relation to than the subject of criticism.  
 
6.2.4 Impression Management: Ignoring Disagreement and Incorrect Behaviour 
Besides confirmation and critique as forms of social control, there were several 
situations in which the Muslims in this study maintained the image of a unified 
Muslim community by ignoring inappropriate behaviour and in doing so 
seemingly managing their Muslim impression (Goffman, 1959). A telling 
example was an incident in the Brixton mosque. On a Friday afternoon a strange 
                                                      
128 As Durkheim (1988: 164-165) explains, breaking social rules can confirm what the norms are or 
should be. 
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woman enters the mosque to pray. She looks and acts in ways that differ from 
the way the Brixton women do things. Firstly, she is dressed differently as she 
wears a t-shirt and sweatpants as opposed to the traditional khimars or at least 
abaya’s and hijabs worn by the other women. Furthermore, she has bare feet and 
only puts a headscarf on when she prepares for prayer. Secondly, she prays 
differently from the women, which starts with the preparation for prayer. Instead 
of going to the bathroom to do the washing ritual, wudu, she rubs her hands 
against the wall and makes gestures as if she is washing herself. Thereafter she 
refuses to borrow the khimar that one of the women offers her because the 
Brixton women believe tight clothes turn a prayer void. This causes some 
exchanges of secretive smiles and glances among the women. Yet, they do not 
correct the woman nor talk about what happens. When I see one of the women, 
Rasmiyah, giving a disapproving look I ask her why the woman rubs her hands 
against the wall. Rasmiyah does not express criticism, though, but simply 
explains that when Muslims are travelling and do not have water at their 
disposal, they are allowed to do the washing like this. When I remind Rasmiyah 
of the obvious fact that there is water downstairs a reserved look comes into her 
eyes and she says that you do not have to use water in the case of certain diseases 
or aches that the water would worsen. While I establish that there are no visible 
signs of such diseases or aches and want to ask a further question, Rasmiyah 
indicates that she does not want to talk about it anymore and nobody comments 
on what has happened after the woman has left. While their lack of response is 
in keeping with their orthodox discourse of not judging others too quickly and 
the prohibition of gossiping, it seems that ignoring dissonance also helps to keep 
up appearances because it implies ignoring differences of opinion within the 
Muslim community.  
 Another way of ignoring dissonance was visible online. In the 
discussions it occurred regularly that opinions were far apart and that one 
participant severely criticized another participant. Though many discussions 
involved people who refuted each other’s opinion and tried to convince them 
otherwise, there are multiple cases in which the participant who is criticized 
totally ignores the critic. In these cases it seems as if parallel discussions are 
taking place within one topic between different clusters of like-minded people, 
for instance between those with an orthodox orientation and those with 
extremist sympathies. To an outsider it might seem that the participants are 
taking the easy way out, because in this way they do not have to counter the 
‘evidence’ that other parties present. Unfortunately the discussions did not 
disclose the motives behind ignoring critical participants. The result, however, 
seems to be a form of impression management, because the person who is 
criticized ignores it in order to be able to continue his or her own performance, 
as if there is no dissonance and no threat to one’s claim to absolute truth.  
 
To summarize, confirmation, stimulation, critique and impression management 
help the fundamentalist respondents to keep their group together and secure 
their individual and group Muslim identity. 
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6.3 Internalizing Muslim Identities  
A common ground between the representations and group processes discussed in 
the previous sections is that they help the Muslims in this study to internalize 
fundamentalist identities and stimulate them to commit to the group. How does 
this work? 
 Religion studies demonstrate that by engaging in religious practices and 
presenting oneself as a religious person to the outside world, one confirms one’s 
religious identity not only to others, but also to oneself. This can help people to 
reshape their self-image (Grimes, 2002; Henkel, 2005; Mellor & Shilling, 2010; 
Storey, 1999: 129; Winchester, 2008). In this study the presentation of self as a 
fundamentalist Muslim has a similar circular effect. By trying to talk, dress and 
act as a fundamentalist Muslim, the respondents present themselves as Muslims 
to others, commit themselves to their fundamentalist community and 
simultaneously remind themselves about being a Muslim. While the 
fundamentalist respondents admit that they had to make an effort to represent 
their religion in the beginning, they argue – in so many words – that behaving 
like a Muslim comes more naturally to them over time. As orthodox convert 
Natasha says representatively: “It is not that you think with every step that you 
take ‘oh yes, I should do this du’a when I go in. It simply becomes automatic, 
just like waking up in the morning is automatic”. Furthermore, internalization 
and commitment make them feel that they are making progress and becoming 
better Muslims over time. Orthodox convert Vanessa presents this common view 
as follows:  “I feel a stronger Muslim now than in the beginning. Then it was 
only on the outside, in matters of appearance. Now it is my entire way of life”. 
To keep up their level of commitment and to ensure their progress, several 
fundamentalist respondents admitted that they try to shake themselves up when 
they feel that their level of imaan is getting low. They do this in various ways, 
such as by – temporarily – engaging more intensively in fundamentalist circles 
and Islamic activities. Some mentioned that they stay inspired through their role 
models. Extremist born-again Nidal, for example, admits that he watches films 
of jihadi fighters on You Tube to remind himself of his activist cause.     
In terms of the group processes, confirmation, stimulation, critique, and 
impression management are instruments to confirm fundamentalist individual 
and group identities in several ways. First of all, impression management helps to 
keep up the credibility of the Muslim identity of individuals and the 
connectedness within the Muslim community. Besides, the various forms of 
social control – confirmation, stimulation and critique – appear to have a double 
effect. On the one hand, the persons who exert the various forms of social 
control implicitly confirm that they are Muslims and commit to fundamentalist 
norms. On the other hand, those who are subjected to social control are believed 
or asked to confirm their Muslim identity and commit themselves to the group. 
This could explain why fundamentalist respondents talk about social gatherings 
with their Muslim brothers and sisters as stimulating experiences. These 
respondents admit that the presence of their brothers and sisters motivates them 
to strive to become better Muslims by keeping them ‘focused’ or ‘alert’ as they 
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stimulate each other to read more books, undertake more Islamic activities, et 
cetera. One of the women in the As-Soennah mosque, for example, said that she 
loves the conferences because they make her feel inspired to do better. She adds 
with regret that the intensity of this feeling only lasts for a little while, ‘just like 
when you get back from holiday’ and ‘you get back into the old rut’ more quickly 
than you would like to. Several respondents used the rise in their level of imaan 
in the presence of other Muslims as an argument to associate more with Muslims 
than with non-Muslims. Though, as Section 6.2.2 has demonstrated, there are 
some exceptions to this general rule. In the case of a couple of extremist 
respondents pressures within their group have seemingly prompted them to 
distance themselves from their group members.129 Overall, however, impression 
management and social control help the respondents to internalize their 
fundamentalist identities and strengthens their commitment to their Muslim 
communities.  
Yet, how does this relate to the apparent tensions between 
fundamentalist beliefs and actual behaviour? Do these apparent tensions obstruct 
the fundamentalist respondents’ self-image as committed Muslims? Obviously, 
the respondents are often aware of the apparent discrepancy between some of 
their beliefs and behaviour for which they gave a number of general theological 
justifications and a remedy. These concern 1) their level of belief (imaan), 2) the 
remedy of remorse (tawba), 3) the importance of the right intention, 4) setting 
religious priorities, 5) distinguishing between obligatory and recommended 
behaviour, and 6) pointing at differences of opinion among scholars.130 Firstly, 
regarding their imaan, the respondents argue that it fluctuates. Because of their 
human nature they have strengths and weaknesses, and better moments and 
moments in which they make mistakes by giving in to temptations. Secondly, 
while the fundamentalist respondents believe that they are bound to commit sins, 
they argue that if they show true remorse and have the sincere intention to better 
themselves – even in the last seconds of their lives – God will forgive them. 
Thirdly, the respondents emphasize that it is not only their actions that count, 
but also their intentions. If they have the intention of behaving like good 
Muslims, they contend, they will already be rewarded to a certain extent. To give 
an example, if they try to shake hands with people of the opposite gender in as 
few situations as possible, they could – according to some – gain at least some 
credit (hasanat). Fourthly, the fundamentalist respondents argued occasionally 
that there are situations in which certain Islamic rules have priority over others, 
such as in the case of radical convert Hujjat who shaves off his beard to gain 
support for the Islamic state. Fifthly (and also expressed by Hujjat concerning his 
                                                      
129 This is in line with Matza’s (1990) argument that “unstable and shaky groups may come to stress 
loyalty and solidarity and thus mask the brittle bonds that tie it together” (Matza, 1990: 157). It 
could thus be that these groups’ stress on living according to strict rules was actually a sign of them 
being unstable, as a result of which they eventually fell apart.  
130 Such explanations can also be found in other religions, such as Christianity, and they are therefore 
in no way exclusive to the fundamentalist Muslims in this study. The moderate Muslims also used 
such arguments though their liberal interpretations did not lead to the same paradoxes as in the case 
of the fundamentalist respondents. 
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beard), the fundamentalist respondents distinguish between obligatory and 
recommended behaviour. Wearing the niqab, for example, is in the view of the 
fundamentalist respondents recommended, but it is not obligatory. Thus, even 
though they would not be behaving at their best, they reason that they are 
remaining within the framework of Islam. Finally, the fundamentalist 
respondents argue that there are differences in scholarly opinion, also within 
their own current in Islam. In those cases where they admit that the ‘evidence’ is 
not clear, they have to determine which evidence they consider to be the most 
convincing. Since the fundamentalist respondents emphasize that Muslims have 
a personal responsibility it is ultimately up to the individual to choose the right 
verdict. In the case of some fundamentalist respondents I received the impression 
that they had chosen certain verdicts, which suited them best. In short, the 
fundamentalist respondents explain and remedy their ‘drift’ with theological 
arguments.  
Hence, one could argue that group interactions and trying to represent 
Islam strengthen the fundamentalist respondents’ individual and group identity 
as a Muslim, that is, unless the demands of commitment seemingly become too 
high as in the case of a couple of the extremist respondents. Through their 
commitment, the fundamentalist respondents have come to see their Muslim 
role as an ever more convincing identity.131    
 
  
6.4 Merits: Self-Identity, Belonging and Social Status 
So what do representation, commitment and internalization offer the 
respondents? It is possible to deduce several merits from the data. A merit from 
the point of view of the respondents themselves – as of religious believers in 
general – is obviously the spiritual experience (Giordan, 2009b). Yet, as this 
study is concerned with understanding what representation, commitment and 
internalization offers to these particular respondents, it is necessary to also 
consider the attraction in the light of identity strain. The former sections have 
already pointed at an important merit in this respect, namely that representing 
Islam and committing to fundamentalist groups can strengthen one’s individual 
and group identity as a Muslim. Regarding their individual identity the previous 
section has demonstrated that the fundamentalist respondents generally admit 
that they are still ‘weak’ and give in to temptations at times. However, 
theological explanations of ‘drift’ and the ‘progress’ that they experience through 
internalizing their Muslim identity help the fundamentalist respondents to 
develop a positive self-image;132 these explanations and the internalization help 
them to see themselves as committed Muslims who are striving to eventually 
                                                      
131 Also see Goffman (1959) for the internalization of roles in general and Lövheim (2004) for 
religious online communities.  
132 Compare to Ellison (1992) who says that religious people form more positive self-images and to 
Pollner (1989) who argues that religious people score higher in terms of their well-being. It would 
thus seem that the impact of representation of and commitment to fundamentalist identities is 
similar to that of other religious identities.  
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become an ‘authentic’ Muslim. In terms of their group identity, moreover, the 
fundamentalist respondents gain a secure sense of belonging through committing 
themselves to the Muslim community and playing their part as group member.  
In addition, the image that other group members have improves when 
the respondents represent Islam and commit themselves to the group. By 
becoming a practising Muslim the fundamentalist respondents give the 
impression that they have a good relation with Allah and consequently they gain 
more respect from in-group members and a better status within the group, which 
is known to strengthen people’s sense of a positive identity (e.g. Bourgois, 2003, 
Matza, 1990: 189). The respondents report increased respect from family 
members, like-minded Muslims in the mosque but also random Muslims that 
they meet. Despite the formal discourse that it is only Allah’s opinion that 
matters, several respondents admitted caring about the opinions of others. Some 
orthodox female respondents in particular said that they feel more respect from 
others now they cover themselves. In addition, a couple of the female 
respondents from Muslim families argued that covering their bodies and 
practising their faith more helped them to gain trust from their parents. As a 
result, they say their parents have become less controlling and granted them 
more freedom to go out (also see Roex et al., 2010). Former radical and born-
again Almahdi is one of the men who experienced more respect when he started 
to grow a beard, dressed more traditionally and became more involved in Islam. 
He says that almost everybody around him showed him more respect and started 
to look up to him. He says about this experience: “You are glad, almost proud. It 
is good to hear that people see you like that. (…) It’s those things that give you 
that positive feeling”. In his case, as in the case of many other respondents, 
initially moderate Muslims in his environment also reacted positively towads him 
for becoming serious about Islam.  
When their fundamentalist orientation becomes clear, however, their 
fundamentalist community becomes a more important source of respect. Despite 
the fundamentalist respondents’ argument that they should not feel better than 
other Muslims, they acknowledge that some Muslims practise their faith more 
and are therefore better Muslims than others. The main criteria that they use to 
determine whether somebody is a good Muslim – and thus their status within 
the group – is a person’s level of 1) knowledge and 2) imaan. One could argue 
that a high level of knowledge is a precondition for being a good Muslim, 
whereas the level of imaan determines how well somebody tries to put or puts 
this knowledge into practice. Obviously, the various fundamentalist respondents 
do differ in terms of what they consider to be the right knowledge and what they 
see as an expression of high imaan. For example, orthodox respondents 
commonly mentioned that Muslims who are studious, modest and altruistic as 
probably having a high imaan. On the opposite side of the fundamentalist 
spectrum the extremist respondents argued that engaging in a violent jihad and 
being prepared to die as a martyr are signs of a high imaan.   
 With these differences in mind, two principal trends become apparent 
from the conversations, online discussions and observations. Firstly, new 
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members to the group have less status than members who have shown 
commitment to the group for a longer period of time. In the mosques the 
relation between being a regular student and status was particularly evident. On 
average the women who seemed to be viewed as the most knowledgeable in the 
mosques were in their late twenties up until their mid-thirties and appeared to 
have been loyal students for a number of years. Yet, there were also younger 
studious women in their early twenties who taught classes or were regarded as 
knowledgeable because they had proved their commitment by being a regular 
visitor. In the mosques this difference in status became apparent, as the loyal 
students were more eager to answer the teachers’ questions than the newer group 
members. Moreover, besides them providing more answers, the loyal students in 
the Brixton mosque had fixed places. These women were generally more serious 
about taking notes and sat next to the ‘sing along’ karaoke machine through 
which they could hear the voice of the imam, whereas the other younger women 
sat at the sides of the room where they were often more occupied with taking 
care of their young children than with taking notes. When asked about these 
fixed places, a younger woman explained that this was because these women had 
been coming to the mosque for a longer time and had earned these places. Over 
the course of the 3.5 month observation period I never saw any of the younger 
girls occupy the places of these knowledgeable older women during classes.  
The second trend among the Muslims in this study is that they gained 
status by making a higher than average effort to commit themselves. Examples of 
such efforts vary from being particularly studious (for instance by learning the 
Quran by heart), making a special effort in helping Muslim brothers and sisters 
in trouble, to sharing food with others in the mosque. From the respondents’ 
accounts it appears that Muslims who encounter obstacles to being a Muslim 
and still stay on the right path, gain additional status. This might explain why in 
this study’s fundamentalist circles converts have a relatively high status, whereas 
in moderate-traditional Muslim circles it is argued that they experience more 
trouble in gaining status (e.g. Harmsen, 2008) The fundamentalist respondents 
mention three reasons for their appreciation of converts. Firstly, the 
fundamentalist respondents who were raised as Muslims usually see them as 
brave for having chosen Islam in opposition to their parents and social 
environment. As a result, they argue, converts have to struggle to be Muslims on 
a daily basis. This is particularly the case for the youngsters who have recently 
converted and who still live at home. Secondly, from the observations it became 
clear that converts tend to make greater efforts to be good Muslims as if to 
confirm their group membership. Several of the converts in this study mentioned 
that they felt far behind the other group members in terms of knowledge, which 
made them feel insecure and inspired them to try to catch up. Their fellow 
Muslims, in return, argue that they respect the tendency of converts to follow 
Islam more strictly than many of their brothers and sisters from Muslim families. 
The common view of the enthusiasm of converts is that it results from the fact 
that they make a conscious choice to become Muslims. Extremist born-again 
Marid, for example, says that he is a bit jealous of converts, because ‘they have 
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not wasted time’, as he thinks he has. Thirdly, the fundamentalist respondents 
regard converts as clean, uncorrupted slates. They argue that converts can 
immediately learn about ‘pure’ Islam and do not have to rid themselves of the 
excess baggage of previously adopted cultural Islamic practices. The accounts by 
the converts show that they generally come to accept these positive views and 
become more confident, thereby confirming their status. Figure 6.4 contains a 
fragment from an observation report from the Al Fourkaan mosque in 
Eindhoven which summarizes the reasons that the respondents give for the 
converts’ positive status.  
Besides the reasons that the fundamentalist respondents mention, it is 
likely that it helps the respondents to feel positive about belonging to their 
Muslim community. In a time in which the respondents regularly face negative 
opinions from Dutch non-Muslims about Islam, the fact that native Dutch 
people convert to Islam could support them in their viewpoints and strengthen 
their group identity. It seems that in return the group members compliment the 
converts and make them feel more welcome. 
 
FIGURE 6.4 | Position of Converts 
 
 
In short, one can argue that commitment and internalization help the 
fundamentalist respondents to confront identity strain. They do so by, on the 
one hand, securing a positive sense of self and belonging. On the other hand, 
they confront identity strain because it gives the respondents an opportunity to 
gain status. The special status that converts have within the fundamentalist 
communities in this study could point to an additional attraction of 
The following observation is from a conference where I met a group of Muslima’s of 
Moroccan descent and some Dutch converts. During one of the breaks I was with 
Laiba when we witnessed the following scene: 
A friend of Laiba comes in and greets Laiba in a friendly manner. She is 
with some older women who enter into a conversation with a native Dutch convert 
of about 20 years old. The convert is dressed in a dark khimar and has red cheeks, 
seemingly due to excitement. She obviously feels welcome thanks to the interested 
women and she shares her conversion experiences. She says that in particular she has 
never been able to understand the Holy Trinity in Christianity. By now I have heard 
this argument many times, so I listen carefully to what the women have to say. They 
say alhamdulillah several times, full of admiration, in response to the choice to 
convert. The convert says that she was introduced to Islam through a Muslim friend, 
but contrasts her own development to that of this girl. According to the convert her 
friend is now far behind in terms of level of practising. (…) Laiba’s friend then 
explains to me that she respects Dutch converts, because they consciously choose 
Islam and really go for it. She has been raised as a Muslim and thinks that many 
other Muslims like her are not as seriously involved with the religion as the converts 
are, even though they might want to be. 
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fundamentalist views for Dutch converts. While they might be seen as outsiders 
with little knowledge in traditional Muslim groups, they receive respect in 
fundamentalist groups who want to purify Islam from cultural innovations.  
 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that the fundamentalist respondents strive to 
represent Islam individually and within their fundamentalist communities. They 
commonly do this through the use of names, language, their physique, behaviour 
and activities. Moreover, they maintain the local fundamentalist groups that they 
form together – besides through representing Islam – through different types of 
social control and impression management. Despite these efforts, there are some 
indications that the fundamentalist respondents ‘drift’ between Islamic and 
Western life styles.  
Representing Islam and commitment to their fundamentalist 
communities helps the respondents to internalize their Muslim identities. To 
help this internalization and to resolve the tensions of drift, the fundamentalist 
respondents rely on several theological arguments. As a result, they feel that they 
are making progress in becoming their ideal, ‘authentic’ self. The principal merits 
of being a representative of Islam, committing themselves to the group and 
internalizing the Muslim identity are that they gain a secure, positive sense of 
self and belonging, and status in the eyes of group-members. It appears that 
converts have a special status within fundamentalist communities because of the 
obstacles they have to face on their way to ‘pure’ Islam, their evident efforts and 
their lack of cultural practices. Thus, representing Islam, committing themselves 
to fundamentalist groups and internalizing Muslim identities help the 
fundamentalist respondents to deal with identity strain. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
7  
 
A ‘LATE MODERN’ IDENTITY PROJECT UNDER STRAIN 
 
 
So far this study has sought motives and reasons which can explain the 
respondents’ conversion to orthodox, radical and extremist interpretations of 
Islam. It has done so by exploring their conversion reports (in Chapter 3), their 
fundamentalist discourses (in Chapters 4 and 5) and their everyday practice (in 
Chapter 6). It has become apparent that the fundamentalist respondents report 
that they had experienced an identity crisis. With the exception of some of the 
orthodox respondents from Muslim families, this crisis appears to have been an 
experience of identity strain: feeling a discrepancy between what the respondents 
saw as their actual, ‘unauthentic’ self and their ideal image of an ‘authentic’ self. 
While this experience of identity strain (and, in the cases of the few orthodox 
respondents from Muslim families, a milder identity crisis) has contributed to 
their cognitive opening, their fundamentalist turn took place under the 
additional influence of significant others. Furthermore, this study has shown that 
Islamic fundamentalism offers discourses which provide a means for dealing with 
identity strain. In brief, the dualism of fundamentalist – and particularly 
extremist – discourses offer a positive and secure individual and group identity. It 
does so by providing clear sources of identification as well as aspects to ‘resist’. 
Moreover, it has become clear that the fundamentalist respondents try to put 
these discourses into practice. Even though there are some tensions observable 
between their fundamentalist ideals and everyday practice, the respondents 
believe that they represent Islam or are at least trying to do so. Through their 
individual practices, their commitment to the group and group pressures the 
fundamentalist respondents internalize the image of an ‘authentic’ Muslim self 
and community. 
My following task is to try to put these findings into perspective by 
interpreting them further. That means that, firstly, it is necessary to reflect on 
the respondents’ conversion to fundamentalism in the light of the contemporary 
social context. And secondly, on the basis of its findings, this study requires a 
coherent theoretical framework, which – if possible – encompasses the 
respondents’ various motives, reasons and practices. The following section deals 
with the first matter. In this it considers what scholars have previously presented 
as modern aspects of fundamentalism and which modern characteristics can be 
deduced from the Dutch respondents’ fundamentalist views and behaviour. The 
subsequent section includes the explanatory part of the theoretical framework. As 
will become clear, this framework is the result of ‘bricolage’ as I take useful 
elements of existing theories – that might in some cases seem outdated, but hold 
valuable lessons – and reconstruct them to fit the modern context. The principal 
theoretical elements stem from Cohen’s theory of delinquent subcultures and his 
later ‘sociology of the deviant act’, Merton’s strain theory (as introduced in earlier 
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chapters), Gidden’s ideas about identity projects and Bauman’s reflections on 
liquid society. The resulting theoretical framework shows how social structure, 
cultural goals, negative representations of Muslims in the media and individual 
experiences all play an interactive part in the construction of fundamentalist 
subcultures among Dutch Muslims. 
 
 
7.1 ‘Late modern’ Fundamentalists 
How does the respondents’ conversion fit into the broader social context of 
modern Dutch society? At first glance there might not seem to be much modern 
in a turn to Islamic fundamentalism, which aims at recovering the ‘pure’ Islam of 
many centuries ago. Yet, when taking a closer look at the attitudes and behaviour 
of the fundamentalist Muslims in this study, some modern elements become 
evident.  
First of all, certain aspects of the respondents’ Islamic fundamentalist 
discourse correspond with contemporary, Western attitudes and beliefs. For one, 
the nostalgia for the glorious past of Islam could itself be seen as modern. 
Giddens (1991: 206) and Young (1999) contend that in the chaos of a 
globalizing, modern world, people are tempted to nostalgically search for past 
securities to hold on to. The longing for ‘pure’ Islam and its clear rules could be 
regarded as examples of such securities. Furthermore, the fundamentalist 
respondents have adopted the belief that humans are capable of reshaping the 
world according to their ideal. Gray (2003) has argued that such a belief in 
human control is a modern, Western myth.133 In line with Gray’s argument one 
could even argue that the fundamentalist respondents have also adopted this 
modern myth on the personal level through their objective to reshape their 
individual selves according to their ideal role models. They believe that through 
striving to be good Muslims they gain control over their own destiny in the 
afterlife. In addition, this study has demonstrated that the fundamentalist 
respondents focus on individual responsibility. Despite their collective ideal of a 
global Muslim community, they emphasize the individual obligation to gain 
Islamic knowledge, distinguish truth from falseness, and to strive to become a 
better Muslim. The fundamentalist respondents stress their personal relationship 
with God and emphasize that they should not blindly follow scholars, but remain 
critical and investigate things for themselves. One could argue, therefore, that 
this emphasis matches modern, individualist attitudes. Finally, the 
fundamentalist respondents display modern, Western arguments in their 
resistance to social injustice as they generally apply common Western standards 
to determine what qualifies as such injustice. For example, they complain about 
double standards of Western countries towards Muslims regarding the right to 
self-defence and/or the freedom of speech. It thus appears that the 
                                                      
133 A typical example of this type of reasoning is present in Fukuyama’s work ‘The End of History’ 
(1992) in which he argues that history is about to reach its ideal destination: liberal, capitalist 
democracy.  
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fundamentalist respondents are disappointed in common, Western expectations 
that they have seemingly internalized.  
 Secondly, Islamic fundamentalist movements are modern in the sense 
that they could be seen as interactive results of contemporary social contexts, 
both globally and in the Netherlands. On a global scale, Roy (2004) and 
Mandaville (2004) argue that fundamentalist movements stem from 
contemporary struggles between currents in Islam within the Muslim world 
which Huntington’s (1996) essentialist view of Islam ignores. Such struggles also 
became visible in this study, both within fundamentalist groups and between 
moderate Muslims and the various fundamentalist groups. Therefore, in 
accordance with Mandaville (2004: 81-82): 
 
The politics of ‘Islam and the West’ is but one side of the story. 
Another politics, that of Islam and its own ‘internal others’, is becoming 
increasingly important in the present translocal climate. Hegemony in 
its Western guise is not the only obstacle contemporary Islam needs to 
negotiate; there is also hegemony within. Islam is still undoubtedly the 
master signifier, but there is an enormous conceptual diversity as to the 
proper relationship between this signifier and its signified(s). 
 
These struggles relate to religion’s claim to be the truth, both within and outside 
the Muslim world. It could, therefore, be argued that the fundamentalist 
respondents’ scripturalist, absolutist claim to one ultimate and knowable truth is 
a counter-reaction to contemporary society’s pluralism. In addition, regarding the 
situation in Western countries, Roy (2004) views the emergence of transnational 
Muslim movements, such as those of radical Islam, as a modern result of the 
longing for a strong Muslim identity in societies where Muslims form a 
minority. This argument also seems to be true for the Dutch context, where 
negative attention to Islam has weakened the already precarious social position of 
Muslims since 9/11. As has become clear, fundamentalism’s strong identity has 
been a major attraction to the fundamentalist respondents, in line with this 
argument to those from Muslim families. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist 
discourses are contemporary in the sense that they are, at least in part, a reaction 
to Western cultural norms and values. This becomes clear from the fact that 
fundamentalist discourses provide a counter-discourse against what they present 
as the ‘excesses’ of Western materialism, individualism, sexual freedom, lack of 
gender roles, lack of deeper meaning and suchlike. Through such counter-
discourses, the covering of women’s bodies and social separation of the sexes can 
– in a Western context – become symbolic for the ‘liberation’ of what the 
fundamentalist respondents see as Western promiscuity and the focus on 
sexuality.  
 Thirdly, on the behavioural level there are some respects in which the 
fundamentalist respondents show that they are products of modern Western 
societies. This becomes principally evident in what seems to be their occasional 
‘consumption’ of Islam and their Muslim identity (compare to Aldridge, 2007: 
216-217; Bocock, 1993). Chapter 6 has shown that the respondents tend to 
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‘shop’ for suitable verdicts and interpretations, and that pragmatism and nuances 
in putting Islamic rules into practice leads them to drift between a more 
fundamentalist and ‘Western’ lifestyle.134 Another example of consumption could 
be argued to be present in the respondents’ great interest in knowledge about 
simple, everyday rules that are relatively easy to implement and are thus arguably 
more ‘consumable’. Besides these forms of ‘consumption’, a modern attitude and 
even practice is visible in the female respondents’ focus on liberties and rights. 
Despite the common image of traditional gender roles, several of the female 
respondents reported that they received less social control from their Muslim 
families after their conversion to fundamentalism and/or used fundamentalist 
discourses to assert themselves to men by pointing to the rights of women in 
Islam.    
In brief, there are thus several modern aspects to the fundamentalist 
discourses and behaviour of the Muslims in this study. The question that 
remains for the following section is to what extent an explanatory, theoretical 
framework could be built to fit the findings as summarized in this section.    
 
 
7.2 Bricolaging an Explanatory Model: A Modern Identity Project, 
Subcultures, and Strain  
To build a theoretical framework that covers this study’s findings this section 
consists of three steps. Firstly, this section considers relevant theories on the 
contemporary social context. Secondly, it will relate these theories about late 
modernity to suitable theories for the individual and group characteristics of the 
respondents. These are theories concerning the emergence of subcultures and 
strain. Thirdly, this will contribute to a theoretical model which encompasses 
both the complexity of the many social-structural and social-psychological 
factors that have contributed to the respondents’ conversion to Islamic 
fundamentalism. The choice of theories stems from an evaluation of these 
factors: the impact of the respondents’ social context, their modern attitudes and 
behaviour, their focus on identity and their group processes. For that reason I 
have opted for theories about late modernity and the formation of subcultures 
which pay attention to identity formation as a process that individuals engage in 
as active actors.     
 
7.2.1 Dutch Fundamentalism and Late Modernity 
The previous section reflected on the modern characteristics of the respondents’ 
fundamentalism. In view of these modern aspects, it could be considered whether 
their conversion to Islamic fundamentalism could be explained using existing 
theories about modern times. To answer that question this section discusses 
some principal ideas that scholars such as Bauman (2000, 2006), Giddens (1991) 
                                                      
134 This ‘drift’ is comparable to how Matza (1990) describes the drift of delinquents between 
conventional and criminal activities. In his view delinquents are only “casually, intermittently, and 
transiently emerged in a pattern of illegal action” and do not fully commit themselves to neither 
delinquent or to conventional acts (Matza, 1990: 28). 
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and Young (1999, 2007) have presented about ‘late modernity’. At the end of 
this section a comparison will be drawn between their reflections and the 
situation of the fundamentalist respondents.  
According to these scholars we live in turbulent times in which society 
is dramatically changing shape through globalization, technological advances, the 
consequential changing dimensions of time and space, fragmentation, 
individualism, the decline of community, secularization, emancipation and rising 
expectations in Western, prosperous societies. One could disagree about the 
novelty and the actual causes of these developments (e.g. Jameson, 1991). Yet, 
despite possible differences in opinion about the causes, there is no doubt that 
people deal with social changes and that these changes foster insecurities. 
Bauman (2000) therefore speaks of late modern societies as being ‘liquid 
societies’ which are characterized by increasing mobility and inconstancy. As a 
consequence, scholars have argued, inhabitants of contemporary societies cope 
with ontological insecurities that threaten a stable sense of self.  
Scholars have argued that such changes affect people’s sense of identity 
on both a group and individual level. Concerning the group level, scholars such 
as Castells (1997: Chapter 5) state that globalization destabilizes a major 
traditional source of identity: national identities. He contends that increasing 
flows of trade and people challenge the power and meaning of the nation state 
and national identities. Though others, like Sassen (1998: Chapter 10), stress 
that the nation-state has not become irrelevant, it is likely that global social 
changes can contribute to identity crisis and strain among the population of 
nation states. In line with Young’s (2007: 141) argument, this crisis could 
increase the desire to confirm national identities, which can foster polarization 
and social exclusion of ethnic and other out-groups, such as Moroccans or 
Muslims in the Netherlands. However, globalization does not only threaten 
group identities. On the contrary, through the relocation of time and space in the 
information age, transnational ‘imagined communities’135 are on the rise. Most 
notably the Internet has opened paths to transnational communities and hence 
transnational ways of belonging (e.g. Eriksen, 2003; Mandaville, 2004).  
At the same time, scholars have argued that identity has become of 
central importance in modern societies. Giddens (1991) speaks of identity as a 
project (also see Bauman, 2004: 18; and cf. Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & 
Wurf, 1987). Giddens characterizes this project as an interactive, continuous and 
reflexive endeavour. In his view, the identity project demands that individuals 
make a life-long effort to accomplish self-actualization. To reach self-
actualization they have to feel ‘true’ to themselves, which requires them to be 
convinced of their self-image (cf. Goffman, 1959). In late modern societies 
people evaluate the level of success of this project in multiple areas: concerning 
personal relations, jobs, talents, health, beauty, et cetera. Yet, Giddens argues, 
                                                      
135 Anderson (1983) also describes nations as ‘imagined communities’. He argues that they are 
imagined  in the sense that “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson, 1983: 6) 
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succeeding in one’s identity project is a personal responsibility. Failure is 
therefore something that one has to blame oneself for and a lack of success can 
thus negatively affect one’s self-image (also see Young, 2007: Chapters 1 and 2). 
Since Giddens also considers identity to be an interactive project, however, it 
requires confirmation by others. When people feel deprived of confirmation and 
feel that they have not reached their ideal image of ‘full potential’, this could 
arguably contribute to stress and an identity crisis.  
 It could be argued, moreover, that there are several factors that can 
further a sense of crisis. One factor which complicates matters for individuals is 
the wide range of lifestyle options that they have in contemporary society. 
Principally through emancipation, fragmentation and individualism such options 
have expanded in Western countries such as the Netherlands and are less 
restricted by matters such as gender, social class and traditions. For example, it is 
decreasingly likely that an individual would become a carpenter because his 
father was one. Moreover, the traditional roles of men and women are 
disappearing, as well as the obvious character of social institutions related to 
these roles, such as marriage. People thus have a personal responsibility to choose 
‘the right’ option from a larger variety of lifestyles (Giddens, 1991: 75-85; 
Bauman, 2000; Beck 1986). This could prompt people to feel stressed about the 
need to make choices, which could enhance the sense of identity crisis (Giddens, 
1991: 196). Another factor which complicates matters concerns the apparently 
increased expectations of success in Western consumer societies. A successful 
identity project – in the eyes of the self and others – requires choosing the ‘right’ 
lifestyle. It would be considered to be the ‘right’ lifestyle if it neutralizes an 
individual’s feelings of meaninglessness and replaces them with the satisfactory 
experience of self-actualization by becoming one’s ‘authentic’ self (Bauman, 
2004; Giddens, 1991; Young, 2007). Satisfaction might be hard to achieve in a 
consumer society, which stimulates people to always want more. It is equally 
hard to achieve because of the images portrayed in the media of what it means to 
be ‘somebody’, such as being a famous VIP and as demonstrated by the 
multitude of talent shows on television. This could lead to people having high 
expectations of themselves which could intensify the experience of crisis. 
Obviously, it is hard to determine what impact such social trends have 
on individuals, such as the fundamentalist respondents. Nonetheless, elements of 
these theories about late modern times are recognizable in the accounts of the 
fundamentalist respondents, since they reported experiences of ontological 
insecurity. Moreover, it appears that their religious practice remedies these 
ontological insecurities in precisely those areas that theories about late modernity 
identify as evoking such insecurities. That is, Islamic fundamentalist discourses 
sketch an image of ultimate security by limiting lifestyle options through rules, 
countering aspects of emancipation through the renewed introduction of 
traditional gender roles, the denial of pluralism’s validity by promoting an image 
of universal truth, the emphasis on brotherhood as opposed to weakening social 
bonds and national identities, and the negation of the value of worldly success. 
However, while trying to overcome these ontological insecurities, the 
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fundamentalist respondents still appear to undertake an identity project. This 
becomes clear from their image of an ‘authentic’ self that one has to strive for 
throughout one’s life, their argument of personal responsibility in self-
actualization, their belief that one can always become better (as a Muslim), and 
the high and idealized standards which the extremist respondents in particular 
set for themselves.  
In short, it appears that the fundamentalist respondents are engaged in 
a late modern identity project. Through this project they try to approach a stable, 
secure image of an ‘authentic’ self that remedies a number of insecurities linked 
to modern times.     
  
7.2.2 Bricolaging a Theory of Identity Strain 
While these theories about late modernity might explain what attracts the 
respondents to Islamic fundamentalist views and why they engage in an identity 
project in this day and age, these theories fail to account for several matters 
concerning Islamic fundamentalism’s attraction. Firstly, considering that theories 
about late modern society assume that ontological insecurities are a common 
societal feature, one might expect that fundamentalist views would attract more 
Western citizens than they currently do. These theories do not thus explain why 
only some Westerners turn to Islamic fundamentalism to find ontological 
security. Secondly, the ideas about late modernity discussed do not explain why 
the respondents opt for Islamic fundamentalism and not for other 
fundamentalist or dualist views. Thirdly, these theories fail to explain why some 
respondents opt for orthodoxy while others adopt radical or extremist views. To 
understand these matters a shift of focus is required from the macro-sociological 
level to the individual and group level. Most notably, the respondents’ conversion 
accounts can help to determine this study’s theoretical focus. 
 As this study has shown, the respondents’ conversion and commitment 
to various Islamic fundamentalist views relates to a combination of a large variety 
of factors, involving a cognitive opening and the influence of significant others 
and group processes. The cognitive opening of the fundamentalist respondents is 
linked to an identity crisis that is in most cases characterized by the experience of 
‘identity strain’. Significant others and group processes have contributed to the 
respondents’ conversion processes by introducing them to fundamentalist beliefs 
and by stimulating commitment to the group. It is the identity strain that 
distinguishes the fundamentalist respondents from the moderate respondents 
and that could thus explain why only some turn to fundamentalist views. The 
interactive role of such individual strain and group processes come together in 
Cohen’s work on delinquent subcultures (1955) and especially in his ‘Sociology 
of the Deviant Act’ (1965). In this work he uses Merton’s (1938) strain theory, 
which he adapts, principally by adding an interactionist perspective. In his first 
major work on delinquent subcultures, Cohen explains these subcultures by 
building on Merton’s concept of cultural goals versus structural opportunities 
(Young, 2009b). Although Cohen explains delinquent subcultures by status 
frustration which stems from class differences and differential opportunity 
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structures, he broadens his theoretical perspective in ‘Sociology of the Deviant 
Act’ by not only talking of ‘status’, but also of ‘self’ and ‘social identity’. He thus 
creates scope for the focus on ‘identity’ that a theory for the Dutch Muslim’s 
conversion to fundamentalism requires. Cohen even challenges academics to 
combine interactionist perspectives on identity136 with strain theories to come to 
a general theory of deviance. Moreover, since he talks of deviance as including 
matters such as opposition to dominant social norms – and compares the 
adoption of deviant roles to processes of religious conversion – his challenge does 
not appear to be limited to explaining crime, but also seems to aim at including 
non-conformist, oppositional views such as those of Islamic fundamentalism 
(Cohen, 1965: 13-14). Cohen’s theoretical contributions on subcultures, 
symbolic interactionism and his adaptations of Merton’s concept of strain could 
thus serve as a basis for bricolaging a suitable theoretical framework which 
explains the choice for the various fundamentalist views. 
 
Explaining the Cognitive Opening 
One facet of the explanation of the respondents’ conversion to Islamic 
fundamentalism concerns the accounts of what I have described as ‘identity 
strain’. I have opted for this term with reference to Merton (1938), because of 
the ontological questions that most fundamentalist respondents report and the 
discrepancy between their actual (‘unauthentic’) self and ideal (‘authentic’) self 
which fosters tension.137 These respondents reported a combination of various 
strenuous experiences, varying from being adrift in their life, personal loss and 
suffering, social exclusion and lack of recognition, and a desire for transcendence. 
But how does identity strain relate to Merton’s distinction between culture and 
social structure? An answer to this question would serve as a first response to 
Cohen’s challenge to bring symbolic interactionist theories of the self together 
with strain theories. In an attempt to take on that challenge, I will first place the 
concepts ‘culture’ and ‘social structure’ in the broader context of present times. 
In relation to cultural goals, Merton has acknowledged in an interview 
with Cullen and Messner (2007) that he chose financial success as an example of 
the multiple cultural goals that exist in society. In view of this, one could argue 
that the emphasis on identity projects would therefore indicate that a successful 
identity is a cultural goal in contemporary Western societies like the 
                                                      
136 The starting point which he summarizes as “the actor engaged in an ongoing process of finding, 
building, testing, validating, and expressing a self”.  
137 Social-psychological identity theories have made a similar distinction between actual and ideal self. 
Erikson (1968) already distinguished between the ‘ego identity’ and the ‘ego ideal’ or the ‘ideal self’. 
Self-discrepancy theories elaborate on these ideas and present various types of discrepancies between 
an actual self and an ideal or ought self. With ‘ideal self’ they refer to the ideal image that somebody 
aspires to, or believes another person to wish, for the self. The ‘ought self’ concerns an image of what 
a person should be like (what his or her duty is), either from a personal perspective or in the eyes of 
others. Self-discrepancy theories have attempted to integrate these different discrepancies into one 
model that explains the emotional reactions to the various discrepancies, such as low self-esteem and 
anger (Higgins, 1999). Self-discrepancy theories fail, however, to clarify how people cope with these 
emotions.  
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Netherlands.138 The fundamentalist respondents also appear to have embraced 
this goal as their search for personal value and their identity projects suggest. To 
reach this goal, modern-day societies grant a multitude of means, due to 
increasing lifestyle options, which allow for different paths to create a successful 
identity project.  
But does that mean that the contemporary social structure grants people 
– including the respondents – sufficient opportunities to succeed in their identity 
project? It is regarding these structural matters that the characteristics of late 
modern societies come into the theoretical framework. As mentioned in Section 
7.2.1, late modern societies have been characterized as liquid which fosters 
ontological insecurity, an insecurity that the fundamentalist respondents also 
claim to have felt and have searched for a way out to overcome it. So, nothing in 
these societies appears solid, including sources of identity. For example, as a 
result of the lack of traditional gender roles, it has become less evident what it 
means to be a woman or a man. Similarly, job insecurities and an increase of 
options on the labour market, makes it harder for people to derive a secure 
identity from their work. Consequently, the liquidity of the social structure limits 
the opportunities for people to reach a stable and satisfying sense of self, 
especially as reflected in the respondents’ experience of being adrift in their lives. 
On the basis of the theoretical thoughts of Cohen (1955, 1965) but also Young 
(2007) and Tajfel (1974) one could argue that such a lack of a solid or ‘positive’ 
identity can breed polarization and social conflicts between groups, because the 
lack of stable sources for identification can encourage people to determine their 
identities in opposition to others, such as the radical and extremist respondents 
above all do. The resulting polarization and social conflict, in turn, impact on the 
social structure as they lead to in-groups and out-groups that have differential 
opportunity structures for achieving a successful identity. Theories on the 
formation of individual and group identities assume that members of out-groups 
are expected to have more trouble establishing a positive group identity (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), which is likely to affect their individual identity (Goffman, 1963). 
As polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims has increased in the 
Netherlands, the social structure has made it harder for Muslims to establish a 
positive group identity since 9/11. This is clearly visible in the social exclusion 
and lack of recognition that the respondents from Muslim families and the 
converts (after their conversion) report.  
It could even be argued that cultural goals themselves form obstructions 
to the opportunities for achieving a successful identity. The assumption behind a 
successful identity project is that one should continuously strive to become more 
authentic regarding every aspect of one’s identity (in terms of jobs, relationships, 
                                                      
138 In so many words Young also acknowledges this by arguing that “self-realization, the notion of 
constructing one’s own destiny and narrative, becomes a dominant ideal. (…) All of this creates great 
potentialities for human flexibility and reinvention. Yet it generates at the same time considerable 
ontological insecurity – precariousness of being. (…) At no stage in history has there been such a 
premium on identity, on constructing a narrative of development and discovery, yet where the 
materials to construct it are so transient and insubstantial” (Young, 2007: 3). 
| Purification and Resistance 
 
202 
self-expression, et cetera). A tension thus between, on the one hand the project 
never being finished, and on the other hand, the focus on ‘authenticity’ and ‘self-
actualization’ which suggest the possibility of completion. In short, high cultural 
expectations obstruct the very potential of the opportunity structure to make 
people – who strive to ‘have it all’, possibly fuelled by consumer ideals – feel 
satisfied about their identity project (cf. Young, 2007: 3). The fact that many 
fundamentalist respondents stated that they ‘lacked a sense of satisfaction’ 
supports the validity of this assumption.  
Furthermore, people necessarily evaluate the success of their own 
project in comparison to others who might be more successful (at least in certain 
respects). This occurs, for example, through comparison with fairytale lives in 
films or images of celebrities that they are confronted with in the media (also see 
Cohen, 1955: 124-125). As a result, people could feel ‘relatively deprived’, which 
would make it hard to feel satisfaction with one’s personal identity project. This 
could account for the desire for personal transcendence that most of the radical 
and extremist respondents report, as this desire also reflects the high expectations 
of oneself in comparison to others. While having to deal with these high 
expectations, the Muslim respondents are more likely to feel relatively deprived 
as they tend to experience less recognition in the Netherlands due to 
Islamophobic sentiments.  
 In sum, updating Cohen’s theories to the late modern context of the 
Netherlands helps to understand the cognitive opening of the respondents for 
conversion and radical conversion. The essence of this update is that the 
respondents, like other people in late modern societies, can experience strain 
regarding their identity because not everybody has the opportunities to reach the 
cultural goal of a successful identity project. The lack of opportunity is, on the 
one hand, due to the social structure, because it is the liquid nature of society 
which fosters ontological insecurity and as such it obstructs a stable and positive 
identity project. On the other hand, the lack of opportunity is inherent in 
contemporary cultural goals. Contrary to the image that one should succeed at 
reaching a fixed state of ‘authenticity’, identity projects are dynamic and are 
supposed to continue until death. One is thus unlikely to reach a stable sense of 
satisfaction. This lack of satisfaction is further impeded by relative deprivation 
through comparison with the many (mass-mediated) examples of ‘more 
successful’ others. Individuals who encounter negative opinions about their 
identity – such as Muslims facing Islamophobic sentiments – are likely to feel 
more relatively deprived regarding their identity project than members of 
positively valued groups.  
 
Explaining Fundamentalist Subcultures 
Besides providing a theory for the respondents’ cognitive opening it is also 
necessary to explain the role of group processes and how – and especially why – 
Islamic fundamentalism provides a ‘secure’ identity, which helps the respondents 
cope with identity strain. For this purpose, it is helpful to turn to Cohen’s and 
other scholars’ work on subcultures, deviant or otherwise. According to Cohen 
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the problems of adjustment that are implicit in status frustration – which could 
be argued to equally apply to ‘identity strain’ – inspire people to search for like-
minded people with whom they form subcultures. Through these subcultures, 
Cohen argues, people seek a way out of their problems of adjustment. Although 
Cohen offers a theory of deviant subcultures he makes occasional reference to 
other subcultures, thereby implying that the same pattern may apply to non-
deviant subcultures. Obviously, subcultural group processes and the merits of 
membership are not reserved to deviant subcultures (e.g. Hall & Jefferson, 1976; 
Hebdige, 1979). Therefore, it should be possible to formulate a subcultural 
theory, which includes the various forms of fundamentalism in this study. I will 
do this by taking three steps. Firstly, I will reflect on what subcultures are and in 
what ways the respondents’ groups match this description. Secondly, I will try to 
explain the different ways in which the fundamentalist respondents became part 
of fundamentalist groups to explain the role of significant others. Thirdly, I will 
try to create a theoretical framework for the attraction of and commitment to the 
different fundamentalist groups.  
 Hall and Jefferson (1976) describe subcultures as ‘sub-sets’ that show 
both differences and commonalities with their parent culture. In their view: 
 
Subcultures must exhibit a distinctive enough shape and structure to 
make them identifiably different from their ‘parent’ culture. They must 
be focussed around certain activities, values, certain uses of material 
artefacts, territorial spaces etc. which significantly differentiate them 
from the wider culture. But, since they are sub-sets, there must also be 
significant things which bind and articulate them with the ‘parent 
culture’ (Hall & Jefferson, 1976: 13-14).  
 
One scholar who can shed light on the distinctive character of subcultures is 
Hebdige (1979). He explains that “subcultures represent ‘noise’ (as opposed to 
sound)” and attempt to form “a kind of temporary blockage in the system of 
representation”. As such Hebdige emphasizes the oppositional character of 
subcultures, such as the punks. Subcultures represent noise through the 
development of subcultural, oppositional styles (also see Clarke, 1976; 
Muggleton, 2000). Previous studies in the Netherlands have already applied the 
term ‘subcultures’ to describe Islamic fundamentalist groups. These studies have 
mentioned that within Islam various subcultures come into being based on 
different interpretations and expressions of Islam. Contrary to the image of 
tightly-knit networks, these studies present a more nuanced view of the level of 
connectedness between group members (Buijs et al., 2006; de Koning, 2008, 
2009; Roex et al., 2010).  The present study also confirms that subgroups and 
individual differences of opinion exist within each of these communities, which 
points to the fragmentation of subcultural identities (also see Grossberg, 1996: 
91). Despite this fragmentation, the general characteristics of subcultures 
mentioned by Hall and Jefferson (1976) are noticeable in each of these groups, 
although one might argue that they have two – namely Dutch and Islamic – 
parent cultures. The commonalities between the fundamentalist respondents’ 
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subcultures and their Dutch and Islamic parent cultures are apparent, respectively 
in the respondents’ modern features as mentioned in the previous sections and in 
the use of Islamic sources of knowledge. Regarding their distinctiveness, the 
previous chapters have discussed several features that set fundamentalist 
subcultures apart from their parent cultures. Most notably, the fundamentalist 
respondents develop alternative activities, such as attending Islamic lectures with 
like-minded Muslims. Regarding their values, they resist what they see as the 
degeneration of both Islam and modern Western societies. Moreover, they 
oppose the negative connotation that ‘pure’ Islam has in these societies. In terms 
of material artefacts, the clothing of fundamentalist Muslims in a Western 
context is the most striking symbol of their subcultural resistance. The ideal of 
covering the body for women and wearing traditional clothes and beards for 
men, for example, most obviously represents opposition to the central role that 
looks, fashion, and sexuality play in Dutch society, including among moderate 
Muslim citizens. Finally, the fundamentalist respondents create Islamic 
territories by creating virtual or actual Islamic surroundings, by trying to avoid 
un-Islamic environments such as bars and clubs and by preferring single-gender 
(work) environments (for subcultural territories in general see also Clarke, Hall, 
Jefferson & Roberts, 1976: 14; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). In short, the 
subcultural styles of the fundamentalist respondents resist their parent cultures to 
a considerable extent.139 One could even argue that their counter-discourses 
symbolize the ‘noise’ that Hebdige talks of in relation to punk subculture, even 
though the punks’ anarchism might seem far removed from Islamic 
fundamentalism (cf. Fraihi, 2006; Hall & Jefferson, 1976; Hebdige, 1979: 100-
102).140 While the punk counter-discourse involved ‘liberation’ from strict rules 
through anarchic ideals, the use of foul language, promiscuous sexual behaviour 
and dissonant music, the fundamentalist respondents seem to be heading in the 
opposite direction and want to be ‘liberated’ – in their view – from the many 
lifestyle options and the lack of ‘clear’ rules in a contemporary Western society 
such as the Netherlands (cf. Haenfler, 2007 who describes this type of resistance 
in the ‘straight edge’ movement). 
 Now that this section has established that the fundamentalist 
respondents’ form subcultures, it will now turn to how they commit themselves 
to these groups. What is obvious about the respondents’ commitment is that they 
took different paths toward the various fundamentalist groups. It appears that in 
some cases peers play a central part in drawing in the respondents, whereas in 
other cases the initiative to engage in fundamentalist circles seems to stem 
                                                      
139 Unlike those of the moderate respondents that reflect their dual belonging; while the moderate 
women generally wear a headscarf and some men opt for a beard, they mix Islamic and Western 
styles and blend them into a more modern form. A typical example is the fashionable, short dress on 
top of trousers which especially the moderate female respondents wear. Another example is that 
moderates listen to both Islamic and Western music. They see the two types of belonging not as 
mutually exclusive and thus a hybrid subculture of a non-resistant kind is a logical result. 
140 The disagreement between the various Islamic orientations and their resistance to both Islamic 
and Western cultural elements confirm criticism of the image of subcultures as monolithic counter-
cultures pitted against one dominant ‘parent culture’ (see Weinzierl & Muggleton, 2003: 7). 
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mainly from the respondents themselves. In both cases, however, the 
respondents seemingly had a cognitive opening for particular fundamentalist 
interpretations. The respondents’ engagement in fundamentalist subcultural 
groups thus appears to result from a combination of interactive learning, the 
gradual internalization of group standards and a desire to belong. This study’s 
theoretical frame should therefore include elements of social learning, identity 
and symbolic interactionist theories. In Cohen’s subcultural theory all these 
elements are present. He describes the coming into being of a subculture as a 
process of “mutual conversion” in which the conversion of others helps to convert 
oneself (Cohen, 1955: 61). In his view, people opt for a specific subcultural 
group through a combination of available ideologies, by ‘shopping around’, and 
by meeting ‘kindred souls’ (Cohen, 1955: 70). His ideas thus cover the situation 
of the respondents, who also appear to have sought contact with like-minded 
people and with whom they have internalized fundamentalist subcultural norms 
in social interaction. 
This raises the question as to why the respondents form and seek out 
the various fundamentalist subcultures. Cohen contends that people who adopt 
an alternative moral order, such as that of a delinquent subculture or a religious 
group, could be inspired to do so by problems of adjustment for which they seek 
a solution in this alternative moral order. He explains the solution that religious 
subcultures promise by describing them as: 
 
Coalitions of groups whose status is unsatisfactory or precarious within 
the framework of the existing order and who find, in the ideology of the 
movement, reassurance of their importance and worth or the promise of 
a new society in which their importance and worth will be recognized 
(Cohen, 1955: 66).   
 
Since the desire for status has made way for the more encompassing search for a 
stable, positive individual and group identity to explain the processes in this 
study, Cohen’s ideas could be further adapted by arguing that the fundamentalist 
respondents who experienced an ‘unsatisfactory or precarious’ individual and 
group identity, also interactively search ‘reassurance of their importance and 
worth’. They appear to find this reassurance in a fundamentalist moral order and 
in the fundamentalist image of an emerging global ummah ‘in which their 
importance and worth will be recognized’ (also see Haenfler, 2007). 
 Nonetheless, according to Cohen becoming part of such a subculture 
does not necessarily lead to a permanent or real solution. Concerning the 
permanence he states that subcultures can come to an end when they cease to 
match the needs of current or potential members (Cohen, 1955: 65). Similarly, 
one could argue that subcultures can adapt over time when the needs of the 
group’s members change. Fundamentalist subcultures are therefore not static, but 
dynamic. From an individual standpoint one could equally argue that a change in 
one’s personal needs or a lack of fulfilment could make one leave a subcultural 
group. This assumption helps to explain why some of the former and current 
fundamentalist respondents either adapt their views and practices or abandon 
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fundamentalist views over time. Regarding how ‘real’ the solution of subcultural 
membership is, Cohen contends that even though people might embrace an 
alternative moral order, their old moral order is still present (see Section 5.2.3). 
As such, Cohen’s theory explains the drift that the respondents demonstrate 
between modern, Western and fundamentalist views and practices as stemming – 
at least in part – from the previously internalized ‘Western’ moral order that 
keeps pressing for recognition.  
Besides these limitations to the solution that subcultures offer, Cohen 
sees complications if the subculture adopts views and behaviour that dominant 
groups in society are opposed to. As he states: 
 
To the extent that the esteem of outsiders is a value to the members of 
the group, a new problem is engendered. To this problem the typical 
solution is to devalue the good will and respect of those whose good will 
and respect are forfeit anyway. The new subculture of the community of 
innovators comes to include hostile and contemptuous images of those 
groups whose enmity they have earned (Cohen, 1955: 68).  
 
In Cohen’s view subcultures can respond to criticism through “protective 
provocation” which means that its members unconsciously evoke the anger and 
hostility of outsiders in order to prove the outsiders’ animosity. In this, Cohen 
(1955: 69) argues in a functionalist way: “the hostility of the ‘out-group’, thus 
engendered or aggravated, may serve to protect the ‘in-group’ from mixed 
feelings about its way of life” (cf. Young, 2007: 141, 165). He argues this is the 
case for members of deviant, criminal subcultures who have mixed feelings due to 
their previous moral order.  
Then to what extent do these theoretical notions about mutual hostility 
apply to the case of the fundamentalist respondents? Regarding this matter it is 
obvious that certain groups in non-Muslim Dutch society have developed critical 
if not Islamophobic opinions about Muslims. This development has particularly 
taken shape since 9/11 and with regard to fundamentalist subcultures. It could 
thus be argued that members of Islamic fundamentalist subcultures are facing the 
outer threat of negative opinions from other groups. Nonetheless, the 
respondents have converted to Islamic fundamentalism when Islam and 
fundamentalist views were already under social scrutiny. More importantly, some 
of them were non-Muslims. This raises the question about why they opted for a 
negatively valued religion rather than other options. Whether negative opinions 
are a complication or could instead be one of the attractions of Islamic 
fundamentalist subcultures could thus be considered. An explanation for the 
attraction of Islam rather than other religions or ideologies could be that it has 
become one of the most obvious alternative moral orders in the first decade of 
the 21st century. Since Islam has become increasingly viewed as ‘other’ by Dutch 
society, a symbolical distance is undertaken from Dutch society, the old moral 
order and sources of identity by the very act of turning Muslim (e.g. Wohlrab-
Sahr, 2006: 74). Regarding the choice for fundamentalism rather than other 
interpretations of Islam this study has demonstrated that the image of the ‘other’ 
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or even ‘enemy’ helps the fundamentalist respondents to clarify their own 
individual and group identity. In theoretical terms Christie (1986: 424-43) 
explains that a communal enemy can raise the sense of connectedness and 
solidarity between group members and divert the attention away from other, 
internal struggles. This would imply that people who experience identity strain 
and who feel outsiders to the dominant groups in society – whether through 
social exclusion or because they want to distance themselves from the dominant 
groups’ moral orders for other reasons – might in fact be drawn to Islamic 
fundamentalism, because its dualism helps them to determine their own identity 
(also see Young, 2007: 34-36).  
But how does the issue of hostility relate to the differences between the 
various fundamentalist groups? This study has demonstrated that these groups 
display diverse responses to their different types of identity strain, involving 
varying amounts of out-group hostility. On one end of the fundamentalist 
spectrum are the orthodox respondents who mainly report strain as a result of 
personal suffering, which principally concerns their personal selves. In response 
they focus inwardly by emphasizing self-improvement through positive self-
identification rather than resistance or ‘hostility’. On the other end of the 
spectrum are the radical and the extremist respondents who have reported the 
greatest sensitivity to social exclusion and the most intense desire for personal 
transcendence. It is especially the extremist respondents who have opted for 
‘hostile’ resistance as the essence of their new identity. These findings are in line 
with Cohen’s assumption that subcultural hostility rises when “the esteem of 
outsiders is a value to the members of the group,” as is particularly the case for 
radical and extremist respondents who express greater sensitivity to the 
judgement of others. It could be that a hostile discourse, through which they 
‘reject the rejectors’ (cf. Sykes & Matza, 1957), helps them to devalue the esteem 
of outsiders. Similarly, the lesser degree of sensitivity of the orthodox 
respondents to the judgement of others could reduce their need to become 
hostile.  
 Moreover, Cohen argues that members of deviant subcultural groups 
simultaneously create a defence against the inner threat of mixed feelings that 
stem from their former moral order pressing for recognition. According to 
Cohen this defence takes place via a process of ‘reaction formation’, as discussed 
in Chapter 5. In this chapter it has already been argued that it is not possible to 
verify whether the response of all the radical and extremist respondents can be 
understood in terms of reaction formation. Yet, the accounts of the former 
radical and extremist respondents do point at reaction formation in their cases, as 
they confirm in retrospect that they projected their internal struggle outwards. 
For now, however, suffice it to explain the differences between the orthodox 
respondents and the radical and extremist respondents without reference to 
reaction-formation. No matter what exact psychological process underlies it, a 
relation can be observed between their type of identity strain and their animosity. 
All in all, it appears that among the respondents a lesser degree of sensitivity to 
the judgement of others and an inward focus coincides with a focus on positive 
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self-identification, whereas a greater degree of sensitivity and an outward focus 
relates to an emphasis on hostility and resistance discourses to cope with identity 
strain.141   
 
FIGURE 7.1 | Explanatory Model Identity Strain and Fundamentalist Responses 
 
 
 
In sum, the respondents have formed Islamic fundamentalist subcultures. They 
have done so in interaction with like-minded people, and in interactive response 
to their personal experiences and the social context of the Netherlands. Their 
choice of Islam can be explained by its counter-cultural potential in modern 
times in which Islam is under close scrutiny. The choice of fundamentalism 
                                                      
141 As a result of the adaptations of Cohen’s and Merton’s theory, the responses to strain that Merton 
describes are not useful for explaining the responses of the respondents. To some extent they display 
elements of multiples of these responses: conformity, innovation, rebellion and even retreatism. 
There are also some resemblances between the respondents’ responses to strain and the reactions that 
Tajfel (1974) describes to inter-group hostility, namely social creativity and social competition. 
Because of the limited applicability it is more fruitful, in my opinion, to hold on to the descriptions 
that this study has provided up till now: by describing the response of the fundamentalist Muslims in 
this study in terms of the process of identification and the different primary focus in this on either 
positive self-identification or ‘resistance’.  
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relates to the secure identity project that its dualism promises and that they long 
for. The different orientations of the fundamentalist respondents’ subculture 
could be explained by their different experiences of identity strain. Considering 
the local meaning that the global phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism 
acquires, the resulting fundamentalist subcultures are of a glocal nature 
(Robertson, 1995; Huq, 2003). Figure 7.1 provides a graphic presentation of the 
theoretical model as set out in this section.  
Their identity strain seems to result from an interplay between the 
contemporary cultural focus on a successful identity project and a liquid social 
structure which colours the respondents’ personal experiences. It appears that the 
orthodox respondents who principally experience identity strain concerning their 
personal selves attempt to cope with this strain by focusing on positive self-
identification. The radical and extremist respondents’ greater sensitivity to 
external opinions points to primarily strain concerning their social selves. They 
deal with this strain through focusing on ‘resistance’, thereby displaying hostility.  
 
 
7.3 Summary 
What are the results of the efforts in creating a theoretical framework which 
explains the respondents’ conversion to orthodox, radical or extremist Islamic 
views? Firstly, this chapter has discussed the modern characteristics from the 
fundamentalist respondents’ attitudes and behaviour. It has argued that their 
nostalgia, belief in the control of destiny, individualism, and their modern 
Western arguments and expectations indicate that they are products of modern 
Dutch society. Furthermore, their discourses appear to be related to 
contemporary struggles, such as in the Muslim world. Moreover, through their 
discourses they oppose pluralism, social marginalization and certain modern 
Western norms and values, most notably concerning sexuality.  
 On the basis of these arguments and the findings of the previous 
chapters this chapter has continued to bricolage an explanatory model. Theories 
about late modernity have helped put the fundamentalist respondents’ modern 
characteristics into perspective. It appears that their choice for Islamic 
fundamentalism is related to the liquid society that they live in as their 
conversion to fundamentalist views helps them to confront exactly the 
ontological insecurities and unstable identities that characterize late modern 
societies. By striving to become as good a Muslim as possible they try to become 
their ‘authentic’ selves and thus redirect their late modern identity project. When 
combining these insights especially with Cohen’s reflections on Merton’s strain 
and subcultures it is possible to complete this study’s theoretical framework. One 
theoretical assumption is that it is a cultural goal in late modern societies to have 
a successful identity project. Secondly, there are both cultural and structural 
pressures that form obstacles for people who attempt to reach this goal. In short, 
the liquid structure of late modern societies, the tendency to compare one’s 
situation to that of others and the cultural goal that one has to always strive to 
become more ‘authentic’ can destabilize identity projects. Late modern citizens 
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are therefore likely to experience tension regarding their identity projects. I call 
this tension identity strain because it involves the tension resulting from a 
discrepancy between one’s sense of an ‘actual’ self and ‘ideal’ (or ‘authentic’) self.  
 The theoretical model continued by explaining the respondents’ 
reaction to identity strain. To cope with their various forms of identity strain the 
respondents became part of different fundamentalist subcultures by seeking and 
interacting with like-minded people. Fundamentalism claims certainty as 
opposed to late modern doubts and therefore promises a secure identity project. 
The reason for choosing Islamic fundamentalism rather than other dualist visions 
is that it is one of the – if not the – most obvious counter-cultural discourse 
available since 9/11. Moreover, in this chapter I have explained the differential 
choice for Islamic orthodoxy, radicalism and extremism with the various types of 
identity strain that the respondents reported. I have done this by combining 
insights from Merton and Cohen. On this combined theoretical basis I have 
explained that the orthodox respondents reacted to identity strain by turning 
their focus mainly inwards through positive self-identification. The radical and 
extremist respondents though, who demonstrated a greater sensitivity to external 
opinions, turn their focus principally outwards through resistance. To cope with 
identity strain it appears that they had to distance themselves more fiercely from 
the opinions of others by becoming more hostile.  
 This chapter has thus placed the respondents’ motives and reasons for 
choosing for Islamic fundamentalism as well as their fundamentalist practice in 
the broader social context and an interactionist theoretical perspective. 
Consequently, the moment has arrived to draw some conclusions to bring this 
study to a close. 
 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
WESTERN FUNDAMENTALISTS: THE NEED FOR AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
 
Now that the end of this study is in sight, it is necessary to go back to the 
beginning. The introduction raised several questions that required an answer. 
The two principal research questions are: how is the fundamentalist development 
of Dutch Muslims taking place, and what are the underlying reasons and motives 
for this development? While seeking an answer to these questions, this study has 
offered insight into the meaning of the various Islamic fundamentalist 
perspectives to the respondents. The conclusions will address this study’s 
principal findings and their implications. For that purpose these conclusions 
consist of three parts. The first part consists of a summarized answer to the two 
main research questions. The second part deals with the implications of the 
findings for the image of an Islamic fundamentalist threat, the ‘otherness’ of 
Dutch Muslim fundamentalists, criminological and other theory, and Dutch 
policy measures. The third and final part reflects on the questions that this study 
raises for future research.  
 
 
Fundamentalist Development, Reasons and Motives 
Regarding the respondents’ religious development, this study has shown that 
they went through a process of religious conversion. The respondents’ conversion 
processes appear to be the result of a complex interaction of various factors. 
Furthermore, according to the fundamentalist respondents’ stories the form this 
process took varied. Some of them reported specific and abrupt turning points 
while others claim their development to have been slow and steady. Furthermore, 
even though converts tend to present themselves as independent seekers, there 
does appear to be some variation in the extent to which significant others played 
a role in the respondents’ conversion processes. Some respondents acknowledge 
that significant others have played an important part in their discovery of and 
commitment to Islamic fundamentalism. Others appear to have been more active 
and independent in seeking out their fundamentalist group. In addition, this 
study has demonstrated that their development has taken different directions 
over time. Whereas some have stayed relatively loyal to their fundamentalist 
outlook, others have drastically changed their viewpoints in the course of time. 
The most typical case was a convert who initially turned to Islamic extremism, 
and then ‘drifted’ from moderate to orthodox views, all within approximately two 
years time. The respondents tend to view this drift as part of a ‘natural process’ 
that is overall one of a gradual ‘progress’. Besides the respondents’ attitudes that 
developed over time, their practice also reflects drift (in terms of Matza, 1990). 
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On the one hand, this occurs because respondents changed their Islamic practice 
over the years, for example because of new insights. On the other hand, the 
respondents seem to drift between fundamentalist and Western lifestyles, as 
becomes evident in their pragmatic approach to life in the Netherlands. With 
regard to their practice the respondents generally feel that their drift does not 
obstruct their aims to become better Muslims. 
  
Differential Experiences: An Orthodox Inward and Radical/Extremist Outward 
Focus 
While significant others play an essential part – at least in the commitment of 
the respondents to their fundamentalist groups – their influence fails to account 
for the choice between the different types of fundamentalism. Instead, the turn 
to orthodoxy, radicalism or extremism, appears to be related to the cognitive 
opening that the respondents have at a particular moment in time. For most 
fundamentalist respondents this opening concerned a severe experience of 
identity crisis, resulting from at least two types of the following experiences: 
disillusionment with being adrift in their lives and a lack of deeper meaning, 
personal suffering and loss, social exclusion and a lack of recognition, and a 
desire for transcendence. I have chosen to talk of ‘identity strain’, because of the 
respondents’ accounts that they experienced a tension due to a discrepancy 
between what they see as their actual or ‘unauthentic’ selves and their ideal or 
‘authentic’ selves.  
Typically, the experiences reported by the orthodox respondents were 
different from those reported by the radical and extremist respondents. The 
orthodox respondents mainly recounted experiences of personal loss and 
suffering and sketched an image of strain concerning their ‘personal selves’ which 
involves an inward focus. The radical and especially the extremist respondents, 
on the contrary, seemed more sensitive to social exclusion and a lack of 
recognition. Combined with their dreams to transgress normality and to ‘be 
special’, I have argued that their strain mainly concerns their ‘social selves’, that is 
how they think they appear in the eyes of others. They direct their attention 
more outwardly.  
 
Dutch Fundamentalists as a Modern Phenomenon 
Furthermore it has become clear that the respondents’ experience of strain is 
closely linked to the modern Western society that they live in. Like other citizens 
in late modern societies, the respondents demonstrate the desire to have a 
successful identity project. I have argued that by undertaking this project they 
strive to gain a stable sense of their ‘authentic’ selves. Yet, several conditions 
contribute to their identity project facing strain. These conditions exist on the 
cultural and structural level of society. Regarding the cultural level, it is inherent 
in the identity project that one has to strive to become ever more ‘authentic’ and 
be successful in all areas of one’s life. Consequently, one can never fully reach 
one’s goal which might contribute to a lack of satisfaction. On the structural 
level, not everybody has the same opportunities (and capacities) and not 
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everybody can thus reach the same level of ‘success’ in every area. So when one 
determines one’s success in comparison to others who are – at least in certain 
respects – more successful, a satisfying sense of success becomes particularly hard 
to attain. Another structural obstacle concerns the liquidity of modern society, 
since liquidity implies a lack of stability and an increase of ontological insecurity, 
whereas a successful identity project requires a stable, secure sense of self 
(Bauman, 2004; Giddens, 1991; Young, 2007). Such structural and cultural 
factors in combination with the respondents’ personal background and 
experiences explain the respondents’ cognitive opening to Islamic fundamentalist 
views.   
 But why did they opt for Islamic fundamentalism and not for another 
ideology or counter-culture? We have seen that this cannot fully be explained by 
significant others. The respondents played a much more active part in their 
conversion processes. As has become clear, identities are formed through positive 
self-identification and differentiation. One could argue that due to the social 
attention paid to Islam since 9/11 and polarization Islamic fundamentalism has 
become one of the most readily available sources for religious identification and 
opposition in the Netherlands. So for the respondents who experienced identity 
strain and who tried to construct their ‘authentic identity’, Islamic 
fundamentalism has become a logical option. As opposed to the ontological 
insecurities and resulting identity strain, fundamentalist views offer a positive 
and stable individual and group identity. These secure identities stem from 
fundamentalism’s dualism which offers clear markers for both positive self-
identification – e.g. with their Muslim role models and the Muslim ummah – and 
resistance to ‘un-Islamic’ elements, and stimulates the feeling that they can rely 
on an ultimate, universal truth and a higher power which is in control. It is in 
everyday practice and through social interaction and commitment that the 
respondents internalize their Muslim role and thus strengthen their individual 
and group fundamentalist identity. It is once again possible to distinguish 
between the various groups of fundamentalists. In line with their inward focus, 
the orthodox respondents emphasize the path of positive self-identification. 
They focus on improving themselves and doing da’wa by following the example 
of their role models in terms of piety, patience, friendliness, helpfulness and 
suchlike. On the contrary, the radical and extremist respondents with their 
outward focus stress the path of resistance. Their resistance identities (Castells, 
1997) help them to distance themselves from normality and/or turn against those 
people or elements of society that they felt judged by or excluded from (Cohen, 
1955).   
 
 
Research Implications: A More Nuanced View of Dutch Muslim 
Fundamentalists 
So far this study has reviewed the religious development and focus of the 
fundamentalist respondents and has proposed explanations for why they have 
chosen different paths. As such, this section has summarized the answer to the 
| Purification and Resistance 
 
214 
two central research questions. That leads to the question: what are the 
implications of this study? The following section discusses these implications by 
answering some additional questions, as hinted at in the introduction: What does 
this study imply for the image of Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to Dutch 
society? How ‘other’ are the fundamentalist respondents from Dutch non-
Muslims? What course should policy makers take? And what are the 
implications of this project for criminological and other theory?  
 
Nuancing the Image of Islamic Fundamentalism as a Threat 
This study’s introduction discussed Dutch society’s perception of Islam and 
particularly Islamic fundamentalism as a threat. Obviously, there are different 
perspectives on the threat that Islam and Islamic fundamentalism pose to the 
Netherlands. In addition, this image has changed over time. On the one hand, 
the link between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism has been 
nuanced. Since there have not been any terrorist attacks in recent years, 
intelligence services and policy documents argue that there is mainly an external, 
yet ‘limited’ threat (NCTb, 2011). On the other hand, the view of Islam and 
Islamic fundamentalism as a potential threat to the Dutch democratic order has 
remained largely intact. Islamophobic sentiments have increased in the 
Netherlands since 9/11, which is seemingly confirmed by Geert Wilders’ 
popularity.142 In addition, some politicians and scholars have taken a firmer 
stance, contending that Islam (or Islamic fundamentalism) is anti-Western and 
inherently undemocratic, thereby insinuating that a clash of civilizations is taking 
place (Huntington, 1996; e.g. Jansen & van de Ven, 2008). The question that 
this conclusion has to address is what this study contributes in the light of 
current images of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.  
 In short, the answer to this question is that current images need to be 
further nuanced. I will explain this by discussing how the fundamentalist 
respondents’ responses to identity strain reveal nuances on three levels, involving 
their attitudes and behaviour: attitudes regarding the national level, attitudes 
regarding the international level and behaviour. Concerning the first level, 
differences are observable in the fundamentalist respondents’ attitudes regarding 
the Dutch context. It is only extremists who legitimize violence and radicals who 
are advocates against the democratic order. By comparing their attitudes, it has 
become clear that the orthodox respondents lack the activism which characterizes 
the radical and extremist ones. On the contrary, the orthodox respondents claim 
to accept Dutch society and its political system and focus mainly on their 
personal development. The radical and extremist respondents consider it their 
personal responsibility to change society from the top down or to support others 
who are trying to do this. While the extremists generally consider terrorism may 
                                                      
142 It remains to be seen whether a turning point has taken place. The Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research observed a possible change in attitudes among the autochthonous Dutch for the first 
time in 10 years. Since 1998 approximately 50% of the native population considered Islamic and 
Western lifestyles irreconcilable, whereas this percentage was 41% in 2008-2009 (Gijsberts & 
Dagevos, 2009: 272). 
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be committed in the Netherlands or other Western countries, the radicals are 
opposed to violent jihad in the Netherlands and they intend to and do keep their 
activism within current Dutch legal boundaries. One could wonder therefore 
whether these radical attitudes undermine the democratic order or in fact 
constitute an appeal to the rights granted by that democratic order thus implying 
actual participation in that very order.   
Concerning the international level, fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist respondents alike tend to criticize the political situation in 
Muslim countries. Unlike the moderate respondents, however, the 
fundamentalist respondents believe that what they regard as a ‘truly’ Islamic state 
is the best alternative. For that reason, the orthodox respondents support the 
implementation of sharia in Muslim countries. Yet with regard to this 
international aspect they do not have an activist attitude. Alternatively, the 
radical respondents present it as their personal duty to protest against injustices 
done to Muslims abroad. Moreover, they invoke the freedom of speech to spread 
their message and to convince others of the necessity of an Islamic state in 
Muslim countries. To realize this Islamic state they consider that a revolution 
may be instigated, if necessary with violent means. The extremist respondents 
have similar goals, but unlike the radicals express support of the violent strategies 
of notorious ‘terrorist organizations’, such as Al Qaeda, in trying to attain this 
goal. Nonetheless, the radical and extremist respondents rely on common, 
Western just-war arguments to legitimize their attitude. So in their activism the 
radical and extremist respondents might show direct opposition to some of the 
democratic order’s central features, but indirectly express their support of 
them.143  
The third level involves the tensions that exist between the 
fundamentalist respondents’ attitudes and behaviour. The everyday practice of 
the respondents reveals many much more nuances than their strict attitudes 
would suggest. Nuances become apparent in precisely those areas that Dutch 
society is worried about. As opposed to the image of a practice of self-isolation, 
the respondents have considerable and often friendly contact with non-Muslims. 
Furthermore, they participate in Dutch society through their work and studies. 
To be able to function adequately they regularly compromise on clothing rules 
and religious behavioural norms, such as by interacting with non-Muslim men 
and women. Furthermore, the political activities of the radical and extremist 
respondents generally do not correspond with their ideals. Instead, the 
respondents demonstrate a considerable level of armchair activism. So although 
the radical and extremist respondents’ beliefs obviously hold the potential for 
more activist behaviour, even the most extremist respondents hardly ever put 
their ideals fully into practice and they do have scope for compromise. 
                                                      
143 Unfortunately, the gathering of data in this study took place long before the Arab Spring and thus 
it was not possible to ask the fundamentalist respondents’ opinion about current developments. In 
view of their fundamentalist discourse they would be likely to support these developments under the 
condition that the next government will implement sharia and install what they regard as a ‘truly’ 
Islamic state.   
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The general implication of this study is that the image of Islamic 
fundamentalism as a ‘threat’ to the Dutch and other democratic orders needs to 
be further nuanced. Essentialist views of Islam as a threatening religion are 
particularly unjustified. Similarly and more specifically, there is a need for a more 
nuanced view concerning Islamic fundamentalism. As such this study has 
strengthened and refined Roex et al.’s (2010) claim that it is necessary to 
distinguish orthodox Muslims from radical and extremist ones.144 It is only the 
extremist respondents who express verbal support for violent means to rebel 
against the Dutch democratic order, and the radical and extremist respondents 
against governments, usually non-democratic orders, in Muslim countries. Yet 
both these groups use just-war arguments and there are hardly any indications 
that they would put these attitudes into practice.  
 
A Glocal Phenomenon: The Sameness of Dutch Fundamentalist Muslims 
Another question raised in the introduction concerns the otherness of Islamic 
fundamentalism. The common view of Islamic fundamentalism is, firstly, that it 
has an external origin. This view provides an explanation for fundamentalism’s 
presence in the Netherlands as a result of Muslim migration to the Netherlands. 
According to these views, it is above all second-generation youngsters from 
Muslim families who feel attracted to fundamentalist interpretations of their own 
religion because of the identity crisis which stems from their diasporic lives. In 
itself it is logical to assume that Islamic fundamentalism as a religious ideology 
emerged in the Netherlands through migration processes. Yet, this study has 
established that not only second-generation immigrants from Muslim families 
turn to Islamic fundamentalism: children from non-Muslim migrant parents and 
native Dutch individuals also feel attracted to orthodox, radical, and extremist 
Islamic beliefs.  
Secondly, in social and academic debate the primary focus is on the 
differences in values and attitudes of fundamentalist Muslims in comparison to 
non-Muslim Dutch citizens. Nonetheless, this study has demonstrated that the 
respondents’ conversion is principally inspired by the internalization of and 
disappointment in common modern, Western expectations – as reflected in the 
resentment about double standards as mentioned in the former section. The 
reasons for the attraction are thus internal in modern, Dutch society and so the 
turn to Islamic fundamentalism does not stem from a clash of civilizations. On 
the contrary, it is apparently the most ‘integrated’ fundamentalist respondents 
who seem to be attracted to radical and extremist views in the sense that they are 
the most indignant about double standards and they appear to care most about 
the opinions of the Dutch, thus implying that they want to belong. They would 
seem to reverse their sensitivity through creating resistance identities. 
Considering the common Western values and attitudes of the fundamentalist 
respondents, it could be that Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands differs 
from fundamentalist movements in Muslim countries. 
                                                      
144 The government has confirmed this need for a distinction in its National Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy (NCTb, 2011).  
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One should therefore acknowledge that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is not 
simply an imported problem, but partly has its origins within Dutch society. In 
fact, this study has indicated that some native Dutch converts have also turned to 
Islamic fundamentalism and that they have done this in part as a protest to what 
they regard as negative aspects of Western culture and society, such as excessive 
hedonism. So even though fundamentalist views seem foreign, the 
fundamentalist respondents are in large part a product of modern, Western 
societies and are thus not as ‘other’ as many Dutch people have tended to believe. 
Western and ‘local’ dimensions underlie the respondents’ turn to Islamic 
fundamentalism and are recognizable in their fundamentalist attitudes, their 
pragmatic practice, the nature of their fundamentalist groups and the modern 
identity project that they undertake. Being modern, Western and becoming a 
Muslim fundamentalist, can thus go hand in hand. Consequently, it is possible 
to conclude that Islamic fundamentalism in the Netherlands is a truly glocal 
phenomenon that would seem to be just as much – if not more – Dutch as it is 
foreign (Robertson, 1995). 
 
Theoretical Implications: Merits of Interdisciplinary Bricolaging 
In the introduction I said that in this study I would consider various levels of 
explanations for the respondents’ turn to Islamic fundamentalism. These levels 
range from micro (psychological) to macro (sociological) explanations and stem 
from multiple disciplines. Moreover, I also said that I would update Cohen’s – 
and Merton’s – classic criminological theories by merging them with identity 
theories in late modern times. This section evaluates the added value of this 
approach and demonstrates what the theoretical implications of this approach 
are.  
 I argue that this approach has resulted in two major insights. Firstly, 
combining social-psychological insights and Cohen’s subcultural theory with 
Merton’s strain theory creates a theoretical opening to distinguish between the 
turn to orthodox, radical or extremist Islamic viewpoints. By paying attention to 
the social-psychological level an apparent difference emerged between the 
experiences and sensitivities of the orthodox, radical and extremist 
respondents.145 It would thus be of value to take a social-psychological 
perspective in understanding social issues such as conversion and radical 
conversion, and the formation of subcultures and deviant subcultures. 
 The second principal insight of this study concerns the merits of 
updating classic theories to apply them in modern times. During the past century 
growing attention has been paid to people’s identity, under the influence of 
individualism and increasing lifestyle options, among other things. 
Simultaneously, ontological insecurities – fostered by, for example, globalization 
and fragmentation – appear to have been on the increase. In view of these 
developments, society and its individual members have changed their focus. 
Theories which use culture and social structure as explanations should thus be 
                                                      
145 Implicit in these findings is the normality of the fundamentalist respondents: their conversion can 
seemingly be explained on the basis of common social-psychological patterns.  
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reconsidered and if necessary, adapted to be in keeping with the current social 
context. This study has demonstrated that such an update to modern conditions 
is a worthwhile endeavour. Through such an update it is possible to learn 
valuable lessons from previous theories while at the same time demonstrating an 
awareness of current circumstances and elaborating on these previous lessons. 
 Together these two insights have lead to a theoretical framework which 
recognizes the impact of the current social structural level by including both 
social structure and culture, the group level through recognizing the importance 
of peer pressure, and the individual level by acknowledging personal differences 
following from individual experiences, sensitivities and motivations. In line with 
the central role of identity in contemporary society it is identity that is at the 
focal point of this theoretical model. 
 
Policy Implications: A Narrower, More Inclusive Approach 
I have been asking myself whether an academic study such as this one should 
present policy implications in greater or less detail as it is not a policy report. I 
came to the conclusion that this study has many implicit policy suggestions that I 
do want to make explicit, because of the negative impact which inappropriate 
policies could have on further polarization. To begin with, considering that 
Dutch fundamentalists are more similar to other Dutch citizens than is 
commonly assumed, policies that treat radicalism as a problem of ‘otherness’ – 
resulting from immigration or a clash of civilizations – are based on wrong 
assumptions and could, as a result, fail. It is likely to be equally dysfunctional to 
adopt an essentialist approach which focuses on Islam or Islamic fundamentalism 
in its entirety as a threat. Through such an essentialist approach politicians fall 
into the same dualist trap that they criticize fundamentalist Muslims for and in 
doing so they could promote polarization. Even though government policies 
explicitly recognize the need to distinguish between those fundamentalist 
Muslims who are violently inclined and those who are not, these policies 
continue to focus on a large group of potential radicals and extremists through 
their ‘broad approach’. 
 This study suggests that alternative, more fruitful policy approaches 
need to be developed.  First of all, it would be more fruitful to narrow current 
policies down in terms of their scope. Policy makers should be more selective 
regarding the groups that policies target. For that reason they have to address a 
number of questions: Is it necessary to worry about orthodox Muslims as long as 
they accept Dutch society as it is? Do their attitudes and/or behaviour not show 
sufficient willingness to compromise? Should one otherwise not pay equal 
attention to orthodox protestants and Jews in the Netherlands for being a threat 
to the democratic order? Overall, the differences between the respondents’ 
discourses and practice reveal that their resistance is often of a symbolic nature: 
they are often opposed to certain characteristics of Western society in words – 
which they are to a certain extent entitled to do due to the freedom of speech – 
but tolerate these characteristics in practice. Policy makers should realize that 
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giving Muslims the impression that they are targeted for being Muslim is very 
likely to be counterproductive.  
It is principally due to this likelihood of counter-productivity that policy 
makers should be more aware of the role that identity plays in the choice for 
Islamic fundamentalism. When remembering what experiences helped to create 
the respondents’ cognitive opening, this recommendation might seem hard to 
put into practice. For example, in a modern society, which is characterized by 
liquidity, it is hard to increase ontological security. Similarly, it is impossible to 
prevent personal suffering, certain forms of social exclusion146 and the high social 
expectations of individuals. However, policies could focus on measures to deal 
with social exclusion on a collective level, which has been the principal 
experience that helped to create the cognitive opening of the radical and 
extremist respondents in this study. On the one hand, such measures could help 
prevent polarization. Policies should thus refrain from an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
approach, because such an approach would foster dualistic thinking on both sides 
– like in the case of the Norwegian right-wing extremist Breivik – and thus 
contribute to polarization. If policy makers ignore this and keep focusing on the 
difference between Dutch Muslims and non-Muslims it could be that Islamic 
fundamentalism becomes more attractive to both Muslims and non-Muslims, in 
particular to those who feel socially excluded. As in the case of some of the 
respondents, becoming Muslim fundamentalists under the circumstances of 
polarization offers them a very immediate way of distancing oneself from the 
groups that they feel excluded from. In short, it is likely to be more productive to 
emphasize these youngsters’ sameness and belonging to Dutch society and – if 
possible and reasonable – to remove the obstacles which prevent them from 
fulfilling their positive ambitions.147 
Participants in public debate can contribute to diminishing polarization 
and thus the attraction of Islamic fundamentalism in several ways. Social 
discourse plays an essential part in polarization. In the past decade Islamophobic 
sentiments have gained a central place in social debate. Several politicians and 
other public figures have taken the lead in criticizing Islam and Muslims under 
the banner of the freedom of speech. Obviously, it is important to safeguard 
constitutional rights such as the freedom of speech. Yet, considering the findings 
about the role of experiences of social exclusion in the conversion to Islamic 
fundamentalism Dutch society would benefit from a more balanced public 
debate. The media could contribute to creating a balance by offering an equal 
platform to multiple viewpoints, including those of moderate and fundamentalist 
Muslims. 
                                                      
146 This is especially problematic if exclusion takes place for characteristics that are specific to the 
excluded person, for example, when people are being bullied at school for the way they dress.  
147 Obviously I am not arguing that extremism and radicalization will cease to exist if the government 
offers more opportunities to Islamic radicals and extremists. Social reality is not that simple and many 
social interactions are simultaneously at work in radicalization processes. Yet, I am arguing that 
Dutch society has to break the negative interactive spiral if it wants to diminish the attraction of 
Islamic radicalism and extremism. Offering alternatives is likely to contribute to this spiral’s change 
of direction. 
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In short, considering that the main motivation behind the respondents’ turn to 
radical viewpoints is their sensitivity to social exclusion, it is necessary to 
remember that arbitrary policies and generalized Islamophobic expressions seem 
to strengthen radical and extremist resistance narratives. Without more 
recognition for the sources of identity strain and a more accurate approach, 
Dutch society is likely to keep nurturing fundamentalist discourses of ‘Islam 
being under attack’ and Muslims being the underdog, thereby raising the 
attraction of radical and extremist currents within Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
 
Remaining Questions and Suggestions for Further Research 
Following from the lessons learned, this study also offers suggestions for future 
research. A major theoretical lesson of this study is the apparent usefulness of 
interdisciplinary bricolaging. The turn to orthodox and radical Islam appears to 
result from a complex social interaction. To come to a better understanding of 
such a complex phenomenon as conversion to Islamic fundamentalism it has 
been fruitful – and will likely to be so for future research – to learn lessons from a 
variety of disciplines, ranging from conversion studies to social-psychology, 
sociology and criminology. Notwithstanding the consequential contributions of 
this study to existing knowledge, it also leaves some questions unanswered and 
evokes new questions.  
 Most notably, the question remains if the findings can be generalized so 
that they can be applied to other cases. Firstly, it remains to be seen if this study’s 
findings are applicable to other fundamentalist Muslims in Western countries. 
This question particularly concerns Muslims with radical and extremist views, 
since their sample has been the smallest in this study. One way of answering this 
question is by subjecting the findings in this study to a further, e.g. quantitative, 
test. Similarly, and maybe more importantly, the implications of this study could 
be examined in relation to other forms of radicalization. For example, are the 
same patterns, and reasons and motives present in the radicalization processes of 
right-wing extremists, such as the Norwegian Anders Breivik?   
Furthermore, several problems remain concerning the meaning of 
Islamic fundamentalism to Western Muslims. There is still much more to be 
said about the ways in which orthodox, radical and extremist Muslim identities 
take shape in the Netherlands, particularly in group contexts outside the mosque, 
which this study has hardly addressed. This matter could be the subject of a more 
extensive ethnographic research project. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
make a full comparative study of Islamic fundamentalism’s meaning in, on the 
one hand, Western and, on the other hand, Muslim countries to increase 
understanding of the glocal dimensions of Islamic fundamentalism.   
A final essential question for policy purposes concerns the extent to 
which the identity strain that contributes to the conversion to Islamic radicalism 
and extremism could be resolved or – accidently – fostered through 
interventions. Considering the apparent link between radical and extremist views 
and social exclusion, it would be worthwhile to study the potential counter-
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productive effects of interventions, through studying the reactions of radicals and 
extremists to policy measures and social discourse, including everyday 
Islamophobic expressions.  
 
As an epilogue to this study I will briefly consider the letter that Jason Walters, 
one of the Dutch terrorist convicts and a convert, sent to the Dutch newspaper 
De Volkskrant in October 2010. In his letter he contends that he no longer 
subscribes to his extremist views. Instead, he argues: 
 
I have lost the ideals that I once cherished and I have come to the 
realization that they are morally bankrupt. (…) I write this to inform 
society that I no longer identify with the viewpoints that I used to 
cherish and that I hope to contribute positively to our divided society. 
By doing so, I hope to warn young people not to be misled by false 
promises and ideals. (…) A return to the past is no longer possible. We 
must accept the modern world, with all its achievements, among which 
the democratic order, and take this as a starting point for deciding on 
our position in society. (…) This does not mean that we should 
renounce our religion; it means that we must accept reality and adapt to 
it. Only then will we really be able to solve our problems (De 
Volkskrant, 2010: 6-7). 
 
Whether Jason Walters is really sincere or not, his words contain some wise 
lessons. If Dutch society really wants to counter radicalization and polarization, 
it needs to face reality and break the interactive spiral. Maybe the spiral of 
Islamic radicalization is already on its retreat, as Jason Walters’ letter could 
symbolize. Yet whether it concerns Islamic extremism or other forms of 
radicalization and extremism, it appears necessary to look beyond the limitations 
of contemporary paradigms. Throughout history we find examples of societies 
only realizing in retrospect what they should have done differently to prevent an 
escalation of social problems. But why should it be so difficult to acknowledge 
personal responsibility if this acknowledgement can contribute to a positive 
change for society at large? I would argue, therefore, that as members or 
representatives of Dutch society we should accept our own responsibility and 
stop fuelling polarization. To begin with, this can be done by becoming aware of 
and changing the exclusionary and contradictory practices which feed discourses 
of resistance. It is also possible to do this (similar to what Jason Walters appears 
to have done in his renouncement of an extremist perspective) by refusing to 
accept simplistic, dualist visions – in our case of Muslims – and instead 
recognizing the complexities and nuances of social reality.  
  
  
 
Samenvatting 
 
ZUIVERING EN VERZET: GLOKALE BETEKENISSEN VAN 
ISLAMITISCH FUNDAMENTALISME IN NEDERLAND 
 
 
In het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw heeft zich een angst voor islamitisch 
fundamentalisme in Nederland gevestigd. In het bijzonder geïnspireerd door de 
aanslagen van 11 september 2001 en de moord op Theo van Gogh in november 
2004, is in Nederland een discussie opgelaaid over ‘de islam’. Vragen die men in 
deze discussie stelt betreffen de legitimatie van geweld in islam en de vraag of 
deze religie en het leven in de Nederlandse rechtsstaat voldoende samen kunnen 
gaan. De discussie in politiek en media kenmerkt zich niet zelden door een 
essentialistische benadering, waarbij de neiging bestaat om voorbij te gaan aan 
diversiteit in geloofsovertuigingen onder Nederlandse moslims.  
In reactie op deze ontwikkelingen zijn er verschillende studies verricht 
naar islamitisch fundamentalistische stromingen in Nederland. In dat onderzoek 
is de aandacht vooral uitgegaan naar het zogenaamde Salafisme, een stroming die 
de aandacht van de AIVD kreeg vanwege haar veronderstelde anti-democratische 
en daarmee gevaarlijke karakter. De meest invloedrijke studie op dit terrein is de 
studie van Buijs, Demant en Hamdy (2006) met de titel ‘Strijders van eigen 
bodem’. De beschrijvingen en verklaringen die deze studie geeft voor het 
radicaliseren van jonge moslims van Marokkaanse afkomst hebben als voorbeeld 
gediend voor latere studies. Al met al schetst eerder onderzoek een beeld van 
Salafisme en islamitische radicalisering als fenomenen die vooral leven onder 
tweede generatie Marokkaanse moslimjongeren. De verklaringen sluiten bij dat 
beeld aan: Salafistische stromingen zouden tweede generatie jongeren aantrekken 
die tussen de Nederlandse en Marokkaanse cultuur instaan en die worstelen met 
hun hybride identiteit. Daarmee leggen voorgaande onderzoeken de nadruk op 
culturele verklaringen. Deze verklaringen laten echter een tweetal belangrijke 
vragen onbeantwoord. Ten eerste hebben eerdere studies geen antwoord op de 
vraag hoe het te verklaren is dat ook autochtone Nederlanders voor een 
Salafistische interpretatie van islam kiezen. Dit is een relevante vraag, omdat zich 
binnen radicale netwerken in het Westen ook autochtone bekeerlingen bleken te 
bevinden. Te denken valt aan Jason Walters binnen de Hofstadgroep en 
Germaine Lindsay die betrokken was bij de aanslagen in Londen in 2005. 
Bovendien bestaat een aanzienlijk deel van de orthodoxe bezoekers van 
Salafistische moskeeën in Nederland uit bekeerlingen. Ten tweede resteert de 
vraag wat het verschil in aantrekkingskracht is van de verschillende stromingen 
binnen het Salafisme. Oftewel, het is de vraag of er een verklaring is voor het feit 
dat sommigen voor orthodoxie en anderen voor radicalisme of zelfs extremisme 
kiezen. Het zijn deze vragen die ik in deze studie heb willen beantwoorden. 
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1. Vooraf: De basis van dit onderzoek 
Om tot antwoorden te komen, heb ik dit criminologische onderzoek middels een 
probleemstelling afgebakend. De probleemstelling in deze studie bestaat uit twee 
vragen: 
1. Hoe vindt de ontwikkeling van die Nederlandse moslims die zich tot 
islamitisch fundamentalisme keren plaats? 
2. Wat zijn de redenen en motieven voor hun bekering? 
 
Bij het beantwoorden van deze probleemstelling heb ik gebruik gemaakt van 
verschillende kwalitatieve methoden: half-open interviews, observaties en de 
analyse van online discussies. De data in deze studie bestaan uit de transcripten 
van 42 interviews en ongeveer hetzelfde aantal informele gesprekken met 40 
respondenten. Onder de respondenten zijn mannen en vrouwen, kinderen uit 
moslimgezinnen, autochtone en allochtone bekeerlingen, met diverse islamitische 
oriëntaties. De observaties vonden plaats in verschillende Salafistische moskeeën 
in Nederland en de Brixton moskee in London. De observatieperiode besloeg 11 
maanden in Nederland en 3,5 maanden in Londen. In de observatieverslagen 
komen inhoudelijk substantiële gesprekken naar voren met ongeveer 135 
orthodoxe vrouwen. Tot slot maken analyses van 38 internetdiscussies op 
Marocco Virtual Community onderdeel uit van de data.  
 Het theoretische kader in deze studie is interdisciplinair. De keuze voor 
specifieke theorieën heb ik gemaakt op basis van eerdere studies en de eigen 
bevindingen. Centrale thema’s bleken de huidige sociaal-politieke context, 
identiteit en groepsprocessen. Naar aanleiding daarvan heb ik gekozen voor een 
bricolage van theorieën over de zogenaamde laat-moderne samenleving, 
interactionistische benaderingen van identiteitsvorming en de betekenis daarvan, 
en strain- en subculturele theorieën.  
 
 
2. Nuances in ‘radicale’ houdingen en een verduidelijking van definities 
In deze studie maak ik gebruik van een aantal beladen termen: islamitisch 
fundamentalisme, orthodoxie, radicalisme en extremisme. De keuze voor deze 
termen berust vooral op het feit dat er geen alternatieve termen voorhanden zijn 
die minder beladen en even passend zijn.  
 Islamitisch fundamentalisme, zoals gebruikt in deze studie, is te 
omschrijven als een oriëntatie binnen islam die zich karakteriseert door 
traditionalisme en ‘scripturalisme’ (een terugkeer tot de zuivere wortels van islam 
door een letterlijke interpretatie van de heilige geschriften), dualisme (in het 
onderscheid tussen waarheid en deceptie, gelovigen en ongelovigen, et cetera) en 
millennarianisme (de overtuiging van een op handen zijnde einde der tijden). 
Hoewel het grootste gedeelte van de moslims in Nederland zich ver houdt van 
fundamentalistische visies, heeft het afgelopen decennium laten zien dat 
islamitisch fundamentalisme wel degelijk voorstanders heeft onder Nederlandse 
moslims. Voorbeelden van islamitisch fundamentalistische bewegingen in 
Nederland zijn het Salafisme en Hizb-ut-Tahrir. 
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Onder de respondenten bevonden zich ook aanhangers van deze stromingen 
binnen islam. Binnen de groep fundamentalistische respondenten heb ik op basis 
van hun denkbeelden een nader onderscheid gemaakt tussen orthodoxen, 
radicalen en extremisten. Het belangrijkste verschil tussen deze groepen volgt uit 
hun houding ten opzichte van politiek activisme en de legitimatie en vorm van 
gewelddadige jihad. Waar de orthodoxe respondenten zich niet inlaten met 
politiek activisme, kenmerken de radicale en extremistische respondenten zich 
juist door de perceptie van een persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid om een 
activistische houding aan te nemen. De extremisten onderscheiden zich 
vervolgens van de radicalen doordat ze geweld toegestaan achten, waaronder 
terroristisch geweld in Westerse landen zoals Nederland, landen die ze als 
medeverantwoordelijk zien voor het lijden van moslims op mondiale schaal. 
 In relatie tot eerdere studies heb ik de kwalificatie van wat als radicaal en 
extremistisch geldt proberen te verduidelijken. In tegenstelling tot een aantal 
eerdere studies (bijv. Roex et al., 2010) heb ik daarbij onderscheid gemaakt naar 
de vorm die de gewelddadige jihad aanneemt en de precieze context waarin deze 
jihad plaatsvindt. Daarmee heb ik zelfverdediging tegen een onmiddellijke, 
persoonlijke aanval met proportionele middelen van radicalisme buitengesloten, 
omdat dergelijk geweld verenigbaar is met de algemeen geaccepteerde just war 
doctrine in Westerse samenlevingen en dus op zichzelf geen teken is van 
radicalisme. Een kenmerk van radicalisme is immers dat men zich juist van de 
heersende orde afkeert.  
 Aanvullende nuances betreffen de attituden binnen de verschillende 
fundamentalistische categorieën en vooral hoe de respondenten hun orthodoxe, 
radicale en extremistische gedachtegoed in de praktijk brengen. Een eerste 
nuancering is dat ook binnen de verschillende fundamentalistische categorieën 
meningsverschillen bestaan. Ten tweede, attituden komen niet altijd overeen met 
feitelijk gedrag. Vooral de radicale en extremistische respondenten leken slechts 
in beperkte mate naar hun activistische overtuigingen te handelen. Een derde en 
laatste nuancering volgt uit de ontwikkeling die de respondenten gedurende deze 
studie lieten zien. Bij een aantal van hen waren in de loop van de tijd sterke 
veranderingen waarneembaar in hun attituden en gedrag. Het meest typerend was 
het geval van een bekeerling tot islam die zich binnen twee jaar tot een 
extremistische houding bekeerde, overging naar een zeer gematigd standpunt en 
corresponderend gedrag en vervolgens een orthodoxe, salafistische interpretatie 
van islam omarmde. Al met al nuanceren deze bevindingen het beeld dat er van 
islamitisch fundamentalisme in Nederland een grote dreiging uitgaat. 
 
 
3. Hoe en waarom bekeren Nederlandse moslims zich tot islamitisch 
fundamentalisme? 
Na het afbakenen van het onderzoeksthema, de conceptualisering en het 
categoriseren van de respondenten volgt de kern van deze studie: het beschrijven 
en verklaren van de fundamentalistische ontwikkeling van de respondenten. Om 
zicht op het verloop van hun ontwikkeling te krijgen, geeft deze studie aan hoe de 
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respondenten ontvankelijk zijn geworden – of in woorden van Wiktorowicz 
(2005) een ‘cognitieve opening’ hebben ontwikkeld – voor fundamentalistische 
interpretaties van islam. Ter verklaring van hun bekering volgt vervolgens een 
beschrijving van wat de verschillende vormen van islamitisch fundamentalisme de 
respondenten te bieden hebben. 
 
3.1 De vorm: een doorlopend, veelvormig proces met een rol voor significante anderen 
Deze studie heeft laten zien dat de respondenten een bekeringsproces hebben 
doorgemaakt. Het bekeringsproces van de respondenten lijkt het resultaat te zijn 
van een complexe interactie van verschillende factoren. Bovendien kenmerken de 
bekeringsprocessen van de fundamentalistische respondenten zich door 
onderlinge variatie en veranderingen in de loop van de tijd. Sommige 
respondenten zeggen dat ze plotseling op een keerpunt belandden, terwijl 
anderen hun ontwikkeling beschrijven als een gradueel, natuurlijk proces. In de 
loop van de tijd lijkt er bovendien sprake te zijn van ‘drift’, aangezien sommige 
respondenten van de ene op de andere interpretatie leken over te stappen. Het 
eerdergenoemde voorbeeld van de respondent die binnen twee jaar tijd drie keer 
van oriëntatie veranderde is daarvan het meest typerende voorbeeld. 
 Wat betreft de rol van significante anderen is er ook een onderscheid 
zichtbaar. Sommige respondenten presenteren zichzelf als ‘actieve zoekers’ in hun 
bekeringsproces, terwijl andere respondenten het voorbeeld van anderen zeggen 
te hebben gevolgd. Het staat buiten kijf dat in alle gevallen significante anderen 
een rol hebben gespeeld. Significante anderen stimuleren, beïnvloeden de richting 
van, of belemmeren het bekeringsproces. Desondanks kunnen significante 
anderen niet voldoende verklaren waarom de fundamentalistische respondenten 
bekeerden, noch waarom ze voor orthodoxie, radicalisme of extremisme kozen. 
Het blijkt namelijk dat de fundamentalistische respondenten met diverse 
stromingen in aanraking zijn gekomen, op verschillende momenten in hun 
bekeringsproces. Bovendien veranderde de kring van significante anderen bij een 
aantal respondenten in de loop van de tijd.  
 
3.2 De aanleiding: een cognitieve opening voor bekering 
Om de keuze voor bepaalde stromingen en de kring van significante anderen te 
begrijpen, is het van belang om te kijken naar de persoonlijke omstandigheden 
waaronder de respondenten interesse kregen voor fundamentalistische 
interpretaties van islam.  
Uit de verhalen van de fundamentalistische respondenten over hun 
religieuze ontwikkeling is af te leiden dat ze een identiteitscrisis doormaakten. 
Aan de basis van deze crisis lagen verschillende ervaringen die als volgt zijn te 
categoriseren: 1) een gebrek aan zingeving en richting in hun leven, 2) 
persoonlijke, pijnlijke ervaringen of het verlies van significante anderen, 3) sociale 
uitsluiting en/of een gebrek aan erkenning en 4) een verlangen naar 
transcendentie van het normale. Op zich zijn deze typen ervaringen niet zo 
bijzonder; er zijn veel mensen – inclusief de gematigde respondenten in deze 
studie – die zulke ervaringen hebben en die zich niet tot islamitisch 
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fundamentalisme bekeren. De vraag is dus in hoeverre de ervaringen die de 
respondenten beschrijven een verklaring kunnen bieden voor de bekering tot de 
verschillende fundamentalistische stromingen waar ze toe behoren.  
Een onderscheidend kenmerk is dat de fundamentalistische 
respondenten – met uitzondering van een paar orthodoxe respondenten uit 
moslimgezinnen – in tegenstelling tot de gematigde respondenten, een meer 
intense crisis meldden. De intensiteit is af te leiden uit de typen ervaringen die ze 
meldden. Terwijl de gematigde respondenten maximaal één type ervaring 
noemden, gaven de fundamentalistische respondenten aan twee of meer typen 
ervaringen – vrijwel tegelijkertijd – te hebben gehad. De aard van deze meer 
intense crisis heb ik omschreven als identity strain, een term die berust op een 
vrije interpretatie van Merton’s (1938) begrip van strain. Een beschrijving die 
meermalen naar voren kwam, was dat deze respondenten het gevoel hadden dat 
ze niet zichzelf waren. In deze studie wijst strain dus op de discrepantie die de 
bekeerde respondenten ervoeren tussen hun actuele ‘niet authentieke’ zelf en hun 
(soms vage of onbewuste) beeld van een ideaal, ‘authentiek’ zelf.  
 Onder de fundamentalistische respondenten is er ook een verschil 
zichtbaar in de typen ervaringen die de orthodoxe respondenten aan de ene kant 
en de radicale en extremistische respondenten aan de andere kant noemden. De 
orthodoxe respondenten noemden vooral persoonlijk lijden, terwijl de radicale en 
extremistische respondenten de nadruk legden op sociale uitsluiting en het 
verlangen om bijzonder te zijn. Aangezien niet is gebleken dat deze radicale en 
extremistische respondenten daadwerkelijk meer sociale uitsluiting hebben 
ervaren, lijkt het dat ze hier vooral meer gevoelig voor zijn. De orthodoxe 
respondenten getuigen daarmee van een grotere interne gerichtheid op hun 
‘persoonlijke zelf’. De radicale en extremistische respondenten lijken daarentegen 
gevoeliger voor het beeld dat anderen van hen hebben, wat betrekking heeft op 
hun ‘sociale zelf’. Deze grotere gevoeligheid en verschillen in focus lijken echter 
momentopnamen te betreffen, zoals is af te leiden uit de veranderde beleving van 
een aantal respondenten in de loop van deze studie. 
 
3.3 De zoektocht: Fundamentalisme als bron van een zekere en positieve 
(verzets)identiteit 
De volgende vraag die deze studie beantwoordt, is wat de verschillende 
fundamentalistische interpretaties de respondenten met hun ervaring van identity 
strain te bieden hebben. Zoals alle processen van identificatie, verloopt ook het 
identificatieproces van de respondenten via enerzijds positieve ‘zelfidentificatie’, 
door te bepalen wie ze wel zijn, en anderzijds via differentiatie, door zich af te 
zetten van waar ze zich niet (langer) mee willen identificeren. Het dualisme dat 
islamitisch fundamentalisme kenmerkt, biedt een ultieme mogelijkheid tot 
identificatie en differentiatie. 
 
Positieve zelfidentificatie 
Ten aanzien van positieve zelfidentificatie blijkt dat het dualisme van islamitisch 
fundamentalisme de respondenten een gevoel van stabiliteit en zekerheid biedt. 
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Dit gevoel krijgen ze onder meer doordat ze geloven dat ze de absolute waarheid 
in pacht hebben en dat ze daar onweerlegbaar bewijs voor kunnen presenteren. 
De fundamentalistische stromingen van de respondenten bieden hen ook een 
aantal strikt afgebakende modellen op basis waarvan ze hun eigen identiteit 
kunnen vormgeven, te weten islamitische regels, de wereldwijde 
moslimgemeenschap, de ummah, waarvan ze deel uitmaken en geïdealiseerde 
rolmodellen. Deze modellen bieden de respondenten een positieve identiteit.  
 Ondanks deze gedeelde patronen, zijn er enige verschillen zichtbaar 
tussen de invulling die de orthodoxe, radicale en extremistische respondenten 
geven aan deze bronnen voor zelfidentificatie. Ten aanzien van de ummah hebben 
de orthodoxe respondenten een meer inclusieve benadering, terwijl vooral de 
extremistische respondenten geneigd zijn tot takfir, waarbij ze andersdenkende 
moslims tot niet-moslim verklaren. Deze meer exclusieve benadering lijkt ertoe 
bij te dragen dat ze zich tot een zeer selecte groep van uitverkorenen kunnen 
rekenen, wat bijdraagt aan een positief zelfbeeld. Een tweede verschil heeft 
betrekking op de rolmodellen die de respondenten kiezen. De orthodoxe 
respondenten richten hun aandacht op de positieve voorbeelden die rolmodellen 
geven zoals vriendelijkheid, behulpzaamheid en geduld. De radicale en 
extremistische respondenten nemen echter vooral oppositionele rolmodellen tot 
voorbeeld. Deze rolmodellen staan met hun ambitie om te strijden voor een 
‘betere’ maatschappij voor heldendom en aversieve kracht, waar de respondenten 
zich mee identificeren. 
 De verschillende benadering van broederschap en rolmodellen, lijkt te 
corresponderen met de verschillende aard van de identity strain die de 
respondenten ervaren. De strain die orthodoxe respondenten met betrekking tot 
hun persoonlijke zelf ervaren, sluit een meer inclusieve benadering van 
broederschap niet uit en verklaart juist hun grotere nadruk op positieve 
rolmodellen om zichzelf aan te spiegelen. De zeer exclusieve benadering van de 
radicale en vooral de extremistische respondenten in combinatie met een focus op 
oppositionele rolmodellen sluit aan bij de strain ten aanzien van hun ‘sociale zelf’. 
Door zich in positieve zin van andere moslims te onderscheiden en zich te 
identificeren met oppositionele helden, kunnen ze zichzelf sterken ten opzichte 
van anderen en zo hun gevoeligheid voor het oordeel van die anderen 
neutraliseren.  
 
Differentiatie in de vorm van verzet 
Als andere kant van de dualistische medaille, zetten de fundamentalistische 
respondenten zich ook af van datgene en die personen waarmee ze zich niet 
willen identificeren. Ik heb ervoor gekozen om deze differentiatie ‘verzet’ te 
noemen, vanwege de sterke mate waarin de fundamentalistische respondenten 
zich afzetten van dat waar ze zich niet mee willen identificeren. Uit dit onderzoek 
komen verschillende verzetsdiscoursen naar voren. Deze hebben betrekking op 
hun leven voor de ‘ware’, ‘zuivere’ islam en hun voormalige sociale groep, de 
Westerse cultuur, andere religies, externe labels, andere stromingen binnen islam 
en islamofobische sentimenten en praktijken. 
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Ook hier is echter een verschil waarneembaar tussen enerzijds de orthodoxe 
respondenten en anderzijds de radicale en extremistische respondenten dat in 
overeenstemming lijkt met hun verschillende ervaringen van identity strain. De 
orthodoxe respondenten geven blijk van een mindere mate van verzet. Zij keuren 
vooral bepaalde aspecten van de Westerse (wat ze op bijna één lijn stellen met de 
Nederlandse) cultuur af, maar ze zijn minder geneigd om anderen te veroordelen. 
De minder sterke veroordeling van individuen correspondeert met hun interne 
focus. De discoursen van de radicale en extremistische respondenten laten een 
sterkere mate van verzet zien. Deze respondenten richten hun pijlen bovendien 
eveneens op individuen, zoals mensen met een ander geloof of mensen uit hun 
voormalige sociale kring. Hun negatievere visie op individuen lijkt aan te sluiten 
bij hun gevoeligheid voor het oordeel van anderen. Het lijkt erop dat de radicale 
en extremistische respondenten ‘resistance identities’ vormen om zich te wapenen 
tegen hun gevoeligheid voor sociale uitsluiting door – in Sykes’ en Matza’s (1957) 
termen – de veroordelaars te veroordelen. Als zodanig kan verzet bijdragen aan 
een positief zelfbeeld.  
 
Het dualisme van islamitisch fundamentalisme biedt de respondenten dus een 
antwoord op hun identity strain. Dit antwoord krijgen ze via twee paden. Het 
eerste pad is dat van positieve zelfidentificatie met de zuivere islam. Dit is het pad 
waar de orthodoxe respondenten de nadruk op leggen. Het tweede pad, dat de 
radicale en extremistische respondenten als primaire weg bewandelen, is dat van 
verzet tegen het ‘niet-islamitische’.  
 
3.4 Van overtuiging naar praktijk: internalisering en de ontwikkeling van een 
subcultuur 
Deze studie laat eveneens zien hoe de fundamentalistische respondenten vorm 
geven aan de zojuist besproken discoursen van positieve zelfidentificatie en verzet. 
In de praktijk proberen de respondenten islam te representeren als individu en in 
groepsverband. Ze doen dit door het gebruik van (islamitische) namen en taal, 
hun uiterlijk, gedrag en activiteiten. Daarnaast investeren de respondenten in het 
verstevigen van onderlinge banden binnen de lokale fundamentalistische groepen 
die ze vormen. Het binden aan de groep doen ze mede door het uitoefenen van 
sociale controle en impressie management.  
Ondanks hun inspanningen blijft er echter sprake van ‘drift’ van de 
fundamentalistische respondenten tussen een meer islamitische en een Westerse 
levensstijl. Dit uit zich bijvoorbeeld in de liefde van de respondenten voor mode 
en computerspelletjes die stand houdt en de pragmatische houding die het leven 
en werken in een niet-islamitische samenleving vereist. Als antwoord op 
eventuele tegenstrijdigheden tussen hun houding en gedrag maken de 
respondenten gebruik van een aantal theologische argumenten. In hun beleving 
blijven ze zich gedurende hun hele leven ontwikkelen en komen ze zo – hoewel ze 
af en toe wat minder goed de regels naleven – steeds dichter bij het ideaal van hun 
‘ware’ zelf. 
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Als zodanig biedt de praktijk ook een antwoord op identity strain. Door zich aan 
de groep te verbinden en islam te representeren, internaliseren de 
fundamentalistische respondenten hun moslimidentiteit voor zichzelf en 
bevestigen die naar anderen wat hun status in de ogen van groepsleden kan 
vergroten. Bekeerlingen blijken in termen van status een bijzonder plaats in te 
nemen. In salafistische kringen hebben ze een streepje op anderen voor, omdat ze 
vaak meer weerstand moeten bieden tegen negatieve reacties op hun bekering 
vanuit hun sociale omgeving, hun vaak verwoede pogingen om hun achterstand in 
kennis in te halen en hun zuiverheid in de leer doordat ze verschoond zijn 
gebleven van culturele lessen van moslimouders. 
 
 
4. Duiding: Islamitisch fundamentalistische bekeringsprocessen en de sociale 
context 
Bij de duiding is het eerste belangrijke punt – vooral in reactie op de ‘clash of 
civilizations’ gedachte (Huntington, 1996) – dat de fundamentalistische 
respondenten in een aantal opzichten laten zien dat ze heel modern zijn, en dus 
niet zo ‘anders’, doordat ze bepaalde moderne, Westerse houdingen hebben 
geïnternaliseerd. Zo getuigen ze van een nostalgische hang naar het verleden (de 
pure islam) en een vooruitgangsgeloof (in hun persoonlijke ontwikkeling en de 
uiteindelijke winst voor islam) wat Gray (2003) als kenmerken van de moderne 
(Westerse) wereld beschrijft (zie ook Young, 1999 en 2007). Daarnaast hebben ze 
een individualistische houding ten aanzien van hun relatie tot Allah en hun 
persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid om een goed moslim te worden. Ook geven ze 
er blijk van bepaalde Westerse waarden te hebben omarmd. Deze studie laat 
onder andere zien dat de fundamentalistische respondenten verontwaardigd zijn 
over de twee maten waarmee de Nederlandse overheid in hun ogen meet in het 
geval van bijvoorbeeld vrijheid van meningsuiting. Het is hun perceptie dat dit 
recht in veel mindere mate zou gelden voor moslims dan voor niet moslims. Juist 
deze verontwaardiging laat zien dat ze de waarde van vrijheid van meningsuiting 
onderschrijven. Aan de andere kant laat zelfs hun verzet tegen bepaalde aspecten 
van de moderne, Westerse samenleving hun moderne karakter zien omdat dit 
verzet een tegenreactie vormt en dus een product is van die samenleving.  
 In het vervolg van deze duiding verbind ik de bevindingen van deze 
studie met bestaande theorieën over strain, subculturen, en identiteit in de 
zogenaamde ‘laat moderne’ of ‘liquide’ samenleving. Het argument is daarbij dat 
de strain die de fundamentalistische respondenten ervaren in nauw verband staat 
met de moderne, Westerse maatschappij waarin ze leven. In lijn met Giddens’ 
(1991) theoretische beschouwingen over de huidige ‘laat moderne’ samenleving, 
lijken de respondenten net als andere burgers een succesvol ‘identiteitsproject’ te 
ondernemen dat zich kenmerkt door een continue en reflexief streven naar 
zelfverwezenlijking. Er zijn echter verschillende factoren op cultureel en 
structureel gebied die de realisatie van dit project belemmeren en zo bijdragen aan 
strain. Op cultureel vlak ligt er een tegenstrijdigheid besloten in het culturele doel 
van een succesvol identiteitsproject zelf. Het identiteitsproject veronderstelt 
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namelijk dat er pas echt succes is bij het eindpunt: de zelfverwezenlijking en een 
gevoel van een stabiel zelf. Dit doel is moeilijk te verwezenlijken als het 
identiteitsproject tegelijkertijd vereist dat men altijd moet blijven streven naar 
‘meer authenticiteit’ en er altijd meer succes is te behalen op verschillende vlakken 
in het leven. Daar komt bij dat het individualisme de nadruk legt op persoonlijke 
verantwoordelijkheid, ten gevolge waarvan het slagen of falen van mensen in hun 
identiteitsproject voor eigen conto komt.  
Op structureel vlak komt daar bij dat niet iedereen dezelfde kansen heeft 
in de maatschappij of over dezelfde capaciteiten beschikt. Niet iedereen kan 
daardoor hetzelfde niveau van ‘succes’ bereiken. Zeker als men zichzelf gaat 
vergelijken met anderen, kan dit een bevredigend gevoel van succes in de weg 
staan. Een ander structureel obstakel komt voort uit de ‘liquiditeit’ die Bauman 
(2000) aan de moderne samenleving toedicht. Deze liquiditeit is onder meer het 
gevolg van alle keuzemogelijkheden die mensen hebben, vooral op het vlak van 
werk en levensstijl. Dit impliceert een gebrek aan stabiliteit en een toename van 
ontologische onzekerheid, terwijl een succesvol identiteitsproject juist een 
stabiliteit en zekerheid vereist (Bauman, 2004; Giddens, 1991; Young, 2007). 
Deze structurele en culturele factoren in combinatie met de persoonlijke 
achtergrond ervaringen van de respondenten, kunnen de identity strain en 
daarmee de cognitieve opening voor islamitisch fundamentalisme van de 
respondenten verklaren. 
 Een fundamentalistisch identiteitsproject biedt een antwoord op juist die 
onzekerheden die de liquide samenleving kenmerken. Zo bieden 
fundamentalistische discoursen een beeld van ultieme zekerheid, omdat ze de vele 
keuzemogelijkheden ten aanzien van werk en levensstijl door strikte regels 
beperken, traditionele gender rollen herintroduceren en pluralisme met een 
beroep op één universele waarheid ontkennen. In reactie op afnemende sociale 
bindingen wijzen deze discoursen op de betekenis van broederschap en in respons 
op het streven naar wereldlijk succes, ontkennen ze de waarde daarvan. Hoewel 
daarmee het doel van een succesvol identiteitsproject op wereldlijk niveau komt te 
vervallen, blijven de respondenten streven naar een authentiek zelf, zij het in 
andere vorm. Hun streven is nu om hun ‘authentieke’ zelf als moslim te bereiken 
door een ‘steeds betere’ moslim te worden. 
 Een vraag die resteert, is hoe het te verklaren is dat de respondenten juist 
voor islamitisch fundamentalisme hebben gekozen en niet voor een andere 
ideologie of tegencultuur. Voor een deel hangt dit samen met de mensen die ze 
tegenkwamen. Aan de andere kant is echter gebleken dat een deel van de 
respondenten aanvankelijk zelf op zoek ging. Het is zeer goed mogelijk dat 
islamitisch fundamentalisme, sinds 9/11 en de daarop volgende polarisatie, van de 
verschillende dualistische opties de meest voor de hand liggende bron van 
religieuze identificatie en verzet is geworden voor de respondenten die identity 
strain ervoeren en op zoek gingen naar hun ‘authentieke’ zelf.  
 
Het is daarom van belang om te erkennen dat islamitisch fundamentalisme niet 
simpelweg een ‘geïmporteerd’ probleem is, maar dat het deels wortels heeft in de 
|  Purification and Resistance 
 
232 
Nederlandse maatschappij. De meest duidelijke wijze waarop die Nederlandse 
wortels tot uitdrukking komen, is via de bekeerlingen in deze studie. Er zijn 
moderne, westerse en lokale dimensies zichtbaar geworden in de houdingen, hun 
(pragmatische) gedragingen, hun fundamentalistische groep en hun 
identiteitsproject. Hieruit blijkt dat een islamitisch fundamentalistische identiteit 
gepaard kan gaan met modern en Westers zijn. De conclusie is al met al dat 
islamitisch fundamentalisme een glokaal fenomeen is (Robertson, 1995), met 
mondiale ideologische wortels en een sterke lokale kleur van de moderne, 
Nederlandse context. Daarmee zijn de fundamentalistische respondenten een stuk 
meer ‘eigen’ dan over het algemeen wordt aangenomen. 
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GLOSSARY OF CONCEPTS 
 
Authentic self: the assumption of a stable and ‘true’ self. 
Being adrift: the experience of ontological insecurity through a lack of direction in one’s 
life. 
Born-agains: the respondents from Muslim families who converted to Islamic 
fundamentalist views. 
Clash of civilizations thesis: Huntington’s (1996) thesis that since the end of the Cold 
War a new clash is taking place between principally two civilizations: that of the 
West and that of Islam. 
Conversion: the turn of the respondents from a certain meaning system to Islam, 
regardless of whether their previous meaning system was a-religious, religious, 
or concerned another Islamic current.  
Converts: the respondents from non-Muslim families who converted to Islamic 
fundamentalist views. 
‘Cultural’ Islam: the term used by the fundamentalist respondents to denote Islamic 
currents that have accepted cultural innovations and adaptations that ‘impurify’ 
the ‘pure’ Islam of Muhammad, his companions, and the first generations after 
them.  
Drift: the shift from socially conventional to socially unconventional attitudes and 
behaviour. In this case modern, Western or conventional Islamic beliefs and 
behaviour could be seen as conventional, whereas Islamic fundamentalism 
represents the unconventional. Drift in this sense implies that the respondents 
express at times more and at other times less commitment to their beliefs. Drift 
can also be expressed through a total change of heart and reorientation over 
time.  
Home-grown: a term commonly applied to radical and extremist Muslims who 
grew up in the Netherlands. 
Identity project: the reflexive, life-long project individuals in late modernity undertake to 
reach a state of self-actualization and to become their meaningful and 
‘authentic’ selves according to Giddens (1991).  
Identity strain: a sense of tension (strain) due to a felt discrepancy between what one sees 
as one’s actual (‘unauthentic’) self and one’s ideal image of an ‘authentic’ self. 
Islamic extremism: a fundamentalist discourse that is characterized by ultimate dualism, 
 an activist political stance and the general legitimization of violence against 
enemies of Islam as the necessary means to reach socio-political goals. 
Islamic fundamentalism: an orientation within Islam characterized by a scripturalist/ 
literalist interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah, nostalgia for a ‘pure’ 
Islamic past, a dualist view on the world, and millenarianist beliefs of the world 
coming to an end.  
Islamic moderateness: a label that is common to denote a more latitudinarian 
interpretation of Islam. Some basic characteristics of this interpretation are its 
view of sources of Islamic knowledge in its socio-historical context and, as a 
result, acceptance of certain reinterpretations and innovations to make Islam fit 
the modern context.  
Islamic orthodoxy: a fundamentalist discourse that is characterized by a lack of political 
activism. 
Islamic radicalism: a fundamentalist discourse that is characterized by an activist political 
stance, a stance that is seen as a personal responsibility, and a relative lack of 
support for violence as a means to reach these goals.   
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Glocalization: processes in which global phenomena – such as Islamic fundamentalism – 
merge with the local into glocal shapes (Robertson, 1995).  
Liquidity: the mobility and inconstancy that characterizes late modern societies as 
Bauman (2000) argues to be especially visible through the consequences of 
emancipation, individualism, and the changing character of work, time and 
space, and community.     
Othering: the creation of an out-group by distinguishing ‘them’ from ‘us’. 
Personal self: a person’s internalized self-image as originating from a process of social 
interaction.  
‘Pure’ Islam: the image that Muslims with a Salafi orientation have of Islam at the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s life and the Salafis, the pious predecessors. They 
believe that Islam was then still pure in the sense that it was still uncorrupted 
through innovations and cultural traditions that later generations of Muslims 
introduced. 
Radical conversion (or radicalization): the conversion process toward radical viewpoints. 
Relative deprivation: deprivation does not have to be of an absolute nature, but it is a 
result of expectations, aspirations and the comparison with others. Relative 
deprivation occurs particularly when people fail to be as successful as they 
expected or desired to be in comparison to others (Runciman, 1966; Webber, 
2007). 
Resistance: that part of the identification process in which individuals distance themselves 
from everyone and everything that they want to oppose to and not or no longer 
identify with. The term resistance refers to various types of differentiation, 
whether involving disagreement, distancing, criticism, opposition, or actual 
protest and rebellion. 
(Positive) self-identification: that part of the identification process in which individuals 
identify themselves with those role models, beliefs, and ideals that they want to 
identify with. 
Salafism: an Islamic fundamentalist current that wants to practise Islam the way that the 
Prophet, his companions, and the first three generations after them practised 
Islam. For that reason they ban cultural practices and other innovations and 
refrain from choosing between any of the four major Sunni schools of law 
(Hanbali, Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafii).  
Social self: a person’s image of how he or she is seen by others. 
Sufism: a ‘moderate’ Islamic current that is characterized by a focus on personally 
experiencing spirituality and – in the words of the fundamentalist respondents – 
a focus on ‘love’ instead of rules.  
Trust: in this study trust refers to the sense of the fundamentalist respondents that they 
can rely on Allah as the Higher Power and hence on their fate as individuals. 
They trust that anything that happens to them is eventually in their own 
interest.  
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS 
 
Abaya: a traditional gown from neck to ankles that covers female shapes   
Al djannah: paradise 
Alhamdullillah: Allah be praised  
Al-Wala wal-Bara: the doctrine of love and hate for the sake of Allah 
Ameen: Amen 
Aqeeda: the creed 
Bismillah: in the name of Allah 
Burqa: a cloth in one piece that covers a woman’s face and body from head to toes 
Dar-al-Harb: the non-Islamic territory that Muslim rulers have no treaties with and that 
is therefore considered the territory of war 
Dar-al-Islam: the territory of Islam, that is under the rule of Islamic law 
Da’wa: doing da’wa means inviting others to Islam 
Djanat al Firdaus: the highest level in Paradise 
Du’a: an act of supplication 
Duff: a traditional Islamic drum that fundamentalists consider allowed for making music 
Fitna: the divides between Muslims and the consequential lack of unity in their religious 
attitudes  
Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence 
Hadith: the words and deeds of the Prophets and the pious predecessors that 
form the Sunnah  
Halal: in accordance with Islamic rules 
Halaqa: study circle 
Haram: opposed to Islamic rules 
Hasanat: rewards for good deeds 
Hijab: a headscarf 
Hijra: emigration to an Islamic country 
Imaan: belief 
Insha’Allah: if Allah wants it 
Irhab: terrorism 
Jihad: striving in the way of Allah. Jihad can refer to both the internal struggle (jihad  
al-nafs) and the violent struggle against enemies of Islam (jihad bil saif).  
Jihadis: is used in this study to refer to those Muslims that are activist supporters of a 
violent struggle against what they see as the enemies of Islam 
Kafir: a non-Muslim and thus ‘un-believer’ 
Khimar: a long headscarf that leaves the face uncovered and can have a length varying 
from the head till just below the breasts or to below the knees. 
Kuf(a)r: unbelief/unbelieving 
Manhadj: the religious methodology that a Muslim follows 
Masha’Allah: whatever Allah wills 
Mujahideen: a warrior on the path of Allah 
Muwahideen: a monotheist 
Niqab: a veil that covers the face. When Muslim women wear the niqab they do this often 
in combination with the khimar, a combination that outsiders usually refer to as 
a burqa. 
Salaam ‘aleikum: the Islamic greeting that means ‘may peace be upon you’ 
(al-)Salaf al-salih: the pious predecessors, that is the Prophet Muhammad and  his 
companions and the first three generations of Muslims after them. 
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Shahada: declaration of belief in Allah as the only God and the Prophet Muhammad as 
his last messenger 
Shirk: the major sin in Islam as it involves associating partners to Allah, thereby denying 
tahwid, the oneness of Allah, that forms the basis of the Islamic monotheist 
claim 
Sjaitaan: the devil 
Sunnah: Islamic courses of conduct as established through the hadith 
Tahwid: the belief in oneness of Allah which refers to monotheism in Islam 
Takfir: doing takfir implies excommunicating somebody as a Muslim by calling him a 
kafir 
Tawba: remorse 
Ummah: the global Muslim community 
Wudu: the ritual washing that is required before prayer 
Zakaat: compulsory almsgiving, one of the five pillars of Islam 
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